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ABSTRACT 
The following study outlines the different aesthetic theories developed 
by Theodor. W. Adorno, Leo Löwenthal and Herbert Marcuse between 1931 
and 1978, describing the work they undertook while members of the Frank- 
furt School (1931-1942) and relating this to their later writings. A 
brief explanation is also given of why - in the author's opinion - Walter 
Benjamin's work should not be included amongst that of the Frankfurt School. 
The thesis adopts a chronological approach based on immanent, textual 
analysis of primary source material including unpublished correspondence. 
The main point of comparison from which the different aesthetics are eva- 
luated is the degree to which they accept the main social theory developed 
in the School by Max Horkheimer. It is argued that Horkheimer's work was 
in turn based on Friedrich Pollock's theory of state capitalism. One of 
the main arguments advanced here is that all the aesthetics constructed 
before and after 1942 were indeed influenced to a greater or lesser extent 
by Pollock's theory, an argument which challenges the dominant interpret- 
ations of Frankfurt School aesthetic theories which regard them as not 
being grounded in a theory of the base. The thesis shows that adopting 
Pollock's social theory created problems for the aesthetic theories and 
led to the emergence of two different aesthetics: Adorno's aesthetics of 
mimetic experience and Marcuse's political aesthetics. Löwenthal's essays 
are judged to form a literary sociology and not an aesthetics as such.. 
The dissertation concludes with the attempt to recuperate Adorno's con- 
cept of mimesis as the basis for a Marxist aesthetics. 
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CHAPTER1: INTRODUCTION 
The following study will attempt to provide a systematic account 
of the aesthetic theories of the Frankfurt School. This task is 
not as straightforward as it might seem for, as has often been the 
case with discussions of 'schools of thought', there are considerable 
differences of opinion as to what or who exactly constitutes the 
'Frankfurt School', and when it was constituted. I say 'what' because 
there has been a tendency to describe the 'School' in terms of its 
physical existence in one place or another. Jürgen Habermas has 
recently stated that there was no Frankfurt School until its location 
as the Institute of Social Research at 429 West 117th Street in 
New York in the second half of the 1930s, 
1 
in which case it might be 
more accurate to speak of a New York School. This would be inappropriate 
as most of the inhabitants of the above address had worked at the 
Institut fürialforschung in Frankfurt from 1930 onwards, although 
since most of them were of Jewish descent they had emigrated from 
Germany in 1933. Nevertheless, most of them had published fairly 
regularly in the Institut's journal, the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 
from the 1932 first issue on until its last issue as the Studies 
in Philosophy and Social Science. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the label 'Frankfurt School' is used to signify the School in terms 
of the body of formal members of the Institut in Frankfurt and the 
Institute in New York. I shall therefore refer to these two institutions 
collectively as the Institut(e). 
The following individual members of the Institut(e) and their respective 
contributions to School aesthetic theory provide the central focus 
of this study: Max Horkheimer, Director from 1929-30 onwards, philosopher; 
Leo Löwenthal, editor of the Zeitschrift/Studies''review section, 
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a theorist on the sociology of literature and a member from the 
same time as Horkheimer; Herbert Marcuse, a philosopher who worked 
for the Institut(e) from 1931-32 onwards; Friedrich Pollock, Vice- 
Director and one of the Institut(e)'s economists from the time of 
Horkheimer's arrival; and last Theodor W. Adorno, philosopher and 
musicologist, who did not formally become a member until 1938, contributed 
a weighty essay to the inaugural issue of the Zeitschrift. 
Recent studies often mention Jürgen Habennas in the same breath as 
Horkheimer et al. Nevertheless, because he belongs to a later generation 
of 'critical theorists', his work falls outside the parameters of 
this study. He first started having work published after the disbandment 
of the New York Institute and the second 'diaspora' of its members. 
Furthermore, any close examination of his thought would provide ample 
evidence of a different starting point in his work to that taken 
by the other theorists in the 1930s. 
The above list omits any mention of Franz Borkenau, Erich Fromm, Henryk 
Grossmann and Karl Wittfogel, who were all present in Frankfurt 
and New York and thus fall within the bounds of our definition. Their 
exclusion is not arbitrary, however, for despite having written import- 
ant essays in their respective fields for the Zeitschrift, they played 
little part in the devising of the aesthetic theories. Admittedly, 
to exclude Fromm from this discussion ignores his considerable influence 
on the foundation of early Institut(e) 'critical theory', the trade 
name under which Institut(e) work goes after 1937. However, his work 
is both well documented elsewhere2 and not of crucial importance to the 
School's aesthetic positiions and need not, therefore, concern us 
here. 
Adopting this restricted definition of the Frankfurt School, however, 
immediately presents us with three main difficulties. Firstly, work 
undertaken prior to the inception of the Zeitschrift goes unmentioned 
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and is judged to have little or no influence on the individual writers, 
which is clearly a dangerous assumption. Secondly, there is the 
danger of smoothing over differences between the respective theorists 
in order to accommodate them under the umbrella of the School, a prob- 
lem particularly acute in the case of Adorno's work. Thirdly, it 
follows from our definition that one of the major thinkers of this 
century, Walter Benjamin, could be included in the ranks of the 
School. He will not be. Older than the other writers, he was never 
formally a member of the School, although he received an Institut(e) 
stipend; and research has shown that he had already established his 
own intellectual method prior to writing for the Zeitschrift. It 
would therefore be unjust to reduce his work either to the status of 
his four main essays in the Zeitschrift, or to accredit him with 
the desire to influence the thought and development of the School. 
Generally speaking, the Frankfurt School's main contribution 
to European thought is judged to have been their expounding and 
elaboration of 'critical theory' and not their work on aesthetics. 
Criticaltheory is held to be a methodology constructed as a heuristic 
addition to either a Marxist sociology or philosophy, or to socio-cultural 
criticism, an addition that was intended to bring these disciplines 
up to date in tie 1930s. It is in terms of these disciplines that 
the School's work has usually been discussed, although attention has 
also been paid to the underlying philosophy or theory that informs 
the sociological and cultural propositions. Such discussions have 
in the main treated the various theorists either individually3 or else 
have subordinated their work to the thought of the School. 
4 
On the 
one hand, studies of the thought of an individual theorist have tended 
to divorce his theories from those of the remaining members of the 
School and underplay or even disregard any instructive role the School 
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may have had. 
5 This approach leaves the researcher confronted with 
various discrete monographs on theorists who all worked for a number 
of years in the same offices on the same projects. On the other 
hand, studies that investigate the School's work usually ignore - in 
their emphasis on the distinct branches of School theory - the dialect- 
ical interplay between an individual theorists's position and the 
overall guidelines laid down in the joint work of the School. 
6 Although 
the individual work of each member warrants the first approach, 
and the importance of the material merits the second, both procedures 
are beset by methodological problems. They tend to isolate the theorist 
or the particular field under discussion in a manner which runs contrary 
to the nature of critical theory. The conception of society developed 
by the School is either lost completely or reduced from an integrated 
and systematic analysis of society to a series of individual thoughts. 
Although the previous intellectual influences on each member are 
indeed important to an understanding of their respective work, be it 
Adorno's intellectual attraction to Benjamin or Weber's theoretical 
influence on Horkheimer, the study of this background also cannot be 
made the sole purpose of an investigation of the School's work. Such 
a mode of inquiry is limited to the extent that it can neither concept- 
ualise the influence of the School on the writings of its members, nor 
conceive of the manner in which each member's work interacted with 
this overall body, be it in rejection or acceptance of the wider 
framework. 
The limitation of the approaches outlined has much to do with the inter- 
disciplinary nature of Institut(e) work testified to in Horkheimer's 
inaugural address at the Institut(e).? As Helmut-Dubiel has demonstrated, 
8 
the School practised critical theory by delegating to each member research 
in his specific field. The research work then undertaken, for example that 
on aesthetics, was continually mediated with the more wide-ranging theories 
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of society that the School produced. Only in such a manner, Hork- 
heimer in particular believed, could a research institute claim 
validity for its results. Accordingly, all-the members of the Institut(e) 
met in regular plenary sessions to discuss not only each other's work 
but also the overall theory of society that they sought collectively 
to establish. Horkheimer himself was responsible, as is evidenced by 
his essay 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie', 
9 for laying down 
publicly the School's basic position; in this respect he was as much 
a linchpin for its research work as he was an administrator and coordin- 
ator. This 'delegation of duties' within the Institut(e) can be most 
clearly seen in the 1941 Studies edition,, in which the four issues 
that comprise it each centre on a separate specific topic which, in turn, 
refers back to the other three areas of discussion. The compendious 
Autorität und Familie'0 also bears witness to this process, Horkheimer 
and Marcuse providing socio-philosophical articles for it and Fromm. 
elucidating the psychoanalytical basis for the study. 
The following inquiry will thus differ from previous studies of 
the Frankfurt School both in the material it addresses and in the 
method it adopts. Firstly, it discusses the different aesthetic positions 
developed by the various members of the School. Secondly, in order 
to do so it utilizes a methodology that emphasizes precisely the 
interplay of the various theorists' respective work while still 
setting the individual aesthetic positions off from one another. A 
chronological account of School work will be given because such an approach 
is best suited to highlight the similarities as well as the differences 
between the individual aesthetics. In this manner the aesthetic pos--- 
itions will be elaborated but in such a way as to reveal both the influence 
general School theory had on them and also how they formed part of that 
wider analytical framework. It is hoped that this dual emphasis will 
do justice not only to the claims of individual members to have constructed 
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aesthetic theories but also to a portrayal of how these theories 
interlocked in their analysis of certain commonly perceived problem 
areas. 
This approach involves correlating the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Löwenthal and Marcuse before and after 1950 (the date usually taken 
by researchers as marking the time after which no comparison between 
the theorists' respective writings can be made). The methodology best 
suited to this task is textual analysis since it allows for both an 
outline of each individual aesthetics as well as for cross-referencing 
of these aesthetic positions, because only in this way can it be 
established whether common denominators exist between the divergent 
theories. This study, therefore, consists mainly of an immanent analysis 
of the writings of Adorno, Horkheimer, Löwenthal and Marcuse which is 
both comparative and contextual in the sense that each piece of work 
by one of these authors is placed in the context of the writings of 
the others. This immanent analysis of each individual aesthetics will 
pay great attention to the logical consistency in the construction of 
each argument. Criticism of the aesthetics themselves will at first 
centre on pinpointing illogicalities, inherent problems or implicit logical 
barriers, rather than bringing external standards to bear on the theories. 
In other words, each aesthetic position will be tested to see whether 
it fulfils what it set out to achieve, and to ascertain whether it 
accomplishes this without altering the basis of its structure or starting 
point. The methodology of this thesis thus rests on the assumption that 
a logically consistent argument warrants greater attention than a flawed 
system of thought and that only the former can merit further critical-- 
investigation as to whether the observations that can be made by applying 
such a theory to empirical material are accurate, i. e. 'correct', or not. 
The other main presupposition of this study is that a theory consists 
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of two distinct levels of reflection. On the one hand, a theorist tries 
to construct an internally structured, logical body of thought and, on 
the other, he or she intends that structure to grasp adequately an object 
in all its specific forms and permutations. Thus, once the logical under- 
pinnings of the aesthetic theories of the Frankfurt School have been 
outlined and tested for consistency, the respective aesthetics will be 
criticized wherever they fall short of their common aim; that is. to say, 
they will be assessed as to whether they do provide an example of or an 
epistemology for an historical materialist theory of art. That this is 
indeed their aim will be elaborated in the course of the reconstruction 
of, their discussions on aesthetics. Although methodologically separate, 
these two angles of critictn do, on occasion, coincide owing to the nature 
of the material, for aesthetic theories operate at a high level of abstract- 
ion, and thus illogicality can entail a loss of descriptive power. 
This second line of criticism focusses primarily on the relation between 
Frankfurt School aesthetic theories and the conceptual preconditions nece- 
ssary for an historical materialist understanding of art. The theorists' 
respective views of the relationship between art and society will be exam- 
ined critically in this context, for a Marxist aesthetics is founded 
epistemologically in a particular conception of this relation. This critical 
investigation is of especial importance, for, as we shall see, it has 
often been claimed that members of the School possessed no Marxist view 
of society at all and thus, by extension, that they could not have produced 
Marxist theories of aesthetics. The assessment of Adorno, Löwenthal and 
Marcuse's respective contributions to a Marxist aesthetics will, therefore, 
be connected to the immanent analysis of their positions, in that the 
absence or presence of an historical materialist view of society can only 
be determined by examining the internal suppositions of their theories. 
Additionally, this external form of criticism allows a differentiation to 
be made between, on the one hand, individual flaws, and, on the other, 
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mistakes common to all the School's aesthetic theories. Common errors 
can then be scrutinised in order to ascertain whether these can be traced 
to Institut(e) work, i. e. whether or not they occur as the consequence of 
a commonly held, but incorrect assumption. 
In order to introduce the subject of Frankfurt School theory, a synopsis 
of the main strands of its reception will be given. This will serve to pin- 
point the main problems areas thus: far detected in Frankfurt School work, 
and in particular the claim that the Frankfurt School did not have a Marxist 
conception of society. An attempt will then be made to evaluate this criti- 
cism in the course of outlining the various aesthetic positions the School's 
members developed. The first half of the outline (Section I) concentrates 
on the genesis of Adorno, Löwenthal and Marcuse's theories of art, whereas 
the second half of this comparative, immanent analysis (Section II) discusses 
the positions. they later adopted or rather the aesthetics which evolved 
out of each original set of ideas. 
Adorno, Löwenthal and Marcuse's writings are thus treated chronologcally 
in the sense that their work is divided into two periods: one prior to, 
the other consequent on the disbanding of the New York Institut(. These 
two periods are paralleled by the two main Sections of this study, a struct- 
ure which in turn reflects an hypothesis on the periodisation of Frankfurt 
School work; namely,, that from 1932 - 1942 aesthetic theories existed along- 
side a critique of political economy whereas from 1942 - 1978 the aesthetic 
theories to a great extent replaced, or attempted to replace, the critique 
of political economy epistemologically. 
11 
Reception of the Frankfurt School 
The absence of a systematic outline of School aesthetic theories seems at 
first glance somewhat puzzling and yet closer analysis reveals numerous 
factors that go some way towards explaining this gap in the reception of 
the Frankfurt School. However, before discussing what these reasons might 
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be, it must be pointed out that any synopsis of the reception of the 
School's work must differentiate according to geographical interests. An 
awareness of regional considerations is necessary in order to take account 
of the different academic and intellectual traditions that form the back- 
ground to the reception, e. g. factors such as the foreignness of Hegelian 
language to ears drilled in Anglo-Saxon philosophy, or the comparative 
lack of translations of the School's work. 
12 This dearth until very recently 
of translations moots causes other than just a linguistic tradition however. 
For example, the fact that in the Anglo-Saxon world sociology is rarely 
extended to include aesthetic theory means that Frankfurt School aesthetics 
is from the outset foreign to a reader trained in England or the U. S. A. The 
regional approach must consequently be complemented by an outline of the 
possible historical and political reasons for changes in the reception of 
the School. In order to explain this lack of work on the School's aesthetic 
theories a brief portrayal of the School's reception in Germany, the U. S. A., 
and England is attempted. This sketch will both contextualise and histori-' 
cise the various understandings of critical theory and of School aesthetics 
as well as delineating the main problem areas discussed by the secondary 
literature. 
During the 1950s and early 1960s -. the Cold War era of Adenauer's chancel- 
lorship - the Frankfurt School's influence in West Germany was twofold: 
first of all, Adorno and Horkheimer's reopening of the Institut für Sozial- 
forschung in Frankfurt furthered a concern with Marxism and with the 
empirical methods used by American sociologists; and secondly, through 
the figure of Adorno a great influence was exercised over musical and 
literary criticism. Outside academic or artistic circles, however, a wider 
knowledge of School work was first gained after the School had been 
'rediscovered', in the late 1960s by the anti-authoritarian student move- 
ment. This coincided with an awakening of interest in Marcuse's work, 
initiated by the publication in 1964 of One Dimensional Man. In a sense 
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Marcuse promoted this revival of interest in School work by delivering 
a series of lectures at the Free University in Berlin which touched on 
topics close to the heart of the student movement. As a consequence of 
this theoretical affinity, the sprightly 70-year old became the movement's 
spiritus rector. 
However, the German anti-authoritarian movement was quick to turn on its 
intellectual predecessors and rejected their work for a variety of reasons. 
First and foremost, the School was charged with being pessimistic in the 
sense that it did not foresee a rapid revolutionary change occurring in 
West Germany in particular or in capitalist society as a whole. Furthermore, 
the School was accused of being elitist, for it was deemed to have under- 
estimated the working class's power and to have abandoned the linkage of 
theory to praxis. Both these charges were based on the supposition that 
the School eschewed any analysis of the economic base of society. Since, 
it was argued, the School had addressed itself only to superstructural 
questions, especially aesthetic ones, they could no longer be considered 
Marxists. The economistic interpretation of Marx's writings that followed 
the resurgence of interest in Marx is quite telling here. Although this 
accusation is undoubtedly true in the case of Horkheimer's later beliefs, 
its accuracy as a description of the writings of the School as a whole is 
highly questionable. One of the main purposes of the following pages will 
be to demonstrate the simplistic nature of such accusations. 
Versions of the above objections raised against the School's work can be 
found in various periodicals at this time, such as Kursbuch, Das Argument, 
Alternative or even Merkur. This general hostility led to Adorno's aesthetics 
being rejected out of hand as 'elitist' or 'metaphysical' without due 
attention being paid to its methodology or intentions. The reasoning behind 
this accusation is of particular interest in this context. Because Adorno, 
who had initially been viewed as a paragon of Marxist literary criticism, 
later refused to man the students' barricades or take up their banner, his 
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student föllowing increasingly rejected his work, no doubt to his great 
sorrow and disappointment. Adorno's lack of personal engagement - falsely 
understood to be a reflection of his political sympathies - was used as 
an excuse for iconoclastic attacks on him. A similar fate did not befall 
Marcuse, perhaps on account of his being more openly involved in the student 
movement. However, Marcuse's writings were nevertheless rejected by 
the students for the reasons given above and with the same speed with 
which they had previously been acclaimed. 
The question of whether the School was Marxist or not continued to domi- 
nate debates in Germany and was taken up in a seemingly separate discussion 
concerning the writings left in Benjamin's estate. Alternative, a young 
Berlin journal on aesthetic matters and German studies, launched an att- 
ack on both Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann in the late 1960s by suggesing that 
the latter two men's edition of Benjamin's letters and works was insidiously 
partisan in that the editors were judged to have deliberately omitted 
Benjamin's more explicitly Marxist works. 
13 This charge was extended to 
include another claim, one perhaps more vicious than the first, namely 
that while the Institut(e) was in New York it forced Benjamin, working 
alone in Paris in the late 1930s, to alter his essays substantially before 
they could be accepted for publication in the Zeitschrift/Studies. It was 
inferred that Benjamin's Institut(e) stipend thus became dependent on his 
watering down the Marxism of his essays 'Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit' and 'Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire'. 
In particular, it was Adorno, the chief Institut(e) correspondent with 
Benjamin, who was held responsible for this supposed intellectual black- 
mailing. Subsequent research has shed much light on this whole argument. 
It was Pollock, on Horkheimer's instructions, who allocated the stipends, 
so that Adorno can at most be charged with having tried to bully Benjamin. 
14 
Nevertheless, at the time the effect of this accusation in Alternative was 
considerable as far as the acceptance of Adorno's work was concerned. Adorno, 
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hitherto regarded as a Marxist aesthetician, was now considered reactionary 
and idealist. The revived interest in the 'Expressionism Debate', with 
which this acrimonious discussion more or less coincided, tilted decidedly 
in Brecht and Benjamin's favour. Adorno's academicism or intellectualism 
was no longer de rigeur and was replaced by the activism acclaimed in 
Brecht's work on realism. 
In the wake of the student movement the emphasis in the reception of the 
School in the 1970s was altered. Principally, it moved in two directions: 
one was concerned with the logic of the aesthetics, the other with theories 
of mass culture. Ever since Hans Magnus Enzensberger's essay on the 
'consciousness industry'15 there had been some critical involvement with 
Adorno and Horkheimer's theory of the production and dissemination of mass 
culture, i. e. their analyses of the different forms of popular culture. 
Two notable examples of this critical use of Adorno and Horkheimer's work 
would be Oskar Negtand Alexander Kluge's Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung and 
Dieter Prokop's Faszination und Langeweile. 
16 These studies sought to pro- 
vide an objective theory of mass culture founded on the empirical analysis 
that was judged to be absent from the School's work. The concern with the 
methodology developed by the Frankfurt School has been kept alive in part- 
icular by Jürgen Habermas' researches into 'critical theory'. His work 
has led to an attempt to redress the damage done to the reception of crit- 
ical theory in the late 1960s-with a view to assessing more impartially 
to what extent critical theory provides the basis for a theory critical of 
contemporary society or for an interdisciplinary, critical sociology. 
17 
Jürgen Habermas, too, maintains that the School's work is inadequate for 
such a task because it is not based, or so he claims, on an interactive 
model of truth. Nevertheless, he still uses many of the School's central 
concepts alongside more hermeneutically based ones in his construction 
of a model of 'communicative action'. This attempt to treat the School in 
an 'academic' or even 'neutral' manner is also evident in the writings of 
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Wolfgang Bonß, Helmut Dubiel, Alex Honneth and Alfons Söllner. 
18 
The most recent work being undertaken that uses Frankfurt School theory 
tends to be found in social science faculties, where the importance of 
Marcuse's early work for a phenomenologically grounded Marxism is being 
studied as part of a search for an epistemological foundation for the 
social sciences. This interest centres on work written prior to Marcuse's 
membership of the Institut(e) and is therefore excluded from this study, 
although some of the later essays, such as those addressed to audiences 
in Korcula and Prague, echo these early themes and will be considered below 
with regard to their place in Marcuse's thought. The influence these early 
essays might have had is restricted at present by the authority exercised 
by the form of phenomological Marxism espoused by Agnes Heller and György 
Markus. 
The work of a member of the School who up till now has been generally 
ignored in Germany, namely Leo Löwenthal , is slowly coming into vogue. 
His 
efforts to establish a literary sociology are being re-examined in intell- 
ectual circles disappointed by Marxist approaches to the subject hitherto. 
Nevertheless, not until 1982 did Löwenthal's extensive work in this area 
(i. e. his erection of a framework for a sociology of literature) start to 
merit more than an occasional footnote in books on the subject. 
Quite a broad spectrum of interest in the Frankfurt School was to be found 
in the United States from the early 1960s onward following the publication 
in 1949 of the Studies in Prejudice. Horkheimer's major work on the Eclipse 
of Reason had appeared in the English original two years prior to that, but 
it did not attract the critical acclaim that awaited the Studies in Pre- 
udice. This concern with the School's psychological work was not extended, 
however, to its other writings, except in the case of Marcuse, whose 
Reason and Revolution was widely discussed. Partly because he resided in 
the U. S. A. and partly because he published in English, Marcuse's works came 
to be regarded as critical theory per se. Eros and Civilization, Soviet 
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Marxism and One Dimensional Man were debated seriously in forums ranging 
from the Jewish journal Commentary to the communist periodical Partisan 
Review. Eros and Civilization in particular was a subject of discussion, 
prompted possibly both by Marcuse's debate with Norman 0. Brown as 
well as the broadsides exchanged between Marcuse and the 'revisionist' 
Freudians. 
In the late 1960s the 'New Left', composed mainly of ex-members of 
the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), set about about , rediscovering 
critical theory from a broader vantage point than that previously taken 
in America. This is evidenced, above all, by the amount of translation 
work undertaken between 1967 and 1973. The ensuing. accessability of the 
texts to non-German speakers led to a great deal of discussion of 
critical theory and widespread interest in establishing whether there 
were still parts of the theory relevant to contemporary Marxism. The 
leading articles in this context were published in Telos, 
19 New German 
Critique, Social Research and, at a slightly later date, in Theory 
and Society, although many other less seminal journals carried articles 
on the subject at that time. Russell Jacoby's article 'Towards a Critique 
of Automatic Marxism '20, can be taken as representative of discussions 
prevalent then. 
Critical theory was utilized as a weapon against vulgar Marxism but 
it was also applied as a tool in debates on the social implications of 
technology's use and on the connection between the technocratic society 
and a loss of subjectivity. 
21 Both debates drew their inspiration from 
Marcuse's writings, although Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialektik der 
Aufklärung was also a standard reference work in this context. The end-- 
of these discussions coincided more or less with the publication of the 
translation of Marx's Grundrisse, which served to reopen the argument as 
to whether technology could indeed function to satisfy truly 'human' 
needs or whether it was condemned forever to being the lackey of the 
profit-motive. 
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This renewed interest in the Frankfurt School culminated in 1973 with 
the publication of Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination, a thorough, 
empirical and historical portrait of Frankfurt School work up until 1950.22 
This book, almost single-handedly, put critical theory firmly on the map 
of 'European thought and ideas', as well as providing a vast wealth of 
material culled from numerous unpublished sources. For this achievement 
alone the book is to be lauded. However, as Russell Jacoby was quick to 
point out, 
23 
the methodology Jay had used precluded any fecund interpret- 
ation or application of the School's diverse work. In many ways Jay had 
inadvertently ensconced debate on the Frankfurt School in a purely academic 
arena. 
The Dialectical Imagination was followed by a spate of articles on the 
Frankfurt School by various authors, discussing its Marxism or its 
'dialectical humanism'. Typical of this line of inquiry was Zoltan Tar's 
brief monograph of 1977.24 Most of the work undertaken in the U. S. A. on 
the School does not, however, address aesthetic questions and certainly 
nothing like to the extent to which they were posed in Germany, although 
debates in Germany were known to American readers from the pages of Telos 
and New German Critique. Susan Buck-Morss' book on the relationship between 
Benjamin and Adorno touches on the subject, as do Barry Katz' and Morton 
Schoolman's books on Marcuse, while Harold Bleich's monograph devotes all 
of three pages to this major aspect of Marcuse's work. 
25 
Adorno's influence in the United States never matched that which he exerted 
in Germany (perhaps owing to the absence of translations) and little 
critical attention was paid to him. By the time his main work on aesthetics, 
the Ästhetische Theorie, had been translated into English in 1982, Post- 
structuralism and Deconstructionism had jointly cornered the discipline 
in the U. S. A. Frederic Jameson, Diane Waldeman and Richard Wolin never- 
theless published articles on his work, as had Russell Berman at a slightly 
26 
earlier date. Whereas Jameson compares Adorno's work to other Marxist 
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aesthetic theories, Waldeman tries to assess the value of Adorno's 
jottings on film. Wolin's article is less a critical discussion of 
Adorno's work than a praiseworthy attempt to define for an Anglo-Saxon 
audience the essential concepts in Adorno's aesthetics. Unfortunately, 
Wolin's essay suffers from a common complaint of recent American work 
in the field for it relies over. much on an esoteric jargon in its exe-- 
geses of School work. While Adorno once argued that critical writing 
had necessarily to be complex if it were to prevent its ideas from being 
infected by reality's monochromatic character, the same excuse can hardly 
apply to expositions of Adorno's work if these are intended to clarify 
precisely the original complexities. 
The Frankfurt School has more or less been ignored in England for not 
until the late 1970s was there any real reception either of critical 
theory in general or of Frankfurt School aesthetic theories in particular. 
Various reasons can be put forward to explain this curious lacuna. Firstly, 
translations of the School's writings appeared later here than they did 
in the U. S. A., indeed some of the translated texts have not beeipublished 
in England at all. In the early 1970s the New Left Review altered this 
balance slightly by publishing a few hitherto untranslated articles by 
School members, some of which treated aesthetics. Over the years, however, 
the New Left Review was to devote no more than ten pages to discussions 
of Adorno. Marcuse's works were more widely available than the writings 
of the others, although even here a time-lag is noticeable in relation 
to the appearance of his works in the United States. 
Perhaps this lack of reception is itself a comment on the way debates on 
Marxism developed in pos-\ r Britain. From the late 1950s onwards. leftist 
English theorists were more concerned with rescuing a forgotten indigenous 
working-class tradition and providing a left-wing interpretation of Eng- 
lish culture than with importing new theories from abroad. Above all, 
Edward P. Thompson and Raymond Williams distinguished themselves in this 
area. Such empirically oriented cultural historiography was hardly com- 
patible with the highly theoretical nature of, for example, Adorno's 
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writings. 
This particularly English approach evolved, on the one hand, into an att- 
ack within English Studies on the ditist, high culture academicism of 
contemporary literary criticism. Such an assault on the dominant mode of 
text interpretation sought not to claim those texts for the leftist camp 
but to refute the interpretation's claim to neutrality. The literary criti- 
cism practised by Terry Eagleton, for example, endeavours to identify the 
bourgeois character both of the interpretations and the authors in quest- 
ion. On the other hand, such groups as the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies tried to provide a non-empirical theory of mass culture starting 
from a critique of the work by Thompson and Williams. In such a situation 
there could be little place for the prescriptive aesthetics offered by 
Adorno and Marcuse, although an ideology critique, in the form in which 
it was practised in early Frankfurt School work, namely as an attempt to 
locate anti-ideological elements within bourgeois culture, could most 
certainly have aided these projects. Nor, it must be added, was the 
reception and acceptance of the Frankfurt School furthered by the reticence 
of German Studies in British universities to engage in the debates outlined 
above. 
27 
The strong sway the various schools of thought round Raymond Williams and 
Edward Thompson, Terry Eagleton, the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies or even the New Left Review held over the type of theory to be 
adopted and practised, all but barred the entry of Frankfurt School work 
into English theoretical discussions. Furthermore, in order to counter what 
they saw as excessive empiricism in the former two theorists' work, the 
younger generation of English thinkers turned to French Structuralism as`- 
expounded by Louis Althusser in their efforts to underpin their work with 
a solid theoretical foundation. Althusser's dissociation of the different 
structures forming society meant that the Frankfurt School's depiction of 
the superstructure was anathema to the groups that followed him. 
28 In 
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other words, whereas in Germany the younger generation of thinkers rejected 
the Frankfurt School as 'unscientific' for supposedly not possessing an 
adequate theory of the base, in England the School was labelled 'unscien- 
tific' for precisely the opposite reason, namely for having used the 
base-superstructure model in the first place. Althusser's reading of Marx 
was heavily slanted against an 'Hegelian' Marxism that saw the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts as important and, since the Frankfurt School were 
adjudged quite accurately to be 'Hegelian' in their thought on Marx, they 




One example of the recent dominance of French thought in England can be 
seen in the fact that even in its work on fascism the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies concentrated on Nicolas Poulantzas' theory and largely 
ignored the pioneering research the Frankfurt School had undertaken in this 
field. However, perhaps the best illustration of the comet-like ascendancy 
of Structuralist thought and the opposition to the Frankfurt School that 
accompanied it is to be found in the New Left Review's presentation of 
the 'Expressionism Debate'. This debate, so vital to German thinking on 
aesthetics, was never discussed thoroughly in. the journal. Instead, the 
editors chose to print translations of letters exchanged between Benjamin 
and Adorno, the implication of this correspondence being the by now fam- 
iliar claim that Adorno had watered down Benjamin's Marxism. At the same 
time, Perry Anderson, New Left Review's editor, and Göran Therborn30 both 
attacked the Frankfurt School for being 'unscientific'. It was not until 
the publication in 1977 by New Left Books of Aesthetics and Politics, 
31 
a 
motley collection of essays culled from the 'Expressionism Debate', that 
more material was made available for discussion and some of Adorno's 
criticisms of Benjamin were belatedly acknowledged to be valid. However, 
the New Left Review had by then settled discussions in favour of Brechtian 
or Benjaminian aesthetics, so that the Fkankfurt School never received a 
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real hearing. 
A welcome exception to this form of rejection is to be found in Phil 
Slater's The Origins and Significance of the Frankfurt School. However, 
in his strict and somewhat partisan adherence to Brechtian aesthetics and 
his reiteration of criticisms of the School common in Germany at the 
time, he ends up damning the School for its bisection of the 'theory-praxis 
nexus'. Also the book unfortunately concentrates on defining what the 
Frankfurt School were not rather than on identifying what they were, and 
so left the task of providing a systematic English introduction to critical 
theory still unfulfilled. In recent years a number of books have been 
published in England that go some way towards filling this vacuum. Gillian 
Rose, David Held and Michael Billig 
32 
show in their respective work a 
common interest in engaging in a critical dialogue with the School's 
writings. Most recently, Julian Roberts has returned to the problematic 
question of the relationship between Adorno and Benjamin. 
33 Nevertheless, 
the impact of these various studies, especially in the field of aesthetics, 
has as yet not caused a reevaluation of the Frankfurt School to be made. 
34 
With respect to literary and aesthetic theory then the case for or against 
the Frankfurt School still remains to be debated in England. 
In summary, it must be said that most profiles of critical theory have been 
over-influenced by the particular political discussions current in various 
countries at the time of interpretation, with the result that such outlines 
have rarely been able to compare Frankfurt School thought with the School's 
own philosophical and methodological intentions. In trying to apply School 
work to a contemporary setting, an eye for the historical nature and evo- 
lution of critical theory has often been lost. Thus, rejection or accept- 
ance of the Frankfurt School's conclusions has often depended on the 
subjective preferences of the interpreters, i. e. on whether they approached 
the material in question already convinced that the School was Marxist, 
idealist or even metaphysical, instead of founding their evaluation on 
more objective criteria. 
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With regard to the School's aesthetic propositions, such slanted 
approaches offer little room for a discussion of views of art or of 
the artwork. Rather, they reduce aesthetics to a reflection of a pre-affirmed 
or pre-condemned social theory, in that any evaluation of the aesthetics 
is made entirely dependent on whether the Frankfurt School's social theory 
is judged to have been Marxist or not. In order to avoid this pitfall, 
the following study will concentrate on determining the exact nature of 
the Frankfurt School's version of Marxism and will explore in what manner 
it is reflected in the different aesthetic theories members of the School 
produced. Outlining these different aesthetic theories will, nevertheless, 
remain our primary concern, for , as we have seen, up till now no systematic 
account has been provided of the interrelations obtaining between the 
aesthetic works of the individual members of the School after 1950, nor 
has much attention been paid to the aesthetic theories in terms of their 
forming an important branch of Frankfurt School work. 
SECT10NI 
CHAPTER2: FRIEDRICH POLLOCK'S THEORY OF STATE CAPITALISM 
Pollock and Horkheimer - 
If one approaches the School's work only from a study of the secondary 
literature or solely having read the School's 'major' writings, then one 
could be excused for supposing that the theorists in question knew and 
wrote little about that domain so crucial to Marx's thought, namely the 
substructure or base of society. However, this was not the case, as even 
a cursory examination of the contents of the Zeitschrift/Studies shows: 
numerous articles exist on economic matters. Alongside essays by the main 
Institut(e) political economists, Henryk Grossmann, Friedrich Pollock 
and 
Franz Neumann, others were ppblished by Julian Gumperz, Kurt Mandelbaum 
and Gerhard Meyer, who all also worked for or collaborated with the 
Institut(e). Surprisingly, this evidence is often overlooked by critics 
of the main theorists and is particularly ignored or forgotten when dis- 
cussing their aesthetic and cultural theories. 
1 A critical analysis of 
theorists who understood themselves as Marxists that omits to pay attention 
to their colleagues' conception of the base of society is seriously flawed, 
particularly when one considers the interdisciplinary nature of the 
Institut(e). 
Of the economists mentioned above, it was specifically Pollock whose work 
over the decade from 1932 - 1942 came to form the basis of the School's 
economic theory of society, and thus his essays in the Zeitschrift/Studies 
warrant outlining if the aesthetic theories produced by other members of 
the Institut(e) are to be understood correctly. The extent to which Pollock's 
work plays a role in constituting the underlying thought of Adorno, Hork- 
heimer, Löwenthal and Marcuse during the years of the Zeitschrift/Studies's 
publication can then be explored (this course will be pursued in the post-Jar 
years in Section ]I) This exploration also entails establishing whether 
specific differences between each individual reception of Pollock's work 
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exist or not. Despite the fact that he only wrote sparsely on aesthetics, 
I include Horkheimer in the above group, because, owing to the delegatory 
nature of School work, it was in his writings that the School's theory 
of society and its methodology was elaborated. Agreement or disagreement 
with Pollock's work can thus be assessed in part by comparing each individ- 
ual theorist's writings to Horkheimer's work at a particular time. 
There is a wealth of -empirical evidence, especially correspondence, that 
establishes quite firmly.; that Pollock's theory of the substructure - or 
to be exact his theory of 'state capitalism' - was indeed endorsed by Hork- 
heimer. The theory is developed within the general framework of the School's 
research - the study of the transition from liberal capitalism to monopoly 
capitalism or the authoritarian state - in two periods, from 1932-34 and 
from 1940-41. With reference to the theory of monopoly capitalism, Horkheimer 
wrote to Pollock on the 18th of June, 1934: 
Es schiene mir eine starre und unhistorische Betrachtungsweise zu sein, 
wollte man die gegenwärtige Epoche insofern der vorhergehenden gleich- 
setzen, als man die Kombination, in welcher die vorhandenen Kräfte sich 
dann wirklich entladen, für relativ zufällig erklärte. Den Inhalt der 
europäischen Gegenwart bilden vielmehr die Bestrebungen einer Zusammen- 
fassung der hochentwickelten Länder zum gemeinsamen, aus wirtschaft- 
licher und politischer Krise herausführenden Handeln. 
Horkheimer thus opposed the orthodox Marxist position, championed by the 
Comintern and the KPD, according to which contemporary society formed a 
simple linear continuation of monopoly capitalism and fascism constituted 
a last-ditch attempt to save capitalism. Rather, he implies that a 
qualitative change has occurred, for crises are no longer merely domestic 
but now take place on the world market. While thus realizing that a new 
Marxist model was needed to describe this change Horkheimer was not prep- 
ared, however, to accept Pollock's suggestion that society had become 
state capitalist. He commented on this to Pollock in a letter of the 3rd of 
July, 1934 refering to Pollock's concept of state capitalism: 
Eine Rückkehr zur Demokratie ist für die ökonomisch Ausschlaggebenden 
jedenfalls nicht mehr zu befürchten. Aber all das sind Einzelheiten, 
unser Gesamtbild der deutschen Situation scheint in den entsche'de sten 
unKten 
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immer noch nicht übereinzustimmen... Du nimmst die Ereignisse, welche 
meiner Ansicht nach mehr der Oberfläche angehören,..., für die wesent- 
lichen Tendenzen... Wenn die Verhältnisse im Osten ihren gesellschaft- 
lichen Sinn ändern, dann kann die Oberfläche zum Wesen werden. 
However, by 1938-39 Horkheimer revised his position. His essay 'Autoritärer 
Staat', written in 1938 but published in 1942 is a pellucid expression 
of this revision. The article was originally entitled 'Staatskapitalismus' 
but this term only appears twice in the final version, one of the two 
references making the significance of the term obvious: "Der Staatskapitalismus 
ist der autoritäre Staat der Gegenwart". The elision of the term in the 
final draft was not the result of Horkheimer's rejection of the concept 
of state capitalism, but is attributable instead to the fact that the 
label 'authoritarian state' embraced both East and West and was therefore 
judged to be theoretically more powerful. Horkheimer must have adopted 
this evaluation of Soviet society and capitalism by 1941 at the latest, 
for he says to Pollock in a letter of the 30th of April of that year: ' 
Die Russen haben ein Gefühl dafür, daß der Staatskapitalismus die 
zeitgemäße Form der Herrschaft ist. Ihr unbewußtes oder bewußtes 
Bekenntnis zu ihm ist keine Liebe, eher Haß - Haß gegen das Unrecht 
in seiner veralterten Form, der sich jetzt hervorragt, eben weil sie 
veraltert ist, wie der Haß gegen den sterbenden König, wenn der junge 
schon die Hand nach der Krone ausstreckt. 
On reading the draft manuscript of Pollock's state capitalism essay he 
was to comment (ist of July, 1940): 
Die These ist schlagend: Die ökonomische Entwicklung zeigt eine 
Tendenz zum. Staatskapitalismus - überall. Die totalitäre Form ist 
nur eine seiner möglichen Formen... Ich halte ihn (the essay) für 
einen bedeutsamen Schritt in der Richtung der so notwendigen neuen 
Manifeste. 2 
He went on to insist, however, that Pollock make it clear that 'state 
capitalism was still an internally antagonistic social structure, to -, - 
prevent anyone from thinking that the Zeitschrift/Studies in any way 
supported it. 
By the 18th of August, 1941 Institut(e) opinion must have been solidly 
behind Pollock's theory, judging from the way Adorno addressed the topic 
in a letter to Horkheimer concerning the foreword the latter was to write 
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for Pollock's state capitalism article: 
... (zugleich) finde ich, daß das Vorwort ausgezeichnet die taktische 
Aufgabe löst, daß Mißverständnis auszuschließen, als erkenne der Auf- 
satz von Fritz in der Tat die Möglichkeit eines nicht-antagonistischen 
Staatskapitalismus an, ohne daß Sie doch den offiziellen marxistischen 
Optimismus die leiseste Konzession machten. 
The main reason for the acceptance of Pollock's work by this time can be 
gleaned from the interpretation Marcuse gave of Pollock's main essay on 
state capitalism in an interview conducted by Jürgen Habermas in 1978: 
Pollock hat ja den Aufsatz geschrieben über den Staatskapitalismus, 
der meiner Meinung nach einer der allerersten Versuche war zu zeigen, 
daß der Spätkapitalismus aus inneren-Gründen, aus rein ökonomischen 
Gründen nicht zusammenbrechen wird. 3 
Pollock's theory offered the I'nstitut(e) an up to date model of society 
that avoided the problems posed by other Marxist interpretations. Before 
assessing the influence of Pollock's theory of state capitalism on the 
work of Adorno, Horkheimer, Löwenthal and Marcuse, however, it is neces- 
sary to describe in greater detail its exact nature and development. 
Pollock's Theory of State Capitalism 
Pollock had studied the concept of a 'planned' economy before he commenced 
writing for the Zeitschrift, for in 1929 he had published Die planwirt- 
schaftliche Versuche in der Sowietunion. 
4 
However, when he took up the 
question of planning again in his articleslin the Zeitschrift/Studies a 
distinct difference can be noted: he now addressed capitalism. When tack- 
ling this analysis of capitalism Pollock found himself confronted with 
the question facing many Marxist economists at the time, namely whether 
capitalism would collapse owing to its inner contradictions, or whether 
it somehow had the capvity to avert such a crisis. The conclusions reached 
by the various economists differed according to the emphasis adopted 
within their particular analyses of capitalism. However, Pollock's work 
offered a novel approach to this context for he decided in a series of 
essays written over two periods (1932-34 and 1940-41) that capitalism 
need not collapse at all. 
5 In his first two essays for the Zeitschi-ft 
Pollock outlined his theory of state capitalism by means of an analysis 
-25- 
of the crises inherent in monopoly capitalism and fäund. a potential anti- 
dote to them in the possibilities afforded by a planned economy. Two 
distinct currents of thought were prevalent at the time of writing: one 
view held that crises were caused by a decisive shift in the organic 
composition of capital, the other, the theory of*'underconsumption', located 
their origin in the inability of capital to create a market capable of 
meeting the requirements of its own production. Pollock took a daring step 
in that he proceeded to incorporate solutions to both these forms of crisis 
in the concept of state capitalism. While admitting that isolated economic 
and political problems were of import he nevertheless atuated all crises in 
the structural problems that arose as a result of the concentration of 
capital in ever fewer hands. He detected that the concentration of capital 
itself led to increased difficulties in valorizing profit, as large amounts 
of goods had to be off-loaded with a consequently lower profit margin. 
Furthermore, the introduction of new technology, which attacked this process, 
entailed a rationalisation of the means of production with concomitant 
unemployment. In overcoming these problems capitalism tended to try to 
bridge the gap between politics and economics, so that the opposite poles 
of 'state' and 'capital' met and cooperated. 
Pollock explained this causation as follows. He suggested that the existence 
of large monopolies resulted not only in a contraction of competition but 
also in the reliance of increasingly large sections of the work force on the 
economic prosperity of a single company. This process was accelerated by 
crises which had the effect of eliminating 'disproportionality' within and 
between the different sectors of the economy in that they tended to destroy 
smaller companies, which in turn exacerbated the tendency towards capital 
concentration. Consequently, the state was forced into improvisatory 
intervention in the economy in order to bail out the companies upon whom 
ever larger numbers of workers had come to depend. This amounted to direct 
political action in order to guarantee the functioning of the economy. Such 
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an interlocking of economics and politics could only become greater because, 
by dint of being in receipt of state aid, monopolies now not only obstructed 
free competition but destroyed its very basis in equal opportunity. 
The inflexibility in the economy increased still more as the capital in- 
vestment per company that was necessary to ensure technological innovation 
and cheaper production grew. Pollock proposed that this had two radical 
consequences for -the economy and thus for society. Firstly, technological 
development now unceasingly necessitated structural changes in t. e mode 
of production. Secondly, capital-intensive mass production replaced labour- 
intensive work processes bringing with it the dual dangers of perpetual 
over-production and structural unemployment. These two socio-economic 
tendencies, Pollock maintained, caused crises to become greater and to 
occur in ever more rapid succession. 
Pollock held that mere contingency measures on the part of the state were 
insufficient to prevent these crises from causing a collapse of the cap- 
italist system. Rather than predicting the imminent collapse of capitalism, 
therefore, he reached a conclusion which at the time must have seemed some- 
what surprising, for he suggested that a restructuring of the system was 
possible without its capitalist foundations being shaken. This should not 
be read to mean that Pollock believed the tensions and antagonisms within 
the capitalist system to have abated, but rather that, unlike orthodox 
Marxists, he viewed an automatic collapse of capitalism to be improbable: 
Ohne Zweifel läßt sich begründen, daß diese Krise mit kapitalistischen 
Mitteln überwunden werden kann und daß der 'monopolistische' Kapitalis- 
mus auf zunächst unabsehbare Zeit weiter zu existieren vermag. 6 
In other words, a new social structure that allows capitalism to continue 
can be achieved by limiting the economic and political powers of the indiv- 
idual owners of the means of production, in short by establishing a capital- 
ist 'planned' economy. 
This would involve formulating a unified production and pricing policy 
either for each individual economic sector or for the economy in its 
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entirety. Such a wide-scale restructuring of capitalist society, Pollock 
observed, would have to be effected by means of the machinery of the state. 
The state, as the agent of the ruling class, was in a position to devise 
a plan that involved all sectors of the economy and allowed for optimum 
output. By arguing that the continuation of the capitalist economy now 
depended on state intervention and regulation, Pollock proposed that state 
capitalist planning betokened something economically and socially new: 
Sie ist qualitativ etwas ganz anderes als die bisher vorgenommenen 
partiellen Eingriffe. Sie setzt voraus, daß die mächtigsten Gruppen 
sich zugunsten des kapitalistischen Gesamtinteresses über eine plan- 
wirtschaftliche Politik verständigen, die die Gewinninteressen einzelner 
dieser Gruppen sehr stark berühren muß. Eine solche allmächtige Plan 
zentrale hätte dann über das Wohl und Wehe aller übrigen Wirtschafts- 
subjekte, Kapitaleigentümer und Arbeiter eigenmächtig zu bestimmen, 
soweit sie nicht bei ihrer Willensbildung ausschlaggebend mitgeteiligt 
wären. 7 
Since political measures could clearly be used to effect a stabilisation 
of the economy, prognoses of an imminent systemic collapse lost any valid- 
ity they might have had. 
The plan was enforced, Pollock believed, so rigorously by the state that 
any opposition, it might encounter from sections of the population would 
soon be eradicated: 
... das veränderte Gewicht der Arbeiterklasse im Wirtschaftsprozess, 
die 
Umwälzungen in der Waffentechnik und die außerordentliche Vervollkomm- 
nung der geistigen Massenbeherrschung lassen auf absehbare Zeit einen 
Widerstand nur im Gefolge schwerster Katastrophen als möglich erscheinen. 8 
From an assessment of these twin characteristics of contemporary capitalism, 
economic planning and the concomitant loss of social freedom, Pollock 
concluded that a new phase in the history of capitalism had begun: 
Was zu Ende geht ist nicht der Kapitalismus, sondern nur seine liberale 
Phase. Ökonomisch, politisch und kulturell wird es in Zukunft für die 
Mehrzahl der Menschen immer'weniger Freiheiten geben. 9 
This assumption that capitalism was undergoing or had already undergone a 
significant change runs like a thread through the Institut(e)'s work in 
the 1930s, and it is thus hardly surprising that the changes in the role 
of the working class and the advent of techniques for controlling the 
masses became focal points of School research. 
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Pollock provided a sociological outline of the structures of power that 
held in this new form of capitalist economy. Within the framework of 
this 'planned' economy society became controlled by an ever dwindling 
group of 'economic feudal lords' and their adjutants. Private owners of 
capital either abdicated their power in favour of this group or went 
out of business and dropped into the ranks of the proletariat (while a 
pronounced division simultaneously became evident between highly qualified 
and unskilled workers). Further, this most powerful social group dictated 
what measures the government was to take and underlined its authority by 
controlling the whole apparatus of psychological mass domination. 
Whereas the concept of a 'planned' capitalist society seemed plausible in 
sociologi. _al terms, a major objection could be raised against it from the 
viewpoint of economics. It was argued that a capitalist 'planned' economy 
was impossible, for capitalism could not survive without a market in which 
commodities could be bought and sold. Pollock contested this by suggesting 
that the destruction of the market actually permitted a more efficient reg- 
ulation of prices and therefore of profits. The formation of capital would 
be facilitated by the fact that the economy was no longer subject to the 
vicissitudes of single owners of capital. It was thus possible that the 
removal of the market by the state through political intervention could 
eliminate the problems caused by monopolisation, for example, its negative 
effects on the forces of production, by establishing a direct relation 
between production and consumption. If subjected to a plan the concentration 
of capital into monopolies would not necessarily curb technological advance- 
ment either and changes within the organic composition of capital could 
thus be contemplated that would not effect employment or the realisationof 
surplus value. In order to be able to conceive of a marketless capitalist 
system Pollock had to change the relation between production, distribution 
and consumption that customarily held true in Marxism, for the locus of 
distribution and that of consumption more or less coincide in a 'planned' 
e 
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capitalist economy. In a situation in which the market had either totally 
disappeared or existed only in a residual form and could no longer be con- 
sidered an independent economic factor, distribution and consumption would 
be subject to the dictates of the sphere of production and their position 
in the theoretical model altered. This new conception allowed Pollock to 
avoid two obstacles he had originally foreseen to the factual existence of 
a 'planned' capitalist economy, namely the problem of striking a balance bet- 
ween centralisation and decentralisation, and the necessity of retaining 
limited consumer freedom so as to ensure sales. 
If distribution and consumption were to be controlled, the second point became 
insubstantial, for freedom of choice would be a redundant category. Thus 
Pollock was : able to assert: 
Durch eine beschränkte Konsumfreiheit wären aber erhebliche Störungen 
des Planes nicht zu befürchten, da die Bedarfsgewohnheiten bei mittleren 
Einkommenslagen relativ starr sind und diese Konstanz durch gesellschaft- 
liche Beeinflussung und das Zusammenrücken der Einkommenspyramide sich 
noch verstärkte. 10 
As we shall see, this proposed convergence of economic and social forms of 
controlling the population's wishes was later to be accorded great signifi- 
cance by Adorno and Horkheimer. 
Pollock's conception of a 'planned' capitalist economy lays great emphasis on 
the interaction of base and superstructure. In a sense, this also amounts to 
a modification of Marxism, for Marxists had usually considered the relation 
between base and superstructure to be one-way, i. e. the base was judged to 
determine the nature of the superstructure and not vice versa. In Pollock's 
concept of state capitalism, by defirätion the state (an integral part of 
the superstructure) became enmeshed in regulating the means and relations 
of production, that is to say, in controlling the base rather than merely 
helping to maintain those relations. Pollock supposed that such state inter- 
vention was precipitated by the need to restructure the relations of product- 
ion in line with the development of new techniques within the means of 
production, e. g. flow-processing, taylorisation etc. In other words, he 
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asserted that the forces of production had expanded and developed to such an 
extent that superstructural control of the base was necessary if capitalism 
was to be able to utilize these new forms effectively. The superstructure 
thus became, for the first time ever, a 'pure' superstructure: it adapted 
so as to meet the demands of the base and performed and functioned only 
to meet the base's demands -although the dialectical possibility of it 
affecting and thereby altering the base is equally dominant in Pollock's 
analysis. 
It is now necessary to examine just how and to what extent Pollock saw 
this change as having taken place by 1941, following the establishment of a 
totalitarian planned state in Germany under National Socialist rule. In the 
1941 issue of the Studies Pollock devoted an article to an elaboration of 
his concept of state capitalism. Significantly this article contained a 
preface by Horkheimer in which he described the series of which it was a 
part as depicting the transition from liberalism to totalitarianism. In his 
article Pollock judged state capitalism to be the successor to 'private' 
capitalism, because the state had assumed important functions held previously 
by entrepreneurs. State capitalism was not, however, to be equated with mono- 
poly capitalism, for the market no longer possessed a regulating function; 
production and distribution could be coordinated by a system of direct con- 
trols. Consumption had in effect become the reflection of production. It' 
could thus be said that the consumer was left no freedom of choice whatsoever 
owing to the preponderance of this system of controls. The new ruling class 
that emerged under state capitalism asserted its interests by installing it- 
self as the administrative bureaucracy governing society. In its bureau- 
cratic cap. ity it directed and dominated the vast majority of the population. 
Society. was therefore still to be considered as an antagonistic unity of 
two opposing classes. However, Pollock did not elaborate on the form this 
antagonism took (something that has definite consequences for the validity 
of his theory )for in his view it could be kept in check by administrative 
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measures in the political arena : 
The genuine problem of a planned society does not lie in the economic 
but in the political sphere, in the principles to be applied in deciding 
what needs shall have preference, how much time shall be spent for work, 
how much of the social product shall be consumed and how much shall be 
used for expansion etc. 11 
Such political decision-making rested on a bed-rock of continuous production, 
for production could not, in the abs'nce of economic risk and private, com- 
peting interests be interrupted by economic factors. State capitalism's 
success thus depended on its ability to legitimate itself politically, i. e. 
to prevent conflict within the ranks of the ruling class both as to the 
choice of ends to be encoded in the plan and on the distribution of profits. 
In his discussion, however, Pollock remained undecided whether the higher 
standard of living possible in a peace-time economy would permit the contin- 
uation of a state capitalist system which seemed to be founded on a dictator- 
ial war economy. He indicated that a peace-time economy would also allow more 
free time for the population, which might lead to greater difficulties for 
the ruling class in legitimating itself politically. In this context Pollock 
mentioned that a democratic form of state capitalism might exist. He did not 
clarify this point, mainly because such a form would appear to be logically 
impossible; state capitalism is founded on the domination of individual inter- 
est by a plan, and democracy runs counter to such domination. It would appear 
that this form of state capitali sm is only mentioned to prevent Pollock's 
readers from seeing state capitalism as a stable, unchangeable structure. 
In general, under state capitalism the political sphere is compelled by the 
needs of the economy to impose its wishes by force upon the sphere of produ- 
ction by suppressing society's real economic divisions. Society is therefore 
static in essence, not dialectical, for no dynamic relation exists between 
the superstructure (the polity) and the economic substructure. Pollock's 
theory thus culminates in an undynamic view of society, one, it will be seen, 
which becomes embedded in the analyses of the other theorists of the School. 
Whereas in his 'state capitalism' article Pollock had only mentioned Nazi 
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Germany in passing, he devoted his next essay for the Studies 'Is National 
Socialism a New Order? ' to the task of determining whether Nazi Germany was 
a state capitalist society or not. He first assessed Germany's social struct- 
ure and ascertained that a compromise had been reached by the ruling groups 
which had resulted in a small, bureaucratic elite deciding on the scope and 
direction of the productive process. This new group ruled by diktat, thus 
abolishing the liberal public sphere. In the absence of such a public sphere, 
social power came to be determined solely by one's position in a hierarchy of 
commanders and commanded, i. e. the hierarchy Pollock viewed to be necessary 
if state capitalism were to persist. He summarised the situation: 
... all basic concepts and institutions of capitalism have changed their 
function, interference of the state with the structure of the old econo- 
mic order has by its sheer totality and intensity 'turned quality into 
quantity', transformed monopoly capitalism into state capitalism. 12 
The function this caretaking elite exercised resembled that which Pollock 
had discerned to be one of the hallmarks of state capitalism. In a similar 
manner, the complete erosion of the market he found to have occurred under 
National Socialism was also a fundamental feature of state capitalism. 
In economic terms the market, prices and profits were now fully regulated 
and full employment achieved, guaranteeing the all-important political 
legitimation necessary if state capitalism was to establish itself. The 
central steering of the whole economy led to the actual disappearance of the 
market as a social force. In this context Pollock argued that in Nazi Ger- 
many profit interests had become subsumed under a general plan, thus elimi- 
nating the possibility of market-caused crises. Such planning also meant that 
the totalitarian state became pervaded by a one-sided, non-legitimatory 
technical rationality, allowing a high degree of precision to be attained 
in planning. 
It was possible to designate the order of National Socialist society as new, 
Pollock insisted, because it was state capitalist, i. e. an (as yet not neces- 
sarily fully developed) command economy, as opposed to a free market economy. 
This 'new order' seemed to be highly resilient, although the price for its 
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resilience was the 'total brutalization' of society, for the absence of auto- 
nomous market or economic laws, eradicated by the 'all-comprehensive technical 
rationality' of the plan, ensured that no serious dangers existed to prevent 
its continuation. One can conclude from this that Pollock did not foresee 
a speedy end to National Socialism. This is not to say that his theory of 
state capitalism and his centring of it on Nazi Germany was not without its 
problems. Pollock's approach forced him to abandon the Weberian ideal types 
of his previous essays. As state capitalism was regarded as innately total- 
itarian, the concept of 'democratic' state capitalism would now appear 
logically implausible. By concentrating on Nazi Germany Pollock alsofailed 
to make clear whether capitalism as a whole was changing into state capitalism 
as its only hope for stability, or whether this was an isolated German pheno- 
menon. The thrust of his argument favoured the latter position, whereas he 
explicitly mentioned that state capitalism was coming into being elsewhere, 
albeit in non-totalitarian forms. 
This last judgement was accepted by some of the other theorists of the 
'School' who held the concept to have more general relevance and treated it 
as a theory of late capitalism. If this was Pollock's underlying intention 
then it would imply that he thought capitalist states as a whole were forced 
to be totalitarian if they wished to survive. This view of late capitalism's 
totalitarianism cannot envisage a change coming about, for if society is 
commanded by a plan - economically and psychologically - then nobody will be 
able to alter the fabric of state capitalism. Pollock's theory thus ends in 
a theoretical cul-de-sac. 
The difficulties Pollock faced in correlating state capitalism and Nazi 
Germany are matched by a lack of clarity in the analysis he offers of the 
exact theoretical implications of the assumed absence of the market. He 
specified that the abolition of the market deprived individuals of the 
space they needed to constitute and develop their individuality. Marxism had 
traditionally founded its theory of revolution in a theory of individuality; 
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only by seeing himself to be an individual, it was believed, could a 
person comprehend his individuality as being curtailed by the ruling class. 
In the absence of a public sphere the individual was prevented from being 
more than an abstract 'in-itself'. Its 'for-itself' could no longer 
develop. If Marxism were to accept the theory of state capitalism, accord- 
ing to which the sphere of distribution was eradicated, then it had concom- 
itantly to acknowledge that an agent of revolution was now prevented from 
developing, be it the working class or a non-class based grouping. In other 
words, without a market the social structure is static regardless of whether 
society is overtly totalitarian or not. A critical analysis that takes this 
into account can only negate society completely for a theory of determinate 
negation can no longer be situated within the social structure. The prole- 
tariat can now be conceived of as the determinate negation of society only 
at the very most in a highly abstract manner. However, even such an extreme- 
ly pessimistic, abstract conception would have to be erected on an analysis 
of the constitution of surplus value and production in state capitalism. 
Pollock suggested that production now determined what was consumed and thus 
the sphere of distribution had no function independent of production, i. e. 
any dialectical relation that had existed under liberal capitalism had now 
ceased to exist. 
Since production and technology were judged to be geared to furthering the 
requirements of a totalitarian ruling group any theory of change cannot 
be founded in them nor hope to use them. Equally, in the absence of a 
market, the concepts of surplus value and exchange value lose the character 
they had in Marx's work: they no longer describe capitalism. Quite how 
Pollock is therefore able to specify that society remains capitalist is 
unclear, for the appropriation of labour power can no longer be situated in 
a concept of surplus value. In other words, Pollock's initially fruitful, 
and indeed highly necessary corrective to mechanistic versions of Marxism 
deprives Marxism of its all-important dialectical theories of production and 
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change. The change Pollock detected in the organisation of commodity 
exchange and the problems it creates for Marxism have two important con- 
sequences for an analysis of art and culture. Firstly, culture, if under- 
stood as part of the superstructure, undergoes a functional change. The 
base now dictates to the superstructure how it should function. The super- 
structure, and with it culture, becomes a reflex of the base, although 
besides carrying out the base's commands and ensuring the latter's stabi- 
lity it must also at times effect change in the base when the plan requires 
it. The main function that the superstructure fulfils is to enforce con- 
sumption and, as the ececutor of the plan, to foster 'needs' for the base's 
products. Secondly, the constitution of value in all commodities - including 
cultural products since these are in the last instance commodities - is 
changed. It is particularly because of these two changes that Pollock's 
theory is of such importance for the work on aesthetics undertaken by the 
School's other theorists. 
Before going on to analyse the degree to which his colleagues accepted the 
theory of state capitalism it is first necessary to pinpoint the implications 
that Pollock's theory has for a critique of political economy. To do so, the 
effect which the loss of the market and the change in the relation between 
base and superstructure have on the theory of value must be assessed, for 
such a theory forms the kernel of Marx's work. 
Commodity exchange is based, according to Marx, on the presence of 'use 
values' and 'exchange values' in commodities, the former guaranteeing the 
latter's existence and the latter defining the product as a commodity. The 
nature of 'use value' and 'exchange value' is altered by the loss of the 
market Pollock's analysis envisaged. The 'use value' of the commodity is 
now defined by the producer, and this definition is reinforced not only by 
the influence of the superstructure's mechanisms of psychic domination but 
also by the controlled availability of products. The need on which a 'use 
value' is based no longer corresponds to a need a person experiences, as was 
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held to be the case by Marx. The function a commodity has for its producer 
is its 'exchange value' and since the producer determines needs, this 'ex- 
change-value' replaces the 'use-values in the commodity. That is to say, the 
consumer now purchases a commodity not for its 'use value', but for the 
'exchange value' it represents, i. e. the worth he has been told it-has. Pol- 
lock's theory of state capitalism thus not only destroys any dialectical 
theory of social change, it alters the very basis of a Marxist economic 
analysis. 
Pollock's alteration of the Marxist theory has dire consequences for a Marx- 
ist theory of art and culture. As we have just seen, in a perverse sense 
the 'exchange value' is now the 'use value' that the consumer wishes to ac-aa 
quire by purchasing the commodity; perverse for the term 'use' now only ref- 
ers to the profit the producer gains from the sale and because the arbitrary 
need the consumer experiences can no longer be judged to be his own. Pollock 
concluded quite accurately from this that the gratification individuals 
were offered by a commodity ensnared them completely: 
The released individual is thus caught in a physiological and psycho- 
logical structure which serves to guarantee and perpetuate his oppress- 
ion. 13 
In this context cultural products (understood here to be 'high culture' and 
'mass culture', not as products of lived praxis, but something presented 
from above) would be subject, to the same alteration in the constitution of 
value, that is unless they are viewed as having nothing in common with 
commodities. Culture and hence art, in other words, is now produced to per- 
petuate domination or to foster particular needs in the consumer. Any dialect- 
ical nature cultural products might have had, any 'use value' they might have 
possessed, is eradicated: they become purely ideological in nature. To the 
aesthetic theorist who is seeking to find a progressive element in art, such 
an analysis offers little alternative other than to flee into a world detached 
from the social structure, a position untenable for a Marxist. 
It is difficult to ascertain prima facie to what extent the theorists of the 
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'School' were conscious of the structural change in capitalism suggested by 
Pollock. Because of the delegatory nature of Institut(e) work Adorno, Hork- 
heimer, Löwenthal and Marcuse only ever made indirect references to the con- 
. 
cept of state capitalism, and even then such indications were couched in the 
non-economic language of either aesthetics or ideology critique. Nevertheless, 
a discussion of Pollock's theory of state capitalism clearly formed a back- 
drop to their writings and as such its influence is undeniable. In the light 
of this it would seem all the more important to pay some attention. to Pol- 
lock's work when discussing the aesthetic theories of the other members of 
the School, for, since his theory of state capitalism:.. was central to the 
positions his colleagues held, Pollock's work must also be crucial for our 
understanding of their work. By assessing the degree to which each of them 
accepted his theory it is possible to determine basic differences between the 
work of Adorno, Horkheimer, Löwenthal and Marcuse which would otherwise go 
unnoticed. The concept of state capitalism will therefore be used as the 
point of all comparison in the elaboration of the aesthetic positions. 
However, as we have seen, the theory of state capitalism is itself not without 
its problems and this could have had two possible effects on the work of 
Pollock's colleagues. On the one hand, the theoretical inadequacies of Pol- 
lock's theory may have been transposed into the writings of those colleagues 
who accepted the theory, i. e. certain weaknesses and emphases inherent in the 
respective aesthetic positions of the School's core members may be attributed 
to the problems posed by Pollock's theory. On the other, Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Löwenthal and Marcuse may have reflected on the theory's deficiencies and 
explicitly attempted to surmount them by altering some of Pollock's presup- 
positions. Regardless of whichever transpires to be the case (and they 
may both hold true), at this stage of the analysis what can be said is that 
the limitations inherent in the concept of state capitalism assuredly pose 
problems for aesthetic and cultural theories based on it. The validity of 
Pollock's theory today could be challenged by pointing to the fact that under 
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late capitalism a market appears to persist and that all Western economies 
are to a greater or lesser extent crisis-ridden. Nevertheless, the fact that 
Pollock had a theory of the base at all shows the inaccuracy of the criticism 
commonly levelled at the School, namely that its aesthetic and cultural the- 
ories involved no conception of the base. 
14 Doubt must also be cast on the 
equally prevalent criticism that the School's various theorists are elitist 
or esoteric, 
15 
since it can be argued that in a totalitarian society thought 
is forced to buy abstract-theoretical rather than praxis-oriented. Such forms 
of criticism are superficial for they ignore the roots of the theories they 
wish to criticize. 
Criticism of School aesthetics must, therefore, address itself to a different 
problem, that is to say, it must trace Pollock's theory in the work of the 
other theorists and determine the consequences which the flaws in the con- 
cept of state capitalism have for the different aesthetic theories. An 
understanding of the School's underlying theory of society thus presents a 
clearer basis for a comprehension and criticism of its judgements as well as 
providing a position from which the concepts the theorists developed can be 
rejuvenated in a manner more appropriate to a contemporary analysis of cap- 
italism. 
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CHAPTER3: HORKHEIMER AND THE FORMATION OF CRITICAL THEORY 
In his influential essay 'Traditionelle und-kritische Theorie' Horkheimer 
argued that a theory could remain valid despite changes in its constituent 
elements. 
' 
In keeping with this statement, his social philosophy treated 
each object of study as something which contained within it the distinguish- 
ing marks of the society in which it had originated, be that thing a philo- 
sophical idea or a concrete 'fact'. Equally, if the object was perceived to 
have changed, then the theory attempting to grasp it had also to change so 
as to remain able to give an adequate description of the object. What Hork- 
heimer meant by this was that Marxism itself had to be regarded as an hist- 
orical object of which certain parts were in need of revision or alteration 
if it was to be able both to keep in step with social change and to take 
such change into account in the -theory of society which Marxism constructed 
and on which, in turn, it was centred. Horkheimer hoped that by being open 
to such flexibility, social theory could reflect on major changes and yet 
avoid becoming epistemologically relativist, i. e. so long as Marxism did 
not become a static body of thought its main, incisive analysis of society 
could persist. In accordance with this view, the main framework of theory 
that Horkheimer constructed in the course of his directorship of the 
Institut(e) stayed stable whereas the emphases within it and the nature 
of some of its parts changed considerably. 
In the light of the above it is surprising that there has been a tendency 
among scholars to treat Horkheimer's writings as an unchanging body of 
thought, namely as a critique of ideology. The failing of this approach is 
that it cannot observe or account for the changes within Horkheimer's theoret- 
ical opus, but sees this instead as a continuous elaboration of one theme 
which then, suddenly, was transformed in 1941. Horkheimer's essays do not 
bear this out, for, if studied with Pollock's findings in mind, they clearly 
fall into three chronological phases. In this context Pollock's work on 
4 
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planned economies assumes critical importance for any understanding of 
Horkheimer's philosophy, because Pollock had, crucially, judged society to 
have undergone a significant transformation from monopoly capitalism to state 
capitalism. If Horkheimer followed his own thinking on the historical nature 
of theory and agreed with Pollock's assessment of capitalism, then he would 
have had to change those parts of his theory that no longer described adequately' 
the new state of affairs. 
A close study of his essays reveals that y precisely such a change was made. 
The three phases in Horkheira°r's work (1931-1937,1937, and 1938-1942) match 
the stages in his acceptance of Pollock's proposals. In his pre-1937 essays 
Horkheimer rejected Pollock's suggestion that a capitalist 'planned' society was 
possible; by 1937 he was less certain of his ground and maintained that a 
theory had to be able to adapt itself to a changing situation; and by 1941 
he saw fit to retract his initial rejection entirely and write a foreword to 
Pollock's state capitalism essay, for Pollock's insistence on the connection 
between National Socialist Germany, New Deal America and the concept of 
state capitalism seemed to Horkheimer to hold true. 
This chapter will therefore proceed to describe Horkheimer's philosophy by 
outlining chronologically the changes that occurred within it. Moreover, since 
it was Horkheimer who laid down the theoretical lines to be adopted in the 
School's research work, the changes in his thought are of exceptional signifi- 
cance for an understanding of the work undertaken by Adorno, Löwenthal and 
Marcuse. If these changes can be shown to have been influenced clearly by 
Pollock's work, then we must expect the aesthetic theories devised by the 
latter three thinkers also to reflect the influence of the concept of state 
capitalism. 
1931 - 1937: Early Essays for the Zeitschrift 
In the essays he wrote prior to 1937,2 Horkheimer proceeded from the premise 
that capitalist society, as exposed by the critique of political economy, was 
not rational. Such a society was founded on an antagonism, for its central 
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pillar - the exchange principle - divided society into two groups: owners of 
the means of production and owners of labour power. By preventing the 
majority of the population from exercising any control over the means of 
production (and by extension over their own destinies) society functioned only 
in the interests of a minority of its members and was thus irrational, given 
that potentially it could provide for the wellbeing of all. 
Horkheimer concluded from this description of class socbty that the concepts 
which class society used in order to describe itself must also be irrational. 
By irrational he meant that the concepts used by bourgeois philosophy did 
not correspond to the objects they sought to portray, for the designation 
of these objects never reflected what they could potentially be in a future 
'rational' society. In labelling as rational' 'that which is what it can be', 
Horkheimer made use of Hegelian logic. Hegel had suggested that a difference 
existed between what a person thought an object was and what it really 
could be or indeed was. Whereas Plato had assumed that this state of not 
reaching the full 'form' of an object was eternal, Hegel (and with him Hork- 
heimer) believed the discrepancy could be overcome if society were to be 
governed by Reason. Hegel had maintained that since all objects would exist 
in a rational totality, they would be what they had always inherently been 
able to be. However, Hegel's philosophy lost its critical edge at this 
juncture, for he advocated that such a state of Reason already existed under 
what he termed 'civil society'. Here Horkheimer parted company with Hegel 
and followed the path taken by Marx, for he defined 'rational' as the state 
in which man is what he potentially could be, i. e. when all people share 
equally in the wealth of socity. 
Horkheimer's definition of rationality and the epistemology he founded on it 
fulfilled two important functions. They provided him with the basis for a 
critique of contemporary bourgeois thought and also allowed a different 
society to be conceived of. The frame of reference of the methodology Marx 
had used in his Critique of Political Economy was extended to include not 
only basic economic and social structures, but also patterns of thought. Hork-i 
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heimer set out to show by means of this epistemology that bourgeois science's 
claim to be objective was untrue, for it followed that the objects science 
tried to describe did not match the concepts used to describe them as long 
as society - and with it science as part of that society - was rational. 
Bourgeois thought ignored the object's inner necessity by deeming society, 
and with it its sum parts, to be rational disregarding the potentiality lat- 
ent in each object. Horkheimer argued that such thought was ideological pre- 
cisely in that it assumed a one-to-one correspondence, i. e. an identity;, 
between their concepts and the objects these are intended to encapsulate, 
whereas the object could not in fact be reduced to what they were in the 
irrational society. 
Horkheimer concluded that the truth of society could be portrayed by means 
of an exposition of this claim that an object's appearance was identical 
with what it was. In contrast, for Horkheimer, society's truth lay in its 
'non-identity' with what it appeared as in the present. Horkheimer's work 
could thus be adequately labelled 'non-identity theory', in that by making 
use of Hegel's 'determinate negation' it attempted to confront an object's 
current material state of development with that object's inherent possibili- 
ties by uncovering the false interpretation given the object by contemporary 
science and philosophy. In addressing the potentiality of an object. non-' 
identity theory undertook to indicate how the barriers preventing the un- 
folding of this potentiality could be lifted. Horkheimer's method followed 
the Marxist notion of 'critique' by being both a critique of the present 
state of a social phenomenon and simultaneously a construction of an alter- 
native state for that object. 
In a manner akin to his critique of modern thought (specifically of positivism 
and metaphysics) Horkheimer determined that historical materialism as a 
body of thought was in danger of committing a similar error. He took the 
radical step of proposing that Marxism in its contemporary form no longer 
embraced its object of inquiry adequately. Indeed, historical materialism's 
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concepts needed to be reformulated if they were to account for changes in 
society that had occurred in the 20th century. In this sense, non-identity 
theory was critical towards itself in that it was ever aware of its own 
historical nature (a fact which has led some to question its validity 
3 
As a consequence, its concepts were designed to reflect as accurately as 
possible the contemporary form of societal antagonisms and the manner in 
which these developed by measuring them against a rationality based on an 
assessment of society's 'inner necessity'. 
In line with this methodology Horkheimer used non-identity theory predomin- 
antly to analyse on the one hand the potential for change to a more rational 
society (by means of a study of the inhibiting factors preventing such change), 
and, on the other, contemporary philosophy. From these two lines of inquiry 
he then derived what 'true' theory should be, for the analysis of society 
would reveal whether a historical materialist theory needed to be up-dated in 
any way. Non-identity theory in the manner in which Horkheimer developed it 
in his early essays can thus be said to be simultaneously an ideology critique 
of modes of thought prevalent at the time and a critique of society itself. 
Although it follows from the above that a critique of society was central 
to his methodology, in his early essays in the Zeitschrift Horkheimer never 
addressed this area specifically, preferring to remark' upon society in pass- 
ing. Reconstructing from these fugitive observations it can be deduced that 
Horkheimer conceived of society as being 'in transition' ("Übergangsgesell- 
schaft ") Economic indicators suggested to his mind that liberal capitalism was 
in the process of changing into international monopoly capitalism, whereby 
the emphasis on the international character of monopoly capitalism marked 
a divergence from Pollock's work. While regarding this transition to be com- 
plete in economic terms, Horkheimer judged that the change in cultural insti- 
tutions and people's beliefs had not, as yet, been fully effected. 
This conception of society is from the outset, fraught with contradictions, 
not'least because Horkheimer offered no rigorous definition of what he meant 
by international monopoly capitalism. He viewed the monopolies as competing 
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against one another on the world market, akin to Lenin's conception of 
imperialism, and yet, from his frequent reference to crises, it is evident 
that he believed the international market still to exist. These crises 
arose because vested interest groups disregarded the potential inherent in 
the productive forces, shackling these rather to their. personal gain. 
(In this context Horkheiner classed science as a productive force) He 
concluded: 
Nie stand die Armut der Menschen in schreienderem Gegensatz zu ihrem 
möglichen Reichtum als gegenwärtig, nie waren alle Kräfte grausamer 
gefesselt als in diesen Generationen, wo die Kinder hungern und die 
Hände der Väter Bomben drehen. 4 
Unlike Pollock, Horkheimer saw the only possible change such a social form- 
ation could undergo as being the move to a completely different, planned 
society. Consequently, he could not conceive of, let alone countenance, 
society already being based on a plan, for he associated a plan with a 
rational, positive future in which all people partook of the fruits of 
production. 
In part, Horkheimer coupled his remarks on the economic shape of international 
monopoly capitalism with a brief outline of the socio-political structure 
it had created-The market-dominated society, he maintained, had consisted 
of isolated 'monads' which had competed with one another, either for capital 
or for work. Horkheimer drew a distinction between liberal capitalism and 
monopoly capitalism at this point, for he noted a shift in the order of 
this dbnination of man by man (and of nature by man). He did not consider 
this to have constituted a change in the ideology of abstract in4vidualism 
liberal capitalism had preached, but argued instead that this showed the 
balance between the social classes to have changed. The concentration of 
capital now occurring meant that an ever-decreasing number of dominators 
controlled an ever-increasing number of people, 
5 
with the consequence that 
society under international monopoly capitalism became a truly mass society. 
6 
The masses - monadic units of labour power - became dominated directly 
('Befehlsgewalt') by the political institutions of society functioning as 
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caretakers for the dominant interest groups. This conception is similar in 
nature, structure and logic to Pollock's concept of state capitalism, but 
with the difference that Horkheimer did not envisage the state having to 
intervene by plan so as to enable this process to continue. 
From the above we must infer that Horkheimer judged the relation between 
the socio-political sphere and the economic sphere (i. e. between base 
and superstructure) to have changed. The superstructure now functioned on 
behalf of the base quite. directly in the form of domination and ensured the 
latter's continuance. That is to say, it became a reflection of the base 
and was thus reduced to the undialectical form vulgar Marxists always assumed 
it had taken. Horkheimer suggested that this ideological apparatus had to 
be maintained if continual stabilization of the base were to be achieved: 
Erst wenn die Verhältnissse so weit fortgeschritten sind, die Interessen- 
gegensätze eine solche Schärfe erreicht haben, daß auch ein durchschnitt- 
liches Auge den Schein durchdringen kann pflegt sich ein eigener ideolo- 
gischer Apparat mit selbstbewußten Tendenzen auszubilden. 7 
However, rather than outlining the structure such an apparatus would have 
to adopt Horkheimer concentrated on listing its effects. 
To do so he introduced a novel element into Marxian social theory. Ever since 
his inaugural address he had maintained that'it was only by use of psycho- 
analytical categories that the mediation of the base in the superstructure 
could be understood and it is precisely such categories that he set out to 
use in order to reveal the concrete psychic forms that monopoly capitalism's 
ideology appealed to and utilized. 
The most forceful manner in which 'false consciousness' was embedded in 
people's minds, : he argued,. was.. _ 
by persuading them to internalise psychic 
drives. 8 This internalisation was therefore the cornerstone of the conformity 
shown to international monopoly capitalism's political system and consequently 
the most basic form of domination on which it was founded. Such domination 
also distinguished the era of international monopoly capitalism from past 
ages in psycho-social terms. Whereas in the past people had internalised 
psychic drives as a response to external stimuli in order to attain some 
religious or nationalist goal, they now internalised their wishes for 
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gratification without being offered some 'higher happiness' in return. 
On the basis of this analysis Horkheimer ascertained that the authorita- 
rian state - the label he gave to the political form of international mono- 
poly capitalism - had to be centred on the cult of a 
'leader'. This cult 
encouraged the population to transpose their sublimated drives onto the 
figure of the leader and, by proxy, the state, and thus not to experience 
dissatisfaction at their renunciation of sensuous, earthly pleasure. This 
use of psychoanalytical categories enabled Horkheimer to unearth a dual 
purpose behind the authoritarian state's nurturing of such drive-interalisa- 
tion. Not only were the masses kept under control thus guaranteeing the 
economic position of the dominant social group, but also society was divested 
of any obligation to offer its members material happiness. In this fashion 
mankind was deprived of the ability to complain at its suffering, for the 
masses no longEr"had a psychological need to improve their economic status. 
As a consequence there was little reason for Horkheimer to consicr social 
change a likely occurrence. 
This description of current drive internalisation poses difficulties for 
Horkheimer's analysis of society. If, as a result of drive internalisation, 
people cannot recognize there being a better world inherent in the present 
form of society then surely there is no need for the exhaustive ideological 
apparatus Horkheimer had determined was necessary, for people would never be 
able to penetrate. the web of deceit monopoly capitalism had woven around 
itself. This would only not hold true if the ideological apparatus were 
judged to have brought this stage of drive internalisation about in the first 
place. However, Horkheimer is unclear on precisely this point. 
Horkheimer underpinned his indictment of international monopoly capitalism 
with his other major concern, namely the application of non-identity theory 
to bourgeois philosophy. This he investigated for its ideological content, 
for, viewing philosophy as the bulwark of the thought of any particular era, 
he found it logical that any ideological content he would uncover 
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was just as important for an overview of contemporary ideology as was the 
discussion of drive internalisation. He turned his attention specifically 
to positivism and metaphysics, treating both systems of thought as rep- 
resentations of ideological thought in the transition from liberal to 
international monopoly capitalism. 
9 
Horkheimer claimed that positivism reduced society to its given empirical 
reality and was as a consequence ideological. He based his argument on the 
assumption that positivism regarded every object as empirically measurable 
and thus quantitatively verifiable. In so doing positivism divided reality 
into a quantity of essentially identical entities because these could all 
be reduced to one standard of measurement. Positivism thus implied that 
society was unchanging for such quantification ignored any historically- 
changing qualities inherent'in objects. Furthermore, bq basing verification - 
supposedly the standard of truth - on the repetition of an event, positivism 
had to assume that the world was a constant, harmonious entity. Additionally, 
the x4ght placed on repetition debased all things and events to the level 
of their immediate function overlooking any qualities they might have over 
and above that present function. As a consequence of the approach it took, 
Horkheimer regarded positivism as a method of calculation ('Verstand') 
rather than reasoning. 
By emphasizing the manner in which positivism failed to describe the real 
world, i. e. its non-identity with its claims, Horkheimer highlighted what 
positivism could not perceive and thus was able to outline how positivism 
eulogized the reality of international monopoly capitalism. and denuded that 
reality of any potential for change. In this sense positivism was deeply 
ideological and served not as a science to aid people as a whole but to abet 
the powers that governed society. 
Metaphysics, Horkheimer proposed, tended to obscure reality in a similar 
manner. Unable to find a meaning in reality, metaphysics planted a meaning 
behind reality in the shape of some unifying concept that transcended the 
antagonisms of class society. In so doing, metaphysics assumed that sthstance, 
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i. e reality, was substanceless in its substantiality. As a body of thought 
metaphysics had therefore to be considered solipsistic for it turned reality 
in upon itself, perceiving an ontos within the self beyond history. Horkheimer 
argued that metaphysics' postulation of a single meaning beyond all antagonisms 
was quietistic and conformist in that it condemned everything to always 
remain unchanged in essence, for changes in reality would not effect the 
unifying concept behind reality. Metaphysics thus deprived itself of any 
basis from which it could criticize social injustice. Metaphysics in its 
contemporary forms of Existentialism, 'Lebensphilosophie' and 'Neokantianism 
was, Horkheimer contended, just as ideological as positivism for it too was 
content with society as it was and not only did not view change as possible, 
it also considered social change essentially pointless. 
Unlike positivism or metaphysics, Horkheimer proposed, his variant of hist- 
orical materialism established on the foundation of non-identity theory was 
a correct theory of society. This was the case because his theory preserved 
humanity's real interests in that it viewed objects as being potentially 
rational in the future, e. g. the productive forces could be used for the 
good of all and science would be freed from its servitude to a dominatory 
social system. Reason could be established in society by means of a system 
of planning which would guarantee that technical knowledge and the potential 
of the productive forces would be used fruitfully for the benefit of all. 
10 
In his early essays Horkheimer therefore rejected Pollock's concept of state 
capitalist planning for he envisaged the plan providing the basis for the 
transition to a future classless society. In this sense the theory itself 
could lay claim to being rational and therefore true. 
Horkheimer founded this criticism of international monopoly capitalism on a 
quite 'concrete form of verification, namely whether individuals could act 
on the critique and change socfty. The possible connection that cold be est- 
ablished between theory and action was sufficient in Horkheimer's view to 
demonstrate the correctness of the theory. The fact that individuals were 
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able to interact with reality to bring about social change was made possible 
by non-identity theory's exposure of both the ideological constellations of 
international monopoly capitalist soctty and the objective possibilities for 
a new society which that society nevertheless contained. Horkheimer maintained 
that the majority of'the population' (his term for the proletariat) need 
only understand the existence of this potentiality and its subconscious 
awareness of the nature of capitalism would be activated. His work at this 
point seems to mirror Lukhcs' belief that the proletariat somehow innately 
comprehends capitalism. Unlike Pollock he was optimistic in that he believed 
such a change to be possible. And yet, the presence of drive internalisation 
that Horkheimer had described would surely prevent this social class from 
reaching such a consciousness. 
In summary, it can be said that in the first phase of his work not only did 
Horkheimer show how non-identity theory could be verified, but he also 
claimed that ethically it had to be put into practice, for only via the 
transition to a new society could what was to his mind an otherwise doomed 
society survive. In this context Horkheimer referred to those elements of 
the liberal capitalist superstructure eradicated or endangered by its mono- 
poly capitalist successor, namely the ideals of humanity promulgated during 
the Enlightenment: liberty, fraternity and equality. These could, he proposed 
optimistically, be transformed ('umfunktioniert') by being given real rather 
than ideological meaning as the key properties of a rational society, since 
they would designate integral features of reality. In this new society there 
would no longer be any destructive drives caused by repressed, internalised 
energy, for society would not be based on domination and would therefore no 
longer exact such internalisation from its members. Horkheimer thus claimed 
that non-identity theory was both true and partisan (to the majority of the 
population and therefore to humanity as a whole), and that it was optimistic 
in that it centred itself on proposals for a new, free society. 
1937: 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' 
The second phase of Horkheimer's work consists of one essay for the Zeitschrif 
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namely 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie', often cited as the 'manifesto' 
of the Frankfurt School. 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie'll, does not 
signal a break with Horkheimer's earlier writings but rather a shift in 
subject matter. It provides a thorough elaboration of non-identity theory's 
categories and reveals an underlying difference in tone to the earlier essays. 
While attention must be paid to these new developments, because the ideas 
this programmatic-essay contains are undoubtedly relevant to the Institut(e)'s 
work as a whole, it is worth concentrating on the precise nature of critical 
theory as Horkheimer presented it in the essay. However, there is some diffi- 
culty in depicting critical theory, for in the essay the portrayal of such a 
theory is interwoven with an analysis of what Horkheimer called 'traditional 
theory'. By this he meant science in the Cartesian tradition, vulgar Marxism 
and the various philosophies of late liberal capitalism he had analysed in 
his earlier essays. By including vulgar Marxism in the analysis Horkheimer 
made it clear that he wished historical materialism to reflect on itself 
rather than to accept its epistemology as timeless and unchanging. Owing to 
this overlap with his earlier work in the following discussion of 'Tradition- 
elle und kritische Theorie' and its significance for the Institut(e) only a 
brief summary of the salient points in Horkheimer's critique of 'traditional 
theory' will be offered in order to highlight the properties Horkheimer accor- 
ded to critical theory. 
In 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' Horkheimer took up the fusion of 
non-identity theory and the framework of a Marxist critique of political 
economy where he had left it in the earlier essays. He maintained that such 
an approach was necessary not only to show traditional theory's limitations 
but also to identify the changes in society that had to be taken into account 
by contemporary Marxism. Surprisingly, it has been suggested that Horkheimer's 
earlier essays were 'materialist' (since they were optimistic in their expect- 
ation of social change) but that his later work turned away from such a mode 
of thought after the advent of a fully-fledged Fascist state in Germany. This 
-51- 
interpretation of 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' only provides a 
partial account of the shift in emphasis to which the essay testifies. Where- 
as his earlier essays discussed either explicitly or implicitly the super- 
structure of the 'transitional' period from liberal to monopoly capitalism, 
its relation to the economic base of society and the way in which the two 
interacted and infected the individual, in 'Traditionelle und kritische 
Theorie' Horkheimer sought to analyse the nature of monopoly capitalism 
itself and its implications for a critique of political economy. He devised 
'critical theory' in the light of the conclusions he drew from this 
analysis. 
Horkheimer suggested that traditional theory contented itself simply with 
the collection of data in the form of so-called 'facts' These facts were 
then ordered according to mathematical algorithms. In other words, 'facts', 
be these things or persons, were reduced to mechanical functions from which 
theorems were then derived. Traditional theory therefore had to be viewed 
merely as a system of interactive theorems which regard the world as blind 
material that is only 'knowable' if ordered in accordance with such theorems, 
and is thus bereft of any human influence: Reality was thereby reduced to 
the function of a linear logic. 
12 
As a consequence, a complete division 
arose between traditional theory and the reality it sought to describe, for 
everything in that reality became regarded as a 'rationalized' object of a 
theory which considered itself not to be transcendent of reality in its 
ordering of 'facts'. In this manner, Horkheimer maintained, induction was 
granted an absolute epistemological status. 
Traditional theory therefore, vassolely a mattter of rendering 'facts' 
tangible ('befaßbar'), it could only be interested in both calculation and 
the measurable function of each object, i. e. it regarded things merely in 
terms of quantity and not quality; things were what their quantity was. 
Horkheimer asserted. that this quantity did not differ in essence from the 
exchange value of commodities. Traditional theory was in this sense ideo- 
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logical in that it was self-deceptive; it ignored its own social condition- 
ing. It was also ideological for it disguised science's relationship to the 
productive process and the role this process played in the formation of 
ideology. Traditional theory was additionally ideological for it grounded 
itself in a supposedly 'objective' observer who was 'interest-free' or 
'value-free'. Horkheimer pointed out that such a conception of the scientist 
was untrue, for not only were facts prejudged in their existence bytsociäl' 
forces dominant at a particular time, but the same forces also influenced 
the scientist himself. Traditional theory coupled this conception of a 
'value-free' scientist to an ideological advocacy of the 'naturalness' of 
all laws, whereas many were social in origin. Both the market sode'. ty and 
man's relation to nature were not, however, natural in essence but historical 
and therefore changeable. By viewing all laws as natural, Horkheimer argued, 
traditional theory degraded the 'transcendent' observer and with him 
mankind to the passive role of merely measuring occurrences, not causing 
them. In so doing, Horkheimer continued incisively, traditional theory 
resigned in the face of human praxis and indirectly championed conformism 
to the status quo of monopoly capitalism and its productive apparatus. 
In contradistinction to traditional theory, Horkheimer proposed, critical 
theory assumed all facts - including the very formulation of problems - to 
be d ermined in some way by the social structure of which they were part. 
13 
Such a theory did not, therefore, consider that the theorist, the theory 
or the facts existed in a vacuum; all were elements of the social process. 
In critical theory there was, consequently, no autonomous observer. Equally, 
it could not found itself on logical induction in that it regarded percep- 
tion as socially-mediated, not as ahistorical and abstract. Horkheimer 
located this observation in the very nature of language: 
Es (das Reden) richtet sich gegen, die Annahme eines absoluten, ilber- 
geschichtlichen Subjekts oder gegen die Auswechselbarkeit der Subjekte, 
als ob man sich aus dem gegenwärtigen historischen Augenblick hinaus und 
ganz im Ernst in jeden beliebigen hineinversetzen könnte. 14 
Where critical theory agreed with the traditionalists was in believing that 
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that nothing could be changed within the existing social structure. Hork- 
heimer demonstrated, however, that if the concept of reason were understood 
historically, then the very structure of society could be changed into a 
new, täfioriäl sociäl formätion. 
15 He did not mean that a change in ideas 
could bring about a change in society, but only that a new concept of 
reason could function as the basis of a new society. In such a society the 
present duality of thought and object, which traditional theory took as 
its starting point, would, he submitted, be factually overcome. 
By showing how a future, rational society could be created which obviated 
all misery the critical theorist avoided, Horkheimer maintained, becoming 
bound to the interests of one social class16 and was thus able to retain 
independence from the socially-dominant forces. Significantly, Horkheimer 
did not presume that such an exposition of a future society involved 
allegiance to the proletariat or that this class was the subject-object 
of all knowledge and of true history, as had Lukäcs. The theorist was not, 
as a consequence, bound to a particular historical outlook of the working 
class. 
'7 
Nevertheless, Horkheimer's construction ensures that what the 
theorist speaks of is true and positive, for it shows the possibility of a 
just society based on the intellectual and technical means available. In 
this sense, critical theory cannot be classified as utopian for Horkheimer 
spoke of a real freedom and of the real spontaneity of mankind, by which 
mankind's 'inner' necessity would be fulfilled. 
'8 Indeed, Horkheimer sugg- 
ested that the only remaining constraints on mankind in the future society 
would be the need to produce to survive physically. 
In order to analyse the irrationality of present society Horkheimer used 
'critical concepts' in the manner of non-identity theory - but at the 
level of a critique of knowledge itself, not of particular philosophies. 
To do so he transformed ('umbilden') the meanings of conventional concepts 
by showing their inherent limits and thus forced tham to switch over 
('umschlagen') into concepts critical of the present. He argued, for instance 
that an exhaustive concept of reason could not be fully conceptualised, 
for society had not yet become rational and there was thus no means of 
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knowing what shape full rationality would take. What could be said, however, 
was that the traditional concept of reason, like its object, was man-made 
in origin and therefore historically limited in validity. If this insight 
were taken up into the initial postulation of the concept, then the notion 
of reason would receive a critical edge, because it presented the potential- 
ity within itself: it would indicate the need for a new, truly rational 
society. 
In establishing a tension between concepts (such as 'labour' or 'value') and 
what they were taken to mean by traditional theory, critical theory thus 
passed judgement on present society. This judgement itself had to change as 
society changed in history; nevertheless, the analysis of the underlying 
nature remained, Horkheimer thought, unaltered as long as the economic 
structure of society were to stay constant. Critical concepts thus presented 
a continually unfolding picture of the social totality: 
Allgemeine Kriterien für die kritische Theorie als Ganzes gibt es nicht; 
denn sie beruhen immer auf der Wiederhöluxg von Ereignissen und somit auf 
einer sich selbst reproduzierenden Totalität. 19 
Critical theory could therefore be termed imaginative for it was ever-changing 
and yet always created a constructive image of a real, rational future. In 
this latter sense alone can it be deemed transcendent. 
At the heart of its critique of knowledge, critical theory deployed a 
critique of the object of knowledge, society. It refrained from reducing 
facts to the status of exemplars - as traditional theory did - for not only 
did it highlight the irrational nature of concepts, it also specified that 
the very objects or facts which the concepts described were equally irration- 
al. Because capitalism was based on repression the nature of all objects 
within it was moulded by that oppression. Significantly, Horkheimer argued, 
that nevertheless most colyiectsalways retained an element of reason, since 
they originated in man's struggle with nature for self-preservation, which 
was by definition the basis of all rationality. Because the struggle had 
hitherto been based on the oppression of men by men the objects thus produced 
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had assumed an irrational form - one from which they could, however, be 
freed, Critical theory preserved these objects' rational content, Horkheimer 
claimed, by emphasizing their 'inner' necessity and as a consequence was 
able to show how their irrationality could be discarded in a future society. 
In other words, this future orientation inherent in critical theory not only 
served to prevent the theorist from becoming bound to a historical class 
position, but to ground the critique of knowledge and that of social 
material. 
The extent to which this conception of a future, truly human society 
played a pivotal role in critical theory can be seen by Horkheimer's descrip- 
tion of the relation between nature and mankind. This was intended to 
demonstrate the contradiction between what mankind could be and what it 
was under monopoly capitalism. Horkheimer maintained that because nature 
was chained under mortpoly capitalism to mankind's needs by means of the 
domination of men, relations between people had become completely external- 
ized, i. e. people regarded and treated each other as objects and were-no 
longer able to recognize that they were themselves nature. Horkheimer's 
position resembled that of Lukäcs at this juncture for he viewed this 
externalisation to have become 'second nature' to people(although; unlike 
Lukdcs, he used psychological categories to underpin this category). The 
workers' immediate experience of the work process, Horkheimer sggested, was 
suppressed by this second nature as a result. of various psychological 
mechanisms, so that people were unable to perceive the alienated character 
of the fruits of their labour. However, he parted company with Lukäcs in 
suggesting that the continued presence of this second nature meant that 
the proletariat could no longer be viewed as a harbinger of change, i. e. 
as a revolutionary agent per se. It is this point that has led some commen- 
tators to regard Horkheimer's writings as un-Marxist, despite the fact that 
he had pointed out that: 
Wenn auch die Elementerderr zukünftigen Kultur schon vorhanden sind, 




In the light of this remark one must conclude that if Horkheina wa; un-Mirxist 
at this stage in his writings this was because he was no longer believed 
Marx's political analysis to be accurate. 
Horkheimer proposed that in order to realign Marx's political standpoint 
with the contemporary state of affairs, critical theory had to strive to 
penetrate to the level of the real facts if the ideology that cemented the 
otherwise deeply sundered social fabric together was to be countatd. Only 
with such knowledge at its disposal could humanity , he assrted, at some 
point constitute itself as the subject of society and undertake a new 
construction, not a modification, of the economy which was at the centre 
of society. This new, less optimistic view both of the political power of 
the working class and of the manner in which the economy could function 
in a future society would seem to indicate that Horkheimer had started 
to take Pollock's work into account, for more orthodox Marxist economists 
merely suggested that the same productive forces could be used by the 
working class to lay the foundations for socialism. 
21 Using the same 
productive forces would simply mean, in Hörkheimer s eyes, continuing the 
domination of mankind under a different social structure and would be no 
guarantee of freedom, for a planned, structured use of such productive 
forces had resulted only in a new form of capitalism, namely its state 
variant. In other words, in 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' Horkheimer 
came to the conclusion that the domination of nature and man by man 
lay deeply rooted in the productive forces themselves. 
Whereas this conclusion was quite unheard of in Marxism, Horkheimer's des- 
cription of monopoly capitalism's economy was completely in line with main- 
stream Marxism at the time. In 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' he made 
a series of observations on the economy which did not, tally with Pollock's 
work. Society, Horkheimer maintained, was based on the e, change principle, 
according to which goods were produced and exchanged as commodities, i. e. 
for profit and not for the good of all. 
22 Because, he continued, this 
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principle led to a sharpening of social relations and to the creation of 
an oppressive culture, society could not be deemed rational. Whereas this 
general analysis still accorded with Pollock's views, Horkheimer disregarded 
Pollock's proposal the-crises could be surmounted by capitalism: 
... wie die Tauschwirtschaft bei der gegebenen und sich freilich unter 
ihrem Einfluß-verändernden Beschaffenheit von Menschen und Dingen/... / 
ohne daß ihre eigenen, von der fachlichen Nationalökonmie dargestellten 
Prinzipien durchbrochen würden, notwendig zur Verschärfung der gesell- 
schaftlichen Gegensätze führen muß, die in der gegenwärtigen geschicht- 
lichen Epoche zu Kriegen und Revolutionen treibt. 23 
Horkheimer clearly still believed that the economic base of society could 
not be structured by a plan in such a manner as to prevent the development 
of crises, whereas Pollock held that the political sphere could keep crises 
in check and had thus become the motor of society. Horkheimer continued to 
speak of the economic base in classical Marxist terms: 
Die Festigkeit der Theorie rührt daher, daß bei allem Wandel der Gesell- 
schaft doch ihre grundlegende Struktur, das Klassenverhältnis in seiner 
einfachsten Gestalt, und damit auchdie Idee seiner Aufhebung identisch 
bleibt. 24 
Nevertheless, by insisting that socialisation could not be adequately 
explained simply by citing the direct overall influence of the economy, 
he managed to avoid collapsing critical theory into an economistic version 
of Marxism. 
25 
It remains unc]ear whether Horkheimer intended his readers to understand the 
"sharpening" of which he spoke to have occurred within the institutions of 
the superstructure as well or not. If this were indeed his intention then 
his analysis would in a sense accept one of Pollock's tenets, namely that 
the superstructure had been altered to such an extent that social change 
was possible within the political sphere. Since Horkheimer claimed that as 
long as the exchange principle dominated the substructure, changes in 
society could be traced in social institutions and in society's ideology, 
any acceptance of Pollock's thesis would be reflected in Horkheimer's analy- 
sis of such changes. A portrayal of the changes he detected is therefore 
central to an understanding of the alteration in the emphasis of non-identity 
theory that 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' represented. 
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Under monopoly capitalism, Horkheimer claimed, power and influence over 
the whole of society had become vested in the administration and judiciary, 
both of which were controlled by an increasingly small number of industrial 
and political leaders and their followers. 
26 Furthrmore, the independent 
owners of capital (who formed the backbone of liberal capitalism) had ceased 
to exist. Horkheimer supposed that a masa_gerialbureacracy supervised the 
sphere of production so that individual owners of capital no longer played 
any direct part in this process; even their role as owners of capital had 
been usurped, namely by the banks. Horkheimer argued that by partial nation- 
alisation ('Verstaatlichung') state intervention in the economy had aided 
this decline in the social influence of the majority of independent owners 
of capital. 
Horkheimer propounded the view that this change in the social hic=hy occur- 
red simultaneously with the advent of a new ideology, namely the idolisation 
of the 'great personality', which, in turn, lent support to the new leaders 
or managers of society. 
27 This ideology also espoused the virtue of a 
'community of all', the 'Volk', and in so doing overthrew the last vestiges 
of a liberal ideology of individualism. If there were no independent owners 
of capital left in the authoritarian state and if for similar reasons 
individual rights had been suspended, then, Horkheimer averred, not only had 
monopoly capitalism reached a stage of maturity and eradicated liberalism, 
but it had also erected a 'closed society'. At this point his analysis once 
again verged on adopting Pollock's notion of state capitalism. 
Horkheimer interpreted the existence of a closed society to mean that it was 
now possible to derive people's attitudes directly from 'mass' beliefs dis- 
seminated to them by the ruling bureaucracy. 
28 In other words, attitudes 
could no longer be derived meaningfully from a specific economic and there- 
fore class position. Rather critical theory had to assume that class conscious 
ness existed only in the broadest terms of there being a class of dominators 
and a class of the dominated. Indeed, the dominated individuals probably did 
not even have an awareness of their true interests for value systems were no 
longer individual in any meaningful sense but instead were cultivated from 
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above. Critical theory thus analysed the superstructure as being solely 
responsible for the formation of attitudes of conformity in the population. 
The superstructure had been delegated the role of such mass persuasion pre- 
cisely because the stability of the base had to be preserved in a time 
when crises continually threatened it. This pessimistic assessment of indiv- 
iduality was to have dire consequences for critical theory. 
Whereas the existence of the #1ividual in liberal capitalism had allowed 
the critical theorist to postulate a possible new society by means of 
determinate negation based on the praxis of individuals, monopoly capitalism 
not only invalidated the very basis of such an analysis of ideology critique 
itself, in so doing it also deprived critical theory of any addressee. 
Critical theory avoided allegiance to any one particular class position not 
only for epistemological reasons but also because it believed such class 
positions to have ceased to exist. 
Horkheimer had started from the assumption that critical theory had to be 
altered to take account of the changes it detected in society. His assertion 
that the ruling bureaucracy directed culture, a conception whichieveals a 
close connection Pollock's work, indicates that in his view a change in the 
relation between base and superstructure had come about which critical 
theory had to take into account. Indeed, he stated towards the end of 
'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie': 
Der Begriff der Abhängigkeit des Kulturellen vom Ökonomischen hat sich 
daher verändert /... /Die Erklärungen sozialer Phänomene werden einfacher 
und zugleich komplizierter. Einfacher, weil das Ökonomische unmittelbarer 
und bewußter die Menschen bestimmt und die relative Widerstandskraft und 
Substantialität der Kultursphären im Schwinden begriffen ist, kompliz- 
ierter, weil die entfesselte ökonomische Dynamik, zu deren bloßen Medien 
die meisten Individuen erniedrigt sind, in raschem Tempo immer neue 
Gestalten und Verhängnisse zeitigt. 29 
Horkheimer had - in his earlier essays - conceived of the superstructure 
(the configuration which culture inhabits) as being semi-independent of the 
base. Although its content was determined primarily by the economic sphere, 
it was judged to interact with the latter, influencing the manner-in which 
the base functioned. 30 That is to say, it had a positive side, for it could 
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Deserve positive ideals within its domain which could be realized in the 
founding of a new society. However, Horkheimer held the superstructure's 
function and determination to have changed-in the era of the authoritarian 
state, for it was no longer independent of the economic base. Rather, the 
superstructure appeared to be completely determined and defined by the 
latter's daily needs. While the superstructure acted in independence of 
immediate economic needs and constraints in its enforcement of conformity, 
this very task was itself 'dictated by the base. This being the case, depict- 
ing the irrationality of present objects became easier,. but presenting a 
portrait of how their non-identity could be overcome became more difficult, 
for it could no longer be anchored in the closed society. 
Horkheimer's analysis of society in 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' 
is thus remarkably similar to that ventured by Pollock. Only one major 
difference separated the two men's respective positions. Horkheimer was 
still not prepared to accept that the base was thoroughly organised and no 
longer prone to crises, i. e. he wished to retain a theory of value, the 
theoretical basis for a negation of society at a time when there was nobody 
to act on it. Nevertheless, the change Horkheimer noted in society was of 
sufficient importance for him to challenge a purely economistic theory of 
society and to try and reground an historical materialist epistemology 
(hence the global overtones of the essay). However, he clearly felt that it 
no longer sufficed for critical theory simply to identify the potential for 
a new society in the old, the task he had undertaken optimistically in his 
earlier essays, for critical theory was now bereft both of an addressee 
and of any basis for determinate negation. All critical theory could do, 
Horkheimer declared, was to speculate that, as the economy now visibly- 
functioned only in favour of a small minority, the chance was greater than 
before that people might notice this bias. 
31 The reason that this had not 
as yet taken place Horkheimer attributed circuituously to the presence of 
the authoritarian state's repressive cultural apparatus. The exact nature 
of the authoritarian state and its cultural apparatus and the implications 
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these had for ideology critique and non-identity theory were to be the 
subject of investigation in the essays he wrote after 1937. 
1938 - 1942 
In the third phase of Horkheimer's writings for the Zeitschrift/Studies, 
his essays follow the trend established by 'Traditionelle und kritische 
Theorie', in that they vacate the position adopted in the early articles 
and move increasingly into line with Pollock's work. In the discussion of 
this third phase two essays will be referred to which were published in a 
special mimeographed edition of the Studies in 1942, 'Autoritärer Staat' 
and 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung'. Although these fall outside the parameter: 
we have set, they are vital to an understanding of the turn critical theory 
takes in this third phase. Following Horkheimer's attempt to construct a 
systematic epistemology that took into account, explained and criticized 
the character of the base and superstructure of monopoly capitalism, the 
third phase tied into the discussions on society being conducted at that 
time in the Institut(e) at Morningside Heights. These centred on Pollock's 
suggestion that National Socialist Germany constituted an example of state 
capitalism, and that the new order of fascism could only be understood in 
the light of this. 
Although the nine essays Horkheimer wrote in this period will be treated as 
one body of thought, there is a noticeable difference in tone between the 
seven essays written for the Zeitschrift/Studies and the two from the 
mimeographed edition. 
32 This is attributable to the different functions the 
two sets of essays have. The first group presents an attempt to determine 
the factual and ideational structure of the authoritarian state in a manner 
stylistically reminiscent of Horkheimer's earlier work (althougithe last of 
these. partly goes beyond this frame of reference). The two later articles 
apply critical theory to the authoritarian state's social structure. At the 
same time they examine to what extent the concepts used in non-identity 
theory still have any critical edge and question whether indeed a stage of 
-62- 
history had been reached where it was no longer possible to construct 
antithetical concepts that both described material reality and simultaneously 
indicated a future society. - 
In the last of these essays, 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung', Horkheimer 
established that non-identity theory was faced with an internal barrier posed 
by a change in its material and which its concepts could not overcome. As 
a consequence he started to develop a new critical concept that regained the 
transcendent element non-identity theory had lost, namely the concept of domi- 
nation understood as instrumental reason. This does not mean to say that 
Horkheimer abandoned a Marxist conception of society, but rather he now 
placed the domination of nature by means of the domination of men as opposed 
to the domination of men by economic processes in the foreground of his 
social theory. 
The first two essays of this period demonstrate the change to a totalitarian 
state that Horkheimer meanwhile believed had taken place; the skepticism of 
Montaigne and the loss of economic function the Jews had experienced. are 
both used to describe symbolically this change, the former from the point of 
view of the superstructure, the latter from that of the base. Horkheimer 
portrayed contemporary culture by studying the manner in which skepticism 
had changed in function under the authoritarian state33 from that which it 
had exercised in liberal bourgeois culture. Skepticism, Horkheimer maintained, 
as practised in the authoritarian state, was similar to the usage of such 
thought in Absolutist times, for it declared the certain existene and in- 
telligibility only of the self, thus favouring a retreat from the world into 
the inner self. This self-centredness relieved the individual of any oblig- 
ation to make value judgements and therefore paved the way for a passive 
acceptance of the prevailing order of society. The skepticism of Absolutism 
was thus analogous to the ideology of the authoritarian state, Horkheimer 
suggested, for they both degraded individual inquiry and cognition to the 
status of social conformity. In this manner the concept of skepticism is 
taken in Horkheimer's later work to symbolize the nature of the authoritarian' 
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state's superstructure. 
That the concept of skepticism only had symbolic validity and that the 
authoritarian state's social structure could not be equated with the 
ideologies by which it rationalised itself was a point underlined in all 
Horkheimer's essays of the third period. Horkheimer remarked, for example: 
"Wer aber vom Kapitalismus nicht reden will, sollte auch vom Faschismus 
schweigen. "34 In other words, a criticism of ideologies alone was - regard- 
less of the change in society that may have come about - not a critique 
of that society in the strict sense of the word, unless it were to be coupled 
with a criticism of the base for ideologies could not be regarded as prime 
causes of change. 
In order to provide the basis for a critique of contemporary society Hork- 
heimer undertook to examine why the authoritarian state had become necessary. 
Importantly, he judged Pollock's concept of state capitalism to be the 
contemporary form of the authoritarian state: "Der Staatskapitalismus ist 
der autoritäre- Staat der Gegenwart., 
35 He chose to speak of the 'authorit- 
arian state' for this term included the USSR as well as Western Europe and 
and the U. S. A., all societies he considered forms of statism, and he thus 
extended the frame of reference of Pollock's concept. The most rational 
form of statism, Horkheimer suggested, would be 'state socialism'. He dis- 
tinguished this, however, from the social structure prevalent in the USSR, 
for he argued that there wage-earners and the profit-motive continued to 
exist in a manner as oppressive as the role they played in capitalist 
societies. The most irrational form of statism Horkheimer, like Pollock, 
held to be fascism, which he understood to be the contemporary form of state 
capitalism, i. e. he attributed fascism's occurrence in Europe purejyýto 
capitalism's needs. Without fascism, capitalism would not be able to continue 
to exist. 
36 
The base had necessitated a complete change in the content of the 
superstructure. 
This acceptance of Pollock's work is to be encountered in the space Hork- 
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heimer reserved in his later essays for an analysis of the causation under- 
lying the genesis of fascism. In late bourgeois society, he claimed, invest- 
ment was no longer followed by an automatic increase in profit. At the same 
time, the number of workers decreased as a result of the technological 
developments that created mass production, a process that had gradually led 
to unemployment and social dissatisfaction as well as the production of 
socially unnecessary goods in the attempt to reap profits anew. These reasons 
are almost identical to those Pollock gave as the origins of state capital- 
ism. Horkheimer suggested, as Pollock had also done, that these factors had 
led to the authoritarian state being brought into existence in order to con- 
trol social unrest and to extend society's power over all individuals. The 
state of state capitalism was akin to that of monopoly capitalism; it was 
composed of political and bureaucratic elites under one leader. The differ- 
ence between the two lay, in Horkheimer's opinion, in the fact that to 
achieve the regulation of the economy for which they had been appointed, the 
rulers exploited the 'masses' in a planned manner according to prior agree- 
ment. In this fashion the authoritarian state directed the economy, guaran- 
teeing the acquiescence of the labour force, the presence of consumers, the 
continued realisation of profit and the requisite investment necessary for 
technological progress. 
In keeping with Pollock's theory Horkheimer maintained furthermore that the 
authoritarian state dispensed with a market, thus eliminating crises caused 
by over-production or underconsumption. (Horkheimer argued that consequently 
the power' of money declined, a detail missing in Pollock's work. ) The logical 
basis of this argument as that the economy no longer possessed an independent 
dynamic of its own. for interaction between economic and political spheres 
had become complete. The superstructure used the political and bureaucratic 
power vested in it by the base to organize thoroughly the composition of the 
latter; in other words the superstructure controlled and regulatai_the base. 
The two were, to Horkheimer's mind, at once distinct spheres and yet simul- 
taneously form a unity. The dialectic of base and superstructure suggested 
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in Horkheimer's earlier essays is now synthesized in a manner he could 
only view with great concern. 
Despite the fact that in this conception competition could occur only on 
the world market, Horkheimer proposed that state capitalist society must 
be described as being in permanent crisis for the productive forces were 
utterly subjugated to the planners and not unleashed for the good of all. 
In this fashion-Horkheimer attempted to smuggle a standard of critical 
measurement into the analysis of state capitalism so as to avoid Pollock's 
all too linear conception. He therefore concentrated on delineating a con- 
cept he believed lay at the heart of the authoritarian state and that re- 
vealed it as an antagonistic unity. 
The false equality of liberal capitalism was now forced, Horkheimer proposed, 
to to show what its true basis was, namely domination. This was to be seen 
in the fact that the authoritarian state commanded the population37 and 
enforced brutal relations of production in that it coerced labour into 
submitting to industry's needs. Conformism to this society was the price 
each individual had to pay for physical survival. To assure the uninter- 
rupted success of such conformism the state kept society in a conditionof 
'permanent mobilization', using external or internal dangers as a pretext 
for this. 
38 Individuals now existed, Horkheimer claimed, solely to react 
to such commands; they were degraded to the status of being 'single people' 
rather than individuals, 
39 for individuality in terms of a cohesive person- 
ality was destroyed by this need to conform. Equality and individuality thus 
had meaning only in terms of each person being an abstract unit of labour 
power. Everyone had an equal right to try and assert their own social value 
or usefulness to the planners, the latter being the only social group with 
a (usurped) right to exist. Consequently, mankind became a collective 
appendage to the social process rather than being its centre. 
40 Human life 
had become a coefficient of economic value, survival being brought about 
not by an interaction of the individual and society but by the former, con- 
-66- 
cluding its peace with the state and bowing to its directives. What is more, 
the individual could contemplate only immediate survival and as a conse- 
quence was deprived of a sense of the past or the future so necessary for 
the construction of an image of a new society. 
Having thus pursued Pollock's findings through to their logical conclusion, 
namely that individuality had been destroyed, Horkheimer suggested that 
as a result human beings no longer possessed any psychological unity. Under 
the authoritarian state, Horkheimer proposed, people had ceased to develop 
a personality in the sense of a self-consciousness; rather the retention of 
a specific character by a person had become purely accidental. This process 
was furthered by the authoritarian state's abolition of the distinction 
between 'private' and 'public' spheres. The hallmark of this distinction 
had been debate in one's free time in the now redundant market place. In the 
absence of both, Horkheimer argued, a decline in reflective and discursive 
thought, in the Freudian 'ego', had set in. The direct intervention of the 
state in the form of commands in the private sphere fragmented the psycho- 
logical personality already weakenend by the loss of the public sphere. The 
state, or the 'collective', by which Horkheimer understood a large peer 
group, usurped the role of the family in socialisation. In this manner 
psychological values were instilled directly in the individual by the 
state. People were thus 'administered' and their 'ego' preformed biological- 
ly, for the collective, having overthrown the family, now took charge of 
the Freudian 'super-ego' .41 All objects in the child's environment were 
pre-ordered by the state before the child could reach consciousness. 
Horkheimer concluded that freedom - especially freedom of thought - had. 
to be judged a thing of the past. Accordingly, ideology could no longer be 
regarded as a constellation of ideas promoted by the dominators publicly, 
but now had to be considered a set of values inculcated in the psychic 
structure of each person. The concept of freedom used by critical theory 
had thus to be changed to signify freedom from society. Equally, the criti- 
que of ideology had to be refounded using psychological categories and yet 
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these had become somewhat meaningless in anything but a metaphorical sense 
in that the psychological constitution of the individual had been found 
to be so drastically curbed. - 
Conformism and complete obliteration of any form of freedom, Horkheimer 
emphasized, were also sustained psychologically in another manner. Each 
person was forced to live in fear, in fear of the state, a fear which, more- 
over, bound them still further to the state. To counteract the fear of 
their dispensability - for they were but economic units of labour - each 
person identified with the state, cultivating within themselves a 'fear of 
freedom' as Erich Fromm termed it. To ensure the continual presence of 
this fear, Horkheimer argued, the state nurtured within people the belief 
that there could be no happiness in any other time or space than the present, 
so that the fear of losing what the person still possessed came to complete- 
ly dominate their thought. Horkheimer remarked: "The collapse of reason 
and the collapse of individuality are one and the same. "42 The loss. of any 
freedom of thought meant that there could be no rationality of the individ- 
ual, and consequently no rationality to which critical theory could appeal. 
Although Horkheimer was forced by his own logic to concede that two of 
the main planks of critical theory - its standards of rationality and of 
ideology critique - now seemed somewhat redundant, he was not prepared to 
abandon his theory. He undertook instead to search for elements in the 
authoritarian state's social structure which retained some particle of 
reason, i. e. elements that somehow contained an 'inner' necessity realizable 
in a future society. His last two essays, 'Autoritärer Staat' and 'Vernunft 
und Selbsterhaltung' form the backbone of this project. 
He began by attempting to determine whether the economic base of the author- 
itarian state offered any potential for change. Under state capitalism, he 
claimed, social change was in fact more possible than ever before, because 
economic questions had simply become questions of technical mastery and 
of efficient planning. A positive plan, he argued, could emerge which 
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which abolished the universality of domination and repression and estab- 
lished in its stead a free community of individuals. 
Although critical theory thus regained a conception of an alternative, 
rational society, it simultaneously forfeited the ability to foresee social 
change. In the presence of a plan the economy could not be expected to col- 
lapse as such as as a consequence there was no reason why a positive society 
should be brought about. Economic crises, for example, could now only be 
anticipated in the case of the planners being so inefficient as to cause 
a decrease in productivity on such a large scale that it effected eveyone's 
daily lives. Even this, Horkheimer pointed out, was a tenuous basis for 
change, for in the absence of a market terms such as productivity no bnger 
had any meaning. Furthermore, such an'economic crisis would have no real 
effect on the durability and stability of such a society because only world 
market fluctuations could create a major internal economic crisis of suffi- 
cient proportions to serve as an impetus for chance 
Horkheimer took great pains to establish that revolutionary change could 
not be effected within the existing social formation. A qualitative change 
signified for him a leap out of the linear history of a society into a com- 
pletely new society, Refashioning the existing social structure, e. g. by 
electing proletarian planners, would not therefore create qualitative change. 
Nevertheless, Horkheimer maintained paradoxically, state capitalism was 
the last stage of capitalist history before this leap because of the resour- 
ces it had developed for planning in a future society. These two statements 
are mutually contradictory. By failing to see the very economy of capitalism 
as capitalist - although he claimed that the productive forces were by defi- 
nition dominatory - Horkheimer traps himself in a vicious circle. He can 
only-assert that proletarian planners could not effect a qualitative change 
in society because he has deprived himself of the ability to state what 
economic basis a new society would have. Worse still, he implies that the 
new society would use the resources developed by the old, dominatory 
society. This is reflected in his empty assertion that critical theory could 
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not pinpoint when a leap into the new would occur but only that it was poss- 
ible; it also could not anticipate what such a leap would be like. 
The idea of a leap into a new society is itself very tenuous logically, for 
it would only be possible if people attain a consciousness of the ideological 
nature of reality. Horkheimer submitted that such an awareness was indeed 
possible, because each person was now forced to work only for their own 
survival. However, this claim is incompatible with his own analysis of the 
demise of individuality. Horkheimer tried to make a virtue out of this neces- 
sity by suggesting that the notion that one was working for one's fellow 
beings. no longer existed and that this freed thought: 
Vereinzelt sind alle. Die verdrossene Sehnsucht der atomisierten Massen 
und der bewußte Wille der Illegalen weist in dieselbe Richtung. 43 1 
Somehow Horkheimer hoped that material immiseration might free the individ- 
ual's outlook from its imprisonment in ideological generalities and psycho- 
logical fragmentation. In the final instance, nevertheless, this vestige of 
hope was dashed, for Horkheimer had himself to accept that any awareness 
gained would remain ineffectual. The base and superstructure had become 
welded into a hermetically sealed unity which permitted no one so much as 
a chink through which to see out towards a better, more human society. 
44 
Horkheimer claimed that in addition to their material immiseration 
another factor might cause people to conceive of social change. The harsh 
reality of state capitalist production relations, he proposed, was now 
experienced directly and not, as before, masked by a veil of illusion. The 
owners of the means of production were now clearly represented by the lea- 
ders of society and ideology was revealed to be mere 'appearance'. However, 
Horkheime'qualified this source of hope by suggesting that any potental for 
change this might entail would be negated by the fact that fascism needed 
no appearance. Fascism was able to survive without an ideology precisely 
because of its form of domination. The brutal existence it meted out to the 
population sufficed as ideology. Perversely, the masses were blinded by their 
very freedom from ideology, i. e. by their instrumentalisation in the work 
process and by the fact that their existence was totally dependent on 
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economic chance: 
In der Planwirtschaft werden die Menschen noch unbeschränkter vom 
Produktionsmittel beherrscht als auf dem Umweg über den Markt. 45 
Whereas Horkheimer argued that the authoritarian state could be countered 
if people were able to identify and speak of what life was like, he had 
nevertheless to concede that only critical theory itself was able to arti- 
culate the possibility of the new, i. e. the unspoken truth of the old. 
The circuitous logic both of Horkheimer's conception of a new society and 
his grounding of social change is mirrored in the other main area studied 
in his later essays. Despite his exhortative assertions on the absence of 
an ideology, paradoxically Horkheimer nevertheless described the function 
of a specific ideological apparatus in the authoritarian state, namely 
'mass culture'. He dttinguished 'mass culture' from culture as the sum 
total of social processes and from art, which he considered to be the nar- 
row meaning of culture. 'Mass culture', as a concept, was applicable in his 
eyes to most variants of the authoritarian state as is evidenced by the fact 
that he provided exmples selected from Western Europe and the U. S. A. (altho- 
ugh not from the USSR). Mass culture's main function, he stipulated, was to 
supervise leisure time and to manipulate people's pleasure in the guise of 
offering them 'popular entertainment'. Since there was no market, the supply 
of such ' entertainment' (the word has negative connotations in Horkheimer's 
work) and demands for it could be regulated by the authoritarian state's 
controllers. Popularity, or what people wanted or disliked, was a predeter- 
mined property. If popularity was directed from above then the concepts of 
form and content normally used to analyse culture had become redundant, for 
mass culture had to be studied not as art, but as a system of mechanisms of 
psychological persuasion. Horkheimer propounded the view that the study of 
mass culture had therefore to become the study of the creation of values, 
of ideology. He neglected, however, to analyse specifically how these 
effects were achieved and restricted himself instead to sketching a theoret- 
ical outline of the shape these mechanisms took. 
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Horkheimer decided that mass culture invaded the private sphere in two ways. 
First of all, it infected and impeded the individual's psycho-social develop- 
ment at so early a stage that no 'inner' self could be constituted, with the 
result that the mind - the refuge that had offered the possibility of thinking 
differently - was destroyed as an independent entity. This left no space for 
the imagination to act as a harbour for non-conformist thought and thus cut 
the imagination off from reality and from any ability to project a different 
society. Additionally, mass culture's system of language contributed to this 
destruction of the private sphere. The language it used consisted of signs 
intended for immediate orientation, not for communication. 
46 
The individual 
had to endeavour to utilize these signs so as to be able to conform. People 
were, as a consequence, deprived of any level of social communication for not 
only did they identify with mass culture in order to survive, but in so doing 
were no longer able to communicate with each other. Thus, the ability to 
discuss and change things via true communication was lost. 
Horkheimer considered mass culture to be the opposite of art, for mass culture 
promulgated a completely untrue view of the world and destroyed any vision of 
a different world. Horkheimer centred this argument on mass culture's concern 
with 'marketable' literature, radio and cinema, 
47 
because he held these to go 
against the grain of art. Since he believed the market to have been abolished, 
this notion of 'marketable' cultural products is somewhat obscure. One must 
assume that Horkheimer intended the concept to serve as an antonym to that of 
traditional bourgeois art, which was not mass-produced and therefore was not 
produced solely to be sold. (It is debatable whether this was indeed the case). 
Horkheimer may also have wished to use the concept to highlight the repetitive 
character of mass culture's products and thus undermine its claim of unique- 
ness for its products. 
48 
The approach Horkheimer adopted with his concept of mass culture has decisive 
limitations, for he drifts into generalisations which he fails to back up 
with an analysis of what constituted mass culture or the 'culture industry' 
-72- 
as he termed it, or of how this actually functioned. Rather, he asserted 
the specificity of his analysis with statements such as the following: 
"What today is called popular entertainment is actually demands evoked, man- 
ipulated and by implication deteriorated by the cultural industries. " 
49 
Equally, Horkheimer neither differentiated between mass culture's form 
under German Fascism and the shape it took in the USA, nor did he describe 
the role the planners played in it. The basis of the ideological apparatus 
and its real connection to the purposes of the superstructure, of which it 
had become so vital a part, is left unelucidated. Theory cannot, however, 
ignore the relation to the superstructure or regard mass culture purely as 
an empirical quantity and thus as unsuited to a philosophical discussion of 
the role of mass culture. Horkheimer's brief remarks on the marketable 
character of mass culture hardly provide the basis for a theoretical dis- 
cussion of mass culture. 
Since Horkheimer judged the relation between base and superstructure - and 
thus also that between mass culture and the base - to be hermetically 
sealed we can deduce that he believed mass culture's products to just be 
the extended arm of the authoritarian state. They were in his eyes simply 
commodities and admitted of no intimation of a different state, because 
they served only the use of the dominators, both in form and content: they 
were mere appearance without any essence. However, such a conclusion is 
hardly in the vein of non-ident# theory, nor of ideology critique, for we 
do not know from Horkheimer's analysis either how ideology is imparted, or 
indeed what stereotypy or identification is encouraged in the consumers 
of mass cultural products. Thus, mass culture would seem to resist the 
theoretical instruments Horkheimer had used to assess society, for all he 
was able to decide was that mass culture somehow generated conformism. His 
analysis - and with it this last variant of critical theory - remained 
morphological; it described mass culture's shape, but without subjecting 
that form to 'critique' in the sense in which he had used the term until 
then. 
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In his last two essays of the period, Horkheimer investigated the form in 
which people under state capitalism were repressed by mass culture. Mass 
culture, he presumed, was so effective a-means of enforcing conformism 
because it constitut2d a 'seamless' ('lückenlos') portrait of reality, pre- 
venting people from seeing reality in any other way. 
50 As a consequence, 
the mass dissemination of information mass culture effected had a wholly 
negative character. Horkheimer stated of its effect: "Die Menschen werden 
allseitig ausgebildet und verstümmelt. "S1 He sought to ascertain whether 
in this harshest form of the domination of nature by means of the domina- 
tion of man there was any modicum of reason left, i. e. any basis that 
could restore a critical, dialectical edge to his analysis. Only imagination, 
he determined, could penetrate through to the kernel of state capitalist 
domination. Whereas change now depended solely on the human will necessary 
to put it into practice - the condition for it being at hand - thought was 
either crippled by mass culture or exiled to the realm of pure thought and 
was unable to grasp the possibility. Regardless of these external and in- 
ternal constraints on it, Horkheimer was adamant that imagination was the 
only possible fount of freedom and reason. However, the fear inculcated 
in all individuals of their dispensability prevented the imaginiion from 
having any effect. Horkheimer observed that: "Die Intention auf Freiheit ist 
beschädigt. , 52 If freedom was in jeopardy as an idea and only to be resur- 
rected in the imagination, then the concept of reason that had been the 
sine qua non of critical theory, and indeed non-identity theory, was also 
in danger of losing any validity it might have possessed. 
Horkheimer was only too aware of this problem. His last essays written for 
the Institut(e) accord a central place to the refounding of a philosophical 
concept of reason. Reason, he suggested, was the balance struck between 
individual and societal interests. (This was the way the concept had been 
understood in Kantian and Hegelian epistemologies. ) By means of reason the 
individual mastered socially rebellious feelings and yet also ensured its 
self-preservation: a balance was reached between a person's individuality 
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and their social character. Whereas Freud's psycho-anthropological inter- 
pretation of society relied on the eternal necessity of such a repression 
of feelings, Horkheimer envisaged a state where such self-mastery need 
not be negative. He submitted, however, that historically speaking society 
had always dominated the individual. Although the advent of bourgeois 
society had partially re-weighted this relationship, bourgeois society had 
remained a class society whose members did not, therefore, all participate 
in reason. Without going into the details of Horkheimer's elaboration of 
this point (where he leans heavily on Weberian sociology), it suffices 
to say that he proposed that self-preservation, the basis of reason, became 
voluntary conformism in bourgeois society, without all individuals receiv- 
ing an equal share of social wealth as reward for their conformity. Reason 
could thus be used to demonstrate philosophically and in psycho-social terms 
(such as the Protestant work ethic) the irrationality, and with it the 
ideological nature, of society. 
The concept lost its heuristic power when used. to analyse fascism, however, 
for self-preservation had become complete compliance to the state; the 
individual was faced by a heteronomous apparatus of immediate domination: 
"Die Ideologie liegt... in der Beschaffenheit der Menschen selbst...,, 
53 
The balance between individual and society had been decided in complete 
favour of the latter, and thus destroyed. Psychological introjection in 
response to external stimuli was no longer necessary; indeed, people no 
longer needed to develop a conscience . Furthermore, any notion of a 
future - even in terms of possession and inheritance - became redundant if 
54 the ihdividual could be exterminated at any moment. Self-preservation was 
transformed from being an attempt to achieve happiness to being a question 
only of survival, as part of an inhuman culture. Self-preservation had 
itself been reduced to irrationality. 
With the demise 'of the individual's autonomy in social, psychological and 
philosophical terms, reason as a concept thus becomes pointless. Horkheimer 
reiterated what he had stated a few years before, now not as a proposition, 
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but as a statement of fact: "Der Verfall der Vernunft und der des Individuums 
1ý 
sind eines. "55 There was neither an agent left to enact reason by changing 
society nor did individuals possess a consciousness of self which could 
serve as the basis for dissatisfaction with society. It was consequently 
questionable, Horkheimer suggested, whether society still retained any 
inner elements of reason at all. He therefore termed the authoritarian 
state 'the end-of reason' and proposed: "The new order of Fascism is Reason 
revealing itself as un-reason. "56 His last two essays thus affirmed the 
position adopted in Pollock's work by judging fascism both to be founded 
on a new social structure and to be based on the same rationality as had 
originally formed the foundation of capitalism. 
In Horkheimer's opinion if individials were left free time to recognise their 
own real dispensability then society's 'un-reason' would become obvious to 
them. Whereas this statement accords with the second phase in his work, 
the conclusions he drew from it were new. The authoritarian state, he 
maintained, endeavoured to prevent this happening by replacing the anachron- 
istic ideology of money and individual possession with an ideology of tech- 
nology. The rationality that during the Enlightenment had attempted to 
harness nature to mankind's - and liberal capitalism's - needs became 
completely one-sided in that it ignored its human origins. Enlightenment 
rationality revealed its true character, namely a 'purposive rationality' 
('Zweckrationalität') which treated means (e. g. technology) as ends in 
themselves. An historical stage had been reached with the unfolding of this 
ideological rationality, Hockheimer., asserted, in which either barbarism 
would continue to reign indefinitely or else a truly free society would 
prevail. 
57 
Critical theory could only react to the collapse of reason by criticizing 
this concept itself, by uncovering how and why it had become one-sided. In 
this manner, critical theory sought to preserve the independence so necess- 
ary if the grasp of the closed, planned society was to be resisted. Only 
by repeatedly identifying the antagonisms of a social reality that purportedlll, 
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to have none could critical theory (and by implication the unrealized 
ideals od the Enlightenment) be kept alive. Hockheimer attempted to achieve 
this by continually reasserting rhetorically the possibility of reason 
being put into practice to create a society not founded on virulent 
social divisions and in which a liberating identity of individual and soc- 
iety could reign. 
He relied on a 'concept of happiness in order to expose the inadequacies of 
a concept of reason centred on a purposive, inhuman rationality (a notion 
indebted to Marcuse's work on hedonism58). Happiness as a cüncept could be 
used to exhort the need for social change because it indicated how and 
where people were unhappy and was speculative in that it could only overlap 
with reality, i. e. be true, at a later stage of history. Although Horkheim- 
er was vague as to what precisely constitued happiness - repeatedly asser- 
ting that happiness would exist in a society founded on true reason - the 
concept nevertheless remained true to the spirit of non-identity theory, 
even in an age where such a theory was no longer possible. 
The only definition of happiness Horkheimer offered that broke out of this 
circularity and sought to be more concrete was his claim that bourgeois art 
symbolized and exemplified happiness. The marriage of art and happiness 
was not only one of convenience, but also one of necessity, for only in past 
bourgeois art was an image of 'interest-free' individuals still extant, 
although even this portrait of the future was threatened by mass culture. 
Bourgeois art was founded, Hockheimer suggested, on an aesthetics of absol- 
ute individuality, free from social norms, which lent the characters depic- 
ted the power to withstand (in the fictive world of art) the prevailing 
economic system. 
59 This element of resistance was further emphasized by 
the. real contradiction that had existed between the individual and bour- 
geois society. Bourgeois art could thus be said to provide an image of a 
concrete utopia, in that it claimed, even in 'unhappy' cases, to somehow 
effect a reconciliation of society and the individual. 
Whether bourgeois art can indeed offer such norms and such an image must 
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remain a moot point here, although it should be said that Horkheimer thus 
expected art to carry the burden of the completely unaesthetic problems 
thrown up by social theory and philosophy - and solve them. Horkheimer 
attributed this capacity of bourgeois art to the character of fundamental 
'unmarketability' which in his view it possessed. He maintained that Joyce 
and Picasso, for example, were able to portray the gulf between the 'monadic' 
individual and. its barbaric surroundings precisely because their art - 
sinke it did not try to communicate a direct picture of reality -was un- 
marketable. It'is debatable whether this view is indeed materialist and, as 
a consequence, it is also questionable whether it can be sited at the 
centre of a materialist theory of rationality, for Horkheimer in effect 
attributed the quality of art to its position vis-a-vis the market. He 
tried to found his argument on the claim that art (by which one must assume 
he meant post-bourgeois art, if there is such a thing) used an incomprehen- 
sible language to consolidate its unmarketability, an argument very similar 
to Adorno's writings on the subject at the time. 
60 Such artworks, Horkheimer 
suggested, only appeared discordant in construction because they had to be 
cut off from reality in order still to be art. The undertone of despair 
he detected in such art he took to be an indication of this isolation. 
61 
Art might forfeit a large audience in so preserving its individuality, but, 
Horkheimer insisted, by providing "a shocking awareness"62 of despair, art 
was able to prefigure symbolically the freedom necessary to restore real 
individuality. 
Horkheimer might intezi to embrace the content of such artworks with the 
above judgement, but his remarks do not actually transcend the bounds of 
an analysis of the properties of the artwork's form. Perhaps it is precise- 
ly owing to this formalism that Horkheimer was able to juxtapose art to 
mass culture. Yet, Horkheimer was left unable even to approach art as an 
object. A materialist aesthetics based on non-identity theory is from the 
outset faced with a contradiction, for although it might wish to describe 
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art, it cannot do so, but instead reduces art to some indeterminate ab- 
stract properties inherent in artistic form. This being the case, then, 
there are inherent problems in such an approach's claim to refound critical 
theory; theory becomes a materialism of form, of the history of forms 
devoid of any content that is negatable. Just as Pollock's conception of 
Marxist political economy lacked an analysis of production, so Horkheimer's 
endeavour to erect a philosophy which could encapsulate the points Pollock 
had made is similarly deficient. That is to say, Horkheimer's critical 
theory becomes reduced to a morphology, for it can no longer address itself 
to the physical character and production of the objects in question, as 
this would be to run the danger of equating the objects with their content 
at present and of thus depriving them of any future. 
The later application of non-identity theory in the wake of the changes 
Horkheimer made to it can best be described as- a morphology because, owing 
to its philosophical nature, it ccnitrated on specifying and reflecting on 
changes in the form and structure both of society and of the ndivLdual in 
such a society. The wish to retain a theoretical distance from the planned 
society forced Horkheimer's thought to remain at the level of morphological 
abstraction. Only by establishing with socio-philosophical concepts the 
form of the lowest common denominator of society, Horkheimer maintained, 
could critique function in the manner in which Marx had used it. Economic 
categories could not be used in this project for the capitalist means of 
production could no longer be held to contain elements on which to base 
a future society and thus did not form the dialectical basis of that%ciety. 
The theoretical distance Horkheimer created between his concepts and 
the objects they were to describe permitted the factual data to be broken 
down into theoretical concepts and negated, rather than ordered in the 
manner of positivist science. Horkheimer attempted to devise such concepts 
when analysing the ideologies of the transition to international monopoly 
capitalism (the essays written from 1932-37), to unify these concepts into 
a system by constructing a critical theory of society as a whole (1937) and 
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to detail the consequences the advent of the authoritarian state had for 
the nature of critical theory (1938-42). This morphology and the degree 
of reflexive objectivity it offered made-it possible for Horkheimer to 
remain consistent within an 'immanent' analysis, and yet transcend the 
logical boundaries such an analysis erected. As a consequence, the logic 
of Horkheimer's work stayed remarkably unchanged during the period from 
1931-1942, despite the vast change in its material once Pollock's work 
had been taken into account . 
If viewed as a morphology, his work over the three periods forms a unity 
that follows these three stages. The leitmotiv throughout is the concern 
to uphold a concept of reason as a critical quality existent in society, 
however condemned to failure this task might have appeared to be by 1942. 
Helmut Dubiel has maintained that critical theory remained an unfulfilled 
programme in terms of its social investigations. 
63 
However, if one inter- 
prets the essays of the last period as an attempt to posit determinate nega- 
tion within the static planned society Pollock had designated, then this is 
not the case. That this project of constructing a critical theory of society 
even after the transition to state capitalism culminated in a morphological 
dead-end compels one to conclude that Horkheimer's very logic was problem- 
atic, as we have shown to be indeed the case in his analysis of bourgeois 
art. A study of aesthetic quality is ignored in favour of the formalposit- 
ioning of art in state capitalist society. Once Horkheimer had accepted 
that state capitalism did in fact exist -a social form that had no inherent 
potential for change that Horkheimer could detect - his work entered this 
morphological cul-de-sac. 
In summary, the method he made use of followed the guidelines he himself 
laid down for the Institut(e) in 194164 and must be borne in mind when 
comparing the work of the other Institut(e) members to critical theory. 
First of all, he specified that all concepts were historically formed. 
Furthermore, they were critically formed and therefore did not shy away 
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from passing value judgements. Equally, such concepts were societal 
concepts reached by induction; they unearthed the universal in the particu- 
lar, e. g. the promise of happiness contained in a particular piece of art. 
Lastly, such concepts were 'integrative', in that it was possible to deduce 
the changing pattern of society from the problems which the continued appli- 
cability of the concept encountered. If non-identity theory were not a 
materialist morphology, it would not, as Horkheimer did, be able to extra- 
polate these changes in the form of society from the nature of the form 
itself. The problem in this conception lies in the nature the form of 
capitalism was assumed to have in the first place, a problem which, as we 
have seen, both Pollock and Horkheimer shared. It is at this juncture that 
Horkheimer's programme remained unfulfilled, for he had not ascertained 
how state capitalism could be negated in conceptual terms. He had only 
established what concepts were no longer relevant to critical theory owing 
to their impairment by state capitalist society, and he drew assuredly 
pessimistic conclusions from this assessment. The critical concepts neces- 
sary for such a conceptualisation, and thus for the fulfilment of the pro- 
ject of critical theory, were what he and Adorno endeavoured to provide in 
the major work they were to publish in 1947, namely Dialektik der Aufklärung 
It remains in the next three chapters to trace whether or not the work 
of Horkheimer's colleagues, in particular their work on aesthetics, followed 
his lead and progressed through two earlier stages of his thought to a 
reluctant acceptance of Pollock's analysis of society. 
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CHAPTER4: ADORNO : THE ARTWORK AND MASS SOCIETY 
Comparing and correlating Adorno's work with that of Horkheimer and 
Pollock is not overly easy, because Adorno was only a member of the 
Institut(e) for the last three years of its life at Morningside Heights 
in New York. Nevertheless, Adorno had been in informal contact with Hork- 
heimer and his colleagues ever since the Institut(e)'s inception at Frank- 
furt University, where he had studied with Horkheimer; indeed, the two men 
had intended to write a book on dialectics together. Adorno's informal con- 
tact to the Institut(e) was strengthened by his contributing a major article 
to the first issue of the Zeitschrift, and another to the 1936 edition. This 
allows one to presume the existence of some theoretical affinity between 
Adorno's work and that of the Institut(e). Whether Adorno can be considered 
a leading proponent of critical theory, as many studies have claimed, remain: 
to be seen. 
A major obstacle to any firm inclusion of Adorno among the ranks of early 
critical theorists would be the intellectual influence his friend and erst- 
while mentor, Walter Benjamin, had on him, which, as research in this area 
has shown conclusively, cannot be underestimated. 
1 Neither can the early 
influence and continued contact with the teacher of Adorno's youth, Sieg- 
fried Kracauer, be neglected when studying Adorno's thought (regardless of 
the theoretical differences that were later to come between the two men). 
As a consequence, any affinity between Adorno's early work and non-identity 
theory cannot be taken to imply a subsumption of his work under that. bbel. 
Common interests do not render different works identical; such a similarity 
can only be assumed to have existed after Adorno commenced work at the 
Institut(e). 
It is somewhat opportune for the purposes of our correlation that Adorno 
joined the Institut(e) in 1938, for it is precisely at this time that 
non-identity theory had started to undergo a fundamental change. 
2 If it 
can be shown that Adorno's work after 1938 follows the course of this change 
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then this will serve to underline once again the importance of Pollock's 
work for the construction of critical theory. In order to clarify this 
connection between Adorno and the Institut(e) it will be necessary to con- 
trast Adorno's work prior to his entry into the Institut(e) with that pro- 
duced afterwards. The body of ideas of the two periods will therefore be 
set off against each other but not in a strictly chronological fashion, 
for factors such as Adorno's individual intellectual development and the 
role played by external influences render dating highly imprecise, and 
other sources, such as his correspondence, reveal little to aid such a 
chronology. 
Adorno underwent academic training as a philosopher, but he also had enjoy- 
ed a thorough musical education and consequently his writings tend to 
mediate musical theory with his underlying philosophy. This methodology 
resulted in a series of seemingly disparate articles which, taken as a 
whole, provide the framework for an aesthetics, and yet serve as an obstacle 
to a comparison of Adorno's work with Horkheimer's overtly philosophical 
writings. In order to take this dual character of Adorno's work into account 
his general epistemology will be abstracted from these essays and outlined 
before we proceed to an analysis of his aesthetics before and after 1938. 
The main difficulty in this approach is that Adorno understood himself to 
be a Marxist, as the result of which his aesthetics is inextricably bound 
up with his general theory of society. In the discussion of his aesthetics 
the two fields will therefore have to be separated artificially, except in 
cases where specific aesthetic propositions are not deduced from social 
theory and exist in an epistemological realm of their own. 
Adorno's epistemology was based on what he called 'constellations' of ideas. 
He assumed that a concept devised to describe something was not to be lim- 
ited to a monocausal description of that object, for this would, he main- 
tained, limit the potentiality of the object to what it was at one partic- 
ular time or to how it was seen to be then. Such an approach would implicit] 
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suggest an ontos for the object, one that is exactly similar to what the 
subject-observer held that object to be. Instead of adopting this methodo- 
logy, one promulgated by positivists and vulgar Marxists alike, Adorno 
designed his concepts to embody a set of ways of seeing an object; an ana- 
logy to this would be the different viewpoints simultaneously incorporated 
in Cezanne's paintings. These 'constellations' permit objects to be conceived 
of in a number of states, varying from what the object was in the past to 
what it might be in the future. 
Adorno used such 'constellations' to describe not just objects but concepts 
themselves. In this respect, there is a striking similarity in epistemologic- 
al intent between Adorno's approach and non-identity theory. Adorno referred 
to this attempt to create a mediating avenue between concepts and what con- 
cepts are at a particular time as the "immanente Theorie der Dialektik", 
3 
for it studied the interior of each object rather than its external shape. 
It thus bears an affinity not only to non-identity theory but also to 
Siegfried Kracauer's work. In a letter of the-25th of May, 1930 discussing 
his Die Angestellten Kracauer wrote to Adorno that: 
Ich halte die Arbeit methodologisch insofern für wichtig, als sie eine 
Art der Aussage konstituiert, eine, die nicht etwa zwischen allgemeiner 
Theorie und spezieller Praxis jongliert, sondern eine eigene strukturierte 
Betrachtungsart darstellt. Wenn Du willst, ist sie ein Beispiel für mater- 
ielle Dialektik. 
Adorno was not convinced of the novelty or singularity of Kracauer's 
approach and he responded on the 26th of May, 1930 (i. e. by return of post): 
Zur Angestelltenarbeit zunächst, Dein Begriff von materieller Dialektik 
ist mir darum sehr interessant, weil in meinem Kierkegaard (his book on 
Kierkegaard) ein ganz analoger vorkommt unter dem Namen intermittierende 
Dialektik, d. h. eine, die nicht in geschlossenen Denkabstimmungen abläuft, 
sondern unterbrochen wird von der nicht sich einfügender Realität, in ihr 
gleichsam Atem holt und jedesmal frisch anhebt. Alle meine Marxismus- 
Debatten drehen sich darum und ich operiere wie Du gegen den geschlossenen 
Dialektikbegriff mit dem Argument, daß er kraft der Totalitätskategorie 
als einer bloßen Denkbestimmung idealistisch sei. 
This intermittent dialectic situated itself between the subject and the 
concept or object and is thus materialistically founded both in corfrete 
material and in the history of that material. 
Adorno argued consistently that such an 'intermittent' dialectic had to 
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be used when studying cultural phenomena, for cultural characteristics 
could not be understood as being reducible to one cause alone. For example, 
they could not be deduced simply from the economic substructure. Rather, 
the material determinacy of the object could only be grasped adequately, 
if it were to be regarded as a mediate part of what Adorno referred to 
as the 'social totality' ('Gesamtprozeß'); i. e. each object was over-deter- 
mined but could not be restricted to that state either. The object had to 
be comprehended by placing it in the context both of the culture of which 
it was a part and of the history of that culture. This meant that each and 
every social fact could only be understood if it were viewed from the 
point of general laws but not reduced to these (which are, in turn, abstract= 
ed from the social process, as Marx had done in his Critique of Political 
Economy). In other words, objects always remained 'under-determined'. 
Adorno's aesthetics was, therefore, always conceived of as part of a more 
general social theory and yet the aesthetic objects themselves had an 
equivalent influence to that of the social theory. The concrete, material 
character of an artwork and its general laws as well as those of the society 
in which it existed were essentially inseparable determinants of it. Adorno 
attempted by use of 'intermittent' dialectics to highlight this intermediate 
character of art and to provide a critique founded in it. To do so he had 
to define the notion of 'concreteness' more closely. Adorno held that an 
object's concreteness was not exhausted by its appearance in reality, but 
also embraced its formation by immanent constituent elements and their his- 
tory, i. e. the technics or thought resident within it. At this point, Ador- 
no's method and his theory of what objects are coincide, for the definition 
of concreteness returns theory to its starting point, namely that objects 
are intermediate in epistemological character. This notion is of particular 
importance for Adorno's aesthetics, where it plays a central role. 
Adorno deduced a concept of ideology from this method, labelling ideology an 
'illusion of truth', i. e. something that claimed to be true but was not. 
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This was a wider, less rigorous definition than that given by Marx, or 
indeed than Horkheimer's characterization of ideology as 'false conscious- 
ness' - and undoubtedly more akin to Lukäcs' broad notion of 'second nat- 
ure'. This illustrates a difference between the sphere of applicability of 
Intermittent' dialectics and that of non-identity theory. From Adorno's use 
of the term it is clear that he did not intend his concept of ideology to 
preclude the Marxist understanding of it, but to extend such an interpreta- 
tion. His interpretation of ideology hinged on his concept of coifreteness, 
and it is here that its relation to the notion of 'second nature' becomes 
apparent. If only the immediate social existence of an object could be 
seen, then it had to be considered ideological, for its current state appea- 
red as its nature. The object could be termed ideological if it only permit- 
ted this appearance to be seen. If the concept's or object's immanent con- 
struction predominated then it was true, for its mode of production - its 
becoming - exposed the potentiality of its concrete material. However, if a 
person nevertheless concentrated only on an object's immediate appearance, 
then it perceived the object in an ideological manner, without that object 
necessarily being so. Art as an object could therefore be true, even when 
viewed ideologically. 
Adorno developed a concept of freedom based on this conception of concrete- 
ness and ideology. Something that followed its inherent material and laws 
represented freedom, for it was free both of and from socially-imposed 
meaning. When referring to art Adorno termed this process the fulfilment of 
an object's autonomous. 'laws of form' ('Formgesetz'). he'designated these 
laws 'sedimented Spirit', by which he meant that they had developed in the 
course of art's history in accordance with both what the artistic material 
itself demanded and with the artist's attempt to shape this matter. Form, 
and with it artistic freedom, was the concretisation of these two criteria. 
Significantly, adherence to these laws of form means that art aspires 
to something more than not being"ideological. Adorno claimed that it allowed 
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art to portray social truth - as long as art refrained from reproducing 
social reality as it was. Just as Adorno's use of 'intermittent' dialectics 
opposed Lukäcs' notion of the possible identity of subject and object of 
history (this being for Adorno, as for Horkheimer, logically impossible), 
so too did Adorno's concept of art run completely counter to Lukäcs' 
aesthetics. Indeed, Adorno's work seems to take such an opposition to Lukhcs 
as its starting point in a manner similar to the conception of bourgeois 
philosophy at the centre of Horkheimer's non-identitytheory. 
Whereas his concept of freedom joined together aesthetic and social theory, 
Adorno also derived some general statements specific to art from his notion 
of concreteness and, by extension, from his epistemology. He suggested that 
at one level art (be this music, literature or painting) was a product of 
labour and therefore each piece of art constituted an artwork. Furthermore, 
because production was subject to capitalist aims, artworks were - like all 
products - commodities. In his early work, Adorno did not envisage that sucr 
a form of production was necessarily negative per se, for he argued that a 
degree of alienation was always embodied in the externalized human labour 
expended in producing an artwork. This was not to say that the artwork as 
a commodity could not exist without its fetish character, i. e. without its 
appearance ('Schein'), by virtue of which its fictiveness appeared real. 
4 
Nevertheless, that fictiveness remained in the realm of fiction. If this 
appearance predominatEl, then the artwork had to be considered idalogical. Ii 
addition to its fetish character, its commodity existence allowed the art- 
work to create 'autonomy' for itself. Adorno defined this property as being 
the specific historical 'thing-form' ('Dingform') of the artwork under cap- 
italism; 'autonomy' enabled the artwork to be both fictive and real. - 
At a different level, Adorno gauged artworks to be constructed from materia: 
that was both social in nature and had its own history. An artwork coul1, 
of course, be immediately social in its material, if only social preference 
at that particular historical point were reflected in the artwork. However, 
such an artwork was ideological because the producer ignored the 'immanent 
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necessity' of the socially produced material. This category of the inmanent 
necessity' is similar to that used by Horkheimer in determining the poten- 
tial of certain objects, for Adorno meant the term to designate that the 
material itself possessed a certain logic. This logic, Adorno maintained, 
had accumulated or 'sedimented' during the course of history and had to be 
followed if the artwork was not to betray art and bow down to tendential 
social demands. 
5 By combining these two levels of analysis, the one describ- 
ing the present commodity form of artworks, the other pinpointing the wider 
socio-historical nature of artistic material, Adorno constructed an ideology 
critique of 'modern' or bourgeois art. If the artwork did not follow the 
artistic logic but submitted to social requirements imposed on it, then it 
was ideological. Adorno's methoddogy differs from Horkheimer's at this point, 
for rather than contrasting art's current shape with what it claims to be - 
which would be to follow non-identity theory - Adorno examined the ideolog- 
ical properties within the artwork, or, in his words, which are 'immanent' 
to the artwork. 
Adorno described artworks as 'crystals'. By this he meant that they refract 
an image of society as it was at the time of their production, because the 
artwork was always a mediation of its internal material and what the artist 
at a particular historical moment made of that material. In this sense, art- 
works did not reflect society directly, as Lukacs had maintained, 
6 
for not 
only were they composed of material not reducible to that time but they also 
inhabited an intermediate realm between fiction and reality. Accordingly, 
artworks could be read as 'cyphers' of society, offering a very specific 
form of knowledge, neither purely social nor 'aesthetic'. Furthermore, the 
artwork was a cypher from another point of view, for it revealed society's 
intellectual and artistic preferences owing to its function within that 
society. 
Adorno incorporated both these descriptions of the artwork in a more general 
statement, namely that the artwork presented a mirror image of society, high 
lighting society's contradictions, because each artwork was a highly mediate, 
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concentrated representation of society at one given point. It had a mediate 
character in that the artist synthesized the logic of the artistic material 
and that of society as a whole (the artist's use of artistic material was 
mediated through his membership of society) by means of his own subjective 
perception of society. Under capitalism, art held a mirror up to society, 
for it exacerbated the conflict between individual and society as a result 
of its individuality of expression in describing social reality. Thus, 
Adorno's concepts of the crystal- and cypher-like properties of art allowed 
him to conjecture that art possessed cognitive qualities. These labels, and 
the hypothesis Adorno then put forward on the basis of them, are similar to 
Benjamin's idea of a 'dialectical picture'. Adorno's conception follows 
Benjamin's example by situating art's cognitive qualities in its presenta- 
tion of the antinomy of subordination and sublation. The autonomous artwork 
portrayed, or so Adorno judged, society's contradictions and the alienation 
of the individual in such a society. Yet, art simultaneously sublated these 
contradictions in the catharsis of aesthetic form that cast them in a mould 
beyond immediate social constraints and change, reconciling opposites in a 
synthesis of artistic and social material. Thus, the artwork was able, 
Adorno believed, to show capitalism's ills and also - abstractly - point 
beyond them. 
On the basis of these remarks on art and society, Adorno sketched an outline 
for an historical materialist aesthetics, although he never developed this 
in a systematic fashion. 
7 First and foremost, he tightened his definition of 
ideology in the artwork by specifying that the fact that art was 'fictional' 
and therefore 'harmless' (what he termed the appearance of art) did not in 
itself mean that it was ideological. This appearance was necessary so as to 
prevent art from being of the same order as the social world, something 
which would compel art to forfeit its cognitive qualities. Adorno did not 
mean by this that art was socially transcendent, but that art in itself 
constituted essentially a specific order of social reality. The thrust of 
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his argument is again aimed at Lukäcs' aesthetics of realism, for Adorno 
concluded that although this appearance might cause the artwork to be 
affirmative of the capitalist reality, the autonomous artwork could never- 
theless be antagonistic to such a reality in its composition. 
The obverse of this argument is contained in an important apercu Adorno 
made. Just because artworks were historical entities, Adorno suggested, was 
no reason to suppose that an artwork's meaning was reducible to its histor- 
ical genesis. Rather, the meaning of an artwork and in an artwork could 
change over the course of time. 
8 Equally, meaning could not be attributed 
solely to the socio-historical background in which an artwork first appeared 
for, in keeping with non-identity theory's concerns, Adorno rejected the 
existence of an ontological or metaphysical concept of meaning. Precisely 
Lukäcs' work of the time can, of course, be criticized for possessing such 
ontological undercurrents, in that he sought to claim a static meaning for 
certain novels, such as those of Tolstoy. 
Adorno coupled this historicization of meaning with an analysis of the 
artwork's form. Just as meaning was historical if artworks are read as 
crystals, so too the modes of production, reproduction and consumption of 
artworks had to be regardedas historical. Adorno located this historicalness 
within the nature of form itself, by which, it must be pointed out, he did 
not merely mean 'form' as the opposite of content. He understood form as 
the artwork's concrete shape, and this included its physical content, i. e. 
the words, musical notes or colours, from which an artwork is formed. 
9 Art- 
istic form, Adorno proceeded to argue, was historical in that it preserved 
an image of the past social history out of which that form had developed, 
a history, moreover, which had been and continued to be founded on oppres- 
sion and suffering ('Leiden'). This suffering was taken up in the very 
constitution of artistic form which thus presented a symbolic and 'melan- 
cholic' portrayal of capitalist society's contradictoriness. Clearly, this 
conception of form is founded on a view of the autonomous artwork and would 
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have to be changed if applied to forms other than bourgeois art. The 
question must be posed at this point as to whether Adorno's concept of art 
is, in fact, ahistorical for it takes bourgeois art to be art per se. 
This problematic conception becomes evident in Adorno's conception of 
artistic 'blindness'. Form, Adorno proposed, was by its very nature, a 
conscious externalization of society's antagonisms: it was itself a picture 
of a social microcosm. However, in this capacity the artwork ran the danger 
of becoming 'blind', that is to say, formal considerations alone are con- 
stitutive of the artwork. Art could be emancipatory only if it avoided 
such blindness, by lending expression to its material, i. e. by recognizing 
explicitly its connection to the past development of form and by furthering 
this development. In other words, artworks had to reflect the social reality 
in which they were embedded and the influence of this on the way in which 
the material form was presented. Only bourgeois artworks possess such a 
degree of reflection, it must be remarked, for they alone, Adorno claimed, 
were no longer tainted by the stigma of the iconic properties originally 
implanted in them. Adorno's concept of blindness borders on his notion of 
ideology in the sense that an artwork which presents no internally rational, 
transparent construction blinds any knowledge of its historicalness and 
thus fakes a transcendality it does notin fact possess. 
If, to Adorno's mind, form. was the basis of artistic expression, then it 
also had to be the bearer of meaning (as form is historical per se, so too 
must be its meaning). Form, Adorno argued, assumed certain transcendental 
qualities because it was a carrier of past social suffering, suffering 
indicated by the division of labour on which the production of form is 
based. Nevertheless, the meaning of each individual genre could be such 
that it was not appropriate for use because it was no longer compatible 
with either authorial intention or the reality it was to be used to desc- 
ribe. Thus, genres, the subsector of form, were all equally historical and 
therefore possibly ideological. 
10 
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Adorno proposed that in order to avoid such blindness, the form (and each 
particular genre) to be adopted by the artist had to be evaluated in terms 
of what is meant in the present. Adorno seems to have formulated a dictum 
for aesthetics which is the obverse of the guideline Benjamin laid down 
for literary historians: 
Denn es handelt sich ja nicht darum, die Werke des Schrifttums im Zusam- 
menhang ihrer Zeit darzustellen, sondern in der Zeit, da sie entstanden, 
die Zeit, die sie erkennt - das ist die unsere - zu Darstellung zu 
bringen. 11 
By relating the historical and transhistorical properties of art to each 
other in this manner, Adorno avoided the major problem that had faced Lukäcs. 
Lukäcs had maintained that the ideology of an artwork depended on the auth- 
or's (class) position in society and thus had to go to great lengths to 
explain why bourgeois writers, such as Tolstoy, could produce ideologically 
positive works. Instead of having to posit some ontological quality in a 
particular genre - the manner in which Lukäcs extricated himself from his 
predicament - Adorno was able to conclude that class position or social 
position was of little relevance to whether the work bore ideological 
qualities or not. Ideology was rather a question of how the artist handled 
the historicalness of genres and form.. 
Ideology in art, in the sense of blindness that Adorno gave it, referred 
to the inability to use the technics of artistic production correctly, i. e. 
to further their development. Adorno cited Stravinsky's music as a case in 
point, for the latter, he claimed, had tried to resuscitate past folklorist- 
ic patterns at a time when musical form had progressed beyond folkloristic 
form. Stravinsky's intention - to portray the alienation innate in contem- 
porary musical communication - might be laudable, but his use of musical 
form was ideological. Adorno also listed instances of an opposite, but 
equally ideological, approach to that of Stravinsky, namely when works 
which at their time of production were progressive, had since become ideo- 
logical, i. e. the form they used was now false. Adorno contended, for exam- 
ple, that early bourgeois novels were now ideological because they projectec 
an image of harmony, individuality and individual historical development, 
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whereas society now opposed the validity of these images. 
Throughout, Adorno's aesthetics and particularly his analysis of form was 
predicated on an audience or readership that was not passive. Adorno assumed 
that a 'mediation' of audience and artwork occurred, by which he meant that 
in order to understand an artwork, it was not enough for the audience to 
contemplate it (as Kant had advocated), but rather they had to retrace in- 
tellectually ('nachvollziehen') what the artwork had tried to accomplish. 
It followed that access to the truth or knowledge an artwork offered was 
not pregiven by tle artwork's mere existence, but had to be intellectually 
and emotionally acquired by the receiver thinking the artwork through. To 
some observers this assumption smacks of elitism, 
12 because they interpret 
it as signifying that Adorno held only those blessed with an education in 
high culture capable of appreciating art. This criticism, however, misses 
precisely the point Adorno was trying to make, namely that passive consump- 
tion and the artwork that promoted it were ideological and had to be chall- 
enged wherever they were encountered. Moreover, Adorno did not conjecture 
that such an audience had ever existed on a wide scale; indeed, its non- 
existence was considered part of the suffering that artworks expressed. What 
Adorno did maintain, however, was that certain knowledge was necessary if 
bourgeois art was to be fully comprehended. In this context, Adorno lamented 
the fact that art's truth content - that is to say art's purpose itself - 
was in the process of decay. He attributed this process to changes in soc- 
iety, for any changes in society would effect art's truth, since this was 
defined as resulting from the relation between art and society. Our discus- 
sion must therefore now turn to the manner in which Adorno conceived of thisf 
relation and to the question of whether this conception changed in the 
course of the lifetime of the Zeitschrift/Studies. 
Adorno was concerned in his first essays for the Zeitschrift with the nature- 
of artworks in two particular periods, during liberal and monopoly capital- 
ism. Adorno investigated the transition from the first era to the second in 
terms of the constitution and position of the artwork in the respective 
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societies, in particular with regard to the effect the emergence of the 
autonmous artwork that had existed under liberal capitalism. In his essay 
'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik' 
13 
Adorno distinguished between 
market and anti-market music, two categories which are both fundamental and 
innovative. With the commencement of monopoly capitalism and the evolution 
of powerful consortia and a large propaganda apparatus, musical production, 
distribution and consumption were caught up in the process of capitalism. 
Consequently, some artworks lost their autonomy and were produced by the 
monopolies as commodities purely for their exchange value; i. e. they were 
not manufactured for their artistic merit or to further artistic form, but 
solely to advance the needs of the market. 
14 In terms of aesthetics, the 
monopoly form of capitalism was understood by Adorno to be an extension of 
liberal capitalism and yet as distinct from it, because although autonomous 
artworks existed in both epochs, under monopoly capitalism their existence 
began to be threatened. 
If an objectification of needs and desires had led to art's genesis, then 
class interests had succeeded in halting this process by using those needs 
in order to produce and sell artworks as commodities. Because artworks were 
now solely commodities, complete alienation occurred between the listener 
and the music for the needs were no longer related to the consumer in any 
meaningful manner. Adorno devised the terms market and anti-market music to 
describe this process, one advantage of them being that they avoided the 
value judgement inherent in the labels 'light' and 'serious' music. He 
suggested that market music, since it was produced for consumption, obeyed 
laws external to art. Hence, Adorno used as a measure for true, anti-market, 
art the degree to which it was constructed only according to the artistic 
laws of form. 
Schönberg's music was held by Adorno to epitomise anti-market music and 
by extension all anti-market art. Schönberg's music functions in Adorno's 
earlier writings both as an illustration of anti-market art and as an 
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example - of a prescriptive nature - for art to follow if it were to pre- 
vent itself from being degraded to market art. Adorno argued that by use 
of dissonance Schönberg surrendered all communication with the listener and 
thus broke with the bourgeois ideal of the artwork. Schönberg's Expressionist 
music articulated the unconscious as the only real area of communication 
left untouched by the monopolies. The music's renunciation of communication 
in the conventional sense served therefore to prevent its absorption by the 
monopolies. Further, Schönberg's music had an internal structure which over- 
came current alienation subjectively within the music, for the music expres- 
sed an internal, structured subjective rationality which ran against the 
grain of the capitalist rationality that was imposed from without. Despite 
the fact that this is achieved at the price of a total external alienation 
of the artwork, Adorno judged Schönberg's music to be a valid attempt to 
reconquer the terrain of the autonomous artwork, namely by creating its own 
laws, autonomous from those of society. Adorno supposed that by avoiding 
the paths trodden by market music, Schönberg's works expressed the misery of 
the individual in an, alienated world without, however, glorifying the misery 
and paucity of non-communication. 
Adorno outlined two different attempts to circumvent conformity to the lit- 
erary market in his discussion of George and Hofmannsthal's correspondence, 
out of which he reconstructed their respective social views. 
15 George, 
Adorno claimed, resorted to an esoterism of form in order to protect meaning 
from forgetfulness and tried to recreate a pre-alienated state that opposed 
social reality by means of an iJ ioqncractic use of language. George desired 
success and renown without having to subject himself to the market condition 
of the time. Yet, regardless of this anti-market stance, George's imposition 
of an esoteric meaning in fact breached the form of his poetry, for the 
language was unable to bear the weight of the 'inner' meanings it was inten- 
ded to carry and became reduced to a fetish. As such it had market appeal. 
Hofmannsthal, Adorno proposed, also rejected bourgeois values, but never- 
theless was also eventually engulfed by the literary market. Hofmannsthal's 
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reliance on individuality and convention in order to subvert bourgeois 
art, while avoiding George's restriction of linguistic and literary meaning, 
compelled him to counter realism not with pure 'innerness' but with pure 
'outerness'. He tried to drive a wedge between art and life by transferring 
art into a static dimension of timelessness. Hofmannsthal's endeavours were 
fruitless, because, to create such a distanciation from life, he had had 
to rely on reifying objects of reality in order to generate meaning. Indeed, 
in the final instance, Adorno concluded that neither writer had succeeded 
in both obeying the laws of form and escaping the throttling grip of the 
market. - 
Adorno's aesthetics of this period was prescriptive in its portrait 
of anti-market music-, while at the same time providing an analysis of the 
transition to monopoly capitalism and the manner in which this new social 
form placed constraints on the production and reproduction of artworks. 
Adorno suggested, for example, that with the increase in technology and the' 
rise in commodification, freedom in the interpretative performance of music 
(Adorno termed it 'reproductive' freedom) disappeared. He elucidated this 
loss by means of a sketch of the interpreter's and conductor's contemporary 
functions. These no longer performed as they thought the music demanded of 
them (i. e. in accordance with the necessity of artistic material and form), 
but rather they provided a codified semic system suited and tailored to the 
wishes of the listeners. The interpreting musician was stylized as a vir- 
tuoso, so as to give the music a semblance of individuality, creating a 
sham of communication with an otherwise completely estranged audience. The 
conductor fulfilled a similar function. Adorno went so far as to judge that 
this gradual loss of freedom could be traced into the very composition of 
radio music. 
In this context, Adorno developed two other concepts to characterize the 
new ideological properties of market art: consumption and enjoyment ' 
('Genuß'). The power music held over people increased, Adorno submitted, 
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the more consumption corresponded to fa. ual needs. Under monopoly capitalism 
personal satisfaction and enjoyment were only possible during one's 'free 
time'. Market music was therefore ideological precisely because it contented; 
people without exposing the contradictions of the society in which they lived. 
Such music was composed and then presented in such a manner that it did not 
require 'understanding'; passive consumption sufficed as continual repetitior 
of music on the airwaves facilitated identification with a piece. The hall- 
mark of market music was accordingly not a fostering of truth-cont°nt, but 
the prevalence of stereotypification within its composition and the use of 
a variety of mechanisms to promote identification, consumption and enjoyment, 
since, by definition, it did not appeal to the individual's faculties of 
judgement. 
Adorno took jazz to embody all the properties of marketed art. He stated in 
hissecond major essay for the Zeitschrift that: "Jazz ist nicht was er ist.. 
.. er ist, wozu man ihn braucht. "16 The form of jazz was in this sense 'pre 
formed' by monopoly capitalism's demands for art products with an exchange 
value. Jazz's supposedly spontaneous mode of production was belied in other 
words by its dependence on its marketability and the fact that it was com- 
pletely produced by the art-business ('Kunstgewerb'). 
17 The immediacy it 
offered its audience was false, for such immediacy was based on musical 
repetition by virtue of which jazz could be sold; its repeated use of ever- 
recurring syncopated patterns furthered the same end rather than advancing 
the musical means of production. As music, Adorno declared, jazz was mani- 
pulative. 
In keeping with the general thrust of non-identity theory, Adorno made use 
of psychoanalytical categories to unravel the forms in which jazz encouraged 
identification with itself and thus promoted its sale. Jazz's consumption, 
he claimed, relied on ritualism, on a feeling of false collectivity, on a 
false channeling of sexual satisfaction and on a false form of social oppos- 
ition, all of which trapped the . 
listeners. within monopoly capitalism's 
reality. In this context, Adorno's concepts of consumption and enjoyment 
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become critical, negative concepts, in that, by denoting what jazz was, they 
showed how it was not art and therefore how it forfeited autonomous art's 
reflections on the antagonistic nature of society. The two concepts thus 
preserved ex negativo the real non-identity of society and also criticized 
reality, for they highlighted the manner in which the marketed commodity 
provided only an appearance of freedom from social constraint and thus 
fostered an ideological view of society. 
However, Adorno had to alter radically this dualism of market and anti- 
market music on attempting to systematize his analysis. He was forced to 
abandon this bipolar opposition in all further investigations of the mass- 
produced artwork, for the main effect of the monopolies and of technically 
mass-produced artworks was precisely to eliminate the market. In his later 
essays, Adorno followed Horkheimer and Pollock's lead and assumed that produ- 
ction determined rconsumption. Before proceeding to elaborate on this shift, 
some attention must be paid to Adorno's Versuch über Wagner, 
'8 
which was 
writ1n in between these two periods in Adorno's work and pinpointed an in- 
herent tendency to technologisation within the bourgeois artwork itself. 
Adorno coupled this analysis with an investigation of a phenomenon that had 
become of central importance to the Institut(e) namely totalitarianism. The 
difference between Adorno's work and that ofýHorkheimer and Pollock was that 
he traced totalitarianism's existence in an earlier period: in late nine- 
teenth century art. 
The monograph on Wagner can be seen as a thorough application of Adorno's 
ideology critique of art to the work of one artist19 and it also illustrates 
his belief that any artwork that overemphasized technique to the detriment 
of the laws of form was innately regressive in aesthetic terms. At the 
same time, by acknowledging and identifying the contradictions facing the 
bourgeois artwork, the monograph goes some way towards countering the charge 
that Adorno hypostatised the bourgeois artwork as art per se. 
20 
Two examples serve to outline this twin concern: Adorno's interpretation of 
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the 'beat' in Wagner's music and his concept of the 'phantasmagoria'. 
According to Adorno, gesture in Wagner's music was based technically on 
the music's beat, which functioned as a palliative for the audience to 
whom the lyrics would otherwise have remained foreign. As a result, the 
beat dominated Wagner's music (even though this was illogical in musical 
terms). Wagner had to use this device to promote identification with his 
music, but in so doing objectified the music, which became designed merely 
for external effects; the music treated the audience as an object to be 
manipulated in a certain way. In this context, Adorno suggested that gesture 
in Wagner's music was to be considered both as a reflection of the general 
predicament of alienation facing all bourgeois artworks and as an attempt 
to overcome this separation by technical, but not aesthetic means. This 
overemphasis on technical means resulted in an incompatibility of the 
musical components which falsified all expression in the music; on account 
of this, musical progression, the basis of real expression, disappeared. 
The beat, being subjected to non-musical purposes, no longer conveyed time 
and progression, rendering the music static and bereft of the ability to 
generate musical novelty. 
Adorno concluded from this study of musical time in the Ring cycle that 
Wagner's 'Gesamtkunstwerk' rejected form per se, manipulating as it did 
different musical types purely for their effect. In a sense, Adorno submit- 
ted, Wagner had thus prefigured the transition from liberal to monopoly 
capitalism (i. e. by the manner in which Wagner bent down to market rules 
and tried to achieve effects, rather than instilling knowledge in the 
music). The only principle of form Wagner made use of was what Adorno label- 
led the phantasm agoria. 
21 
With this he signified the process whereby a prod- 
uct hid the manner in which it had been produced by appearing as a 'natural' 
thing. The music Wagner had-composed thus had no substance, but rather 
resembled a 'Blendwerk', dazzling listeners with its brightness in order 
to prevent them from perceiving how hollow it was. That is to say, Adorno 
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saw technics in Wagner's music as weaving an opaque veil round the commo- 
dity character of the music. With regard to the phantasmagoria Adorno 
stated: 
In ihr wird der ästhetische Schein vom Charakter der Ware ergriffen. Als 
Ware ist sie illusionär; die absolute Wirklichkeit des Unwirklichen ist 
keine andere als die des Phänomens, das nicht bloß seine eigene Genesis 
in Arbeit beschwörend fortzubannen trachtet, sondern in eine damit, vom 
Tauschwert beherrscht, geflissentlich seinen Gebrauchswert als echte 
Realität, als 'keine Imitation' pointieren muß, nur um den Tauschwert 
durchzusetzen. 22 
Wagner, in other words, succeeded in marketing the hollowness of his music 
by means of its very hollowness. 
Adorno drew a further conclusion as to the nature of Wagner's music from 
his analysis of the phantasmagoria. By evoking progression and occurrence 
when in fact none existed, the phantasmagoria froze time in the music; the 
supposedly new wm in fact old. In this manner an ideology of immutability 
was founded within the artwork itself. This could be seen, Adorno suggested, 
in the constitution of the characters in the Ring cycle, who only attained 
satisfaction within the world as it was, but could not change anything; they 
were free, in complete unfreedom. Inadvertently, Wagner had thus highlighted 
the crisis that befell bourgeois individuality in the transition to monopoly 
capitalism. Adorno's analysis of the 'technical artwork' in its infancy thus 
indicates the roots of totalitarian ideologies in liberal capitalism, for 
Wagnerian music was shown as already orienting itself towards effect-produc- 
tion and anti-individualism. 
Adorno did not extend this analysis to embrace a systematic appraisal of 
contemporary mass-produced music until after his arrival in New York in 1938 
He then took on the task of devising such a systematic framework in 'Über 
den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens', 
23 his 
first essay written as an Institut(e) member, and continued this project 
with greater precision in his articles on popular music, Theodor Veblen 
and Oswald Spengler. This project involved, on the one hand, an evaluation 
of the change in the function of the artwork and, on the other, the genera- 
tion of categories to describe this change. 
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Adorno asserted that the commodification of the artwork and its incorpora- 
tion into mass production stripped art of its mythological content and 
thus threatened art's very substance. His close friend Walter Benjamin had 
proposed that this loss of "aura" was a positive development. Adorno, how- 
ever, maintained firmly that this process led to the artwork losing its 
'promesse de bonheur', the seemingly magical quality which enabled art to 
transcend reality; the artwork lost its autonomy and was reduced to nothing 
more than a commodity. The demythologization of an artwork therefore func- 
tioned only to augment its immediate consumption by a mass audience desirous 
of psychological gratification. Consequently, the appearance of beauty 
which the demythologized artwork offered so as to promote momentary senuous 
gratification could not be equated with real beauty, which created a mediate 
form of sensuous pleasure. If the artwork was produced for immediate consump- 
tion, then it was absolved from the obligation to offer the observer any 
other specific quality - such as real beauty - than its consumability. 
Accordingly, Adorno refused to treat mass music as a mediate, specifical- 
ly artistic reflection of reality, i. e. as art. Indeed, to his mind mass 
music had no value in musical terms, for it did nothing to further musical 
development. Rather, such music's exchange value replaced artistic neces- 
sity, the appearance of realness. Thus mass music lacked the source of 
autonomous art's ability to be part of society and yet also to expose the 
truth about that society. Adorno stated that in mass music "der Schein von 
Lust und Unmittelbarkeit bemächtigt sich des'Tauschwerts selber. "24 Since 
mass music's meaning was expended in its consumption, its form no longer 
contained the remembrance of past suffering necessary as the foundation 
for artistic truth. 
The other side of this commodification of art was the effect it had on the 
individual listener; mass music, Adorno suggested, enforced what he termed 
'commodity listening'. He argued on the basis of an analysis of the music's 
composition that autinomous listening was destroyed by mass music, for it 
-101- 
allowed the listener no standard with which to judge it, other than the 
cathartic function it fulfilled. Production, in other words, affected 
consumption. Mass music was, in this respect, innately repressive, a fact 
Adorno traced into the very composition of the different musical elements, 
in that he found these not to be determined by an overall logic, but by 
the psychosomatic effects they were intended to have. The listener was 
encouraged, Adorno maintained, to respond to these effects and in so doing 
mistook the immediate pleasure they offered for artistic truth. Since 
monopolies produced only such music, one could either identify with the 
music or else renounce listening to music altogether. 
Adorno developed three concepts to describe these changes in the production 
and consumption of music. Mass music, he proposed, hinged on stereotypy, 
for it substituted repetitious musical patterns for musical progression, 
depriving the listener of any spontaneity and reducing listening to a system 
of aural responses to pre-digested types. Accordingly, nothing in mass 
music was unique or left to chance. Indeed, the very production of mass 
mausic was governed by standardization, in that centralized economic organ- 
izations in the form Pollock had foreseen, produced and reproduced what 
Adorno termed 'planned music'. Successful 'tunes' were repeated frequently 
or imitated in order to ensure the music's sale. In this sense, competition, 
as Pollock had suggested, was suspended to facilitate mass production. Adorr 
stated that such production was marked by its pseudo-individuation, i. e. 
the process by which standardized, stereotyped production was concealed 
from the listener behind a cloak of individual achievement. Presented with 
the option of listening to one of a number of different star performers or 
hits, the listener was led to believe that a musical choice existed, with 
the resultthat the pre-digested nature of the music was overlooked. 
Adorno's analysis of mass music reflected Pollock's work even in its portra: 
al of musical representation. The market was unnecessary, Adorno claimed, 
for mass music was 'plugged' so ubiquitously that all choice was lost, 
-102- 
including even that between different stereotypes. Music now existed only 
as a phantasmagoria that was 'ever-similar' (a term Adorno borrowed from 
Nietzschean philosophy). This phantasmagoric music never changed - just as 
the planned society was itself static - and, as a result, the listener 
was left no intimation of change in the fabric of the music. This staticism 
was reflected in the fact that musical quality and novelty had become ana- 
chronistic properties, for quality was now judged solely in terms of the 
quantity sold, i. e. of planned sales. 
Adorno judged that, owing to the structure of its production and consumptior 
mass music was in both form and content ideological in two ways. Compared 
to autonomous art, it was ideological because it did not provide any 
mediate knowledge of society. This first observation is similar to Hork- 
heimer's analysis of the authoritarian state, for it was founded on the 
presumption that no determinate negation was possible in the present; the 
present could only be shown to be ideological by contrasting it with the 
past. At a second, psychological level, mass music had the effect of train- 
ing listeners to recognize musical patterns ordained from above and to 
identify with these in order to enjoy their leisure time. This brought 
about a psychological dependence similar to that Horkheimer had outlined as 
existing between the person and the authoritarian state, for mass music 
demolished effectively the barrier between the individual's wishes and 
those of the monopolies. Adorno thus conceived of mass music as being a 
paradigm for the totalitarian ideology that functioned as the plinth on 
which the authoritarian state was erected. Totalitarianism was inherent in 
the music itself since the music forced listeners to acknowledge it as 
'good' music by depriving them of any criteria for comparison and judgement 
In so doing it bound them psychologically to the music. In view of this 
ideological nature of mass music Adorno concluded that the cultural monolit 
based on planned sales promoted and consolidated totalitarianism in contem- 
porary society (by using precisely those technical advances from which 
Benjamin had expected political progress). 
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This analysis of mass-produced music bears more than just a similarity to 
Pollock's conception of state capitalism. Close examination reveals Adorno's 
analytical framework to be based on the same theoretical assumptions. This 
is particularly manifest in Adorno's treatment of art as a social cypher, 
for he held this property of art to change dramatically with the advent of 
mass music. Mass-produced music had no internal truth, an absence parallel- 
ing the loss of any rationality in society, but it did reveal a truth about 
society, namely its static character. Central to Adorno's understanding of 
such music was the assumption, which he shared with Horkheimer and Pollock, 
that after an initial stage of establishing successful forms, production 
determined consumption. Logically, direct determination can only be expected 
to occur if the capitalist mode of distribution is considered to have 
changed. Adorno took this into account in his analysis of mass music, where 
he found the market - the sphere of distribution and choice - to have been 
eradicated. 
Adorno's thesis of mass music's totalitarian nature is only explicable if 
understood in the context of the market place having been abolished. His 
conception of mass music hinged on the liquidation of autonomous thought 
that resulted from the disappearance of the market. The 'commodity listenirf 
which replaced critical listening and freedom of choice culminated in the 
perpetuation of a one-dimensional, totalitarian society. Pollock saw this 
social structure as essentially static and Adorno would seem to endorse 
this position both by his own use of the term 'ever-similar' and by con- 
ceiving of mass music as having no internal dialectic. Equally, Adorno's 
supposition that mass music was completely ideological reflected the purely 
ideological position which, in Pollock's model, the superstructure inhabitec 
in state capitalist society. Similarly, Adorno adopted Pollock's belief 
that the superstructure had started to intervene in the base, 
since he maintained that mass music functioned to create a psychological 
dependence on state capitalist production. In Adorno's eyes, mass music 
thus served to tie the base to the superstructure and to ensure that the 
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base's products found ready buyers. Adorno pointed explicitly both to his 
work's affinity to Pollock's social analysis and to the real implications 
of Pollock's 1941 article on state capitalism in a letter to Horkheimer of 
the 3bth_ý'JU1y; 1941, concerning the publication of 'On Popular Music' 
and Horkheimer's 'Art and Mass Culture': 
Es wäre vielleicht gut, auf der einen Seite die Verschiedenheit der Stand- 
punkte mit Bezug auf den Staatskapitalismus hervorzuheben, auf der anderen 
Seite aber die Einheitsmomente und besonders die Beziehung von Ihrem und 
meinem Aufsatz zum Staatskapitalismus kurz anzudeuten, um den Einwand abzu- 
fangen, das Heft befasse sich zu sehr mit dem Überbau. Vielleicht kann man 
sogar sagen, daß der alte Begriff des Überbaus im Staatskapitalismus nicht 
mehr gelte, d. h. daß es für diese Epoche wesentlich ist, daß sie keine 
'Ideologie' mehr hat und daß eben darum die Fragen des Bewußtseins eine 
Dignität gewinnen, die sie nicht hatten, solange die Kultur das verdecken 
mußte, was heute frei ist. Je totaler der Staatskapitalismus und je plan- 
voller, um so ernster wird sie - sowie ja auch in der Frühzeit des Bürger- 
tums ihr Ernst ganz anders war als im Liberalismus. Dieser neue Ernst der 
Kultur und ihre Liquidation durch die manipulatierten Formen des Massen- 
bewußtseins stehen mit einander in der tiefsten Beziehung. 25 
This emphasis on the fact that society no longer required an explicit ideo- 
logy is also to be found in Adorno's studies of music, for these do not con- 
centrate on those forms which are explicity ideological in content, i. e. 
fascist ones. This allows one to conclude further that Adorno made use of 
the broader concept of the authoritarian state in line with Horkheimer's 
writings, particularly as Adorno's analysis tends to try and reveal the 
innate totalitarianism of the very technics developed by state capitalism. 
Adorno reiterated this point in his article on Aldous Huxley, where he spoke 
not of Fascist Germany's totalitarianism, but of that inherent in American 
society: 
Anstelle der Wildnis... ist eine Zivilisation getreten, die als System das 
ganze Leben einfängt, ohne dem unreglementierten Bewußtsein auch nur jene Schlupflöcher zu gewähren, lche die europäische Schlamperei bis ins Zeit- 
alter der großen Konzerne offenhielt. 26 
Because he approached the question of authoritarianism or state capitalism 
from the angle of the technics of mass music's production and consumption 
Adorno's analysis went decidedly further than Pollock's work had. Adorno 
regarded the technics of mass production as inherently totalitarian and con- 
trasted them to the technics of bourgeois art, which he considered progress- 
ive. Indeed, he adhered to the notion of the autonomous artwork as being 
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the determinate negation of mass-produced art. Before going into the 
significance of this contrast in greater depth it is necessary to clarify 
how Adorno analysed mass art's technics. -In his discussion of Brave New 
World, Adorno criticized Aldous Huxley for having regarded mankind's 
needs as somehow static. In contrast, Adorno held needs to be a reflection 
of material production and to develop in line with mankind's ability to 
produce. Adorno specified that needs, although by nature dynamic, appeared 
under mass culture to be static owing to their preformation by the mono- 
polies; commodities had come to prevent people from deviating from a norm 
for consumption imposed by mass culture. Needs under store capitalism were, 
therefore, implicitly false, as was the happiness they fulfilment purport- 
edly offered. 
Adorno drew two conclusions from this reflection on the falsification of 
needs. Firstly, he maintained that alienation had changed qualitatively 
from what it had been during liberal capitalism, for it now consisted of 
being bound within the constraints of the dominant social structure's 
preformed needs. Secondly, the technics which produced such needs could not 
be regarded as positive. Not only did Adorno thus consider technology to 
be historically specific, but he went so far as to state that technics 
under mass culture were equatable with social domination. In keeping with 
Horkheimer's work, Adorno assumed that this domination inherent in state 
capitalist technics testified to that society's continued antagonistic 
nature, 
27 for if society were harmonious then there would be no need for 
domination. This argument not only provided Adorno with a method of proving 
the underlying dialectical nature of totalitarianism where reality did not 
allow such to be perceived, but it also implied that either a non-dominativ 
technics existed or that contemporary technics could be put to a purpose 
other than domination and thus fulfil new needs. 
Although this argument marks a step forward from Pollock's concept of 
technics, in that Adorno attempted to locate dialectical tension within 
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state capitalist society, it is, nevertheless, contradictory. Adorno 
argued. that technics as the general means of production under state cap- 
italism formed the basis of social domination and yet, at the same time, 
he advocated that technics, if not applied to dominative ends, could pre- 
sent the foundation for a future, classless society. 
28 It is unclear whether 
he meant that the technics of mass production were per se dominative, or 
whether it was only their application that generated domination. This 
contradiction could only be resolved if Adorno were to propose that a 
qualitatively different form of techn ics were to exist side by sde with the 
technics of domination which could then serve as the grounding, for the leap 
into a new society. Any conception of a non-dominative technics external 
to state capitalism would, however, breach Adorno's dialectical methodology. 
It can be inferred from a study of his concept of technics as used in 
his analysis of mass culture that Adorno judged state capitalist technics 
to be completely dominative in character. Throughout his essays for the 
Zeitschrift/Studies Adorno implied that it was not just their use which 
was repressive, but that the very technics of mass culture were repressive 
and they could not therefore be used as the foundation for a new society. 
Adorno's conception of dominative technics paralleled Pollock's analysis 
of state capitalist production, for Adorno viewed these technics as essen- 
tially static, incapable of generating change. This is borne out indirectly 
by Adorno's positing of autonomous artworks (in the later essays he reterms 
these 'authentic') as the only antithesis to mass culture. He grounded this 
in the suggestion that only in such artworks did the means, (technic s) 
predicate the end (the 'promesse de bonheur') and vice versa. 
29 
Adorno distinguiied in this context between what he termed the general 
social means of production, which determine the form of mass culture's 
ideological products, and the artistic means of production, i. e. the 
artistic material's forming according to artistic laws. What was new about 
state capitalism was that the specifically artistic means of production 
were subjugated by the general social means of production, a process which 
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destroyed the autonomous artwork and transformed it into a commodity. In 
other words, Adorno considered the general social means of production under 
state. capitalism to be innately repressive, for otherwise he would not have 
been able to contrast them to artistic technics. What this opposition means, 
however, is that a non-dominative form of technics must continue to exist 
under state capitalism. Adorno must therefore have supposed that artistic 
technics resided in a specific socio-historical realm of their own (although 
this realm might be altered by overall social change, e. g. the loss of 
autonomy forced artworks to change if they were to remain autonomous), for 
otherwise they would be subsumed under the general social means of product- 
ion. Adorno was thus able to suggest that a future society could indeed be 
founded on a completely different sort of technics, one which was, moreover, 
inherent in state capitalist society, namely in artistic production. He 
remarked: 
Wenn die klassenlose Gesellschaft das Ende der Kunst verspricht, indem sie 
die Spannung von Wirklichem und Möglichem aufhebt, so verspricht-sie zu- 
gleich auch den Anfang der Kunst, das Unnütze, dessen Anschauung auf die 
Versöhnung mit der Natur tendiert., weil es nicht länger im Dienste des 
Nutzens für die Ausbeuter steht. 30 
Art could serve as the foundation for a non-dominative relation between man 
and nature, and thus by extension, for production, because its purpose was 
not to encourage its own mass sale, but rather to create beauty. 
Mass culture's monopoly nature and its destruction of the critical individua 
deprived art of its basis and threatened the existence of artistic technics, 
In order to embrace this state of affairs conceptually, Adorno had to re- 
think the relation between art and society and between aesthetics and epist- 
emology. The epistemological mainstay of Adorno's aesthetics remained, how- 
ever, unaltered, namely the analysis of artworks as crystals. The change in 
the degree and quality of alienation brought about by state capitalism 
caused Adorno to alter his conception of the manner in which the artwork 
presented a mediate reflection of reality by adding a prescriptive dimensio 
to it. He proposed that the artwork had to develop and heed only its own 
technics in its portrayal of reality if it was to avoid becoming blind-and 
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was adamant that the artwork had not to bow to the deformation of its 
audience's ability to understand it if this was to the detriment of its 
artistic quality. 
Adorno connected this new imperative strand in his aesthetics to the new 
role which he envisaged artworks had to play in society. He argued that in 
epistemological terms 'authentic' artworks fulfilled an important function 
under state capitalism over and above the mode of production they demon- 
strated, for they continued to evoke a memory of past suffering. Promoting 
such a remembrance of pain became the central function of artworks, for 
they thus prevented thought being reduced to an ahistorical knowledge only 
of what was, as Horkheimer had suggested was tending to become the case. 
Remembrance, Adorno hoped, forced a foot in the jamb of a rapidly closing 
gateway into a possible new history. 
The concept of novelty came to play an increasing role in Adorno's thought. 
Only novelty, he believed, encapsulated the qualitative difference to the 
present that a new society had to aspire to achieve. Adorno proposed that 
the concept be placed at the core of historical materialism, because, by 
illustrating the non-identity of the present and the future, novelty pro- 
vided the determinate negation of the 'ever-similar' society. Adorno asserted 
that the new had to develop out of the old, but that it could not be of the 
old, i. e. the new was not to be considered a metaphysical notion, but was 
rooted within concrete reality. In this sense, artistic technics provided 
an image of novelty and thus formed the basis for a determinate negation of 
state capitalism. Art also fulfilled the requirements Adorno made of novelty 
in another way. Authentic artworks appertained to real happiness in con- 
trast to the suffering of 'prehistory' that they highlighted. Equally, art- 
works presented traces of freedom in prehistory upon which new needs could 
be founded to challenge the false 'ever-similar' needs with which the popu- 
lation had been inculcated by mass culture. 
In Adorno's opinion, artworks thus comprised a counter to totalitarianism as 
long as they obeyed only the laws of form, rather than forsaking the specific 
-109- 
artistic dimension of reality. In adhering to the laws of artistic form 
artworks avoided the fate of mass cultural products, namely that of reprod- 
ucing totalitarianism's reified reality. -Artistic 
form became of exceptional 
importance to Adorno, for it alone, he judged, could expose the social 
preformation of the material it treated. For example, individualism in 
music could show loneliness to be a social creation and thus revealed the 
nature of the music to be man-made. By extension, art uncovered the fact 
that society was also man-made and therefore could be changed. Form empha- 
sized this point because it showed subjective expression to be something 
separate from the external meanings attributed to objects. 
Adorno contended that one did not have only to look to past, autonomous art 
in order to negate the present, for he maintained that authentic artworks 
could still be produced in the era of mass culture's hegemony. He grounded 
this thesis in the proposal that the loss of artistic autonomy, i. e. the 
loss of the mythical and magical semblance artworks had created to allow 
their form to be specifically artistic, need not imply the end of art. This 
loss of what Benjamin termed the artwork's 'aura' need not therefore affect 
artistic form. A serious obstacle faced Adorno in making this supposition, 
in that if 'non-auratic' art retreated to the safety of pure form then it 
was in danger of becoming blind, devoid of any reflections on the society 
in which it had originated. 
Adorno avoided this pitfall as is illustrated by the definition of the 
'integral artwork' that he gave in his discussion of Schönberg in Philoso- 
phie der Neuen Musik. 
32 
Schonberg's atonal music functioned by thoroughly 
organizing the material by means of a completely structured form and there- 
fore fulfilled the conditions Adorno laid down for artistic form; it was 
a codetermination of parts and whole. The ensuing piece of art, which 
Adorno labelled an 'integrally organised' artwork, 
33 
was 'non-auratic' 
because it broke with the 'context of its effect ('Wirkungszusammenhang'), 
i. e. it could not be used. The atonal music was thus concordant with the 
categories Adorno had developed to pinpoint art's role under state capital- 
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ism in that such music still allowed the new to be created from art's 
parts without the new being reducible to them,, thus saving real expression 
from its deformation by the technically-managed world. Adorno concluded, 
therefore, that atonal music's production of the new prevented it from 
lapsing into artistic blindness. What remains unclear, however, was how 
Adorno considered Schönberg's music could persevere if mass culture was as 
powerful as Adorno held it to be. 
Adorno ignored the consequent illogicality of his construction and specified 
that atonality opposed the totalitarian world in another fashion. He sug- 
gested that such art was 'breachless' ('bruchlos') in form and was not 
class-assertive since neither parts nor whole dominated in the music. As 
a result the inner consistency of the artwork presented an image of 'class- 
lessness'. This emphasis on the internal construction and production of 
the artwork constituting its meaning does not solve the question of whether 
such artworks are not, in fact, blind, since their meaning remains bound 
within the artwork. The validity of the new in atonal music should therefore 
be regarded as being of limited character, for internal production alone is 
insufficient to ground a social meaning in the new. 
Adorno got around this difficulty by making a virtue of necessity. He 
averred that the integral artwork was indeed blind, because it avoided 
transmitting a social meaning. In this manner the artwork criticized society 
ex negativo, by lending expression to the objective degradation of its own 
material. That is to say, the integral artwork stressed - by renouncing all 
social meaning - that its own inability to communicate was a result of the 
general state of society. Adorno stated that "die Unmenschlichkeit der 
34 Kunst muß die der Welt überbieten um des Menschlichen willen. " 
By virtue of this renunciation, the integral artwork generated novelty at 
a further level, that of psychological shocks. Adorno understood these to 
be elements of purely subjective, and therefore socially incomprehensible, 
meaning which rebelled against any identification or comprehension by the 
beholder. In other words, these shocks forged a realm of communication that 
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challenged the 'ever-similar' by providing an example of something com- 
pletely dissimilar. The shock in this sense was the new inherent in the 
old, for it broke conventional experience ('Erlebnis') and demanded a 
reflectory mode of experience ('Erfahrung') from its audience. In so doing, 
the integral artwork reflected on society, its blindness revealed the art- 
work actually not to be blind. Adorno maintained that precisely this state 
of not being blind in its very blindness highlighted contemporary art's 
historical specificity. The shock functioned in Adorno's conception to fuse 
the specifically artistic and the general social dimensions of the integral 
artwork, which was thus able to exhibit the quality Adorno had declared the 
artwork had to possess if it were to be considered authentic. 
The concepts of 'novelty', the 'integral artwork' and 'shocks' describe and 
parallel the fact that base and superstructure have become unified, for they 
show this unification to be the underlying cause for the incommunicative 
stance artworks adopt. 
35 In that they could not communicate, such artworks 
were isolated and yet this very isolation, Adorno argued, amounted to hope. 
On the one hand, it exposed the enforced isolation of artworks and, on the 
other, it illustrated how incorporation into the system of alienation could 
be hindered. Adorno therefore prescribed that under state capitalism the 
artwork had to cast off all use value and exist alienated from society in 
order to fulfil its duties as art and preserve hope for a new society-Only 
by such drastic means, he believed, could art prevent its absorption by 
mass culture. 
Adorno claimed that until such a time as the contradiction between the 
productive forces particular to art and the mass cultural product ceased to 
be obscured by an ideology of the 'ever-similar', avantgarde art had to 
remain 'functionless'. Artworks had, in other words, to hibernate until 
such a time as their techn is and imaginative powers could be taken up in 
the foundation of a free society. Adorno declared that by dint of this 
attitude - inimical to any audience but true to the historical artistic 
material - the avantgarde artwork was able to approximate to knowledge. It 
il 
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was only an approximation of knowledge, for the artwork could not offer 
its audience a conceptual truth. Nevertheless, because the integral 
artwork reflected on its opposition to society and took this relation 
into account in its form, it could provide knowledge about that society. 
The artwork condemned society as false and presented a reconciliatory iden- 
tity of subject and object as possible only in the future. In other words, 
Adorno judged avantgarde artworks to approximate to a knowledge of society 
because they contained an image of the totalitarian world inaccessible to 
conceptual thought. 
Adorno's statements on Schönberg and on mass culture were based on the 
analytical framework for aesthetics drawn up in his early writings; i. e. he 
still operated with a conception of the historical character of artistic 
material, of the role of artistic technics and of the artwork as cypher. 
The changes in the relation between art and society that Adorno detected by 
means of these fundamental propositions reflects both chronologically and 
epistemologically an acknowledgement that the structure of capitalism itself 
has been reshaped. Whereas in 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik' 
Schönberg's music had been lauded for resisting the market, in Philosophie 
der Neuen Musik Adorno put forward the same composer's work as an example 
of the integral artwork, the only artistic form able to avoid state capital- 
ist domination. Accordingly, Adorno's aesthetics became prescriptive as 
well as analytical in that it proclaimed that 'non-auratic' artworks had to 
seek to protect and preserve an image of subjectivity. 
It has been suggested that Adorno studied only the sphere of consumption and 
that this amounts to a major theoretical flaw in his aesthetics. 
36 This 
criticism is correct in so far as Adorno did not analyse the distribution 
of artworks, but it is incorrect in that Adorno could not analyse the mode 
of distribution since, following Pollock's suggestion, he believed the 
mechanisms of the market to have been suspended. In fact, the above criticise 
is doubly inaccurate. Adorno studied both the production and composition of 
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artworks and based his analysis of consumption on this study. This investi- 
gative framework was indebted to Pollock's theory of society, according to 
which production was considered to determine consumption and the base to 
determine the superstructure. Where Adorno parted company with Horkheimer 
and Pollock was in the attention he devoted to the historically specific 
nature of technics. A.. new society, Adorno proposed, would have to be founded 
on a genuinely new technics and could not be constructed by political 
decisions that had the interests of the population at heart simply being 
applied to state capitalism's sphere of production. In this respect, Adorno 
was just as pessimistic as Horkheimer and Pollock had been in assessing 
the chances of social transformation for he could forward no reason as to 
why people should wish to demand the use of new technics. 
In his later essays in the Zeitschrift/Studies Adorno adopted Pollock's 
interpretation of the relation between base and superstructure. As a result 
of the concentration of capital the base dictated, or so Adorno assumed, in 
its very mode of production the shape of the superstructure, and yet relied 
on increased superstructural activity for its own continued existence. The 
main example of this conception in Adorno's articles was his proposal that 
technological development in mass culture occurred either to satisfy needs 
mass culture had created or to foster conformism to state capitalism. Conse- 
quently, Adorno's analysis of the relation between art, mass culture and 
society indirectly revealed much of this change in the base, for it detailed 
the base's domination of culture and mass culture's allotted role. 
With this analysis of mass culture Adorno brought to light the change in 
the mode of production that Pollock has assumed had taken place. However, 
this initial advance was itself limited, for Adorno's approach matched in 
vagueness Horkheimer and Pollock's general remarks on the nature of capital- 
ist production. Adorno did not study the mode of production specifically, 
but conceived of production only in terms of the opposition between mass 
culture and the authentic artwork. The actual structural configuration of 
radio, film and film-music was left unspecified behind his general categorie, i 
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of stereotypy, standardization and pseudo-individuation. Adorno simply 
contrasted mass culture to authentic art rather than determining the pre- 
cise ideological content of mass music by, for example, analysing it as 
closely as he had investigated Wagner's or, indeed, Schönberg's music. 
Adorno's essays are marred by this absence of any detailed analysis. His 
concept of ideological technics - at first sight a promising addition to 
the analysis of state capitalism - must consequently be regarded as over- 
generalized. Adorno's work runs the danger of only being able to state - 
somewhat blandly - that mass culture was ideological because it was not 
art. 
As a whole, then, Adorno proffered an analysis that was no more binding than 
that of Benjamin, whose work on mass culture Adorno had sought to counter. 
Adorno neither provided an adequate account of the creation of value in 
mass cultural (and artistic) production, nor did he theorize on the social 
force that wish manipulation amounted to. Adorno's work treated such mani- 
pulation as a given property no longer in need of analysis much as he also 
discounted the validity of popularity or reception as aesthetic judgements 
without actually studying these. Adorno's case is further weakened by the 
fact that he tried to justify excluding integral artworks from a study of 
commodities by arguing that they inhabited a separate dimension of reality. 
Yet, such artworks exist only in reality, i. e. the world of commodities, and 
therefore must in some sense be commodities. 
This lack of empirical analysis becomes a serious weakness in Adorno's 
elaboration of the integral artwork, just as it was in Pollock's 'ideal- 
typical' analysis. The question as to whether integral artworks are them- 
selves affected by their mass production in the form of long-playing records' 
or paperbacks is left unanswered; indeed, it is ignored. Such an analysis 
might not establish objective aesthetic criteria for evaluating the artwork, 
but its omission prevented Adorno from even conceiving of the physical 
existence of integral artworks. One can only conclude that Adorno believed 
-115- 
these artworks to retain their autonomy regardless of their physical in- 
corporation into state capitalism. Accordingly, Adorno's tenet that art- 
works had to be integral if they were to-avoid incorporation into mass 
culture must be reformulated to read that 'artworks have to be integral to 
counteract the effects of their incorporation'. 
The absence of an analysis of value production and of the precise constit- 
ution of the cultural monopolies renders Adorno's conception overly abstract. 
This imprecision leaves Adorno open to the charge that his work is merely 
a statement of preference for integral artworks, rather than a binding 
proof that only such artworks can now be considered to be art. Yet, ironic- 
ally, it is precisely a concrete analysis of incorporation that would lend 
credence to the power Adorno accorded the integral artwork in his aesthetic 
and social theory. His concepts of ideology, concreteness and technics were, 
nevertheless, more powerful in content than those present in Lukäcs' and 
Benjamin's respective aesthetics of the time. In particular, Adorno's con- 
cept of technics offers an advance over the work of these two other theor- 
ists, as it did also over Horkheimer and Pollock's work. However, these 
advances are annulled by the fact that Adorno's aesthetic theory - as elab- 
orated in his later essays - came to be based on Pollock's work. Adorno thus 
followed the path marked out by Horkheimer's conceptualization of the 
authoritarian state, namely a severe doubt as to whether capitalist society 
could be changed. Indeed, this underlying pessimism infected his appraisal 
of integral artworks, for he judged these to no longer contain a 'promesse 
de bonheur', i. e. an image of the future, but at most to symbolize in their 
integral construction a different form of production. 
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CHAPTER5: MARCUSE : PHILOSOPHY AND A CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY 
Comparing Marcuse's work in the period from 1932 to 1942 with Horkheimer's 
thought of the same period is a more straightforward task than was recon- 
structing the link between Adorno's writings and Horkheimer's work, and 
yet it is also a complex undertaking. On the one hand, Marcuse joined the 
Institut(e) in 1932 shortly after Horkheimer had become Director and thus 
was in closer contact with other Institut(e) staff than was Adorno. Further- 
more, Marcuse wrote numerous articles both on philosophical matters and on 
the history of ideas for the Zeitschrift/Studies, subjects much closer to 
Horkheimer's work than were Adorno's few articles. Indeed, Marcuse authored 
an essay on philosophy and critical theory to complement that by Horkheimer, 
On the other hand, Marcuse came to Frankfurt from Freiburg where he had 
studied under Heidegger. Although by 1929 he had rejected a purely exist- 
entialist approach, 
2 
his monograph on Hegel and his first essay for the 
Zeitschrift both testify to his not having shaken off entirely this early 
influence on his thought. Moreover, despite having written his doctorate 
on the German 'Künstlerroman', he did not publish more than one essay on 
aesthetics during the period under investigation, so that any explication 
of his aesthetics and cultural theory has to be pasted together from his 
fugitive and disparate remarks on art and culture in general. Thus, his 
aesthetics cannot be examined and compared to Horkheimer's work in the 
manner in which Adorno's can be. Lastly, it has been suggested that Marcuse'j 
writings evidence more similarities to Franz Neumann's conception of fascisn 
than to that developed by Pollock. 3 If this is the case, then attempting to 
uncover whether Marcuse's work was influenced by the shifts in Horkheimer's 
thought would be a fruitless pursuit. 
In order to assess whether Marcuse's work does follow the three stages in 
Horkheimer's thought - and by implication Pollock's theory of society -a 
chronological study will be made of the relation between Marcuse's social 
theory and the philosophical concepts that he developed to explain 'being- 
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in-the-world' ('Dasein') in terms both of its constitution by the sphere 
of production and its interpretation in culture. If this relation is found 
to itself undergo change then it should be possible to investigate whether 
this transformation occurred as a result of a reception of Pollock's concept 
of state capitalism or was attributable to other influences. In the course 
of this study specific attention will be paid to Marcuse's statements on 
the nature of culture and on aesthetics so as to assess whether aesthetic 
concepts play a mediating role between philosophy and social theory as was 
the case with Adorno's work. Marcuse's monographs on Hegel of 1933 and 
1941 will, however, be omitted from the discussion. 
4 
Although they provide 
border markers for the period in question and would therefore seem well- 
suited to being used in an assessment of profound changes in Marcuse's 
work over this time-span, their content is specifically philosophical and 
the detailed analysis that would be appropriate to a proper discussion 
would lead away from the main themes of this chapter. 
Marcuse's early work at the InstiU( e) concentrated on devising both philo- 
sophical and sociological concepts to describe contemporary society. In his 
first essay for the Zeitschrift 'Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der 
totalitären Staatsauffassung'S Marcuse sketched an outline of the totalita- 
rian state and its ideology. In accordance with orthodox Marxist analyses 
of the time he contended that liberal capitalism had evolved into monopoly 
capitalism. However, he also differed with these analyses for he suggested 
that this new form of society could only survive with support from a total- 
itarian state an "alle Machtmittel mobilisierende Staatsgewalt', ' 
6 
able to 
decide "in allen Dimensionen des Daseins über die Existenz. "7 
Marcuse proposed that monopoly capitalism needed the totalitarian state 
because an open contradiction had arisen in society's economic substructure 
between production relations and productive forces. Ideally, all the popu- 
lationh needs could be satisfied by the productive forces, but this would 
require a break with capitalist production relations. Unlike Pollock, Mar- 
cuse did not believe that capitalism could prevent this happening by means 
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of planning. Rather, he concluded that this development in the base brought 
about a change in ideology. In this context he drew a much more direct 
line between base and superstructure than had Horkheimer, by claiming that 
the totalitarian state's function was to mask this otherwise clearly per- 
ceivable contradiction. 
To'do so it relied on a very specific ideology which was radically different 
from a liberal -ideology of individualism. The ideology that the totalitarian 
state was forced to adopt revealed much of that state's nature. Marcuse 
determined at a much earlier stage than Horkheimer that totalitarian ideol- 
ogy fulfilled liberal capitalism's real intentions because it attacked 
bourgeois individualism which was now redundant on account of the presence 
of monopolies. The ideology dispensed with the idea of private freedom, thus 
renouncing any foundation in a rationality of the individual. As a conse- 
quence, not only did the new ideology reflect the structural change in 
society and participate in effecting such a change, it was also overtly 
irrational. The function of ideology had therefore changed, for the new 
totalitarian ideology no longer neededto fabricate illusions but rather 
openly devalued reality. 
The totalitarian state, Marcuse proposed, firstly used a universalizing 
ideology that fostered open brutality in the name of the 'Volk' and 
secondly inculcated an existentialism of poverty in the population. The 
purpose of these two strands of totalitarian ideology was, he gauged, to 
further the 'total activation and politicization' of life. Whereas Pollock 
had assumed that state capitalism was opm ly faced with problems of political 
legitimation, Marcuse suggested that the totalitarian ideology did not 
attempt to legitimate the totalitarian state but served to prevent any 
other social structure replacing it, for such an ideology eroded the very 
basis of autonomous thought, namely individuality. This conception diffemi 
from Pollock's in two other respects; Marcuse considered that the totali- 
tarian ideology dominated and controlled production - unlike Pollock who 
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had believed the two to be interlinked. Marcuse also continually contrasted 
the totalitarian state to a planned society, which to his mind was, by 
definition, socialist. _ 
This view that society was not only totalitarian monopoly capitalist but 
simultaneously contained the potentiality of a free socialist society in- 
formed the philosophical concepts which Marcuse went on to develop in his 
early essays for the Zeitschrift. 
8 These concepts were designed to embrace 
the totalitarian state and to point'out how it could be transformed and 
thus indicate a state beyond it. Marcuse endeavoured to accomplish this by 
making the concepts' primary purpose that of showing how they were limited 
by the division between 'civilization' (the sphere of production) on the 
one hand and 'culture' (the thought and institutions based on it) on the 
other. Each of these concepts he outlined in his various essays for the 
Zeitschrift was informed by this epistemological concern and by the singu- 
lar importance he attached to this division. 
The four main concepts he constructed fall into two natural pairs, both 
hierar_hically equal in the place they inhabit in his work: essence and 
reason, interest and happiness ('Wesen', 'Vernunft', 'Interesse', 'Glück'). 
The major part of his work for the Institut(e) was taken up with the devel- 
opment of these philosophical concepts and collectively they embody an 
attempt to create an historical materialist philosophy. This task included 
advancing a distinct methodology when analysing previous philosophies in 
order to ascertain what parts of them were redeemable in terms of a con- 
temporary critique. Just as Horkheimer's methodology was important to his 
designing a critical concept of reason, so too the way in which Marcuse 
developed his materialist concepts is equally as important as their content. 
From a study of the use by classical and idealist philosophies of the 
concept of essence Marcuse constructed a materialist version of the same 
concept. He ascertained that all previous efforts to define this concept 
had remained idealist or abstract, despite the material core he found to 
exist in the essence of being. In order to avoid this predicament, one 
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present even in phenomenological investigation. Marcuse turned the problem 
on its head. He argued that the contradiction between essence and appear- 
ance was a real contradiction, not a mental construct or Plato's 'eidos'. 
He defined appearance as the historical 'for itself' of essence, i. e. it 
was the appearance of essence in one particular social form. Essence could 
consequently be specified to be the basis of all concrete existence; and 
it was thus possible to measure contemporary existence against the potential 
of a better existence resident within it, i. e. its essence. The past of 
essence functioned as the basis of a critique of existence, since this past 
had formed the productive forces from which the future could be projected 
out of the present. In this manner, Marcuse conceived of essence as a mater- 
ial state whose potential had not yet been realised but rather was hidden 
behind appearance. Essence would, to use Horkheimer's words, be shown to be 
non-identical with itself. What was more, such material essence was closely 
bound up with the happiness of the population in that the potentiality 
inherent in essence by definition could not be used for particular interests, 
be these totalitarian or capitalist. Marcuse thus designed the concept of 
essence to designate the level of social production, of labour, achieved 
in a given society. 
9 
However, he did not equate appearance simply with 
ideology, as had Lukäcs, for something of appearance - as appearing essence 
- was always true. 
Marcuse's definition of essence is related to Marx's conception that the 
appropriation of labour by means of commodity production is the lowest 
common denominator of capitalism. Marcuse's notion of essence permitted 
him to specify that the contemporary stage of production could fulfil the 
needs of the population; the only necessity then facing men would be their 
struggle against nature rather than against one another. A rational, planned 
society that served only mankind's interests would provide the basis for 
such a use of the productive forces. Marcuse spoke of a "Menschheit, welche 
die Gestaltung des gesellschaftlichen Lebensprozesses planmäßig selbst in 
die Hand nimmt", 
10 
and the result of such planning would be a socialist 
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society. 
Marcuse concluded that the difference between essence and appearance 
could only be bridged by appearance being changed, i. e. by praxis. Indeed, 
he constructed the concept of 'essence' precisely so that he could describe 
society as being potentially more than its sum parts. The concept therefore 
provided the important link between theory and praxis, for it spotlighted 
society's changeability. In this respect Marcuse's methodology differed 
from non-identity theory. Whereas Horkheimer sought to expose the ideologi- 
nature of philosophy, Marcuse's work tried to develop past philosophical1l cal 
concepts and use them as a platform from which both to describe capitalist 
society and to point beyond it to how it could be changed. 
11 Marcuse there- 
fore also parted company with Pollock's work, in that he considered change 
not only to be possible but envisaged the result to be a socialist society. 
Traditionally, philosophy conceived the principle ordering essence to be 
reason. Marcuse argued, however, that appearance was not structured by 
reason in monopoly capitalism, for this society was totalitarian and thus 
irrational. He discussed the concept of reason in the manner adopted to 
evaluate the notion of essence, i. e. by investigating the past usage of the 
concept, notably the part it played in Hegelian philosophy. Hegel had 
maintained that a concept of reason was crucial to epistemology for it 
explained the relation of freedom to nature. Nature (and with it society) 
could be regarded as a medium for freedom because, or so Hegel had submitted, 
it was ordered by reason in the form of 'Spirit'. Marcuse objected to what 
he regarded as Hegel's inference that the struggle between nature and 
society was ordered rationally. Just as Marcuse insisted on a materialist 
concept of essence, so likewise he averred that reason had to be concept- 
ualised as a concept and not only an ideational, philosophical ordering of 
reality. That is to say, the concept had to be materially grounded and 
linked to praxis. Its relevance, he maintained, lay precisely in this 
positioning, for reason could then show that reality was not rational. In 
other words, the concept demonstrated its own non-existence in reality, for 
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there it still had to be established. Marcuse's concept of reason is 
therefore 'critical' in a dual manner. Not only can the concept be used to 
assess the general freedom from necessity of a given society, but also - 
since social freedom is based on individual freedom - it describes the 
extent of individual freedom that society allows. The concept of reason is 
true in that it represents the possibilities inherent in essence. Both his 
notions of truth and reason are construed as abstract, for they are mediated; 
by the appearance of capitalist society. Once society is founded on the 
potentiality of essence, reason would shed its abstractness and become 
concrete. 
In contrast to this possible future society, state capitalism could be 
shown to be an. irrational social form, despite its being ordered by a 
plan, if this plan were to be proven to be irrational. However, Marcuse was 
unable to pass such a judgement using the concept of reason, because it 
would undermine the necessary connection he sought to establish between 
reason and planned praxis. For, if an irrational planned social form could 
be imposed on essence, what justification was there for supposing that an 
inherent logical link existed between reason and a socialist society? 
Marcuse developed two concepts to support this linking of reason and 
praxis: interest and happiness. The materialist foundation of the concepts 
of essence and reason led Marcuse to question why appearance was not essence 
by addressing the cui bono of contemporary society. Since contemporary app- 
earance did not serve the general interests of mankind as a whole but, in 
the guise of the totalitarian state, suppressed the potential of essence, 
Marcuse concluded that it must obey only a 'particular' interest. The con- 
cept of interest thus located the link between theory and praxis by showing 
not only that changeýas necessary because society was controlled only in 
the interest of a few and therefore irrational, but also that a different 
society was contained in society's essence. In other words, Marcuse main- 
tained that a society functioning in the general interest where the only 
form of necessity would be the struggle against nature, was feasible if the 
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forces of production were to be put to a different use. 
At this point Marcuse's argument provides solutions to two of the Instit- 
ut(e)'s main concerns. The concept of interest challenges an economistic 
Marxism that centres on a monolinear notion of progress by exposing its 
irrationality in a way not unlike Horkheimer's definition of non-identity. 
For Marcuse, progress is only made when the particular interest governing 
society has been overthrown. The development of the forces of production 
cannot therefore be considered automatically to create such a change. Furth- 
ermore, Marcuse connected this observation to a discussion of the ideological; 
nature of the productive forces. To the extent that dominant particular 
interests are also rooted in science and technology, these forces cannot 
be regarded as an a priori for the foundation of a new society, i. e. science 
and technology must be held to be ideological. 
12 
The concept of interest 
additionally enabled Marcuse to deduce that a complete division of the 
economy and the political sphere was only possible in a free society because 
only then could the political sphere - acting in the general interest - 
regulate and direct the economy rationally. If governed by a particular 
interest economic gain was usurped by a few and the two spheres were inter- 
locked. In this manner Marcuse's philosophy provides a negative determinatioi 
of the fettering of the productive forces under the totalitarian state. 
The concept of interest could also be emplo}ed on another plane. It 
permitted a concept of real interest to be posited, by which Marcuse under- 
stood real to signify the general happiness of mankind. Real interest is 
consequently not just a critical standard against which present reality 
can be measured but also a philsophical notion that allows a state to be 
thought of where reason and general happiness coincide. This dual quality 
is more than a sublation of Hegel's idealist concept of reason, for it 
generates an image of a future state, which although by definition unspeci- 
fic, is nevertheless materialistically founded. The difference in methodo- 
logical intention between Horkheimer and Marcuse is illustrated succinctly 
by this point. Whereas Horkheimer endeavoured to expose the ideological 
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nature of traditional philosophy, Marcuse constructed a philosophy that 
claimed to explain the ideological nature of the social structure itself, 
be it 'planned' or not. 
To be able to define real interest as the coincidence of reason and general 
happiness Marcuse had to elaborate the concept of happiness in greater det- 
ail. He approached this task by analysing the conflicting notions of Cyre- 
naic and Epicurean hedonism. Cyrenaic hedonism, he found, had been substant- 
ially conformist whereas the Epicurean variant he judged to be critical, 
for it had tried to find ways of avoiding unhappiness, a task that had 
involved criticizing social constraints on happiness. The idea of hedonism 
thus offered philosophy an all-important connection to immediate physical 
happiness, although he qualified this statement by contending that this 
remained an ideological bond if such happiness were linked only to a 
particular person. Happiness, he maintained, had to be founded in general 
interest, i. e. in reason. 
If the concept of happiness is used to designate both the extent to which 
happiness does not at present exist, and the possibility that it could be 
established in the future, then the concept can be used critically to under- 
pin Marcuse's notions of interest and reason. Marcuse proceeded to assert 
that current happiness seemed accidental, for people's expenditure of labour 
did not guarantee them happiness on account of that labour being caught up 
in the production of exchange- aid surplus- value. Signally, under the 
totalitarian state enjoyment had to be detached from exchange-value in 
order to avoid the tension that would result from the population realizing 
that their labour did not guarantee happiness. As a consequence of this 
dissociation of labour and happiness, Marcuse proposed, enjoyment was an 
abstract notion that could not provide an understanding of society. Because 
enjoyment could, however, be liberating, in that it could point beyond the 
given relations of production, various devices such as film and organised 
amusement were used by totalitarianism to distract people from realizing 
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that real enjoyment was possible. Marcuse insisted, however, that future 
happiness could not be grounded in contemporary needs. In an argument 
similar to that put forward by Adorno he ascertained that needs under total- H 
itarianism were created manipulatively and could not as a result-be taken to 
II 
be a real measure of what people required. In this context, because of its 
II 
connection to the future, the concept of happiness provided Marcuse with 
the physical, materialist base for the future society he had projected 
abstractly in the concepts of essence, reason and interest. As he remarked: 
Ohne die Freiheit und das Glück in den gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen 
der Menschen bleibt auch die größte Steigerung der Produktion und die 
Abschaffung des individuellen Eigentums an den Produktionsmittel noch 
der alten Ungerechtigkeit verhaftet. 13 
General happiness could only be established by a change in the economic- i; 
political process, i. e. in the distribution and production of social wealth. 
In this manner Marcuse avoided dissolving the concept of happiness into 
either a philosophical anthropology or an economistic theory of society. 
14 
His assertion that both economic and political change were necessary under- 
lines this fact. Marcuse did not, in other words, envisage a simple progres- 
sion to socialism founded on totalitarian monopoly capitalism's means of 
production. This suggestion marks a shift away from his original conception 
of planned socialism, although it does not amount to a complete theoretical 
acceptance of the concept of state capitalism. What his emphasis on economic 
and political change does imply, however, is that the planned society orig- 
inally encapsulated in his concept of essence must be qualitatively differ- 
ent with regard to the structure of work itself, i. e. it cannot be a planned 
variant of capitalist production. 
Despite their common interest in studying the inherent meanings of concepts, 
the methodologies Marcuse and Horkheimer adopted and developed differed 
greatly from one another. Marcuse did not attempt to expose the ideological 
connotations of contemporary philosophy as non-identity theory undertook to 
do. Rather, he derived from-a brief history of the concept the value it 
might have for a current historical materialist philosophy, i. e. the manner 
!I 
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in which it could be used fruitfully in such a philosophy. The ensuing 
concepts were intended not only to describe reality but also simulta- 
neously to contain the basis for a future society. In this respect, 
Marcuse's concepts cannot simply be labelled 'ideology critique'. The 
concepts were indeed meant to earmark the ideology inherent in social 
reality and yet equally they were intended to specify the degree to which 
the basis of that social reality could be changed so as to create out of 
it a new, socialist society. Consequently, Marcuse's concepts were designed 
to outline that praxis necessary to change the existing social structure, 
in the sense that they were meant to be used as a theory by future praxis. 
Marcuse's philosophy can therefore be described as a sublative ideology 
critique not of thought, but of society. 
During his time at the Institut(e), however, Marcuse increasingly came to 
see 'thought' as a refuge for ideas which could no longer be put into 
practice. When confronted with the totalitarian state the truth of 
philosophical concepts could only be posited in an ideational sphere; it 
could not be detected in contemporary social appearance, i. e. in the 
physical reality of totalitarianism. Marcuse tried to compensate for this 
by conceiving of imagination as a faculty that was necessary if truth was 
to be preserved. Since the totalitarian state debarred praxis from occur- 
ing truth could, Marcuse argued, only be conceptualised mentally. Philos- 
ophy therefore became an even more important discipline and had to incorp- 
orate within it imagination and the ability to 'project' a vision into 
the future. In this context Marcuse's work on culture and aesthetics came 
to play a key role in his thought. 
In the 1937 issue of the Zeitschrift/Studies Marcuse devoted a lengthy 
essay to the function of culture and aesthetics in society, 'Über den 
affirmativen Charakter der Kultur'. Marcuse founded the concept of 
affirmative culture in the division of culture and civilization (between 
productive forces and production relations) that informed the epistemology 
he had used to develop his philosophical concepts. The term itself was 
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devised by Horkheimer who, with reference to his essay 'Egoismus und 
Freiheitsbewegung', remarked in a letter to Benjamin of the 27th of 
October, 1936: 
Es wird Sie interessieren, daß Marcuse, angeregt durch die Stelle, auf 
die Sie verweisen, den Plan eines Aufsatzes über den Kulturbegriff 
gefaßt hat. 15 
The passage in question read as follows: 
Der affirmative Charakter der Kultur, gemäß welchem über der wirklichen 
Welt das Sein einer ewig besseren behauptet wurde... 16 
Marcuse defined affi-ruative culture more precisely, however: 
Unter affirmativer Kultur sei jene der bürgerlichen Epoche des Abend- 
landes verstanden welche im Lauf ihrer eigenen Entwicklung dazu geführt 
hat, die geistig-seelische Welt als ein selbständiges Wertbereich von 
der Zivilisation abzulösen und über sie zu erhöhen. Ihr entscheidender 
Zug ist die Behauptung einer allgemein verpflichtenden, unbedingt zu 
bejahenden, ewig besseren, wertvolleren Welt, welche von der tatsächlichen 
Welt des alltäglichen Daseinskampfes wesentlich verschieden ist, die aber 
jedes Individuum, von innen her, ohne jede Tatsächlichkeit zu verändern, 
für sich realisieren kann. 17 
Affirmative culture thus formed the structure in which Adorno had situated 
autonomous art. In contrast to Adorno, however, Marcuse specified that" 
affirmative culture was an ideological opiate that excused society from 
providing earthly happiness. In this fashion such culture reproduced the 
abstract reason unrelated to general happiness practised in capitalist 
society and also fostered the monadification of the populace. 
Affirmative culture offered an abstract, purely mental semblance of satis- 
faction anchored in nebulous notions such as the 'soul'. Despite the fact 
that the notion of the 'soul' centred on the individual and thus to a 
limited extent cut through the impersonality of capitalist economic relations, 
Marcuse argued that emphasis on the 'soul' diverted attention away from the 
capitalist form of production and thus from social change. Marcuse concluded 
from this: 
So konnte die Seele als ein nützlicher Faktor in der Technik der Massen- 
beherrschung eingehen, als, in der Epoche der autoritären Staaten, alle 
verfügbaren Kräfte gegen eine wirkliche Veränderung des gesellschaftlichen 
Daseins mobilgemacht werden mußte. 18 
Although art in particular articulated ideals at the same time as it legiti- 
mized the absence of real happiness in society, these had little effect for 
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Marcuse suggested: "Was in der Kunst geschieht, verpflichtet zu nichts. "19 
However, he underlined that in its articulation of ideals, affirmative 
culture had to be regarded as possessing a positive, non-ideological side, 
i. e. affirmative culture was dialectical. 
It vas especially in art, Marcuse asserted, that one ideal in particular 
was preserved, namely that of potential future real happiness, Stendhal's 
'promesse de bonheur'. In the face of the complete division of civilization 
and culture, Marcuse proposed, "wird das Glück zum Reservatbereich, damit es 
überhaupt noch da sein kann., 
20 The happiness which could no longer be located 
in society could therefore only be posited in the faculty of imagination and 
found its symbolic portrayal in art. Although Marcuse postulated that the 
positive meanings which were critical of reality were symbolically and text- 
ually perceivable, he omitted to itemize how this occurred and why an artwork's 
structure permitted such symbolic construction. Indeed, the question has been 
raised whether it is possible to regard beauty as a symbolic property at all, 
since beauty inhabits a plane beyond symbolism. 
21 
Beauty, for Marcuse the 
essence of art, offered, he suggested, a picture of happiness. The enjoyment 
of beauty therefore pointed forward to the possibility of real sensuous 
happiness, to a state where civilization and culture reunite and become 
'beautiful'. In this context Marcuse gauged that the notion of the 'soul', 
which at first sight appeared to, be negative, actually had a positive side, 
because it had no exchange-value and thus indicated a future state where 
real happiness would be unyoked from exchange-value oriented production. In 
summary, by appealing by means of its beauty to the individual's sensory 
perception, affirmative art retained a concept of individual rationality 
unlike the false rationality of the sphere of production. Marcuse's concept- 
ion of art therefore functions as a paradigm for real interest and general 
happiness at a time when these are no longer accessible in reality. As such 
his argument involves certain latent assumptions on aesthetics which must 
be examined more closely. 
Marcuse's conception of affirmative art implies that the meaning of an artwork 
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is historical and can change. Whereas the piece of art may have originally 
been laudatory of bourgeois civilization, through the passage of time it 
may have taken on a critical edge, for example, by exposing the inhuman 
side of contemporary civilization. Whether or not the beauty of an artwork 
can now be understood in this new sense depends on the existence of a 
public which can appreciate such beauty. There is thus a paradoxical ele- 
ment in Marcuse's construction, for it was just such a public which he 
had insisted totalitarianism was eroding. Equally, the presence of negative 
as well as positive levels of meaning in the artwork signifies that art- 
works can be used against the very ideals they harbour, for example by a 
mass cultural apparatus. 
With the concept of affirmative culture Marcuse presented a dialectical 
appraisal of autonomous art's contemporary function. That is to say, he 
used the term to encapsulate an ideology critique of past art, for under 
totalitarianism autonomous art had become an impossibility. However, the 
conception lacks any degree of differentiation and is limited to one hist- 
orical moment, in that it failsV to take into consideration the different 
forms of reception and forms of art extant in the 19th century, thus 
ignoring the tension between 'traditional' and 'avant-garde' forms of art. 
Only 'bourgeois' culture and forms are included in the analysis, neither 
proletarian art forms nor the later Dadaist and Surrealist branches of 
artistic production are accounted for or evaluated. Furthermore, unlike 
Adorno, and unlike Benjamin's essay on artworks and mechanical reproduc- 
ibility, 
22 
Marcuse did not undertake to suggest forms the future production 
of art should take, but merely looked at past art. Neither did he put 
forward an aesthetics of the artwork, as Adorno had done with reference 
to Hegel's aesthetics. 
Marcuse's concept of affirmative culture embraces art as representative 
of bourgeois culture in total, and yet the bourgeois culture so repres- 
ented is that of liberal capitalism and not of monopoly capitalism. In 
this respect Marcuse must have regarded affirmative artworks as essentially 
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dissynchronous. It was in order to construct such a tension between 
autonomous, affirmative art and contemporary society that Marcuse cast 
the term 'affirmative' so unspecifically and chose to ignore avant-garde 
artworks and concentrate on 'classics'. 
23 In other words, the concept 
was not intended to include the avant-garde, for the notion of affirmative 
culture had to be rooted in the past, namely in liberal capitalism. For 
similar reasons, Marcuse's aesthetics could not suggest what forms art 
should take if it were to project an emancipatory potential. Because the 
happiness it symbolically represented was no longer apparent' in totali- 
tarian society, it could not be represented in terms of that society. In 
other words, in a closed society non-identity could only be posited - or 
indeed preserved - by resorting to past images. Such a non-identity is 
methodiogically distinct from that theorized by Horkheimer, for it no 
longer locates non-identity in the present. 
Art, Marcuse proposed, salvaged the non-identical in its 'promesse de 
bonheur', in beauty, in the imagination. Methodologically, this conception 
differs from his writings on philosophy for, by refusing to show any 
way forward and analysing past products and past production, Marcuse's 
aesthetics is passive rather than offering a link to praxis. In order to 
avoid the threat of mental blockage posed by the civilization of the 
totalitarian state, Marcuse encouraged passivity in order to preserve an 
image of the future, rather than action in order to change society. Art's 
ideals may offer a bridge to the future, but they thus remain sublated 
by the perceiver at an ideational level. 
24 
Activity, Marcuse concluded, 
would involve criticism of the ideality of those very ideals and therefore 
endanger their existence. Only through such a criticism could these ideals 
content be put into practice in accordance with Marx's eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach. However, in Marcuse's conception art is held to preserve the 
ideals of his philosophical concepts in a visible form, but in a manner 
in which they cannot be put into practice. Their truth can only be upheld 
in 'refuge', in the imagination. Thus in its conceptualisation Marcuse's 
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work on art went against the tenor of the philosophical notions he had 
developed, but constituted an attempt to preserve this philosophy's 
truth content, much as Adorno and Horkheimer's work in the late 1930s 
came to discount the possibility of change once they had accepted Pollock's 
thesis on state capitalism. 
Marcuse argued that the preservation of the ideals by art was particularly 
necessary, for under the total mobilization of the totalitarian state the 
production of affirmative art was suspended. Culture had become the servant 
of the dominatory. In other words, Marcuse conceived of the superstructure 
changing in function to cater directly for the needs of the base although 
it is not clear whether this means that the totalitarian economy is diff- 
erent from that of monopoly capitalism. What is certain is that the concept 
of non-affirmative, emancipatory culture which was connected closely to 
the sphere of production was thrown into question by the presence of the 
totalitarian state. Totalitarianism enforces a complete subjugation of 
culture by civilization, parodying in a ghostly form, i precisely that cul- 
tural form Marcuse held to be characteristic of socialism. Since totali- 
tarian society offers nothing on which to found social change, ideology 
critique is forced to centre on abstract ideals contained in past art if 
it is to counter this monolithic cultural structure. 
To uphold these ideals in the form in which they are encountered in 
autonomous art Marcuse had to find causal reasons for the coalition of 
culture and civilization in the sphere of civilization itself rather than 
in culture. That is to say, if art is to retain a potentially liberating 
moment, its subservience to the sphere of production must be explained in 
terms of the latter sphere and not be seen as the result of some innate 
property of art. In order to avoid this danger, in his last essay for 
the Zeitschrift/Studies, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', 
Marcuse postulated that technology itself functioned ideologically in the 
sphere of production. This process occurred because with the downfall of 
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free economic competition commodities were produced for profit alone. 
Unlike technics, which he regarded as an abstract ability, technology 
and a technological rationality had a stabilising effect on society. The 
term 'technological-rationality' was meant to designate the fact that the 
technological power of production pervaded the entire rationality of 
society, as a result of which individuals were treated as mere instru- 
ments of production. 
Marcuse, like Pollock before him, suggested that in the absence of a price 
system exchange-values became the ordering principle of society. Marcuse, 
however, anchored this change in the technological appEratus of production, 
which he held not only to guarantee the creation of exchange-values, but 
as a consequence to dominate society and in so doing to promote a false 
general interest, namely an interest in the further existence of the appa- 
ratus itself. This new technological rationality he deemed to be both 
capitalist and devoid of any rationality that took individuality into 
account. Technological rationality created a new form of social strati- 
fication different from the labour-based class system of liberal capitalism: 
society became divided into the rulers and the ruled. Marcuse thus profiled 
a qualitative change in society similar to that change denoted by Pollock's 
concept of state capitalism, but with the important difference that Marcuse 
founded this change in an inherent totalitarianism within the mode of 
production itself. 
Marcuse proposed that the all-pervasive technological apparatus created a 
qualitatively new form of alienation and to take this into account he ex- 
tended Marx's category of alienation. Conformism represented a new form 
of alienation because orientation towards the totalitarian apparatus was 
demanded of each individual rather than individual autonomous thought. In 
keeping with the main points Horkheimer had outlined in 'Vernunft und 
Selbsterhaltung', Marcuse listed the categories of instrumentalisation, 
atomization and specialisation as the constituent elements of conformism 
in contemporary society. Social divisions were based on hierarchical 
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position, whereby individual autonomy was eradicated in favour of the 
technological rationality of command and this had the radical consequence 
that the individual lost the ability to abstract from the dominating rat- 
"Profitable efficiency", Marcuse maintained, "poses as the final ionality. 
fulfillment of individualism. "25 The population was thus trapped within a 
particular, technological mode of thinking. 
This conception of technological rationality constitutes a shift in Marcuse's 
work, for it signifies that there is no longer a need for the ideology of 
universality he had traced in 'Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der 
totalitären Staatsauffassung'. Marcuse's analysis of technology's impact 
and influence on capitalism amounts, in essence, to an acceptance of 
Pollock's work. Marcuse indicated that capitalism could be planned and 
administered by technological rationality and yet remain capitalist, and 
thus he did not foresee a change in society as possible, let alone probable. 
Furthermore, Marcuse's thesis extends Pollock's concept of state capitalism 
for he asserted in a manner more direct than Adorno's remarks on the subject 
that, regardless of the form of distribution, the very mode of production 
was innately repressive. The stabilizing effect of technology on society 
which he had described implied that Marcuse regarded the base and super- 
structure to have become fused together. The insight underlying his concep- 
tion of technology and which is common to the work of his colleagues is that 
the rationality of the base determines the rationality of the superstructure, 
which in turn is put to effect in ensuring the smooth functioning of the 
base; culture and civilization, as a aquence, are completely ideological. 
The sphere of production's ideological quality invalidates any projection 
of a socialist planned society based on those productive forces. 
Marcuse, however, refused to bow to this conclusion, although the ground 
for it had been laid in his concept Of interest. In what can only be regarded 
as a piece of obligatory optimism similar to that practised by Pollock, 
Horkheimer and Adorno, he averred that technics as mechanisation could 
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somehow be utilized to abolish scarcity; the present reduction of people 
to "fingers, arms or heads", 
26 
was, he asserted, a reduction of them to 
their 'natural' capabilities. This use of. mechanisation as a net: 'al force 
to obviate scarcity and to facilitate the acquisition of necessities was 
a theme to which Marcuse was to return frequently in his later writings. 
Marcuse's acceptance of the concept of state capitalism amounts to a 
complete reversal of his earlier position. Totalitarianism is no longer 
held to be an ideological aberration on capitalism's. part but is regarded 
as deeply rooted in the sphere of production itself. In other words, the 
ideology which, Marcuse had assumed, generated the scission of civilization 
from culture transpires to be a key property of capitalist civilization per 
se. Marcuse's concept of essence, based as it was on the dialectical nature 
of the sphere of production, is thus divested of any inherent potentiality. 
If society's essence is latently totalitarian, then a free society can 
surely not be deduced from it, however much Marcuse may qualify the concept 
of essence. 
Marcuse was only able to sketch in rough the wide-ranging effects of the 
ideology of technology and could not project a future emancipatory society 
from an analysis of civilization's properties. The essence of society being 
itself ideological, non-identity, and therefore dynamism cannot be posited 
in society's essence, which must instead be viewed as static. Marcuse's 
last essay for the Zeitschrift/Studies was, as a result, unable to establish 
the dynamic connection between theory and praxis that had been so central to 
his philosophical epistemology; his theory became as static as the society 
it sought to describe. In the absence of a dynamic concept of society the 
concepts of 'real interest' and 'affirmative culture' became completely 
abstract properties. In other words, by 1941 Marcuse's work is flawed by 
the same theoretical difficulties which faced Pollock, Horkheimer and 
Adorno. 
Despite being confronted by similar logical problems, Marcuse's essays in 
the period between 1933 and 1941-2 did not pursue the same course as 
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Horkheimer's work had. Rather than deriving the ideological nature of 
current philosophies from a theory of non-identity, Marcuse attempted to 
found an historical materialist philsophy on an ideology critique of 
society. He devised concepts to locate the ideological interests at work 
in the structure of reality; the only exception to the use of this methodo- 
logy were Marcuse's writings on art, where he opposed reality to an ideal, 
namely beauty. The concepts of interest and happiness that were so important 
in his philosophy allowed Marcuse both to focus his work on the contra- 
dictions of the sphere of production and its potential and therefore to 
remain more concrete than Adorno and Horkheimer. It is specifically this 
concern both nth the sphere of production and with the constructive role 
it plays in the creation of ideology that marks Marcuse's work off from 
that of Adorno and Horkheimer. 
Once Marcuse accepted the main tenets of Pollock's concept of state 
capitalism he met with the same epistemological problems as had his 
fellow Institut(e) members. 
27 He could only hypothesise exhortatively that 
a new society would have to be qualitatively different from the present. 
The opposition of technics to technology (a distinction Adorno makes only 
in aesthetics) did not get around the problem. Marcuse was forced to 
resort to the concept of affirmative culture in order to keep an avenue 
of social change open within his epistemology. This retreat from social 
theory to aesthetics highlights the inadequacies of the theory of affirm- 
ative culture. The concept attempts to offer the concept of non-identity 
a haven against its ideological impregnation once this can no longer be 
grounded in the -concept of essence. Although Marcuse had criticized 
Protestantism for encouraging drive internalisation, 
28 
his aesthetics 
furthers such internalisation in order to preserve certain ideals. Art 
took up a central place in his later work, for, he argued, it retained a 
notion of the new precisely because beauty was a purely ideational entity. 
If it were a physical attribute of reality it would be ideologically 
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infected by the technological reality of totalitarianism. This step 
deprives beauty of any sensuous nature however. The consequent passivity 
of his aesthetics characterizes his epistemology as a whole as soon as he had 
assumed that totalitarianism was latent in the sphere of production. What 
Jürgen Habermas labels the "analytische Zersetzung eines objektiven Scheins" 
as the preparation for "die Veränderung der entschleierten materiellen 
Lebensverhältnisse... und die Aufhebung der Kultur "29 is no longer possible: 
what had at first sight seemed to be objective appearance is n (W found to 
be the essence. 
Marcuse's approach was compelled to become as formalist as Horkheimer's 
and he had to renege on the progressive moments of his analytical framework, 
namely the concepts of interest and happiness, and to sever any connection 
to praxis. A remark Marcuse made in an Institut(e) seminar on Aldous 
Huxley's Brave New World in 1942 reflects the extent to which pessimism 
becomes ingrained in his epistemology once culture and civilization 'marry': 
Fortschreitende Naturbeherrschung und Gesellschaftsbeherrschung beseitigt 
alle Transzendenz, physische sowohl als psychische. Kultur, als der 
zusammenfassende Titel für die eine Seite des Gegensatzes, lebt von un- 
erfüllter Sehnsucht, Glauben, Schmerz, Hoffnung, kurz, von dem, was nicht 
ist, sich aber in der Wirklichkeit anmeldet. Das bedeutet aber, Kultur 
lebt vom Unglück. 30 
In short, technological domination and concomitant social control have 
produced a 'closed' world. 
Marcuse arrived at such a pessimistic assessment because he had assumed 
that state manipulation of the distributive sphere resolved the contra- 
diction between productive forces and the relations of production that 
was otherwise extant in capitalism. The dialectical mediation of theory 
and praxis originally embedded in the concept of essence and appearance 
was, as a consequence, lost. It follows that his concept of essence could 
no longer obtain to a level of practical, empirical truth, but had to 
remain abstract. Furthermore, if the sphere of production involved repres- 
sion in its very productive forces, then the technological potentiality 







capitalist. He could not therefore deduce or extrapolate a future society 
from his concept of essence. That is to say, Marcuse's concept of essence 
was no longer dialectical; the dialectical status of his three other main 
concepts is concomitantly forfeited and their purpose becomes redundant. 
Marcuse could only extricate himself from the ruins of his theory either 
by somehow recasting the concept of essence or be redesigning the initial 
unsystematic distinction he had drawn between technics and technology. In 
his later work we shall see that he attempts with varying degrees of 
success to do both, and in both attempts aesthetics plays an all-important 
role. 
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CHAPTER6: LÖWENTHAL'S FOUNDATION OF A LITERARY SOCIOLOGY 
Comparing Löwenthal's essays for the Zeitschrift/Studies with the three 
phases in Horkheimer's work is not difficult. Löwenthal joined the 
Institut(e) in 1926 and became a full-time member in 1931 on Horkheimer's 
assumption of the Institut(e)'s directorship. Löwenthal brought with him 
a training in philosophy not dissimilar to Horkheimer's as well as a great 
deal of experience as a review-writer. In his work for the Institut(e) 
he combined both these talents firstly as editor of the Zeitschrift/Studies' 
review section and secondly in drafting a critical theory of the sociology 
of literature to match Horkheimer's non-identity theory. Unlike Adorno and 
Marcuse,, however, he concentrated solely on literature, not on art or 
culture in general, so that his work would appear to lack the broad sweep 
of the others. Yet to omit his work from an analysis of the aesthetic work 
of the Frankfurt School on the grounds that he did not address broad 
aesthetic questions would be to underestimate the role his work played in 
the Institut(e) projects. Surprisingly,. the majority of discussions of 
the Frankfurt School make precisely such an omission. 
Martin Jay has stated that Löwenthal's writings for the Zeitschrift form 
... powerful statements of the Frankfurt School's ideology critique at 
a time when-its members still held to relatively traditional Marxist 
expectations about the probable course of history. 1 
This suggests not only that Löwenthal's work bears an epistemological 
affinity to non-identity theory, but also that Löwenthal did not veer 
from this course for the lifetime of the Institut(e). It will be necessary 
to examine whether such an affinity indeed existed and then to ascertain 
whether Löwenthal's position remained static rather than accomodating 
first a study of authoritarianism and then an acceptance of the concept of 
state capitalism. It will be argued that his writings do change over the 
period in question, but only in content, not in underlying methodology. 
Because Löwenthal's work is strictly limited to the application of a 
sociology of literature to past literary works, changes in his work are 
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not immediately apparent and an acceptance of Pollock's work is doubly 
difficult to infer. In order to obviate this problem his work will be 
compared to Horkheimer's. To aid this discussion two texts will be drawn 
on in addition to his Zeitschrift/Studies essays, both of which were 
written in the late 1930s, 
2 
but were not published in the Zeitschrift/ 
Studies. As Löwenthal's essays centre on the various ideologies which he 
judged were inherent in certain types of literature his essays will be 
i 
analysed sequentially according to t4-, time they apply to rather than 
chronologically. Thus a temporal continuum in the presentations of the 
ideologies will be described in which differences both in the ideologies 
analysed and in the mode of analysis itself should be apparent. Before 
Löwenthals sociology of literature can be discussed, however, the theory 
underlying must be outlined. 
The methodology Löwenthal devised rested on two assumptions: that tradit- 
ional literary history offered an excessively limited approach to liter- 
ature and that literature could be analysed sociologically. 
3 Literature, 
Löwenthal maintained, could not be treated as an isolated enclave but had 
to be placed in the triangular setting of author - work - recipient if 
it were to be understood in a materialist fashion. He asserted that a 
literary text was a mediate expression of life at the time of its writing 
and, through the medium of the author, depicted a specific social structure. 
Therefore, by comparing a literary text's statements to a correct theory 
of the society of which the text was a part, i. e. by studying literature's 
non-identity with the reality in which it existed, the ideology inherent 
in the description the author provided could be assessed. The study of 
literature became a study of ideologies. Löwenthal postulated further that 
if this study were extended to include an investigation of literature's 
reception at a particular time, e. g. by analysing the critics' varying 
opinions on a literary work, the ideologies at work in that society would 
become apparent. Indeed, the ideology motivating readers could be contrasted 
to the ideology of the text. 
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This methodology was novel in two respects, for it did not only assess 
the ideological quality of a piece of literature at the text's time of 
production and the history of a work's interpretation. By presupposing 
that literature was a mediation of subjective (authorial) and objective 
(interpretative) expressions, Löwenthal's methodology also avoided vulgar 
Marxism's reduction of each text to the class position of the author in 
question. He asserted programmatically: "Zum Sein des Kunstwerks gehört 
seine Wirkung; das was es ist, bestimmt sich wesentlich in dem, als was 
es erlebt wird. "4 By introducing the category of reception into a socio- 
logy of literature Löwenthal departed from the limited view of the study 
of literature as purely the study of what a printed text was read to 
state. 
This sociology of literature could, when applied to a particular literary 
work, approach it from various angles. It could, for example, analyse the 
form of the work, i. e. its 'literariness' in terms of this being specific 
to a particular item or social group. In this context Löwenthal listed 
the use of dialogue in drama and then the use of narrative interlogues 
in novels as signifying two stages in the ascendance of the bourgeoisie. 
Alternatively, a sociology of literature could study the ideology inherent 
in the motifs, themes or material of a work. Modern psychoanalytical tech- 
niques allowed a third approach to be taken. The psychology of the author 
as articulated by his intentions in the work could be examined, for, 
Löwenthal argued, these described the society in which the author lived. He 
based this assertion on the claim that authorial intention was subjective 
but equally was objective owing to the author's membership of a social 
class (a notion indebted to Hegel's conception of the particular and 
'Spirit'). 
Löwenthal introduced a fourth level into his investigation in his suggestion 
that literature played a role in shaping society in that it had a socially 
conservative function. Because literature offered psychological fulfilment 
to the reader - an imaginary realisation in an 'inner sphere' of what are 
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otherwise socio-psychological taboos - Löwenthal held that it prevented 
the accumulated psychic frustration caused by the taboos from being 
unleashed in a socially destructive form. This function of literature 
as a psychological escape-valve had therefore to figure in an under- 
standing of literature's role in society. By combining an investigation 
of this psychological function with the three other levels of his analysis 
Löwenthal was able to situate and explain the artwork in sociological 
and historical terms. 
The thoroughness of this methodology was not reflected in Löwenthal's 
outline of literature's non-ideological properties, something which was, 
perhaps, indicative of an interest solely in the ideological forms. Liter- 
ature or art, Löwenthal nonetheless maintained, was never just ideological; 
it also contained a 'positive' element. The psychological fulfilment 
art provided was simultaneously an expression of dissatisfaction with 
reality, i. e. an expression of the conformity with society enforced on 
individuals. If this social dissatisfaction expressed in artworks were 
to become consciously articulated by the population, then possibly 
capitalism's social fabric would be torn apart. 
Löwenthal argued that the latent existence of such an expression in 
literature did not imply that social change would necessarily proceed 
from a reading of it. This opinion parallels Marcuse's concept of 
non-affirmative art's 'promesse de bonheur' as is borne out by Löwen- 
thal's statement that: "Alle echte Kunst hat ein Moment der Trauer in 
sich, weil sie unerfüllte Sehnsucht der Menschen gestaltet. "5 What is 
more, Löwenthal's usage of the terms 'sorrow' and 'longing' mirror their 
use in Adorno's work -a fact that testifies to the interlinked character 
of Institut(e) work. This reference to his colleagues' work is also con- 
tained in Löwenthal's assessment of 'authentic' literature. To his mind 
in the absence of a new society and in the face of continued repression, 
authentic art's sorrow reminded beholders of the repression of previous 
generations and therefore described the history of social dissatisfaction. 
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By definition, then, authentic art could not be affirmative; it had to 
negate society in order to preserve the image of sorrow. According to 
Löwenthal, however, art's very authenticity prevented it from becoming 
'engaged'. Rather than : pQsi. tively- pointing forward to a future, art 
had to expose the non-identity of the present until such a time as a free 
society had been created. The ideological nature of literary texts could 
be gauged by exploring the degree to which sorrow appeared in the artwork. 
If, for example, a theme or motif conformed to the wishes of a social 
class rather- than expressing sorrow, then it could be regarded as ideo- 
logical, i. e. an ideology could be determined in artistic terms. In his 
essays on 19th and 20th century literature Löwenthal applied both the 
methodology for the sociology of literature he had developed and the 
notion of the authentic work of art. 
In a study of Conrad Ferdinand Meyer's books 
6 
Löwenthal detected hidden 
evidence for the existence of a 'haute bourgeois' ideology in mid-19th 
century Germany. Meyer's central characters, he claimed, were almost 
exclusively extreme individualists who were set above the law. These 
individualists were so superior to other characters that they were not 
described in psychological terms and were essentially socially amoral, 
acting as they wished. From this form of character description Löwenthal 
deduced that Meyer reduced history to the deeds of 'great' men. To 
achieve this in the narrative Meyer compressed time and space so that 
an epoch became concentrated and described in terms of the acts of a 
single individual. 
Löwenthal submitted that this view of history was specific to the 'haute 
bourgeois' and that Meyer himself wished to belong to such a social class, 
which existed in Germany but not in Meyer's native Switzerland. Löwenthal 
related this ideology to a reception-oriented analysis, for he found the 
main readership of Meyer's books to be precisely this 'haute bourgeoisie' 
in Germany, a social class which saw itself as controlling and directing 
society and consequently could identify with Meyer's characters. Literary 
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and reception analysis converge at this point, for from this Löwenthal 
deduced that at they time Germany lacked a strong bourgeois ideology since, 
if this had not been the case, a large readership would not have existed 
for Meyer's books in the first place. His sociological study of literature 
thus permitted Löwenthal to locate general forms of ideology not specific 
to literature. 
Having established the existence of a 'haute bourgeois' ideology, Löwenthal 
described the petit bourgeois ideology predominant in the closing twenty 
years of the 19th and the first fourteen of the 20th century. In order to 
accomplish this, he undertook to examine the reception by critics of 
Dostoyevsky's work. 
7 Instead of analysing the ideological nature of liter- 
ature in this period, Löwenthal claimed that such an approach was valid 
because Dostoyevsky was a widely read author (approximately 800 articles 
had been written on him in the period under discussion) whose books were 
frequently, to Löwenthal's mind, completely misinterpreted. It was these 
misinterpretations, Löwenthal proposed, that were worthy of scrutiny, for 
they revealed the dominant ideology of the time in question. The reviews 
and interpretations fell into four main groups: the mythical, the harmon- 
ious, the anti-rationalist and the psychologistic. The mythical interpret- 
ations regarded Dostoyevsky's work as a portrait of the 'sublime unity' 
of life. Löwenthal characterised this form of interpretation as petit 
bourgeois principally because it ascribed a metaphysical meaning to life 
in chaotic monopoly capitalist society in which the bourgeoisie were 
being eradicated as a social class. Thus, these interpretations sought 
refuge in some mythical property, an observation greatly in accordance 
with Pollock's view of monopoly capitalism. Löwenthal suggested: 
Es gehört zu den Antagonismen der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, daß, 
je stärker die Tendenzen werden, im wirtschaftlichen Unterbau rationale 
Planmäßigkeit walten zu lassen, im gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein die 
rationalen und kritischen Tendenzen zurückgedrängt werden müssen. 8 
The second set of interpretations functioned similarly, in that they 
harmonised various supposed contradictions in Dostoyevsky's work. Löwen- 
thal maintained that this view subscribed to an idealism beyond class 
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differences, for it disconnected Dostoyevsky's presentation of society 
from any roots in a class reality and by situating Dostoyevsky's work 
in some harmony of thought eternalised those class differences. 
The third group pandered to an ideology of anti-rationalism, levelled 
against the bourgeois rationalism of the 19th century. It adhered inflex- 
ibly to a view that Dostoyevsky's work hinged on his 'Russian' character 
and in so doing was itself nationalistic. The categories of self-justice 
and chance formed another recurrent theme of this group. In so far as 
justice was class-based the category of self-justice prevented any break 
with the ruling class from occurring and attributed causation to chance. 
Löwenthal commented as follows on this unholy alliance of fate, chance 
and happiness: 
Die geringe Rolle, die die Kategorie des Glücks in jenem bürgerlichen 
Bewußtsein spielt, muß aus den gesamten Verhältnissen dieser Klasse 
begriffen werden. Eine befriedigende gesellschaftliche Verfassung ist 
ihr als absteigender Klasse verschlossen und muß sich darum auch aus 
dem Bewußtsein in seiner eigentlichen Bedeutung als Glück verschließen. 9 
Löwenthal meant, by extension, that each thematic body of interpretation 
could only be understood in the light of the social class as a whole from 
which its proponents originated. 
This connection established between class and interpretation is evidenced 
most succinctly in Löwenthal's outline of the last group. The interpret- 
ation offered regarded Dostoyevsky as a psychologist and his works as 
scientific descriptions of the human mind. The 'inner' person of Dosto- 
yevsky's characters was thereby emphasized, detracting from any social 
and individual decision-making depicted in the texts. 
' Such interpretations 
fostered a socially conformist reading of Dostoyevsky while concomitantly 
offering mental solace and were therefore ideological. Löwenthal concluded 
from this categorization of Dostoyevsky's reception that the socially 
descendent class was relieved of the burden of its own plight. The 
four different types of interpretation all indicated in some manner the 
displacement of the bourgeoisie which was taking place and which called 
forth such interpretations. Löwenthal went so far as to correlate the 
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increase in Dostoyevsky's reception with the gradual downfall of the 
middle class, a downfall that in Institut(e) eyes had opened the flood- 
gates to authoritarian ideologies based on precisely such harmonizing 
views as Löwenthal had analysed. Interpretations promoted by the domi- 
nant class and by socialists, Löwenthal averred, were, in contrast, both 
more critical and more accurate than the views of the four groups. 
In other words, at the turn of the 20th century a non-ideological view 
of society was still possible. The existence of the Naturalist literary 
movement roughly synchronous to the reviews of Dostoyevsky allowed Löwen- 
that to analyse the bourgeois ideology of the time, as opposed'to the 
petit bourgeois ideology he had uncovered. This entailed an analysis of 
the way in which Naturalism attempted to criticize traditional bourgeois 
ideology. 
11 
Löwenthal sought to delineate this criticism both by means of 
an appraisal of Naturalist themes (especially those used by Ibsen) and by 
showing the non-identity between this criticism and the reality it sought 
to criticize. To lend theoretical support to this project, Löwenthal also 
contrasted Naturalist texts to traditional bourgeois literature. The 
characteristic of such literature, he asserted, had been to portray the 
individual as capable of self-development so long as this was kept within 
the confines of the existing social order. Consequently bourgeois novels 
had centred traditionally on character development and had possessed an 
underlying educational note. Both strands were, however, jettisoned by 
Naturalism. This was, Löwenthal suggested, particularly evident in Ibsen's 
plays, where the private sphere competed with the public world. The world 
in which this took place was a closed, reified one in which relations, 
facts or events fettered the individuals, whose very existence was thus 
jeopardized. Accordingly, Naturalist works were permeated with a tone of 
melancholia, quite distinct from the sorrow of the authentic artwork. Faced 
with the unreal demands of society, Ibsen's characters became imbued with 
a sense of hopelessness rather than remembrance. Both fear and love he 
portrayed as being infected by the competitiveness of society and thus 
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as ideological, whereas imagination, by virtue of which people and art 
were held to overcome social constraints, was crushed by social pressures. 
Löwenthal contended that it was in particular Ibsen's characterisation of 
women which crystallized this self-indictment of society. Women failed in 
the male world of commerce and yet could not function as women in a private 
world equally disfigured by competition. The female characters thus emph- 
asised the rottenness of such a society, exposing the falsehood of the 
bourgeois ideology of individualism. 
However laudable Ibsen's intentions might have been, Löwenthal claimed 
that they nevertheless had hypostatised society's failings as being its 
meaning. The world's problems were regarded as genetically inherited and 
therefore as lying beyond any human control. This showed a latent mistrust 
of human abilities by the Naturalists quite alien to the traditional tone 
of bourgeois literature. Löwenthal found that while such a view was anti- 
bourgeois, it nonetheless degradedL history to a 'constructive tragedy' 
in which progress was impossible. L13wenthal labelled this last attitude 
'relativist', since it assumed that conditions enveloped individuals without 
attempting to save the individuality thus threatened. This relativism 
pointed to the real impotence of the Naturalist authors when it came to 
their trying to explain the causes of society's shortcomings. This he 
judged to be evidenced by a certain 'silence' ('Verstummen') in their 
work: 
Die Aussprache bricht genau da ab, wo sie eigentlich zu beginnen hätte: 
bei der Entfaltung des Lebensplans; er erleidet dasselbe Schicksal wie 
alle anderen gesellschaftlichen Vorgänge; er wird anarchisch. 12 
In this manner Löwenthal drew a connection between character portrayal, 
authorial intention and the latent ideological meaning of such intention. 
On an aesthetic level Naturalist literature might be anti-bourgeois, or 
individualist, but it nevertheless remained contemplative. Löwenthal main- 
tained that, in attempting to present situations objectively, if not 
scientifically, Naturalism degraded the individual to the status of a 
spectator. This attitude was not just to be discerned in the tone of melan- 
cholia, but also in the static quality of Naturalist narrative. The real. 
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effect of such literature was therefore conformist, for it did not 
furnish the artwork with any medium of change. 
This aesthetic analysis coalesced with Löwenthal's analysis of Naturalism's 
ideological implications. Although Naturalism showed idealism to be hollow 
in practice, it provided no link to praxis but dissolved into despair at 
the individual's "lot". This divergence of Naturalist themes and bourgeois 
ideology signified the following: 
Die Literatur (of the Naturalists) treibt die Analyse menschlicher 
Zustände weiter fort, als es je in der Geschichte der Dichtung vorher 
geschehen war, und vollendet in ihrer analytischen Technik die Forder- 
ungen des bürgerlichen Rationalismus aus seinen hoffnungsvollsten 
Positionen. 13 
In a fashion similar to that of Horkheimer's";: early writings, Löwenthal 
thus distinguished a non-identity of intent and method. By denouncing 
ideals as such while failing to portray any individuals who harboured 
alternative ideals, Naturalism was forced to conclude its peace with the 
dominant social interests. For Löwenthal Naturalist criticism of bourgeois 
ideology never reached the level of critique; it remained bourgeois 
criticism ('bürgerlich-kritisch') and therefore was itself ideologically 
affirmative in the final instance. 
Having established both the prevalence of 'haute bourgeois' and petit 
bourgeois ideologies in 19th century Germany and the frailty of bourgeois 
ideology, Löwenthal proceeded to analyse the presence of authoritarian 
ideologies in early 20th century literature roughly contemporary to 
Ibsen, namely in the work of Knut Hamsun. 
14 This project mirrored the 
Institut(e)'s interest both in the field and in a derivation of the 
ideology from a loss of bourgeois individuality. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that Löwenthal suggested that both the decline in material. 
satisfaction and the evident downfall of such rationalist ideologies as 
he had studied in the reception of Dostoyevsky and had located in the 
limits of Naturalist drama had brought a strong anti-rationalist ideology 
into existence. 
Recurrent in all Hamsun's novels according to Löwenthal was an espousal 
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of the view which saw man's immediate interaction with nature as con- 
stituting a realm of freedom. Löwenthal declared that this theme not 
only idolized brutality in nature but also reduced human nature to some 
irrational, instinctual quality. In its exposition of timelessness and 
immutability Hamsun's work proffered the reader a false sense of comfort 
and in so doing heralded the defeat of the bourgeois individual's power 
to create the world in his image. This theme was amplified by a variety 
of motifs in Hamsun's work: the rhythm of life, pantheism, the secret 
kingdom of nature, the. superiority of youth and the experience of identity 
with external nature. Löwenthal held all these motifs to be authoritarianly 
predicated, for they negated all individual transcience and subjugated 
the individual to external forces. Individuality in Hamsun's work was in 
the light of these motifs, portrayed as mere functionality within a 
system, and was an 'empty' ('nichtig') reactor to outside stimuli. Löwen- 
that also found this authoritarianism to be innate in Hamsun's reliance 
on myths, i. e. on the irrational experience of a 'natural' society. Such 
mythical descriptions obfuscated the individual and his powers of thought 
and was diametrically opposed to the demystifying --rationality of the 
Enlightenment. In other words, Löwenthal uncovered hidden evidence for 
authoritarianism in bourgeois literature well before the Nazis explicit 
use of such an ideology. 
Löwenthal also pursued this research into the roots of authoritarianism 
in another area, in the popular biographies produced between 1910 and 
the 1930s. 
15 
As in his work both on Dostoyevsky and on Naturalism he col- 
lected a mass of empirical sample data (a quantitative approach) which 
he collated into certain representative themes (a qualitative approach), 
which could then be analysed for class attitudes. These themes could be 
correlated to readers' attitudes, particularly in the case of popular 
biographies, which were widely sold articles of mass consumption. Löwen- 
thal argued that these themes could be readily established because, as 
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articles of mass consumption (regardless of their individualist, glossy 
external appearance), these biographies were all similar in construction. 
In a manner which paralleled Adorno's term of the 'ever-similar', Löwen- 
thal specified that the popular biographies were not individual works, 
but stereotyped goods, in internal structure the opposite of the bourgeois 
novel. Externally, such biographies also opposed the structure of the 
novel in that individuals in them were driven by external cause and were 
merely 'typographical' elements which allowed the surrounding material to 
be shown in all its glossiness; even as heroes the characters were func- 
tions of history, not makers of history. The authoritarianism of the bio- 
graphies was thus the reverse of Meyer's 'haute bourgeois' view of history. 
Löwenthal identified four main themes in these biographies, foremost amongst 
which was the presentation of history as a reified entity. Individuals 
were depicted as mere products of their time and accordingly the central 
characters of the biographies exhibited a certain 'helplessness' ('Ratlosig- 
keit'). This presentation was authoritarian since it showed individuals 
to be formed by a static, immutable force, history. Politics in these 
biographies was, therefore, regarded as equally unchanging, as a sphere 
of decision-making causally detached from people. Löwenthal detected an 
imputed identity between history and natural laws, for the biographies did 
not locate themselves in any theory of society, but reduced theory to a 
set of generalised propositions on 'natural causes', by means of which 
they attempted to explain all events. This espousal of a natural history 
was coupled with a form of mysticism which Löwenthal related to late 
bourgeois 'Lebensphilosophie'. This mysticism was essentially relativistic, 
since it preached that fate and chance as accidental forces directed- 
individuals' lives. 
Löwenthal found this ideological nature to be contained in the very 
language of the biographies. Löwenthal's analysis of the use of superlatives 
and adverbs revealed the vocabulary deployed in character portrayal as 
centring on an idolisation of uniqueness and extraordinariness. For-example, 
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superlatives were continuously resorted to in order to equip the 
characters with a depth they otherwise lacked as a result of their 
being reduced overall to a reflection of historical events. These cut-out 
figures were further instilled with character artificially, mainly by 
the repetitious use of adverbs such as 'never' and 'always', i. e. 
their individuality was based on their continual habits rather than on 
their ability to reason. A sense of individuality as a private realm 
of activities was evoked, whereas the individuals were essentially stereo- 
typed stencils. The vocabulary and themes of these biographies were 
authoritarian, for they all suggested that they offered a COY 
understanding of the world, yet in fact they provided only an ideological, 
mystifying view of reality. 
Löwenthal equated their characters with commodities bought and sold as 
capitalism desired: "Diese Artikel sind Menschen, die über nichts mehr 
selbst zu bestimmen haben. " 
16 In line with the approach Horkheimer had 
taken in 'Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung' he argued that the characters 
in the biographies embodied an authoritarian ideology in that they func- 
tioned only as individuals in a private realm of supposed freedom and 
this limited freedom itself depended on their conforming to the status 
quo. Löwenthal surmised that this specifically authoritarian degradation 
of individuality appealed to the petit bourgeoisie, for this class, 
having lost its social and material position in the transition from 
liberal to monopoly capitalism, could identify most readily with such 
a form of individuality. In this manner, Löwenthal grounded an analysis 
of the class nature and effect of mass cultural objects in a thematic 
and textual analysis, i. e. in an immanent content analysis. Despite 
having investigated the content of popular biographies for its underlying 
meaning rather than conducting an immanent analysis of artistic form 
similar to Adorno's evaluation of popular music, Löwenthal reached 
similar conclusions to Adorno on the ideological character of mass culture. 
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Where the two theorists differed was that Löwenthal was able to draw 
a line from the ideology he detected to one specific class, while 
Adorno's work remained vague on the question of the class nature of 
ideology. 17 
In other words, consistent with the methodology he had applied to 
19th and 20th century 'high culture'. Löwenthal deduced the ideological 
nature of mass cultural biographies from their non-identity with reality 
instead of from the formal structural properties of the works them- 
selves and traced this non-identity back to the appeal these works were 
intended to have for one particular section of the population, even if 
the authors themselves were unaware of this. 
In his analysis of 'haute bourgeois', petit bourgeois, bourgeois and 
authoritarian ideologies Löwenthal examined literature on two levels. 
Firstly, he investigated the properties of literature's themes, symbols, 
expressions and language. From this he then drew conclusions as to the 
ideological content of the piece of literature in question. The first 
level approached literature and authorial intention in accordance with 
the materialist methodology he had outlined in 1932, for it considered 
literature both as man-made and as a mediating-point in the social struc- 
ture between subjective and objective wishes. The second level then made 
use of a correct theory of socity and of historical. knowledge in order 
to situate the literary work in a historical context and to locate the 
non-identity between the ideas the text expressed and the social reality 
to which it referred, i. e. by determinate negation the ideological posi- 
tions of the artwork are established and assessed. Once the ideology has 
been assessed it can be related to a readership whose wishes it probably 
fulfils. 
By the use of these two levels Löwenthal avoided collapsing the artwork 
into the readership's wishes and insteadwas able to relate the artwork 
dialectically either to the effect it had on the readership, or to that 
which the readership had on it. Löwenthal's essay on Ibsen articulated 
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this duality of analysis most directly. Löwenthal was interested in 
literature as a social phenomenon and yet by virtue of his methodology 
still accorded literature specifically literary properties rather than 
reducing it to the status of being a mere sociological indicator. The 
two levels kept literature as subjective expression and as possible 
authentic literature separate from literature as a social expression. 
18 
Löwenthal's essays for the Zeitschrift/Studies have been described as 
"an expression of a concrete critique of ideology. "19 It is this feature 
of his work that corresponds most closely to the epistemology of Hork- 
heimer's non-identity theory. Löwenthal's conception of the ideology 
latent in a piece of literature is similar to Horkheimer's deduction of 
the ideological nature of bourgeois philosophies, although it must be 
said that Löwenthal is more specific in his somewhat over-easy attribution 
of the ideology of a certain piece of literature to one particular social 
class. Regardless of the problematic nature of this enterprise, Löwen- 
thal indirectly highlighted by his sociological investigations the absence 
of a strong bourgeois ideology in Germany post-1848. It is this finding 
that ties in most with the Institut(e)'s overall concerns. Indeed, the 
chronological pattern of his investigations mirrors the Institut(e)'s 
analysis of society. 
From his reflections on the absence of a specifically bourgeois ideology 
in the irrationalism of the last century (like Horkheimer's first phase) 
Löwenthal progressed to an analysis of authoritarianism's determinants 
(Horkheimer's second phase) and then to its connection with the social 
displacement of the petit bourgeoisie. This task accomplished he extended 
the analysis to include a study of the latent authoritarianism of mass- 
culture (Horkheimer's third phase). From this it can be seen that Löwen- 
thal followed Horkheimer's lead, without specifically considering the 
import of Pollock's writings. However, just as Horkheimer and Adorno 
were starting in 1939 - 1941 to specify theoretically the impact mass 
culture had had on society, so Löwenthal provided an historical, concrete 
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example of the ideological nature of its products, as well as an hist- 
orical explanation for the particular rise of authoritarianism in Germany, 
namely the lack of a bourgeois ideology of-individuality ever since 1848. 
In this fashion, Löwenthal's investigations functioned as empirical studies 
which underpinned the work of his colleagues, although they did not reflect 
Pollock's work overtly. 
It was germane to Löwenthal's work, however, that a correct theory of 
society could be deployed. Rather than abandoning non-identity theory as 
inapplicable to the present, as a consequence of accepting the concept of 
state capitalism as a description of society and the irrationality of 
bourgeois rationalism, Löwenthal continued to make use of it, for he 
applied it exclusively to past phenomena and confronted the meaning that 
an artwork attributed to reality with what that reality had been. He 
thus joined non-identity theory to an immanent analysis of literature 
and it is the presence of these two main branches of his theory that 
accounts for the two distinct, but interlinked levels of interpretation 
in his work. However, unlike Adorno or Marcuse, his investigations do not 
amount to an aesthetics. Indeed, they are not intended to be one, but to 
provide a materialist sociology of literature that complemented the 
overall thrust of Institut(e) work. 
Löwenthal's methodology not only fell into two interpretative halves but 
also contained a quantitative and a qualitative aspect. Löwenthal gathered 
popular texts of a particular time and then analysed them qualitatively. 
The numerical presence of texts at a particular time Löwenthal took as 
a signal of their popularity and therefore as an indication that they 
offered something qualitatively specific to a certain readership. Theoret- 
ically, this involved Löwenthal examining the text with a view to its 
reception. Accordingly, he both correlated critics and readers in terms 
of class membership and related the author's presentation not only to a 
textually immanent ideology, but to an ideology of the probable readers 
of that author. 
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This emphasis on the importance of reception-based interpretation was, 
at the time, undoubtedly pioneering. John Hall has suggested that: 
Distributors serve as gatekeepers between books-in-themselves and 
books-for-others. The argument that there is no necessary connection 
between these two areas can easily be demonstrated. The truly pion- 
eering work has been done by Leo Löwenthal (1964) on the reception 
of the works of Dostoyevsky in Germany between 1880 and 1920.20 
The manner in which Löwenthal merged interpretation of a text as a 
subjective statement with the text's objective meaning and reception 
ensured that he did not reductively equate subjective intention or the 
author's class position with objective meaning, a reductiveness that 
Lukäcs' work had become prone to. An example of this dialectical app- 
roach would be to find a novel which is realistic in the sense cf pro- 
viding an exact portrayal of the world, but which is nevertheless 
objectively ideological. (Balzac's work has often been understood in this 
manner. ) Since Löwenthal's work analysed the consumption of literature 
rather than concentrating on its production or distribution, it could 
not designate what forms literature should adopt. However, the lack of 
a detailed analysis of distribution rendered Löwenthal's correlation of 
readers and critics theoretically tenuous especially as he provided no 
grounding for this assumed identity. 
Despite his statement that art was not just ideology, Löwenthal did not 
set out the groundwork for an exhaustive study of art. He limited himself 
to ascertaining literature's ideological manifestations, i. e. to an ana- 
lysis of false subjectivity. Consequently, the analysis of form that 
allowed Adorno to pinpoint authentic art was not used in Löwenthal's 
work. Form, for Löwenthal, was but the carrier of ideology and need not 
necessarily be itself ideological or non-ideological. This did not mean, 
however, that the concept of authentic art played no role in Löwenthal's 
work. As had been the case in Adorno and Marcuse's aesthetics, and in 
Horkheimer's essay 'Art and Mass Culture', authentic art underlay all 
Löwenthal's analyses of ideology, for it embodied truth, i. e. he considered 
it to be non-ideological literature. 
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Although Löwenthal did not overtly contrast ideological and non-ideological 
forms of art per se, as Adorno did for example, he accepted the distinction; 
otherwise the notion of ideological literature could only have had a 
sociological meaning and the level of literary thematic analysis would 
have been pointless. 
21 
A further difference between his work and Adorno's 
is to be found in this point. Löwenthal endeavoured to establish the mani- 
fest ideological and social meaning of art by extrapolating the results 
of a literary analysis, whereas Adorno assessed the non-manifest, structural 
ideology of art itself. Consequently, Löwenthal's work fitted more obviously 
into the general framework of Institut(e) studies. It provided a concrete 
application of Institut(e) theory and also uncovered important evidence 
proving some of the Institut(e)'s assumptions, e. g. Löwenthal was able to 
describe the relation between the rise of authoritarianism and the decline 
of the - to Löwenthal's mind - always socially weak, bourgeois individual. 
In this sense Alfons Söllner is correct to claim that: 
Dem Letzteren (L, öwenthal) kommt vermutlich speziell für die Ausbildung 
der materialistischen-Kulturtheorie ein gewichtigerer Anteil zu, als 
es die philologische Textbasis erkennen 1äßt. 22 
In this sense, Löwenthal's work furnished the wide historical backcloth 
against which Adorno and Marcuse's concepts of authentic art gained greater 
relief and validity. 
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INTERSECT10N 
CHAPTER7: BENJAMIN AND THE INSTITUT(E) 
In the Introduction I justified my omission of Walter Benjamin from the 
discussion of the Frankfurt School and its aesthetic theories on the 
grounds that his methodology was different to that used by the School. 
This assertion must now be submitted to critical examination, since the 
nature of the Institut(e)'s methodology has now been established. In the 
following brief portrayal of Benjamin's relationship to the Frankfurt 
School it will be claimed that although his aims and objectives resembled 
closely those of the 'inner' core of Institut(e) members, the method he 
used to reach them did not. Such a portrayal must, inevitable, address 
the questions raised by previous research in this area. 
It is not possible to compare Benjamin's work with that of the Frankfurt 
School simply by compiling an auditing list of similarities and dissimil- 
arities, and then calculating either a surplus of one or the other. The 
relationship is far too complex to allow such a straightforward. comparison. 
Firstly, the nature of Benjamin's formal relation to the Institute of 
Social Research in New York must be established, and then compared with 
any intellectual affiliation he may have had to critical theory. Secondly, 
similarities and dissimilarities arise for specific reasons and it is this 
underlying causal network that is most of interest to us, for it reveals 
Benjamin's epistemological position. Thirdly, Benjamin's work outside 
that published in the Zeitschrift/Studies comprises a vast amount of 
material and cannot be considered adequately here. Fourthly, since Benjamin 
died in 1940, the period of comparison is restricted to the lifetime of 
the Zeitschrift, when the seeds of Pollock. ian social theorY had not yet 
borne fruit. To trace origins and influences after that date would be to 
compare artificially created positions and would thus address a different 
topic altogether. For these reasons the comparison will be restricted (with 
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two minor exceptions) to the writings Benjamin published in the Zeitschrift, 
the Studies and the 1942 Memorial Issue of the Studies1 and will draw on 
material from his correspondence. - 
In the brief biography provided on the jacket of Der Stratege im Literatur- 
kampf2 Benjamin's life after 1932 is described as follows: "Er emigrierte 
1933 nach Frankreich. und wurde Mitglied des nach Paris und später nach 
New York verlegten Instituts für Sozialforschung. " No evidence is adduced 
to support this claim which is symptomatic of the manner in which the 
relationship between Benjamin and the Frankfurt School has often been 
presented. A further example of this is given by Rolf Tiedemann's 'editorial 
report' in Volume 1 of Benjamin's Gesammelte Schriften. There he suggests 
that Benjamin worked for the I'nstitut(e) as a referee of articles from 
outsiders, that Benjamin's essays in the Zeitschrift were "Ergebnisse 
eines bis zu einem bestimmten Grad kollektiven Arbeitsprozesses" with the 
3 
other members (despite the physical distance separating them, one must 
assume). There is, as often is the case in debates about Benjamin, evidence 
both to confirm and to dispute this statement. 
From his -published letters a slightly' different portrait of Benjamin's 
relation to the Institut(e) emerges. Benjamin purchased and sought out 
books required by members of the Institut(e) after they had settled in 
New York and while he was still in Paris. He was also involved in trans- 
lation work for the Zeitschrift and in establishing contacts with Galli- 
mard. 
4 
Financially, he received 1000 (at one point the figure is given 
as 100) French francs a month from May 1935 onwards in order to enable 
him to work on his 'Arcades' project. (In a sense, then, this enormous 
enterprise was commissioned. ) The correspondence otherwise mentions no 
sums of money, although Benjamin often underlined his financial straits 
in his letters to Horkheimer. No doubt the Institut(e)'s accounts would 
reveal the details . 
involved 5 although these are of no importance for 
this discussion. Pollock and Horkheimer arranged the financial transactions, 
Pollock meeting Benjamin in Paris and Horkheimer authorizing the former to 
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determine the amounts to be paid. 
A seemingly innocent remark Benjamin made in a letter to Gretel Adorno 
on the 17th of January, 1940, points to the ad hoc status of his employ- 
ment by the Institut(e): 
I1 importerait donc absolument de me referer aux cours que j'ai professes 
dans le cadre de l'Institut ä Francfort. Comme je n'ai pas voulu en faire 
tat sans Passentiment de l'Institut je n'ai pas encore rempli mon 
questionnaire. Je devrai donc suspendre mes d"emarches jusqu'ä ce que je 
sois fixe de votre: cote. 6 
Benjamin needed the references in order to be able toapply for an entrance 
visa for the United States, and thus his remarks would seem to point to 
the fact that he worked for the Institut(e) on a freelance basis. Letters 
from Horkheimer to Benjamin in the late spring of 1939 also indicate that 
officially Benjamin was understood to be a freelance member of the Inst- 
itut(e): 
Ich habe Sie deshalb gebeten, es (the expose of the 'Arcades' project) 
zu schicken, weil mir von verschiedenen Seiten ein reicher Mann genannt 
worden war, der sich für Arbeiten ausgezeichneter Qualität, auch wenn 
sie aus dem akademischen Rahmen fallen, besonders interessieren könnte. 
(5th of April, 1939) 
Zwei Stiftungen an die ich mich gewandt hatte, haben noch keine Antwort 
erteilt, (i. e. as to whether they would sponsor Benjamin's work). (23rd 
of May, 1939). 
Wenn wir durch seine (a "Herr Z"!? ) Vermittlung überhaupt etwas erhalten, 
sei es unter welchem Titel auch immer, wird damit jedenfalls Ihr Forsch- 
ungsauftrag gesichert sein. (31st of May, 1939) 7H 
It is clear from Horkheimer's remarks that the Institut(e)'s payroll for 
ex officio members was drying up and that, prior to the move to California, 
he was hoping to gain private backing for the various research projects 
supported or sponsored by the Institut(e), but not undertaken by Institut(e) 
members. The German 'Auftrag' suggests sponsorship, not official membership. 
Therefore, if one is to speak of Benjamin as a member of the Frankfurt 
School, one must mean this to describe only an affinity of theories if one 
is referring to the Institute for Social Reseach. Formally, Benjamin could 
perhaps best be described as an 'associate member'. 
The intellectual relation between the School and Benjamin is an equally 
contentious issue, and even harder to establish. Rolf Tiedemann has sugg- 
ested that Benjamin's essays in the Zeitschrift are substantial contributions 
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to critical theory8 and also that Horkheimer influenced Benjamin's work. 
Richard Wolin has recently adjudged Benjamin's work to have greatly 
influenced the School's writings after 1941.9 Julian Roberts characterizes 
the relation between Adorno, with whom Benjamin was on closer terms than 
with other Institut(e) members, and Benjamin as that of Adorno having 
bullied Benjamin into changing such essays as 'Über Einige Motive bei 
Baudelaire' to suit Adorno's view of what Benjamin's work should be. 
10 
This last description is a more thoughtful and probably more accurate 
version of the criticism, commonly articulated in the late 1960s, 
11 
that 
Horkheimer et al, by threatening to withdraw their financial support for 
Benjamin, coerced him into diluting the radical approach of his Marxism. 
If Benjamin was indeed bullied by Adorno then it can only be inferred 
that Benjamin overestimated Adorno's importance in the Institute in 
New York, for Adorno had only been there for a year by the time the debate 
over Benjamin's Baudelaire essay and was most certainly not the editor 
of the Zeitschrift. The two main arguments on the intellectual relation 
of Benjamin to the Frankfurt School can thus be summarized as being either 
that Benjamin influenced critical theory or that critical theory (deforma- 
tively) influenced Benjamin's writings. Both alternatives need to be exam- 
ined more closely, because this very manner of discussing the relationship 
of Benjamin to the Frankfurt School is, as will be shown, questionable. 
Benjamin's essays in the Zeitschrift testify to his attempt to devise 
an historical materialist theory of art. This project fits in with the 
Institut(e)'s efforts to uncover the nature of the relationship between 
base and superstructure. In his first essay in the Zeitschrift, 'Zum 
gesellschaftlichen Standort des französischen Schriftstellers', Benjamin 
tried to determine the class character of authors and audiences. He then 
drew conclusions as to the nature of artistic technics, of non-conformism, 
and of changes in the reading public attributable to the change in society 
after 1900. Above all, Benjamin noted a growing divide between writers 
and intellectuals, i. e. a move away from politicized narration. 
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Benjamin's approach to the problem of art's constitution is distinct from 
that of either Adorno or Löwenthal. There is less emphasis on erecting 
an ideology critique of the bourgeoisie and much more stress on the 
difficulties leftists faced in writing literature, as exemplified by his 
comment that "die vorgeschobensten gegenwärtigen Produkte der Avantgarde in 
allen Künsten haben als Publikum - in Frankreich wie in Deutschland - nur 
die große Bourgeoisie gehabt". 
12 Despite his interest in the product- 
character of novels, Benjamin's method centres more on the possible practi- 
cal gains and conclusions to be drawn from an analysis of this product- 
character. The essay 'L'ceuvre d'art ä 1'epoque de sa reproduction mecanisee' 
in the 1936 issue of the Zeitschrift takes up this point while also treat- 
ing a topic close to the hearts of the core members of the School, which 
had been adumbrated by Benjamin in the earlier essay, namely the question 
of the nature of art under monopoly capitalism. This essay, it should be 
remembered, was intended both as part of the 'Arcades' project, and, as 
was the later Baudelaire essay, 
13 
as a carrot to dangle in front of Inst- 
itut(e) members, enticing them to support the main work. Without going 
into detail on the essay, 
14 
it should suffice to say that Benjamin devised 
the term 'auratic' art to describe the artworks produced before. the 
advent of mass reproductive techniques. Again, it is to be seen that the 
slant of Benjamin's article is angled away from ideology critique and non- 
identity theory towards an inquiry into artistic technics. 
Rather than investigating the dialectical nature of the bourgeois 'auratic' 
or mass-produced artwork (as Löwenthal and Marcuse did), Benjamin looked - 
by means of a detailed consideration of both the production and consumption 
of artworks - to the future uses of the technics or technology being devel- 
oped, especially that of the silent film. In this manner he established- 
an aesthetics involving 'Wirkung' (effect and reception) which was quite 
contrary to Adorno and Horkheimer's later findings in, for example, 'On 
Popular Music', 'Art and Mass Culture' or even the Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
and closer in nature to Bertolt Brecht's work of the time. 
15 For the 
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technology at hand Benjamin faesaw possible emancipatory applications 
which would compensate fully for the death of the auratic artwork, as 
they would also involve a demystification of current society. 
The initial similarity in project and ensuing difference in method and 
conclusions noted above is less evidenced in the essay 'Probleme der 
Sprachsoziologie', which appeared in the 1935 edition of the Zeitschrift, 
and the longer article 'Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler und der Historiker' 
which was published in the Zeitschrift two years later, but it does re- 
appear in the controversial Baudelaire article of 1939. In 'Probleme der 
Sprachsoziologie' Benjamin and stated, quite in keeping with non-identity 
theory, that: 
Man wird kaum leugnen können, daß Wahlverwandschaften zwischen gewissen 
wissentschaftlichen Disziplinen auf der einen, politischen Attitüden 
auf der anderen Seite bestehen. 16 
However, in the context of the Baudelaire essay four years later, intended 
as part of the 'Arcades' project, Benjamin was reprimanded by Adorno for 
having provided too little "Vermittlung" between economic and superstruct- 
ural phenomena. 
17 
Benjamin was adjudged to have ignored the Institut(e)'s 
appraisal that superstructural phenomena could be related only to the soc- 
ietal "Gesamtprozeß", 18 an approach he clearly had adhered to in earlier 
essays. Although such analyses in the Baudelaire essay as that of the 
"Verkümmerung der Erfahrung" and Benjamin's eye for the difference between 
communication and narrative are quite in line with Institut(e) work, the 
continual reference to the 'masses' and the sociological observations, 
exemplified by Benjamin's notion of 'correspondences', most certainly go 
against the grain of the writings of the core members of the Institut(e). 
In the Baudelaire essay a philosophy of history emerges that originated 
in the earlier essay on Eduard Fuchs. Benjamin referred in the discussion 
of Baudelaire to correspondences as "die Data des Eingedenkens. Es sind 
keine historischen, sondern Data der Vorgeschichte. "19 He derived this 
observation from an analysis of beauty in terms both of its cult-value and 
of its value in a Marxist sense, i. e. of art as a product and commodity. 
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This conception of the 'ever-similar' as found in commodity art is, 
undoubtedly, of central importance to Adorno and Horkheimer's later work, 
as is the concept of 'Eingedenken'. In the essay on Baudelaire, the devel- 
opment of the latter concept is explicitly bound up with a discussion of 
art, a central feature in Adorno's work after 1944. 
Richard Wolin, although perceiving correctly that a difference exists 
between Benjamin's 'redemptive' criticism and ideology critique, 
20 
erron- 
eously ignores in his analysis of the philosophy of history Benjamin advoc- 
ated in his posthumously published 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' 
the relation between Benjamin's work published in the Zeitschrift and 
Institut(e) thought: 
The influence they exerted on the two leading members of the Institute, 
Horkheimer and Adorno, was immeasurable. For many of their premises were 
then incorporated into the Institute's major work of the 1940s, Dialectic 
of Enlightenment... 21 
If one bears in mind Julian Roberts' argument that the 'Theses' themselves 
are relatively unimportant in Benjamin's work as a whole - being only a more 
succinct formulation of ideas that Benjamin had been working on for many 
years - and turns to the Eduard Fuchs essay , one finds many of the 
'Theses' already contained in it in nuce. 
23 Indeed, not only would Adorno 
and Horkheimer have known of Benjamin's philosophy of history from this 
essay, they might well have already heard it at the beginning of the 1930s 
in discussions they had had with him in Kronberg im Taunus. 
In the Eduard Fuchs essay Benjamin constructed a theory of negative 
progress, one which was no doubt planned as part of the basis of the 
'Arcades' project. He provided an ideology critique of the bourgeois con- 
cept of progress and from it devised a critique of the notion of progress 
in capitalism (and thus also in Marxism). Firstly, Benjamin criticized 
the Social Democratic proposition that "Wissen ist Macht", 
24 for knowledge, 
he claimed, could not be regarded as value-free and be treated as a neutral 
object to be used by anyone. In this manner, he spoke of the dialectic 
of Cartesian thought in terms common to those used by Horkheimer in 
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'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie'. For example, when speaking of 
positivism, Benjamin stated: 
Er (positivism) konnte in der Entwicklung der Technik nur die Fort- 
schritte der Naturwissenschaft, nicht die Rückschritte der Gesell- 
schaft erkennen. Die Technik aber ist offenbar kein rein naturwissen-- 
sch aftlicher Tatbestand, sie ist zugleich ein geschichtlicher. Daß 
diese Entwicklung durch den Kapitalismus entscheidend mitbedingt wurde, 
übersah er... 25 
It is hardly surprising, then, that Horkheimer remarked in a letter of 
the 16th of March, 1937 with reference to this passage and to 'Traditionelle 
und kritische Theorie': 
Ich kann diese Seite nicht überblättern, ohne Ihnen zu sagen, daß ich 
einige Sätze darin zu den wertvollsten der ganzen Arbeit zähle. Die 
Formulierung, daß der Positivismus in der Entwicklung der Technik nur 
die Fortschritte der Naturwissenschaft, nicht die Rückschritte der 
Gesellschaft erkannt hat, erhellt weite Gebiete der Ideologie des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Sie ist mir umso wertvoller, als in meinem 
jetzt im Satz befindlichen Positivismus-Aufsatz diese Seite unbehandelt 
blieb. 26 
Notably, Benjamin had mentioned both August Bebel and Friedrich Engels 
as supporters of the view of technics and progress criticized so devas- 
tatingly. Benjamin thus devised not only a critique of linear progress 
which fitted in perfectly with Horkheimer's non-identity theory, but also 
connected this indirectly to a political conception of how left-wing 
thought had to be changed if it were to offer a real alternative to 
capitalism. 
However, simultaneous to this critique of progress Benjamin offered a 
notion of history which was not based on 'Eingedenken', but which centred 
on a concept of 'redemption' or 'salvation' that typically Benjamin derived 
from an analysis of art. He worte: 
Diese Werke integrieren für den, der sich als historischer Dialektiker 
mit ihnen befaßt, ihre Vor- wie Nachgeschichte - eine Nachgeschichte, 
kraft deren auch ihre Vorgeschichte als in ständigem Wechsel begriffen 
erkennbar wird. 27 
This conception of history, symbolized for Benjamin by Paul Klee's picture 
entitled 'Angelus Novus', which he possessed, is not only to be distinguished 
from ideology critique, since it does not fix the artwork at one historical 
point that is then negated, but also it hinges on the redemptive notion of 
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the future mentioned above. The future for Benjamin had to rescue, 
redeem and salvage the meanings of the past: "Denn es ist ein unwieder- 
bringliches Bild der Vergangenheit, das mit jeder Gegenwart zu mrschwinden 
droht, welche sich nicht als in ihm gemeint erkannte. "28 It is this aspect 
of Benjamin's theory of history that has led commentators to regard his 
work as Messianic, and it is undoubtedly informed by similar thoughts to 
those on barbarism which fuelled Adorno and Horkheimer's concepts in 
their last essays for the Studies, and, as we shall see, also inform 
the merger of materialism and metaphysics in Dialektik der Aufklärung and 
Negative Dialektik. 
However, within this metaphysical construction of the coincidence of 
past, present and future, Benjamin retained an insistence: on the determin- 
acy of history and on its non-epic nature, 
29 
just as Adorno and Horkheimer 
fused their view of history with ei historically-specific analysis. Benjamin 
elaborated his construction in order to be able to provide an account of 
the historical content of the artwork that concentrated on its aesthetic 
character and not on a socio-historical appreciation of it. 
30 The construct- 
ion which was designed to do justice to an historical materialist theory 
of art was thus coupled with a conception of history, the basis of which 
provided the framework for Benjamin's often quoted concept of 'Jetztzeit' 
in the 'Theses'. In other words, via an analysis characteristic of Insti- 
tut(e) work, namely that of a superstructural phenomenon, Benjamin reached 
conclusions both similar to, and at the same time different from, those 
which Institut(e) members drew from similar assumptions. 
The more radical, overtly political nature of some of Benjamin's work, 
with its thrust towards a progressive, practical use of the insights- 
generated by an historical materialist aesthetics, and the difference bet- 
ween his redemptive method and ideology critique point to an underlying 
social theory in his work which is quite unlike that developed by Pollock. 
Indeed, it is to be suspected that precisely this difference could explain 
the ambiguity in defining his work's relation to Institut(e) writings and 
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theory. 
This difference between Benjamin's thought and that of the Frankfurt 
School is underlined in such essays as those he wrote on Brecht and 
also 'Der Autor als Produzent', all published outside the Zeitschrift. 
They do not, however, indicate a difference in interest or in the attempted 
project Benjamin undertook. In 'Der Autor als Produzent 
31 
- as in the 
'Lbeuvre d'art' essay - Benjamin paid far greater attention to a theory 
of artistic value, to the consumption and reception of artworks than did 
the core members of the Institut(e). This shows the degree to which his 
view of society was at variance with that held by the School's main members, 
for he could not accept the proposition that base and superstructure had 
become soldered together into one barbaric unit. Rather, he contended that 
consumption and reception could influence and reject what production offered, 
and that production could therefore be put to progressive usage. 
32 The 
difference in aesthetics and political judgements between Benjamin and 
Adorno, Löwenthal and Marcuse must be located in this more optimistic macro- 
logical theory of society. 
When Adorno stated that the Baudelaire essay lacked "Vermittlung", 
33 he 
unwittingly espoused the Institut(e)'s opinion that such mediation of base 
and superstructure had become absolutely one-sided in the present, whereas 
the two had been inter-determining in the past. Indeed, Benjamin's radical- 
ness in seeing a clear two-way, bipolar relation between base and super- 
structure actually possessed more 'mediation' than the Institut(e) view 
allowed for and is more dialectical than the School's Dialektik der 
Aufklärung 
_ 
was later to propose. Similarly, Benjamin's redemptive 
criticism tried to draw more from the past for a hoped-for future than 
did non-identity theory, which was restricted to uncovering the essence of 
the present. This difference in social theory thus goes a long way towards 
explaining the alterations Benjamin had to make to the Baudelaire essay 
and permits the affinity between Benjamin's aesthetic statements and those 
of the Frankfurt School to be assessed more precisely, in that it shows 
-166- 
up the differences as well as the similarities between the two. The 
affinity between them must otherwise be overlooked or explained away 
_as the coincidental consequence of all the theorists in question 
having 
lived and worked in the same tradition, and, more tenuously, of Benjamin 
having always written pieces into his work that he knew would meet with 
the Institut(e)'s agreement in the hope that this would ensure its public- 
ation. 
In short a fairly clear characterization can be made of the relation 
between Benjamin and the Frankfurt School. Benjamin published in the Zeit- 
schrift, and his 'Arcades' project was sponsored by the School, not purely 
because of the Institut(e)'s wish to support financially an erstwhile 
associate who was in need. Benjamin's essays that appeared in the Zeitschrift 
attest, as do some that were printed elsewhere, 
34 
to an overall project 
that he shared with the core members of the Institut(e), namely the wish 
to develop an historical materialist aesthetics and a refined, non-vulgar 
Marxist dialectics. This common concern cannot conceal, however, the very 
real differences to School thought evident in the approach he adopted, 
particularly in the second half of the 1930s, to reach this panoramic goal. 
Benjamin's methodology does not have in common with the work of the 
Institut(e) a grounding in Pollockian social theory. On the contrary, it 
opposes in its view of both future change and production precisely such 
a one-way, linear appraisal of social potentiality. It is at this theoret- 
ical juncture that redemptive criticism parts company with ideology critique 
and the two strands become visible in Benjamin's work, particularly in the 
late 1930s when the Institut(e) turned more. wholeheartedly to Pollock's work. 
(Adorno rejected at a similar theoretical and historical point the work of 
Brecht, with whom he would otherwise have shared a view of the character 
of the artwork). Owing to this underlying difference in their respective 
assessments of society, Benjamin cannot be considered a member of the School, 
either in institutional or intellectual terms. Yet his work cannot be 
regarded as completely separate from that of the Frankfurt School, for it 
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contains a common intent and purpose as well as a shared point of arrival, 
even if Benjamin's work started from different presuppositions and made 
use of an idiosyncratic methodology. 
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SECT10N II 
CHAPTER8: THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTERPRETATION OF STATE CAPITALISM 
In Section I the economic aspects of the Frankfurt School's interdiscip- 
linary research were traced and then related to the writings of Horkheimer, 
Adorno, Marcuse and Löwenthal. This comparative task was facilitated by 
the common geographical location of the theorists and the fact that they 
all wrote for one journal. By 1941, however, neither of these factors any 
longer obtained. Horkheimer had moved to California, soon to be followed by 
Adorno, and not until a later date were they joined, and then only temporar- 
ily, by Löwenthal and Marcuse. Pollock stayed on in New York to administer 
the Institut(e)'s remaining affairs. During the last years of the Second 
World War Löwenthal and Marcuse both worked back on the East Coast for the 
United States Government, as did Pollock (although only in the capacity of 
an advisor), whereas Adorno and Horkheimer stayed in California completing 
their book on dialectics and preparing the Studies in Prejudice. In 1949 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Pollock returned to Frankfurt to reopen the Institut 
für Sozialforschung, while Löwenthal and Marcuse elected to remain in the 
United States. Perhaps, then, it is this last date which best marks the 
final dismantling of the Frankfurt School as the cohesive research body we 
have discussed. 
As a result of this gradual dissolution of the Institut(e) any attempt to 
correlate the writings of the above five members in the period after 1941 
would seem beset by problems. In the following section, the main themes of 
works written before 1941 will be related to the writings of Adorno, Hork- 
heimer, Löwenthal and Marcuse after this time and the later studies will 
be compared. This is not as untenable an approach as might seem to be the 
case, for, as I shall suggest, their writings after 1941 are not at all 
disparate, but refer both to each other and to their earlier work. Chrono- 
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logically, and thematically, they divide neatly into two parts: Adorno 
and Horkheimer's writings prior to 1947 and Adorno, Löwenthal and Marcuse's 
individual work after that date. It will be proposed that Adorno and Hork- 
heimer's writings before 1947. are directly linked to the theoretical posi- 
tion they held last in the Institut(e), namely that embracing state capi- 
talism. Adorno, Löwenthal and Marcuse's subsequent research, 
1 
especially 
their writings on aesthetics, will be compared with this first period after 
1941 and thus a connection will further be established, albeit indirectly, 
with the 1941 writings. Simultaneously the work of these three will be 
correlated, in that the extent of their agreement with publications prior 
to 1947 will be assessed. 
In this chapter Adorno and Horkheimer's main writings between 1941 and 
1947 will be analysed: they are Dialektik der Aufklärung, Kritik der instru- 
mentellen Vernunft, and Minima Moralia. 
2 
Dialektik der Aufklärung was co- 
authored; 
3 Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, written by Horkheimer 
treated some of the themes of Dialektik der Aufklärung in greater depth; 
Minima Moralia was composed by Adorno, but he readily admitted that he 
could not distinguish which thoughts were his and which were Horkheimer's. 
4 
By means of an examination of the main categories Adorno and Horkheimer 
developed an attempt will be made to prove that these three texts bear a 
direct--. relation to Pollock's theory of state capitalism. At first sight 
this would seem improbable, as none of the three books, at least in pub- 
lished form, mention Pollock's work. 
5 Furthermore, any such suggestion of 
a connection with Pollock's theory depends on the validity of the pre- 
supposition that the theory of state capitalism necessitated a categorial 
rethink of the framework of critical theory, if critical theory were to 
remain able to grasp society adequately. 
We have seen that critical theory's original categories were already being 
revised in Horkheimer's last essays for the Studies. The theory of state 
capitalism had proposed that no internal dynamic obtained within state 
capitalist societies, so that consequently there was no longer any logic 
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in inferring that positive social change lay latent in society. Change 
could certainly not be conceived of as founded on social planning, for 
it was precisely such planning that was held to be the hallmark of state 
capitalism. Similarly, if planning were not to be viewed negatively, 
according to what criteria could a future, democratic-society be fashioned? 
The loss of an internal dialectic, which critical theory had to accept, 
were it to be able to acknowledge that society had progressed into state 
capitalism, meant that it had to be founded on new concepts if it, were to 
remain critical - concepts, moreover, which had to reflect the loss of 
dynamism and the uncertainty of the future within their conception of the 
present. 
A fundamental question arises out of this need to reconstitute critical 
theory: to what degree could the original structure of critical theory be 
retained? It has been variously suggested both that Institut(e) thought 
priorrto 1941 was abandoned altogether and that it was continued. 
6 
A num- 
ber of points have been made in this context. It has been asserted, for 
example, that social philosophy became meaningless for critical theory. 
Some commentators have also proposed that interdisciplinary research - as 
a materialist fusion of the empirical and the theoretical - was unimportant 
for critical theory after 1941. Others have claimed that psychoanalytical 
concepts were no longer an appropriate too to explain the mediations bet- 
ween base and superstructure. Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of 
this period after 1941 is the charge that critical theory came to reject 
7 
any form of Marxism whatsoever. 
In the following pages consideration of these points will be provided in 
passing. It will be argued that the texts in question exhibit two basic 
intentions: they seek to create an epistemological basis for a critique of 
society grounded in the theory of state capitalism; and they wish thereby 
to refound and thus rescue Marx's concepts by marrying these with a Freud- 
ian conception of the history of the individual. In so doing, they fuse 
Kantian and Hegelian notions of 'critique'. This dual project is based on 
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the underlying theoretical argument - or rather idea, since no convent- 
ionally logical argument is presented - which informs Dialektik der Auf- 
klärung, Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft and Minima Moralia, namely 
the proposition that Enlightenment thought is dialectical. This 'dialectic 
of Enlightenment' is elaborated explicitly in the chapters 'Begriff der 
Aufklärung' and 'Odysseus oder Mythos und Aufklärung' in Dialektik der 
Aufklärung. However, the idea is contained in all the above three books, 
where it is discussed from three, albeit interlinked, points of view: 
those of theory, social theory and metatheory. These three levels can 
best be described as the theoretical construction of the dialectic of 
Enlightenment', its application to an interpretation of society, and its 
implications, both positive and negative, for an historical materialist 
epistemology. These three levels will be addressed separately and the 
questions facing their interpretation will be outlined before a discussion 
of the dialectic of Enlightenment in the context of Pollock's theory of 
state capitalism is attempted. 
1. The Dialectic of Enlightenment 
In the preface to Dialektik der Aufklärung Adorno and Horkheimer stated 
that they wished to establish 
... nichts weniger als die Erkenntnis, warum die Menschheit, anstatt in 
einen wahrhaften menschlichen Zustand einzutreten, in eine neue Art von 
Barbarei versinkt. 8 
They thus placed their work in a definite historical framework, for their 
intention amounted to investigating why society had evolved into (planned) 
totalitarianism rather than into the free society which could be created 
on the basis of the industrial means of production liberal capitalism had 
developed. Adorno and Horkheimer presented as an explanation for this 
relapse into barbarity the conception that "... schon der Mythos ist Auf- 
klärung, und: Aufklärung schlägt in Mythologie zurück. "9 This somewhat 
enigmatic statement forms the kernel of the dialectic of Enlightenment. 
That is to say that Enlightenment', by which is meant post-Cartesian rational 
thought, and science, is held to create of itself its opposite, mythic 
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thought, through whith the world is explained irrationally. Thus, the 
concept of Enlightenment pertains both to an historical period and to 
the thought characteristic of this period. -However, the 
historical period 
imbued with Enlightenment thought must not be understood as an historical 
epoch in the sense Marx gave it in The German Ideology, for strains of 
feudal and archaic thought exist alongside Enlightenment thought. 
Adorno and Horkheimer grounded this metamaphosis of reason into unreason 
in an investigation of the initial constitution of Enlightenment thought. 
They sought, in other words, to answer a question as to the origin and 
causation of an historically specific social formation with an apparently 
disparate, historically indeterminate study of the basis of knowledge in 
history. It will therefore be necessary to examine this philosophy of 
history or dialectical anthropology before passing on to an assessment of 
its adequateness as a critique of totalitarianism. 
Adorno and Horkheimer took Enlightenment thought or rationality to be the 
foundation on which all individuality is founded. As soon as people tried 
to assert their uniqueness - the hallmark of a positive awareness of indiv- 
iduality - by subjugating nature to their wishes, they dominated themselves 
and others: 
Die Geschichte der Anstrengungen der Menschen, die Natur zu unterjochen, 
ist auch die Geschichte der Unterjochung der Menschen durch den Menschen. 
Die Entwicklung des Ichbegriffs reflektiert diese doppelte Geschichte. 10 
In eras before individuality existed, nature had been explained by means 
of myths. These were not to be understood as historical eras but as stages 
in the development of the self. The final stage was, however, also an 
historical period, for the process of development culminated in the 
creation of the 'bourgeois' self. With the birth of individuality (and 
Adorno and Horkheimer viewed this as the beginning of modernity) the exter- 
nal world was divested of any animism and came to be explained by formal 
logic-in that nature became handled instrumentally, as a means, rather than 
as an end. 
11 
All things in nature were thereby treated identically, 
12 
as 
quantifiable parts of a whole that could be transformed according to man's 
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will. Domination, Adorno and Horkheimer argued, had now to be understood 
as the transformation of the external world into a discrete set of object- 
ified, quantified 'things', devoid of any further properties, animistic or 
otherwise. Adorno and Horkheimer stated: "Die Menschen bezahlen die Vermehr- 
ung ihrer Macht mit der Entfremdung von dem, worüber sie Macht ausüben. 
13 
The more thought became conceptual, they maintained, the more 'reified' 
the relationship became between it and its addressee. The thinking person 
treated what was addressed as an object, but in so doing also treated him- 
self, in that he was part of the same universe, as an object. This domin- 
ation of nature which was inherent in Enlightenment thought and on account 
of which mankind had become a sum of individuals led Adorno and Horkheimer 
to make two claims: firstly, that "Aufklärung ist totalitär", 
15 
and secondly, 
that "Aufklärung ist die radikal gewordene, mythische Angst . 
16 Enlightenment 
rationality was totalitarian, they argued, precisely because in order to 
dominate it reduced everything to identical qualities, and was also mythic 
fear because it provided an entirely formal, abstract account of the workings 
of nature that bracketed out any qualities. that it could not categorize in 
this manner. Enlightenment rationality could, therefore, not offer an explan- 
ation of nature's quality, but only an abstract portrayal (. Beschreibung') 
of it. In other words, Enlightenment rationality was not 'objective' reason, 
by means of which the world could be constructed for the good of all, but 
was 'subjective', for it was founded on domination. 
17 Equally, such thought 
was unable to conceive of there being an 'objective' truth beyond the stand- 
point of Descartes' doubting Ego, for all things were reduced to man's view 
of them. 
Adorno and Horkheimer contended that this creating of an abstract duplicate 
of the natural world was, after a certain historical juncture, nothing more 
than mythic: 
Je mehr die Denkmaschinerie das Seiende sich unterwirft, um so blinder 
bescheidet sie sich bei dessen Reproduktion. Damit schlägt Aufklärung 
in die Mythologie zurück, der sie nie zu entrinnen wußte. 18 
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Modern natural science, the basis of the industrial world's mode of 
production, they suggested, also modelled itself on this mythic, Enlighten- 
ment rationality. 
19 The more society was altered by the application of such 
a science, the less reason remained a property of reality. Adorno and 
Horkheimer remarked in conclusion: "Das Fortschreiten der Aufklärung löst 
die Idee der objektiven Vernunft auf .,, 
20 
In other words, a never-ending 
spiral of increasingly subjective, dominative reason came to govern society. 
A critique of society had therefore to take into consideration the 
degree to which Enlightenment thought prevailed and had also to give some 
place to a critique of natural science. Adorno and Horkheimer took this 
into account in the critique they subsequently constructed. What charac- 
terised modern society was, they suggested, that Enlightenment rationality 
had now turned back upon itself: society was now governed by myth. Critique, 
therefore, had to become demythification in a manner Marx could not have 
foreseen. It was this mythical character of modern society that Adorno and 
Horkheimer analysed in their various discussions of 'instrumental rational- 
ity' or 'formal' reason. These discussions were not intended just as a 
critique of positivism, 
21 
but, as should be apparent from the above, asa 
critique of what Adorno and Horkheimer held to be the core of society. They 
suggested that at a certain historical stage, after the initial bourgeois 
revolutions in thought, the ideas of the Enlightenment ossified into a 
system of domination. 
22 
At this point, their argument becomes contradictory. 
On the one hand, Adorno and Horkheimer considered the Enlightenment to have 
become yoked to the dominant mode of production and therefore no longer 
able to protest against society. 
23 On the other, the formalisation of reason 
was judged to be the 'intellectual expression of the mode of production 
24 
Since domination of man by man was, however, now ensconced in the mode of 
production, Adorno and Horkheimer concluded: "Technische Rationalität heute 
ist die Rationalität der Herrschaft selbst, "25 i. e. Enlightenment thought 
was not necessarily regressive per se. 
Adorno and Horkheime, r traced the origins of domination in the instrumental 
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rationality of the Enlightenment. Such a rationality, they proposed, 
attempted to fashion a unified quantifiable order of 'things' and in so 
doing Enlightenment thought bestowed a normative status on facts. Thought, 
as a consequence, became reduced to the adept application of facts, ignoring 
that "gerade der Begriff der Tatsache ist ein Produkt". 
26 
Adorno and Hork- 
heimer inferred that if scientific thought was solely the manipulative 
use of facts, then science itself degenerated into merely being a tool: 
"Wissenschaft selbst hat kein Bewußtsein von sich; sie ist ein Werkzeug . 
27 
In order to manage facts more adequately, instrumental reason functioned as 
a set of stereotyped ideas, i. e. blueprints which could interchangeably be 
imposed on society, 
28 
and could be applied by anyone at any time. In this 
manner instrumental reason was therefore both subjective and conformist. 
Adorno and Horkheimer summarised: "Die subjektive Vernunft fügt sich 
allem". 
29 It is because of this that instrumental reason was, of its very 
nature, incapable of embracing a concept of objective reason transcendent 
of the society in which it existed. 
Adorno and Horkheimer drew two main conclusions from their analysis of 
Enlightenment instrumental reason. Thought in contemporary society is 
viewed as having been reduced to a "Planen der gewaltsamen Aneignung"30 
and the instrumentalisation of the universe is regarded as having led to 
a "Liquidation des Subjekte-s, das sich ihrer bedienen soll". 
31 
By its 
destruction of subjectivity in its insistence on a dominated 'subject', 
Enlightenment rationality reduces people to things. Thus, Enlightenment 
reason necessarily metamorphoses into instrumental reason - the latter 
rationality being located deep in the history of the division of labour in 
the industrial productive process. This instrumental reason is, consequently, 
no longer rational, in that it has no 'subject' inherent in it, but rather 
treats people as objects - units of labour power - while guaranteeing their 
physical survival. Instrumental reason offers no rational picture of the 
world but is instead mythic in composition as it obfuscates the human 
nature of labour. This mythic code, in its extreme contemporary form, leads, 
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Adorno and Horkheimer asserted, to a totalitarian liquidation of the 
individual. In the era in which Enlightenment reason becomes instrumental, 
mankind is subjugated under a social system which offers the critical 
theorist no basis for assuming the existence of a "self". Any criticism 
of such a society must take this reduction of people to units - to things - 
as its starting point. The critique of society has to be transformed into 
a critique of domination. 
32 
If thought has become domination because of the form of the production pro- 
cess, then any belief in the progression from capitalism to socialism, 
whether that progression be deemed inexorable or not, must be unfounded. 
Accordingly, critique cannot make use of linear logic. Adorno and Horkheimer 
thereby throw into question the possibility of the New evolving from the Old, 
for they can locate no telos or dynamism in history. (Equally, there can 
be no subject-object of history as had been proclaimed by Lukäcs). Moreover, 
because thought as domination causes people to view all things as alienated 
objects, which is the case if objectification is equated with alienation, the 
New cannot be created by instrumental activity, for praxis would be based on 
domination, rather than change it. The dialectic of Enlightenment thus allows 
no future 'ought' to be discovered in the 'is'. These implications of their 
theory of domination illustrate that Adorno and Horkheimer's concept of a 
dialectic of Enlightenment is based on an analysis of state capitalism in 
that their critique of society becomes static -a stasis they reflect on 
in the chapter in Dialektik der Aufklärung on the all-embracing character 
of the 'culture industry'. 
This stationary character of Adorno and Horkheimer's critique is grounded 
in the very core of the dialectic of Enlightenment, for if mankind thinks 
according to how it produces (and the mode of production is now domination), 
then it follows that mankind can only think in terms of domination. Adorno 
and Horkheimer argued that if society produced purely for quantity, as Marx 
had suggested was the case under capitalism, then everything was similar 
in terms of productional intent, and mankind was not able to think further 
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than such an 'ever-similarity'. 
33 Any real autonomy of thought and 
perception was consequently lost, which led Adorno to speak of con- 
temporary life as 'damaged' . 
34 
In order to nctbecome bound up in this 
predicament, at a philosophical level Adorno and Horkheimer tried to 
forego using instrumental rationality in the construction and form of 
their own categories. Adorno wrote in Minima Moralia: "In einem philo- 
sophischen Text sollten alle Sätze gleich nahe zum Mittelpunkt stehen. "35 
Dialektik der Aufklärung is itself subtitled "philosophische Fragmente" 
and Minima Moralia is a collection of aphorisms. No systematic 'philosophy' 
is presented, 
36 
which points to Adorno and Horkheimer's rejection of any 
'prima philosophia' per se; for truth, they believed, was that which could 
not be incorporated into the system, which was dominative per se. Systems 
being rational in the Enlightenment sense of the word, truth had to be 
meta-rational. Philosophy had to become the negation of the present and 
thereby the preservation of what we have called the non-identical in oppo- 
sition to society which tried to make everything identical. Adorno went so 
far as to say that "das Ganze ist das Unwahre". 
37 Society ruled by the 
dialectic of Enlightenment is thus 'untrue' and therefore has to be rejected 
by philosophy if the latter is to uphold the truth. Adorno and Horkheimer 
suggested that as a consequence there had to be a relationship between 
ascetism as "die Verweigerung des Mittuns am schlechten Bestehenden"38 and 
materialism if the latter were to remain true, for "es gibt kein richtiges 
Leben im Falschen .,, 
39 
Society's essence having become domination, philosophy had to regain the 
tension between what the observer observed and the observed reality, if 
it was to be able to conceive of society's essence. Adorno and Horkheimer 
state: 
Nur in der Vermittlung, in der das nichtige Sinnesdatum den Gedanken 
zur ganzen Produktivität bringt, deren er fähig ist, und andererseits 
der Gedanke vorbehaltlos dem übermächtigen Eindruck sich hingibt, wird 
die kranke Einsamkeit überwunden, in der die ganze Natur befangen ist. 40 
Only in this 'submission' to the concrete41 was truth to be found, but the 
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process of finding the truth required more than philosophy: it required 
imagination. 
42 It is at this point that aesthetics came to play a crucial 
role in Adorno and Horkheimer's thought. - 
In retaining the truth philosophy served as remembrance, as mankind's 
conscience; 
43 
it recalled the suffering ('Leiden') mankind had undergone 
owing to the dialectic of Enlightenment (and highlighted the use of Freudian 
theory in Adorno and Horkheimer's epistemology). Adorno connected this 
truth-character of imagination, remembrance and suffering with its sub- 
lation in a future society: 
Philosophie, wie sie im Augenblick der Verzweiflung. einzig noch zu 
verantworten ist, wäre der Versuch, alle Dinge so zu betrachten, wie 
sie vom Standpunkt der Erlösung aus sich darstellen. Erkenntnis hat 
kein Licht, als das von der Erlösung her auf die Welt scheint: alles 
andere erschöpft sich in der Nachkonstruktion und bleibt ein Stück 
Technik. 44 
If truth could only be preserved from the standpoint of 'salvation', then 
Adorno and Horkheimer must conclude that their philosophy had to flee 
the historical stage on which it had originally been so firmly situated. 
To avoid instrumental rationality, critique, as philosophy, is forced 
to be 'metaphysical' if it wishes to remain materialist in its demytholo- 
gizing. Metaphysics is to be understood in this context as that which 
goes beyond the bounds of the world as defined by Enlightenment logic. 
Such a metaphysical position, Adorno and Horkheimer assumed, is rational 
and not mythic in that it places real subjectivity at its centre. This 
last, paradoxical point emphasizes the indeterminacy of the analytical 
framework Adorno and Horkheimer constructed to account for a determinate 
historical and social formation: that of totalitarianism. This loss of 
critical specificity is necessary if totalitarianism is to be grasped 
adequately. In other words, the categories used to outline the dialectic 
of Enlightenment and the underlying form philosophy had to take as 
a consequence, were all founded on Pollock's theory of state capitalism 
as well as on an interpretation of Freud's theory of individuality, and 
arise out of the conflict between the propositions of the two theories. 
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2. State Capitalism and Freud 
In Section I Pollock's theory of state capitalism was found to play a key 
'role in the formation of critical theory after 1937. The same theory of 
state capitalism, however, entailed a categorial redetermination of critical 
theory, one not fully evidenced by 1941. It is this projected redetermination 
which is expressed in the dialectic of Enlightenment. 
45 
The 'general', 
ahistorical concepts developed in the context of the dialectic of Enlighten- 
ment are both interconnected with the historically particular situation of 
state capitalism and causally derived from it, these then being projected 
back onto 'post-animistic' history. Indeed, the genesis of these concepts 
is only understandable in terms of the centrality of Pollock's theory. The 
actual epistemological form taken by the concepts is, however, attributable 
to Adorno and Horkheimer's interpretation of Freud's work. 
A look at the notebooks Horkheimer filled with jottings for Dialektik der 
Aufklärung between 1939 and 1940 reveals that there the importance of 
economic theory for an-understanding of changes in society was stated baldly, 
rather than hidden behind either phrasing or a philosophy of history. He 
noted of the economy, for example: 
Sie war mit dem freien Markt verknüpft und dieser ist im Schwinden 
begriffen selbst wo die Monopolherren ihn vorläufig noch mehr durch 
Abmachungen und ergebene Parlamente als durch faschistische Kommissare 
regeln. 46 
By 1942 this use of explicit vocabulary is still in evidence, as is shown 
in the following quotation from the second draft (October 1942) discussing 
the 'culture industry': 
Alle Massenkultur ist identisch und ihr Skelett, das vom Monopol 
fabrizierte begriffliche Gerippe, beginnt sich abzuzeichnen. An seiner 
Verdeckung ist das Kapital gar nicht mehr so sehr interessiert, dessen 
Gewalt sich verstärkt, je brutaler sie sich einbekennt... Lichtspiele 
und Netzwerke brauchen sich nicht mehr als Kunst auszugeben. Die Wahr- 
heit, daß sie nichts sind als Geschäft, verwenden sie als Ideologie, die 
den Schund legitimieren soll, den sie vorsätzlich herstellen. 47 
i 
In the final draft of Dialektik der Aufklärung, however, this economic 
basis of the theory of domination had become cloaked in more abstract 
concepts. Nevertheless, the economic shape of society still determined the 
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interpretation of society. For example, under state capitalism, planning - 
the alleged guarantor of socialism - peietuated the existence of capitalism. 
In broader terms, the source of progress, the means of production, there- 
fore apparently revealed itself as not containing the makings of a new 
and just society. The planned application of technology, which had been 
equated with the organisation of society according to the good of all, 
that is according to 'reason', transpired to be unreason. 
In this context Adorno and Horkheimer suggested in Dialektik der Aufklärung 
that " Vernunft selbst zum bloßen Hilfsmittel der allumfassenden Wirtschafts- 
r 
apparatur wurde. "48 Indeed, the central idea behind the concept of the 
dialectic of Enlightenment is that the condition of human freedom attain- 
able is ignored and instead planned domination governs society. That is to 
say that the very question Adorno and Horkheimer addressed at the beginning 
of Dialektik der Aufklärung is conceivable only from the standpoint of 
the theory of state capitalism. 
49 
The attempt to define reason as having 
always been inherently mythic and the rejection of any notion of linear 
progress both follow from this adoption of the theory of state capitalism. 
Instrumental reason, and with it modern natural science, are both held to 
be the basis of planning and since planning is not for the good of all, 
they must, therefore, be unreason. Science is restricted by its function 
as the logos of planning and becomes what Adorno and Horkheimer called "der 
Inbegriff der Reproduktionsmethoden. , 50 
The category of domination, so fundamental to the construction of the 
dialectic of Enlightenment, is thus rooted in the analysis of state capi- 
talism, a form of social organisation in which reasoned planning had 
become domination. State capitalism had been classified by Pollock as a 
command economy. Adorno and Horkheimer stated in Dialektik der Aufklärung 
that the dialectic of Enlightenment culminated in precisely such commands: 
"Herrschaft überlebt als Selbstzweck, in Form ökonomischer Gewalt. "51 To 
their mind, the existence of this command hierachy greatly impaired the 
existence of any notion of individuality under state capitalism, for a 
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person existed there only as a cog within the apparatus. Once Enlightenment 
thought had become mythic the subject becomes the prisoner of economic 
chtermination: "Was er ist, erfährt er durch die Wechselfälle seiner 
wirtschaftlichen Existenz. "52 Moreover, this statement implies that the 
internalization of domination (as described in Autorität und Familie) was 
no longer necessary under state capitalism. 
53 
The domination exercised in state capitalism had been attributed by Pollock 
to the needs of the production process. That is to say, it was seen as a 
means of ensuring the capitalist nature of production and thus as the 
base dictating the shape of the superstructure. Adorno and Horkheimer con- 
sidered this new relation between the economy and the polity in their 
discussion of the means and ends of instrumental reason: 
Die vollständige Transformation der Welt in eine Welt, die mehr eine 
von Mitteln ist als von Zwecken, ist selbst die Folge der historischen 
Entwicklung der Produktionsmethoden. 54 
The base in state capitalism was, in other words, never questioned. Rather, 
the application of technology was divorced from a discussion of ends, for 
all that could be discussed in state capitalism was the adoption of differ- 
ent means, and since domination, in the shape of a plan, governed society, 
this society could only be regarded as founded on unreason, regardless of 
its origins in the 'reason' of early liberal capitalism. The ahistorical 
declamation "Die Dialektik der Aufklärung schlägt objektiv in den Wahnsinn 
um, 
55 
thus reveals itself to be only understandable from the standpoint of 
domination in state capitalism. 
Adorno and Horkheime. r's general philosophical construction of the dialectic 
of Enlightenment, which is based on the three theoretical cornerstones 
of 'reason as unreason', 'domination as the telos of liberal thought' and 
'progress as regression', shows itself to be deeply embedded in a contemp- 
orary social theory. Thus, philosophy, for Adorno and Horkheimer, while 
continuing to be social philosophy (albeit one tainted with the problems 
inherent in Pollock's theory), was condemned to being only philosophy, 
56 
for it could project no change within society. It remains to be seen whether 
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a relation exists between the two remaining basic elements of the dialectic 
of Enlightenment (the descriptions of ideology and alienation) and the 
theory of state capitalism, before Pollock's work can be regarded as 
central to the genesis of Adorno and Horkheimer's writings after 1941. 
In Dialektik der Aufklärung Adorno and Horkheirner-spoke of a world 
grounded in appearance, by which they meant that the world appeared to its 
- inhabitants as that which Lukäcs had tern d 'second nature'. The essence 
of society was no longer perceivable to or conceivable for the individual. 
Lukäcs had claimed that this second nature was a function of what Marx 
had designated the 'fetish character of the commodity'. Adorno and Hork- 
heimer took this thought one step further: 
Seit mit dem Ende des freien Tausches (i. e. the beginning of state 
capitalism) die Waren ihre ökonomischen Qualitäten einbüßten bis auf 
den Fetischcharakter, breitet dieser wie eine Starre über das Leben 
der Gesellschaft in all seinen Aspekten aus. 57 
Since the fetish character "permits goods only to be treated-quantitatively 
( as exchange-values) and signifies that a commodity's origin in human 
labour is overlooked, this assertion by Adorno and Horkheimer in the 
above statement implied that the whole of society was tending to become 
governed by quantitative mythic thought. 
58 Owing to the presence of 
thought, essence, as quality, was no longer perceivable. If labour was 
held to be instrumental action, then objectification, i. e. the very making 
of a product, was now equivalent to alienation. Adorno and Horkheimer 
proposed that people could no longer conceive of their own activity in 
the products they manufactured. 
59 
This is a plausible description of production only under very specific 
conditions, namely. those of a command economy. 
60 Only if people are 
commanded to perform tasks do the tasks lose any meaning for them, a 
situation in which they would then fail to distinguish their productive 
activity in the result of such a task. 
61 
Adorno and Horkheimer inferred 
from this state of affairs that as a result of these commands people 
could not conceive of the essence of society. Because production was 
directed from above and people were judged to know ('erkennen') by virtue 
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of how they produced they were no longer able to know anything other than 
the quantitative aspect of production. This is what Adorno and Horkheimer 
meant when they stated: "Die konkreten Arbeitsbedingungen in der Gesell- 
schaft erzwingen den Konformismus... "62 The thesis that the fetish 
character infected society and that as a consequence consciousness became 
'standardized' 63 is based on a model of production that can only be state 
capitalist. It is only within this context of state capitalism that com- 
plete physical alienation (from the production process) results in complete 
mental alienation. 
In a society where the fetish character encroaches on every facet of life, 
there is no need for a superimposed ideology. The life-world is itself 
ideological; the base is the ideological superstructure. When the base 
becomes its own superstructure, ideology loses any truth content it might 
have had. Furthermore, if society is ideological, then no reason inhabits 
it and no anchor is left for an immanent critique of society 
64 
This change 
in the constitution of ideology is conceptualised by Adorno and Horkheimer 
in their discussions of conformism (the main leitmotiv of Minima Moralia) 
and of a 'ticket mentality' (cf. the closing section 'Elemente des Anti- 
semitismus' in Dialektik der Aufklärung). They stated: 
In unserem Zeitalter der großen ökonomischen Verbände und der Massen- 
kultur legt das Prinzip der Konformität seinen individualistischen 
Schleier ab, wird offen verkündet und in den Rang eines Ideals per se 
erhoben. 65 
The command economy enforced conformity upon everyone, so that non-ideolog- 
ical thought was only possible outside the 'system' at the risk of losing 
one's economic existence: 
Wie alles Leben heute immer mehr dazu tendiert, der Rationalisierung 
und Planung unterworfen zu werden, so muß das Leben eines jeden Indivi- 
duums, einschließlich seiner verborgensten Impulse,... jetzt die Erfor- 
dernisse der Rationalisierung und Planung beachten: die Selbsterhaltung 
des Individuums setzt seine Anpassung an die Erfordernisse der Erhaltung 
des Systems voraus. 66 
State capitalist production imposed instrumental thought on everyone in 
order to be able to continue producing for the benefit solely of a minority. 
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This reduction of production to physical and mental alienation and the 
concomitant conformism demanded of the individual, however, have dire 
consequences for Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of society. 
Just as Pollock was left with a static analysis of society, so Adorno and 
Horkheimer described a society of complete alienation in which no change 
could occur, even though they asserted that internally society was 
somehow dynamic, 
67 
The domination of man by man for the purposes of prod- 
uction was now complete: the rebellion of man's inner nature against 
internalised domination had been usurped by the dominators of the command 
economy for their own purposes: 
Der Faschismus ist totalitär auch darin, daß er die Rebellion der 
unterdrückten Natur gegen die Herrschaft unmittelbar der Herrschaft 
nutzbar zu machen sucht. 68 
In other words, the dialectic of Enlightenment ended in the planned utili- 
zation by society of even people's innermost psychic resistance: liberalism 
culminated in totalitarianism. The dialectic ceased to be fluid movement 
between two poles but becomes frozen, no synthesis is possible. 
The loss of dynamism involved in the dialectic of Enlightenment is evidenced 
in Adorno and Horkheimer's notion of a 'damaged life'. 
69 By this Adorno 
and Horkheimer understood that the individual as a social entity was disr 
appearitg owing to the aforementioned dual forms of alienation. Individuality, 
therefore, cannot be used any longer as a critical standard against which 
to measure reality (as is often the case, for instance, in Minima Moralia), 
because in the light of the dialectic of Enlightenment the concept is 
paradoxical. In evolutionary terms individuality, i. e. the ego, must be 
regarded dialectically, because it is both emancipatory in that it guaran- 
tees mankind's survival by dominating nature instrumentally and non-eman- 
cipatory in that it dominates itself and others in the process. 
70 
This 
conception of "a dialectic of individuality seemingly enabled Adorno and 
Horkheimer tq avoid postulating the existence of a completely hermetic 
command economy, for a dialectical "ego'was by definition the product of 
an antagonistic world. 
7' 
However, the drive internalisation, which creates 
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the ego, is required by a dynamic world, not by one in which everything 
occurs according to diktat and force. The command economy needs no individ- 
uals - only units of labour - and accordingly is not founded on internal- 
isation. Concomitantly, Freudian psychology ceases to be a tool with which 
to explain the relation between individual and society and instead becomes 
a standard against which the loss of individuality can be measured. In 
other words, the considerations on individuality in Dialektik der Aufklärung 
led Adorno and Horkheimer to remove psychology from its central position 
in critical theory. 
The above discussion of state capitalism explains the theory of the 
dialectic of Enlightenment, but it does not explain the origin of this 
idea itself. It is at this point that psychology comes to play a new role 
in critical theory. The loss of dynamism in society, which, consequent on 
that loss, resists any projection into a future based on the same means of 
production but on a new relation between producers and products, is assessed 
by means of an epistemological framework indebted to the Institut(e)'s 
interpretation of Freud's social psychology. 
72 
Adorno and Horkheimer's notions of 'first' and 'second' nature on which 
is founded their category of domination, owe more to Freud than to Lukacs, 
for they posited indivduality in Freudian terms. Individuality, they main- 
tained, arose out of myth because the ego (second nature) subordinated 
the id (first nature). People stopped thinking of themselves as nature and 
saw themselves as separated from their environment (also first nature) 
so as to be able to subjugate it to their needs. Adorno and Horkheimer 
identified two forms of the domination of'man by man as necessary correlates 
of this subjugation of nature: one phylogenetic, the other ontogenetic. 
Man dominated other men, but also dominated (i. e. repressed) parts of 
himself: 
Individualität setzt das freiwillige Opfer unmittelbarer Befriedigung 
voraus zugunsten von Sicherheit, materieller und geistiger Erhaltung 
der eigenen Existenz. 73 
Unlike Freud, Adorno and Horkheimer did not derive the phylogenetic from 
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the ontogenetic but conceived of the two as mutually determining. The 
'self' created by social and historical processes (phylogeny) was never 
a whole self, because in the individual socialization (phylo-ontogeny) 
necessitated by these processes the self maimed itself. 
Adorno and Horkheimer offered a detailed symbolic portrayal of the repres- 
of inner nature (ontogenesis) and the domination of outer nature sion 
(phylogeny) as forming the dual basis of individuality in their discussion 
of Odysseus' trial by the Sirens. In their eyes, Odysseus exhibited indiv- 
iduality in the form of rational logic in his encounter with the Sirens. 
He thought, cunningly ('listig', a Hegelian concept), how he could avoid 
falling into the hands of the Sirens and in this enterprise he did not 
rely on a whispered hint from a god, as was often the case in his adventures, 
but was left entirely to his own devices. He tad himself bound to his ship's 
mast (ontogenesis) and ordered his men to place wax in their ears (phylogeny). 
He thus allowed himself to enjoy listening passively to the beauty of the 
Sirens' voices, i. e. he enjoyed art, without coming to any injury, while 
forcing his men to forego this pleasure for the sake of the progress of 
their ship. Man's reason as exhibited by Odysseus, therefore, did not 
facilitate his physical satisfaction or that of mankind and was accordingly 
not rational. Adorno and Horkheimer summarised this discussion of Odysseus 
by stating that "die Geschichte der Zivilisation ist die Geschichte der 
Introversion des Opfers., 74 Odysseus gained social identity as an individual 
by overcoming his id, 
75 
the libido- (pure sensuous pleasure) and by then 
dominating others, imposing a superego on them (formal, instrumental reason) 
and a reality principle on them and himself. 
Adorno and Horkheimer's main paradigm of the domination of nature resulting 
in a twofold domination of people is based on the id-ego-superego model 
Freud had developed in his later writings. The dialectic of Enlightenment 
reflects this by equating the ego with instrumental thought per se (second 
nature, ideol ögy) in its repression of first nature. Adorno and Horkheimer 
thus adopt Freud's distinction between primary and secondary thought-Primary 
thought (real individuality, childlike mimesis) was, to their mind, repressed 
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by secondary thought (sublimation, based on formal, identifying principles 
76 
The history of individuality - that of capitalism - could therefore be 
regarded, they suggested, as a history of increasing repression, and conse- 
quently as a bad history. 
77 Moreover, history therefore bore no immanent 
_dynamicthat would allow the good to arise out of it, for individuality 
was sought at too high a cost. It is in precisely these terms that the 
Dialektik der Aufklärung conceives of history. 
With their conception of the dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Hork- 
heimer located the origins of indidduality in the genesis of capitalism, 
78 
while also detecting that just as capitalism disintegrated into a command 
economy, so its microcosm - the individual - disintegrated. 
79 Adorno and 
Horkheimer offered two psychological interpretations for the outcome of 
what happened to the individual. 
80 
On the one hand, they judge the id to be 
confronted by the superego owing to a withering away of the ego. This 
occurs in an authoritarian, but open society. On the other hand, however, 
they also contend that the id is held to be confronted by society (in the 
form of the 'culture industry'), i. e. in a closed world neither ego nor 
superego can develop. 
81 
The fact that nevertheless Adorno and Horkheimer 
also retained the first interpretation perhaps illustrates a reluctance on 
their part to accept the necessary existence of a completely closed world. 
This ambiguity is at least in part a result of the overriding importance 
attached to the oppression of primary thought by secondary thought, irres- 
pective of the exact form this might assume. But it also highli$ts the 
problem Adorno and Horkheimer faced in making the dialectic of Enlightenment 
socially and historically specific. Adorno and Horkheimer are ambiguous in 
their use of Freudian epistemology precisely because by using it they 
sought to ground a social dynamism at, a 'deeper' level, namely within the 
psyche. 
Social dynamism can, at, most, only be asserted to exist if it is transformed 
into an opposition between psychic forces. By transforming it in precisely 
this way Adorno and Horkheimer cannot, however, construct a true dialectic 
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of society from which the future could be generated. They criticize 
domination because historically it has meant a repression of the id, but 
a non-dominative system is thereby rendered impossible, for to grant the 
id's wishes would involve disregarding the ego/superego, the force(s) 
necessary for self-survival. The id may thus be for Adorno and Horkheimer 
a potential force of resistance, but its urges remain entwined with those 
of Thanatos, the death-drive (of pure libidinal satisfaction) and the 
search for stasis in death (Nirvana). 
82 
Real individiality - defined as an individuality that heeds libidinous 
wishes - cannot therefore ever be attained because it entails self-destructio 
in a social sense. In other words, the very basis on which Adorno and Hork- 
heimer sought to ground dynamism in a closed world - libidinous individ- 
uality as the opposite of 'closedness' - seems to be aporetic, for its 
existence would signify the end of self-survival, death. 
Adorno and Horkheimer suggested, nevertheless, that this aporetic character 
of the dialectic of Enlightenment was, in fact, false; it was, they claimed, 
in turn historically conditioned. They insisted that society's enforcement 
of the ego/superego to the detriment of the id had to be partially repeated 
in each individual, in each ontogenetic process, since this was not achieved 
by phylogeny: 
Furchtbares hat die Menschheit sich antun müssen, bis das Selbst, der 
identische, zw"gerichtete, männliche Charakter des Menschen geschaffen 
war, und etwas davon wird noch in jeder Kindheit wiederholt. 83 
In a sense one could speak here of Freud's 'eternal recurrence of repression', 
the violence of the first moment in which Enlightenment reason imposed itself, 
on nature being repeated in each generation. The ontogenetic process was 
thus considered by Adorno and Horkheimer to be phylogenetic, and hence 
historical in character. This being the case, the process could be changed. 
Adorno and Horkheimer seemingly rejected this view, when they stated: "Jeder 
Versuch, den Naturzwang zu brechen, indem Natur gebrochen wird, gerät nur 
um so tiefer in den Naturzwang hinein. "84 
In other words, individuation at the cost of the libido is an irreversible 
-189- 
process, originating in the "Urgeschichte der Subjektivität". However, 
this description of individuality as subjectivity signals that the process 
described is the dialectic of bourgeois subjectivity - Adorno and Horkheimer 
know of no other even if they detected symbols for it in Greek mythology. 
Nature's compulsion ('Naturzwang, '), an ahistorical division of id and ego, 
is therefore not ahistorical, but related to bourgeois subjectivity. If 
another subjectivity were founded, one not grounded in the domination of 
the self through the domination of nature, the compulsion could be avoided. 
This is the context in which the following statement must be understood: 
Aufklärung ist mehr als Aufklärung, Natur, die in ihrer Entfremdung 
vernehmbar wird. In der Selbsterkenntnis des Geistes als mit sich 
entzweiter Natur ruft wie in der Vorzeit Natur sich selber an... 85 
This recognition of the self in nature could be achieved, Adorno and Hork- 
heimer suggested, by application of the 'concept': 
Denn er (the concept) distanziert nicht bloß, als Wissenschaft, die 
Menschen von der Natur, sondern als Selbstbesinnung eben des Denkens, 
das in der Form der Wissenschaft an die blinde ökonomische Tendenz 
gefesselt bleibt, läßt er die das Unrecht verewigende Distanz ermessen. 
Durch solches Eingedenken der Natur im Subjekt, in dessen Vollzug die 
verkannte Wahrheit aller Kultur geschlossen liegt, ist Aufklärung der 
Herrschaft überhaupt entgegengesetzt... 86 
In this manner Enlightenment can oppose domination if uncoupled from an 
instrumental science which is the lackey of economic gain (cf. the 6th 
Thesis on Anti-semitism in Dialektik der Aufklärung). 
Adorno and Horkheimer intend the term 'concept' to signify understanding 
as Eingedenken, i. e. thinking oneself into the Other, a term dating back 
to Nietzsche and indebted to Benjamin. In the context of the dialectic of 
Enlightenment 'Eingedenken' referredto the ego coming to understand and 
remember the id's wishes, a task accomplished by the former mediating the 
latter's wishes with the external world rather than oppressing them. A new 
reality principle could be established on the basis of 'Eingedenken' and 
therefore a new society would be brought about, since the present society 
opposes such 'Eingedenken'. This is not a return to some 'innocent' primeval 
state of nature, since no such conditiön of 'Eingedenken' has as yet existed 
otherwise society would not be oppressive. The possibility of 'Eingedenken' 
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proves society still to be dynamic, even if it is at present held in 
stasis ad infinitum. Such a use of the term 'concept' is not to be found 
in traditional science and yet was left seriously undeveloped and vague in 
the framework of Dialektik der Aufklärung, which prompts one to wonder 
whether even Adorno and Horkheimer were completely convinced of its power 
to overcome the aporia of self-survival being self-negation. In Adorno's 
later philosophy and specifically in his aesthetics, however, 'Eingedenken' 
and the ''concept are elaborated on more fully. 
The influence of Freudian psychology on Dialektik der Aufklärung goes some 
way towards explaining the commonly observed confluence of repression of 
the self (natural) and the domination of others (social). 
87 Irrespective 
of the problem entailed in their grounding of social dynamism, in using 
Freudian categories Adorno and Horkheimer are able to interpose social 
psychology between the traditional opposites of natural history and human 
history; an opposition to be found in the different philosophies of Newtonian 
and Cartesian science on the one hand and Idealism's philosophy of 
consciousness ('Bewußtseinsphilosophie') on the other. This interposition 
fuses natural and human history into one process and hinders their reified 
separation into two unrelated spheres of activity and thought. Only thus 
can a category of 'Eingedenken' be conceived of. However, in thus fusing 
natural and human history the difference between 'natural' and 'social' 
domination becoems blurred because the two forms are seen only as different 
expressions of the same process. Further, the unspecific nature of Adorno 
and Horkheimer's analysis deters them from drawing any distinction between 
the two forms. Thus their position again borders on the aporetic, for 
freedom from social domination was unthinkable. 
Nevertheless, this indeterminacy had five major advantages. Such a conception 
prevented a positivist reification of natural history to the detriment of 
human history. Equally, a reduction of human history to natural history as 
practised by Stalinist 'diamat' became impossible. Furthermore, Idealism's 
hypostatisation of human history as an emanation of consciousness was 
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avoided. At the same time, Freud's own interpretation of human history 
as a 'linear progression' of the continued construction of the ego was 
jettisoned because Adorno and Horkheimer redrew the ego's history as a 
history of decomposition. 
88 
Finally, phylogeny was not therefore reduced 
to or deduced from ontogeny but rather, as mentioned previously, the two 
were conceived of as mutually-determining, however indeterminate Adorno 
and Horkheimer's definitions of them might have been. 
89 
By discussing history using only the category of the individual, Adorno and 
Horkheimer confused the two quite distinct levels of domination: the social 
and the 'natural'. 
90 
Social domination could, as a consequence, no longer 
be analysed by Adorno and Horkheimer in any specificity, although this had 
been their initial intention. The id-ego-superego model (despite being seen 
as bourgeois) is generalised in that the individual, as existent under 
capitalist society, is equated with society qua society. Secondary nature 
comes to be understood solely as formal, instrumental logic, although this 
is only the case under capitalism. Nevertheless it was this equation of 
individual and society that enabled Adorno and Horkheimer to transform social 
theory into the theory of knowledge which the Dialektik der Aufklärung 
constitutes. 
91 
The appended 'Elemente des Antisemitismus' in Dialektik der 
Aufklärung serve an important logical function in this context, for they 
illustrate the disintegration of the ego into a 'ticket mentality'. 
The centrality of both the theory of state capitalism and Freudian 
epistemology for Adorno and Horkheimer indicates that the Dialektik der 
Aufklärung was not an analysis based solely on fascism, but was meant to 
have contemporary validity for capitalism as a whole and for late capitalism 
in particular. In this context, two conclusions suggest themselves. Firstly, 
social theory was still intended by Adorno and Horkheimer to inform the 
metatheory and to embrace possible future change, although they were unable 
to found such a dynamism even at a 'deep' level. Secondly, the dialectic of 
Enlightenment was historically specific, for it had meaning only in the 
context of state capitalism, not as a generalised philosophy of history. The 
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combination of these two aspects resulted in a socio-psycho1gicalphilos- 
ophy. However, in this attempt to be historical in their refounding of 
'critique' Adorno and Horkheimer transhistoricised (owing to both Pollock- 
ian and Freudian components) precisely that historical content. 
92 The loss 
of social dynamism is therefore central to the theory of the dialectic 
of Enlightenment and must be regarded as constitutive of it. This loss, 
moreover, led Adorno-and Horkheimer to add a further dimension, namely 
that of the 'culture industry', to the theory-of state capitalism in an 
effort to prove, in a more empirical fashion, the existence of a 'closed' 
world centred on a pseudo-market. It is my contention that state capitalism's 
stability and the logic of the dialectic of Enlightenment have to be grounded 
by Adorno and Horkheimer in the structure of this 'culture industry' and 
I shall therefore now analyse this complex structure in some detail.. 
3. The Culture Industry 
The subtitle of the chapter headed 'Kulturindustrie' in Dialektik der Auf- 
klärung reads: 'Aufklärung als Massenbetrug', indicating that 'the culture 
industry' is the physical shape Enlightenment thought takes in its mythic 
shrouding of the world. The chapter undertakes to explain how the 'closed- 
ness' of the world is both shaped and enforced, thereby apparently ignoring 
the ambiguity evident in Adorno and Horkheimer's account of the Ego for if 
the concept of 'the culture industry' establishes that the world is 'closed', 
the -conception of a dialectical Ego becomes redundant, unless it is powerful 
enough to escape such 'closedness'. The culture industry as a structure 
signified for Adorno and Horkheimer the contemporary organisation of 
culture; the latter they considered to consist of film, radio, magazines, 
jazz and television. These formed a unified 'industry', Adorno and Hork- 
heimer argued, in that not only were such cultural forms without exception 
dependent on the all-powerful state capitalist monopolies (steel, 
electricity etc. ) 
93 
but what each produced was identical: "Alle Massen- 
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kultur unterm Monopol ist identisch ... 
". 94 Specific differences amongst the 
products of the culture industry could be attributed solely to the fact 
that each was intended to serve in some way "der Klassifikation, 
Organisation und Erfassung der Konsumenten. "95 The form the products assumed 
depended entirely on the technical developments of capitalism: "Ihr (the 
products) Fortschritt entsprang den allgemeinen Gesetzen des Kapitals. "96 
Viewed as a whole, these products were able to erect a monopoly purely by 
virtue of the economic role they fulfilled on behalf of the sectors of the 
economy on which they depended: "Was nicht konformiert, wird mit ökonomischer 
Ohnmacht geschlagen., 
97 In this sense the culture industry took over the 
function of liberal capitalism's market in the shape of a pseudo-market, 
centred on advertising. 
...: die modernen Kulturkonzerne sind der ökonomische Ort, an dem mit 
dem entsprechenden Unternehmertypen einstweilen noch ein Stück der 
sonst im Abbau begriffenen Zirkulationssphäre überlebt. 98 
The nature of the culture industry was thus derived by Adorno and Hork- 
heimer from state capitalism's need for a pseudo-market. It remains to 
be seen whether the manner in which the culture industry functioned can 
also be inferred from the same social form. 
Adorno and Horkheimer addressed the way in which the culture industry 
operated from the very beginning of their investigations. In the second 
sentence of the chapter on the culture industry Adorno and Horkheimer 
declared: "Kultur heute schlägt alles mit Ähnlichkeit. "99) 
As we have seen, it evinces this quality in economic terms. However, Adorno 
and Horkheimer clearly intend the statement to designate the culture 
industry's existence on three further levels, i. e. to detail what its 
products are, to describe whom these are aimed at and also to show in 
what fashion they are thus aimed. They fail, however, to put the question 
as to the ownership of the culture industry, an omission evidencing the 
degree to which the chapter on the culture industry remeins theory-bound 
and devoid of empirical demonstration. In this respect Adorno and Hork- 
heimer's analysis of the culture industry moves uneasily between a 
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description of its products, whereby the former becomes the sum-total 
of the latter. For the purposes of reconstructing their analysis the two 
will be distinguished as clearly as possible. 
The products of the culture industry, Adorno and Horkheimer maintained, were 
made up of stereotyped elements or rigid invariants. All details within 
each pxodtct were subordinated to the product and thus had no separate 
importance or meaning for the parts were subsumed under the product as a 
whole. Words, for example, were repeated frequently and used purely for 
effect, i. e. they became slogans. 
PBbnsequently, 
the only style inherent 
in the culture industry's products was the negation of style, rooted in 
the absence of tension between the general and the particular. The products 
in toto formed a system of non-culture ('Nichtkultur'). 
101 This system of 
products ensured that everything and everyone was incorporated into the 
system: "Für alle ist etwas vorgesehen, damit keiner ausweichen kann. " 
102 
The products themselves offered no escape from the 'dominant culture', since, 
as a result of their artificial variety, the public became part of a system 
that supposedly was there to serve them. Adorno and Horkheimer deduced from 
this that "die ganze Welt wird durch das Filter der Kulturindustrie ge- 
', 103 leitet. 
In other words, not only was everyone caught within the culture industry's 
stranglehold, but the efficacy of the latter's products prevented any other 
world from being seen. 
104 
It is this last point, the second level of the 
all-pervasiveness of 'similarity' that Adorno and Horkheimer used to prove 
the 'closed' nature of state capitalism. 
It was not only by means of the standardised nature of its products that 
the culture industry. succeeded in sealing the world hermetically. Its 
products were 'dreamless'; 
105 
they mirrored society, but did not try to 
reshape it as affirmative culture was held to have done: "Kulturindustrie 




The products of the culture industry imitated 
because they mirrored society exactly as it appeared to be and by so doing 
duplicated it. 
107 As we have seen earlier, -Adorno and Horkheimer judged 
reality to be ideological. In their view the culture industry was therefore 
particularly insidious, for it reproduced an ideological reality and yet 
purported to create something new: 
Kulturindustrie bietet als Paradies denselben Alltag wieder an. Sie 
wird zur nachdrücklichen und planvollen Verkündigung dessen, was ist. 108 
This ideology had two levels in that it was both: 
... die Photographie des sturen Daseins und die nackte Lüge von seinem 
Sinn, die nicht ausgesprochen, sondern suggeriert und eingehämmert 
wird. 109 
Mdreover, this presentation of the world made life seem imbued with sacrifice 
and hardship, so that toil took on the additional appearance of being 
worthy: 
Das lückenlos geschlossene Dasein, in dessen Verdoppelung die Ideologie 
heute aufgeht, wirkt um so großartiger, herrlicher und mächtiger, je 
gründlicher es mit notwendigem Leiden versetzt wird. 110 
The culture industry closed the world by reproducing it as it appeared to 
be: in this sense culture had become an all-embracing totality. 
111 If people 
were able to see the world as it appeared to be, and were content with it 
in the shape of a domain of 'stars', then it would not be possible for them 
to envisage anything beyond it, either temporally or substantially. 
Adorno and Horkheimer took film to be the main example of this imposition 
of what could be called 'one-way' thought. Adopting a rather conservative 
stance towards it, they maintained that, owing to a film's technical 
composition, it prevented people from thinking or even needing to think for 
the duration of its projection: 
Der Zuschauer soll keiner eigenen Gedanken bedürfen: das Produkt zeichnet 
jede Reaktion vor: nicht durch seinen sachlichen Zusammenhang - dieser 
zerfällt, soweit er Denken beansprucht - sondern durch Signale... 112 
The consumers of the culture industry were allowed no moment in which to 
think of the possibility of rebellion, for from the moment they left the 
factory at night until they clocked on next morning they were exposed to 
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the full brunt of the culture industry. 
113 
That is to say, they were 
reduced to reactors to demands made of them. In this fashion they lost 
any individuality: 
Die Kulturindustrie hat den Menschen als Gattungswesen hämisch 
verwirklicht. Jeder ist nur noch, wodurch er jeden anderen er- 
setzen kann. 114 
Society's direct domination of the individual, as noted in the discussion 
of Freudian categories, was founded by Adorno and Horkheimer in the 
nature of the culture industry. It is the totalised domination of this 
cultural apparatus that they held to be the reason society had become 
'seamless' ('lückenlos'). 
Adorno and Horkheimer maintained that the culture industry thus not only 
standardised cultural production but in so doing forced culture to become 
purely ideological. Within such a complex even 'accidents' were a planned 
part of the whole. 
115 
To illustrate this Adorno and Horkheimer once again 
turned to the cinema, for it was film which as a "lückenlos(es) Gef{ige 
der Verdoppelung der Realität ,,, 
116 demonstrated better than anything else 
the hermetic quality of society. It followed from the doubling of reality 
by the culture industry that nian's very nature was effected by such products 
as film: 
Unweigerlich reproduziert jede einzelne Manifestation der Kultur- 
industrie die Menschen als das, wozu die ganze sie gemacht hat. 117 
Adorno and Horkheimer based this observation on the claim that the culture 
industry was able to create, and thereby falsify, human needs, an argument 
that resembles so-called 'manipulation theses'. 
118 Via the entertainment 
('Vergnügen') that it offered, the culture industry was able to influence. 
people without them being aware of any command having been given. The 
power. the culture industry exercised stemmed from this 'hidden persuasion', 
namely the culture industry's overlap with the needs it had created , 
121 
which prompted Adorno and Horkheimer to state: "Nicht sowohl paßt Kultur- 
industrie sich den Reaktionen der Kunden zu, als daß sie jene fingiert. 
j20 
Such influence was achieved by offering the consumers what they thought was 
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a range from which they could choose. This, however, was not only a 
spurious range (since the choice had been prearranged) but even the 
products themselves were standardised, i. e. a choice was possible only 
from identical articles. 
Adorno and Horkheimer encapsulated this whole argumentation in Adorno's 
concept of the 'ever-similar', contending that entertainment, as offered 
by the culture industry, was centred on products whose main characteristic 
was their 'ever-similarity'. Entertainment is thereby 'ever-similar' in 
essence. The concept encompasses both the processes of standardisation 
and the conformism, whether conscious or unconscious, on the part of the 
consumer that results from it. Since all is similar, nothing can change, or, 
as Adorno and Horkheimer put it:: "Das Neue der massenkulturellen Phase 
gegenüber der spät-liberalen ist der Ausschluß des Neuen. " 
121 The concept 
of 'ever-similarity' thus expresses the loss of dynamism which Adorno and 
Horkheimer regarded as the main characteristic of state capitalism and 
which they therefore absorbed into their dialectic of Enlightenment. The 
'ever-similar' is, in effect a fascist 'Gleichschaltung' of culture; again 
the spectre of Pollock's analysis of Nazi Germany makes its presence felt. 
The concept of the 'ever-similar' is the fundamentum in re of the dialec- 
tic of Enlightenment for it pinpoints the regression and domination innate 
in culture today: 
Die Fusion von Kultur und Unterhaltung heute vollzieht sich nicht nur 
als Depravation der Kultur, sondern ebensosehr als zwangsläufige 
Vergeistigung des Amusements. 122 
Whereas the products of past cultures had involved real thought, Adorno and 
Horkheimer believed the culture industry provided only a surrogate of the 
same in that it masqueraded as having been imbued with thought. The real 
content of entertainment Adorno and Horkheimer declared to be "... Einver- 
standensein. Vergnügen heißt allemal.. das Leiden vergessen. "123 Through 
amusement the 'ever-similar' erected a closed universe of discourse and 
thought, one that caused conformity and prevented a recognition of the 
domination at the heart of society. This duplicating of an ideological reality 
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was the creation of the 'ever-similar'. It is this that renders society 
static. 
For Adorno and Horkheimer the advent of the culture industry signified: '. not 
only the 'depravation' of culture, but also, in accordance with the complete 
about-turn of Enlightenment thought, the end of culture in the sense in 
which, for example, Marcuse had examined it in his essay on affirmative 
culture. What is really new about the 'ever-similar' (and by extension the 
culture industry) is therefore that: 
..., und 'daß Kunst ihrer eigenen Autonomie abschwört, sich stolz unter 
die Konsumgüter einreiht, macht den Reiz der Neuheit aus. 124 
Culture, as art, had renounced its 'aura', its claim to transcend and negate 
society, and had conformed instead to production's needs by acting as the 
sales agent for the economy. 
125 Such an incorporation of art meant to 
change its social existence, namely "eine Verschiebung in der inneren ökon- 
126 
omischen Zusammensetzung der Kulturwaren. " Art, Adorno and Horkheimer 
suggested, lost any real, non-manipulated use-value and could not therefore 
be sold, an example of this being radio music which the culture industry 
offered to consumers but did not sell to them. 
127 In this manner, culture 
obeyed the propagandistic needs of the powerful in society and yet had to 
appeal to the masses who were to consume it, even if this involved it being 
disseminated free of charge. Adorno and Horkheimer formulated this problem 
by an ingenious application of Marx's theory of value: 
Kultur ist eine paradoxe Ware. Sie steht so völlig unterm Tauschgesetz, 
daß sie nicht mehr getauscht wird, sie geht so blind im Gebrauch auf, 
daß man sie nicht mehr gebrauchen kann. 128 
They therefore concluded: "Daher verschmilzt sie (culture) mit der 
Reklame ,, 129 
Adorno and Horkheimer argued that cultural products, in that they: were 
'ever-similar', served simply to reinforce the pseudo-market, for they 




This advertising quality was embedded in the, 
cultural products very composition: 
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Der Montagecharakter der Kulturindustrie,..., schickt sich vorweg 
zur Reklame: indem das Einzelmoment ablösbar, fungibel wird, jedem 
Sinnzusammenhang auch technisch entfremdet, gibt es sich zu Zwecken 
außerhalb des Werkes her... Technisch so gut wie 8konomischverschmelzen 
Reklame und Kulturindustrie. 131 
This argument is marred, however, by the fact that Adorno and Horkheimer 
adduced little evidence to support it other than their somewhat perfunctory 
analysis of film. 
In arguing that there was a necessary connection between culture and ad- 
vertisements, Adorno and Horkheimer underlined the staticism that had 
'befallen' society; culture could not protest the closing of the world for 
it had become part of it. Mass culture had become administration. The chap- 
ter dealing with the culture industry was intended to describe the concrete 
form the dialectic of Enlightenment had taken in everyday life, i. e. the 
manner in which the hermetic universe was created. 
132 In this sense the 
chapter provides an empirical determination and epistemological clarification 
of the dialectic of Enlightenment's factual existence. Adorno and Horkheimer 
hinted at this in the admittedly guarded statement that "die rücksichtslose 
Einheit der Kulturindustrie bezeugt die heraufziehende der Politik. , 
133 
The concept of the culture industry thus relates the application of 
Freudian and Marxian theory to a concrete analysis of society. Consequently, 
it is the effects state capitalism has on the constitution of the individual 
which form the main focus of the inquiry into the culture industry. This 
analysis seeks to prove that owing to the duplication of an ideological 
reality, i. e. the creation of a hermetic society, the critical individual 
can no longer be constituted. The 'whole' can hence be adjudged 'untrue' in 
that it does not function equally for the good of all, and everything is 
now second nature, --i. e. rendered identical. The model of society Adorno 
and Horkheimer constructed on the basis of their analysis of the culture 
industry highlights the influence of Pollock's work and thus reveals the 
same flaws as were detected in the concept of state capitalism. It follows 
therefore that the staticism of Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis cannot be 
considered to be a consequence of their innate pessimism or idealism, or of 
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their lack of a Marxist epistemology. Rather it is generated by the social 
theory that informed their epistemology. As we have seen, the culture indus- 
try is the means by which the commodity is brought to the consumer and the 
means by which the latter's needs are manipulated. That is to say that the 
basis of the culture industry's existence is the fact that production deter- 
mines consumption. By acting as the regulator of distribution the culture 
industry completes the closing of society. In accordance with Pollock's 
theory, Adorno and Horkheimer view society as still capitalist in its mode 
of distribution. 
Despite this similarity, the concept of the culture industry describes a 
stage of state capitalism that Pollock had not been able to outline, namely 
that of a peace-time economy. Adorno and Horkheimer stated that: "In der 
Tat verwirklicht sich heute eine Art Wohlfahrtsstaat auf höherer 
leiter., 134 Culture industry is the structure through which force is exerted 
upon the population in peace-time; it is that pseudo-market of advertise- 
ments which imposes dominant beliefs on the population and ensures good 
sales. In other words, the culture industry is a new circulatory sphere, one 
which is, moreover, completely ideological. 
135 The loss of specificity in 
Adorno and Horkheimer's conception of domination finds its complement here, 
in that Adorno and Horkheimer asserted that the whole is ideological and 
then inferred this to be the case for all the parts, i. e. everything within 
the culture industry was believed to be ideological. This logical short- 
circuitry is attributable to the main flaw in Pollock's work, the failure 
to"investigate the sphere of production. Indeed, apart from the sparse 
remarks on film, Adorno and Horkheimer merely impute the main characterist- 
ics of the culture industry's products. By assigning to the culture industry 
the role of regulating consumption Adorno and Horkheimer reject any distinc- 
tion between base and superstructure. With the introduction of the culture 
industry the base determines the life-world and therefore 'culture'. Because 
they attribute this reduction to the elision of a real distributive sphere, 
136 
Adorno and Horkheimer have to ignore any dynamic properties that might 
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actually persist within the base itself. They are forced to infer that all 
production is capitalist, because otherwise the individual could become 
aware of non-capitalist modes of production. By definition, however, capi- 
talist production is dynamic, since it is based on a contradiction between 
the forces and relations of production. In other words, Adorno and Horkheimer 
end up inadvertently disproving what they wished to prove, namely the her- 
metic-nature of society. 
With the exception of the few remarks on filmic portrayal, Adorno and Hork- 
heimer's analysis centres on the 'cultural' not the 'industrial' side of 
the concept. By thus concentrating on the distributive sphere as enforcing 
a closed world they were unable to conceive of change occurring in any fash- 
ion. Consequently, they cannot say why society is capitalist, for they have 
no socially grounded concept of what constituted the opposite of capitalism. 
Only in "this way is it possible for them to equate objectification with 
alienation. The statement that all is ideological within the society governed 
by the culture industry is therefore both unfounded and tautological. Further, 
if all is absolutely ideological and not merely tendentially so, then Adorno 
and Horkheimer could hardly account for their own critique. The degree of 
generalisation and loss of specificity such a statement entails reproduces 
the enchantment of the world that contemporary society is held to have 
brought. 
In this manner Adorno and Horkheimer impose a mono-causal logic on society 
without proving that this need be, or indeed is, the case. The concept of 
the culture industry, based on Pollock's understanding of capitalism, does 
not help delineate what forms of culture are not capitalist and yet never- 
theless persist within the capitalist world. We shall see, that Adorno later 
tried to avoid this problem by determining things in reverse: he judged 
authentic art to be negative, and therefore deduced capitalist production 
from its opposite. In conclusion we can say that the far-reaching embrace of 
the concept of the culture industry is severely limited, radical though its 
assessment of culture under late capitalism may have been, for in conceiving 
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of this culture as thoroughly structured, the concept loses any specificity. 
4. The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Suffering and Art 
Adorno and Horkheimer did, however, endeavour to find a cause for change in 
the hermetic world they had outlined, namely in their notion of suffering 
('Leiden'). The term itself has associations with art and religion, these 
often being regarded as the particular realms in which the suffering of man 
is portrayed. In this sense, the term testifies to the metaphysical propert- 
ies of Adorno and Horkheimer's critique. It also evidences once more the 
common structure and epistemology of Dialektik der Aufklärung, Kritik der 
instrumentellen Vernunft and Minima Moralia - that is, the marriage of 
Freudian and Marxian concepts - for it describes on social, psychological 
and metatheoretical levels the state of society. 
Adorno and Horkheimer proposed that the only escape from the closed society 
was to be found in the symbols of the past, of past suffering. These were 
oppositional because they exposed the whole to have been built on pain, and 
thereby exploded the image the 'whole' projects of itself, namely that it 
was both good and the optimum existence possible. The symbols of suffering, 
found in art predominantly, were of past pain for the cause of this pain 
was visibly rooted in the class society of the day, whereas under state 
capitalism such roots were disguised. The 'whole' thus tried to prevent 
any recognition of suffering: "Es gehört zum Mechanismus der Herrschaft, die 
Erkenntnis des Leidens, das sie produziert, zu verbieten.... 
137 
It was 
precisely the culture industry's glossy, star-spangled duplication of reality 
which tried to achieve this. 
The concept of suffering becomes necessary for the critical theorist only 
when socikty is held to be closed, for suffering is then the only means where- 
by people can recognise society's first nature, namely that it is both 
based on domination and kept closed. 
138 
Adorno and Horkheimer had imputed 
that the culture industry was able to influence fully people's knowledge 
of themselves via its presentation of second nature. Accordingly, the 
constitution of individual thought was completely jeopardised by the presence 
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of the culture industry, so that recognition of this first nature had to 
be felt rather than conceptualised. Their concept of suffering is thus in 
part based on the assumption that people do not know of their own contempo- 
rary suffering but may be able to feel it. 
Critical philosophy, Adorno and Horkheimer asserted, was able tD, counter the 
second nature posed by the 'ever-similar' if it took up the task of describ- 
ing such suffering. They thus made a consciousness of society's closedness 
dependent on people's recognising the manner in which they repressed them- 
. selves. In this project of showing people their suffering, Adorno and Hork- 
heimer considered philosophy akin to art: 
Die Philosophie ist mit der Kunst darin einig, daß sie vermittels der 
Sprache das Leiden reflektiert und es damit in der Sphäre der Erfahrung 
und Erinnerung überführt. 139 
In view of this the 'Aufzeichnungen und Entwürfe' that form the last part 
of Dialektik der Aufklärung can be seen to have a logical place in the 
book. They are not merely a philosophical addendum, but figure as a set 
of descriptions of suffering over the ages. 
The concept of suffering implies that people have to be shocked by a 
recognition of pain if they are to become aware of the domination to 
which they are subjected. Equally, this awareness, in accordance with 
the dialectic of Enlightenment, has to involve a recognition of one's 
repression of oneself. A knowledge of suffering is therefore essentially 
anamnesis, for it forces the individual to become aware of the pain imposed 
on the id and it tries to force the id to remember that its pain originates 
now from the superego or society encroaching on it. This consciousness 
of repression was not, Adorno and Hbrkheimer argued, in itself cathartic,, 
nor could it ever be, for in the last instance repression could only be 
alleviated by social change. 
140 
Adorno and Horkheimer's suggestion that suffering was the only mental means 
of recognising society's oppression of the individual was founded not only 
on a specific notion of the constitution of the individual depending on 
the production process but also on a consideration of the distributive 
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sphere's role within the individual's life-world in the closed, state 
capitalist society. The concept of suffering thus highlights the inter- 
connectedness of a theory of knowledge, a theory of individuality and a 
theory of society in the refoundation of critique that Dialektik der Auf- 
klärung, Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, and Minima Moralia were 
intended to be -a refoundation necessitated by the change in society 
that Pollock had outlined. 
141 The concept also emphasizes the staticism 
of this critique because opposition can only be a feeling and not conceptual, 
and thus is not practical in any sense. 
142 Adorno unwittingly depicted this 
staticism in his purely ethical exhortation: "Einig sein soll man mit dem 
Leiden des Menschen .,, 
143 
Adorno and Horkheimer felt that a representation of suffering was contained 
not only in philosophy but also in art. 
144 
Any interpretation or analysis 
of art had, however, in the light of the dialectic of Enlightenment, to 
take into account the culturally all-embracing character of the culture 
industry. To Adorno and Horkheimer art and the culture industry were dia- 
metrically opposed. 
145 
The culture industry drew its power from an invasion 
of the realm of symbolic truth hitherto reserved for art, and thereby 
created a closed world. This had disastrous consequences for art, for, 
"devrived-of its realm of truth, it died out: "Fürs Absterben der Kunst 
spricht die zunehmende Unmöglichkeit der Darstellung des Geschichtlichen. " 
146 
A closed society gives no hint of an idea of history or transcience, whereas, 
as we have seen, Adorno and Horkheimer considered both these properties to 
be constitutive factors in the creation of art. Indeed, in the symbolic 
discussion of Odysseus, the Sirens' music is countered by instrumental 
rationality. Art is opposed, by its very nature, to instrumental reason. 
Owing to this opposition between art and the culture industry, Adorno and 
Horkheimer decided that art could provide an antidote to the closing of 
the world. Two historical forms of art came into question: either past, 
affirmative and reflective forms or such forms as Adorno had judged 
'authentic' but 'post-auratic'. Affirmative forms were no longer affirmative, 
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since society no longer required affirmation. Rather, the existence of 
affirmation in such artworks showed that an idedogy had existed at the 
time of their production. This portrayal of tension between ideological 
and non-ideological strands in the artworks served to ensure both that 
these are dissynchronous and that they do not incorporate any part of 
the closed world's ideology: 
Mit fortschreitender Aufklärung haben es nur die authentischen Kunst- 
werke vermocht, der bloßen Imitation dessen, was ohnehin ist, sich zu 
entziehen. 147 
In as much as artworks could still do this, Adorno and Horkheimer maintained, 
art was oppositional to society and could parry the culture industry's 
embracing thrust on account of its very constitution as art. 
148 
Art was 
accordingly judged to be non-conformist and as such reflected ex negativo 
the conditions that forced it to be as it was, therefore revealing a truth 
about society, namely its foundation in domination. Adorno and Horkheimer 
spoke of the nature of art as being the artistic "Erscheinung des Ganzen 
im Besonderen" 
149 
and saw an artwork's style as representing a promise to 
portray the truth. 
150 
These properties were destroyed by world in which 
the whole was the parts and in which these, in turn, were dominative. Art 
was thus non-conformist, in that it became the antithesis to society. 
Adorno went so far as to suggest that art could still grasp the truth 
about society, a point Horkheimer disagreed with quite radically (and 
the only point, incidentally, on which the two did disagree). Horkheimer 
considered that the culture industry overwhelmed art: 
Ein Kunstwerk war einmal bestrebt, der Welt zu sagen, wie es ist, 
ein letztes Urteil auszusprechen. Heute ist es völlig neutralisiert. 151 
Horkheimer justified this by saying that subjective reason 
... überführt Kunstwerke in kulturelle Waren, und ihren Konsum in eine 
Reihe von zufälligen Gefühlen, die von unseren wirklichen Intentionen 
und Bestrebungen getrennt sind. Kunst ist ebenso von der Wahrheit ab- 
gelöst wie Politik oder Religion. 152 
Adorno, on the other hand, insisted in Minima Moralia that art provided, 
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in its 'non-instrumentality', a reconciliatory image of nature, an image 
of non-domination of contemplative 'mimesis'. 
153 This property endowed 
art, he suggested, with a truly 'creative' view of a future reality where 
the world of objects was not a world of domination. 
154 In this respect, 
Adorno held mimesis to reveal a new form of production, namely "Zweck- 
155 
mäßigkeit ohne Zweck" , i. e. non-instrumentality, or, as 
he termed it, 
the "Dasein des Nutzlosen". 
156 
Above all - and as a summary of the properties just mentioned, - art 
retained an image of suffering in that it endeavoured to maintain a 
remembrance of the past: 
Der Drang, Vergangenes als Lebendiges zu erretten, anstatt als Stoff 
des Fortschritts zu benutzen, stillte sich allein in der Kunst, der 
selbst Geschichte als Darstellung vergangenen Lebens zugehört. 157 
This act of anamnetic remembrance that prevented the 'damned' 
('Gerichteten') from being forgotten158, lifts the bane of the culture 
industry's creation of a closed, history-less world. Art, in other words, 
can potentially form the basis for critical thought. Faced by a closed 
society, it is implied, philosophy has to turn to art to interpret the 
world, and even then only indirectly. Changing it was impossible. 
Adorno and Horkheimer's conception of art as the opposing force to the 
culture industry entails certain problems. By dint of its "Verzicht auf 
Einwirkung"159, they reduce art to a quietist role, since otherwise it 
would conform by shedding its non-instrumental character. 
160 What is more, 
in viewing affirmative art positively, Adorno and Horkheimer run the danger 
of not being able to distinguish between affirmative and emancipatory 
artforms, or between the original meaning of an artwork and its meaning 
at a later point in time. The level of historicity and unspecificity that 
bedevils the dialectic of Enlightenment as a whole even permeates Adorno 
and Horkheimer's pronouncements on aesthetics. Relatedly, in a closed 
society a sociology of art becomes unnecessary, for fart pour fart is 
the standard of opposition to society and art's origins become irrelevant. 
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Equally, how are new artforms or adequate artforms to be generated or 
characterised within Adorno and Horkheimer's bipolar opposition of art 
and society? I shall turn to a detailed study of these problems in the 
following chapter on Adorno's aesthetics. 
In the light of our discussion of the different components inherent 
in Adorno and Horkheimer's conception of a dialectic of Enlightenment 
and their logical position in Adorno and Horkheimer's epistemology, it 
is now in order to view the social theory, which evolved in Dialektik der 
Aufklärung, Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft and Minima Moralia between 
1941 and 1947, as a whole. Primarily, Adorno and Horkheimer reconsidered 
Marxism in the context of a postulated change in the structure of 
capitalism161, namely the transition to state capitalism that Pollock had 
outlined. Adorno and Horkheimer believed that society had, through the 
loss of the sphere of distribution, become monolinear, i. e. closed. For 
the culture industry now mediated on behalf of production between production 
and consumption. As a consequence, Adorno and Horkheimer affirmed that the 
base dominated the superstructure and built their theory around this. Any 
distinction between the two had become meaningless. This point was founded 
on an understanding of the base-superstructure relation as the constitutive 
relation of society only in terms of the sphere of distribution, an 
understanding which meant omitting and neglecting any definition of society 
according to the sphere of production. 
162 This reconsideration was adhered 
to by Adorno for the rest of his life, (a point I shall treat in the next 
chapter 
163). 
This redetermination of the cornerstones marking off a Marxist epistemology 
does not simply reject critical theory as practised in the period from 
1932 - 1941, but rather reexamines non-identity theory's interests and 
aims. The Dialektik der Aufklärung essentially provides, in a manner 
similar to the earlier period, a critique of thought in its Cartesian form, 
but intends this now as a more fundamental corrective to Marxism than was 
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embodied in the earlier critique of vulgar Marxism. The Dialektik der 
Aufklärung's critique of thought amounts to a critique of the under- 
lying structure of the Modern Age and thus Adorno and Horkheimer must 
be judged to have assumed that capitalism could be characterised not 
only by the form of production, as Marx had stated, but at an even more 
basic level by its form of thought: 
164 it becomes an idealist critique. 
The Dialektik der Aufklärung thus takes up the debate on the relation of 
capitalism and mechanistic thought which Borkenau and Grossmann had 
conducted inconclusively in the pages of the Zeitschrift up to 1935. 
The theory of rationalisation (or racionation) Adorno and Horkheimer 
developed is thus a quite clear continuation of Institute work, its point 
of inquiry matching the questions raised by an ideology-critique of 
bourgeois thought and society. Whereas, however, such an ideology-critique 
did not go so far as to establish a comprehensive critique of society, 
in the form Adorno and Horkheimer assumed it had to take in the wake of 
Pollock's findings, it had to be extended to found and embrace all thought 
within society, including the logic inherent in Marxism itself. 
This reconsideration lost, however, in its epistemological framework, a 
level of specificity latent in the earlier critical theory. Adorno and 
Horkheimer's social theory of the 1941-1947 period cannot analyse capitalism 
qua capitalism, but only as 'society' as a whole. As was shown above, the 
crucial loss of specificity is evidenced at all levels of their analysis. 
This aporetical indeterminacy of the analyses of a concrete historical 
situation is just as much due to their use of Freudian categories of 
individuality as to the variant of Marxism they adopted. The category of 
the constitution of individuality which they used is, as we have seen, 
paradoxical. It could almost lead the reader to suppose that Adorno and 
Horkheimer wished to highlight the repressive character of the Freudian 
concepts themselves. The validity of the version of Marxism employed in 
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the reconsideration of social philosophy is not itself cast into doubt, 
only its applicability is called into question, thereby necessitating 
Adorno and Horkheimer to resort to Freudian categories. That the term 
state capitalism cannot determine what it is that is capitalist, is 
left ignored. 
The weakness of their version of Marxism is, however, illustrated 
unintentionally by Adorno and Horkheimer. Their interpretation led them 
to regard capitalism as having permeated the whole life-world, for both 
materially and ideationally no political counter to it could be posited, 
no new social form could be found to inhabit the old. Consequently they 
could not ground the existence of a cognitive subject and thus their 
critique itself lacked a material foundation. The dialectic of Enlighten- 
ment, and with it the notion of state capitalism, culminated in the view 
that no dynamism existed in society. 
By analysing contemporary society as state capitalism Adorno and Horkheimer 
were able neither to find nor to found any opposition to it. The first 
inability is understandable: in the 1940s there was no major radical 
opposition either in Germany or the USA. The second presented a serious 
theoretical shortcoming, if their theory was to retain its validity after 
1947. All Adorno and Horkheimer were able to propose was that in those 
tattered remnants of an earlier bourgeois culture in which the base- 
superstructure distinction had made sense, there existed a challenge to 
the culture industry of today. That is to say, only in art could the 
theorist brush history against its grain, 
165 
only in art could people's 
suffering - la condition humaine - be revealed. Logically, modern art 
would have had to take the situation under state capitalism into account 
if it were also to have survived. To remain oppositional, art had to 
become non-conformist and yet this meant, paradoxically, resisting the 
irresistible, namely the culture industry. This concern with modern art 
came to play an increasingly important role in Adorno's further thought 
not only in terms of it being a 'time-lagged' preserve of emancipatory 
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ideals, but more significantly as a paradigm of the new society, based 
on a new, non-capitalist mode of production. It is this transference of 
a dialectical methodology away from social theory - its traditional 
. location in historical materialism - to aesthetic theory that I shall 
address in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER9: ADORNO'S AESTHETICS 1947-1970 
'In the last chapter we found that a direct connection existed between 
Pollock's work on state capitalism and Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialektik 
der Aufklärung. Unlike Pollock, however, Adorno and Horkheimer located a 
dynamic element in the closed society, namely in art. Nevertheless, they 
failed to explore the precise nature of the relationship between art and 
society, preferring - perhaps for tactical reasons - to state vaguely 
that art was the negation of the closed society. This chapter will try to 
pinpoint more exactly, by means of a critical reconstruction of Adorno's 
thought on aesthetics and art in the period following the publication of 
Dialektik der Aufklärung, what questions this negative determination posed 
for a critical theory of art. 
In order to do so this reconstruction will address three interrelated 
questions: whether Adorno's writings follow Dialektik der Aufklärung in 
trying to found social dynamism in art, whether they are therefore based 
on the same theory of society and , finally, what internal role 
Adorno's 
aesthetics and writings on art play in his overall philosophy in the years 
after 1947.1 This project will centre on a study of the main concepts 
developed in Adorno's aesthetics, of their relation to his philosophy and 
social theory and of their basis, i. e. his investigations of particular 
artworks. The aesthetic concepts Adorno devised and their possible limita- 
tions will be interpreted after his theory of society has been outlined 
because (since Adorno considered himself a Marxist) we must assume that 
the former was based on the latter. 
2 
Adorno's work after 1947 can be divided into three subject areas: social 
theory, philosophy, and aesthetics. In order to be in a position to 
answer the above questions we must first determine whether a link exists 
both between the Dialektik der Aufklärung and his social theory and subse- 
quently between these and his philosophy. The philosophy can then be used 
as the point of comparison between his social theory and aesthetics. 
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However, since Adorno shared Horkheimer's belief that philosophy was 
by nature social philosophy, it will suffice for our purposes to correlate 
his philosophy and the Dialektik der Aufklärung without devoting any space 
specifically to a study of his social theory alone. Our discussion of his 
social philosophy will, however, also draw on the extensive remarks he made 
on the nature of society in his numerous essays on art. This approach 
allows the argument to concentrate on Adorno's writings on art, rather than 
branching out into all the areas touched on by the vast body of his work. 
The internal relation between aesthetics and philosophy will subsequently 
reveal whether an important connection does indeed obtain between aesthetics 
and the Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
3 
something that has frequently been asser- 
ted, but never studied systematically. 
4 
1. Negative Dialectics and Social Theory 
In 1961 Adorno wrote: "Das waren noch gute Zeiten, als eine Kritik der 
politischen Ökonomie dieser Gesellschaft geschrieben werden konnte, die 
sie bei ihrer eigenen ratio nahm., 
5 
This often quoted sentence contains 
Adorno's theory of contemporary society in a nutshell. Society had changed 
from the social structure Marx had analysed, Adorno believed, to one that 
no longer possessed an inherent rational purpose. In the absence of any 
rationality this society could not be subjected to dialectical critique, 
for determinate negation had no rational basis from within that society 
from which to oppose society. Consequently, society had to be judged to be 
static, as Pollock had suggested, for only dynamism would permira critique 
of society that could lead in theory to that society's sublation. It 
therefore had to be assumed either that such a society contained no contra- 
dictions or else that it was able to restrain these from forcing a change 
in its form. In other words, Adorno thought neither a social class nor the 
productive forces in the shape of modern technology would generate social 
change within a form of late capitalism which had achieved a high degree 
of stability. 
6 
This did not mean to say that society was not capitalist, 
7 
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for Adorno argued forcibly that it still was, but rather merely that 
dialectics had come to a standstill. He based this argument on Pollock's 
notion that, owing to state intervention, the market mechanism had been, 
or was in the process of being, displaced by direct domination8 and that 
the economic processes had become controlled directly by political instit- 
utions. It is this transformation of political economy into politics which 
enables Adorno to conclude that society evidenced no true rationality, as 
was also the case under liberal capitalism, which, however, at least con- 
tained the innate possibility of a transition to a rational society. This 
analysis, quite clearly based on Pollock's ideal-typical model of state 
capitalism, leads to Adorno's assumption that the base has become its own' 
superstructure, thus rendering the distinction obsolete9 and with it 
political economy as a discipline. 
The feature of this= static society thatcAdorno emphasized above all else 
was that of a 'universalization of the exchange principle', also termed a 
"universeller Verblendungszusammenhang". 10 These two terms are used to 
afford greater analytical precision in studying the closed world of capi- 
talism, thereby extending and improving on the Dialektik der Aufklärung's 
theory of society, which, as we have seen, was far less historically spec- 
ific than was desired. Adorno's writings on social theory attempted a 
posteriori to provide the historical exactness lacking in Dialektik der 
Aufklärung and in this manner to complement it. 
The above two. terms were intended to embrace three different levels of 
meaning. Firstly, the consumer was judged no longer to experience 'real' 
needs but to consume exchange-values; ideology as second nature had success- 
fully invaded first nature. 
" Secondly, this reification of needs corres- 
ponded to a dissolution of the autonomous psychological subject whose grad- 
uäl disappearance had been so central to Dialektik der Aufklärung. Adorno 
argued: 
The form of the total system requires everyone to respect the law of 
exchange if he does not wish to be destroyed, irrespective of whether 
profit is his subjective motivation or not. 12 
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Thirdly, the presence of direct domination had led to a complete, enforced 
objectivation of the individual. This, above all, epitomised the closed 
world: "Das hermetische Prinzip ist das der vollendet entfremdeten Subjekt- 
ivität. "13 By this Adorno meant that because people were treated as objects 
and treated each other as objects, it was no longer possible to distinguish 
between human beings and the world of things14 when analysing this 'seamless 
organisation', this 'administered world'. 
15 In abstract terms such reifica- 
tion caused subject and object to be factually similar, although Adorno 
held such an identification to be false from the point of view of a critical 
theory of society. 
This complete objectification of the individual bore witness to the absence 
of dynamism in society. As a result Adorno attempted to formulate a critique 
of society by means of a philosophy which grasped the change society had 
undergone and transcend it. 
16 This intention is clear in the opening sentence 
of Negative Dialektik, the main work on philosophy Adorno produced and the 
text on which the following discussion will centre: "Philosophie, die einmal 
überholt schien, erhält sich am Leben, weil der Augenblick ihrer Verwirklich- 
ung versäumt ward . 
17 Society which could have become rationally structured 
on the basis of liberal capitalism's means of production, i. e. according to 
mankind's real needs, has instead degenerated into barbarism. 
Adorno drew a radical conclusion for his philosophy from this state of bar- 
barism by applying the dialectic of Enlightenment to all logic. Such an 
application was theoretically necessary if the Dialektik der Aufklärung was 
to retain its consistency and heuristic value, for not only psychological 
processes, but the very act by which mankind recognises and thus knows its 
world, had to be subjected to that dialectic. 
Adorno argued that "Denken heißt identifizieren ,,, 
18 
i. e. he specified that 
in the identification of an object as 'some thing' the object was reduced 
to a mere quantity ('A') compared with itself and measured against other 
objects ('non-A') and in this process was stripped of any quality. That is 
to say, in using such logic the subject 'man' reduced the object to being 
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other than himself ('reductio ad hominem') and by equating it with other 
similar objects in order to'identify it, simultaneously imposed his logic 
on that object: the subject dominated the object. Above all, Adorno claimed, 
there was no perceivable difference between the reduction of all objects to 
comparable, measurable quantities and the exchange principle which compared 
'things' according to their price and thus compared quantitatively and not 
qualitatively, e. g. according to what need they might correspond to. 
19 
Such comparative logic was not rational but non-identical in Horkheimer's 
terms with what it thought it was. If such analytical logic was therefore 
ideological, by virtue of its being mythic in its divesting of all objects 
of quality, then both Stalinist diamat and positivism were false in their 
very methodology. Philosophy of Adorno's brand reflects on this state of 
affairs and attempts to tread a narrow path between East and West, simulta- 
neously resisting the embrace of each and spotlighting their ideological 
nature. The contention that Adorno's thought in this period was influenced 
by 'National Socialism and Stalinism' is not quite accurate and should be 
revised to read 'State Capitalism's and Stalinism's respective dogmas'. The 
critique of such dogmas provided the parameters and structure of his 
philosophy. 
Adorno set about constructing such a critique by deducing from the ideological 
nature of Cartesian logic that: "Universalgeschichte ist zu konstruieren und 
zu leugnen. "20 Mankind might have been the creator of a universal history 
up till now, he argued, but the results had to be remgiised as having been 
catastrophic, for they had culminated in the present state of barbarism. The 
possibility of a history that had 'man' at its centre had therefore to be 
denied. History was not to be mistaken for positive progress. 
21 In the 
light of this, philosophy was forced to become a programme of 'anti-identity' 
- of possibility and hope - if it was to lay claim to defending a truth that 
pertained to a future, just society. It had to construct a logic that paid 
heed to the quality of each object or, in Adorno's words, that gave prece- 
dence ('Vorrang') to the object, a procedure Adorno defined as follows: 
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"Vorrang des Objektes bedeutet die fortschreitende qualitative Unter- 
scheidung von in sich Vermitteltem. "22 In its thinking of the object the 
subject had to think of its own (mediating) relation to the object rather 
than thinking idealistically or positivistically that its thought was the 
object as it is conceptualised. 
23 
This awareness of the subject's relation to the object is what Adorno 
terms 'second reflection' ('zweite Reflexion'); the first act of reflection 
being the initial distinction between the subject and object that the 
subject makes in thinking. Adorno labels this second level of reflection 
'mimetic' in the sense that the subject approached the object mimetically 
as opposed to conceptually. In a discussion of a form of differentiality 
and rationality that took each thing into account as possessing properties 
that opposed its conceptualisation Adorno remarked: 
In ihrem Postulat (the thing's), dem des Vermögens zur Erfahrung 
des Objektes... findet das mimetische Moment der Erkenntnis Zuflucht, 
das der Wahlverwandtschaft von Erkennendem und Erkanntem. 24 
By means of such mimetic knowledge of an object, the object was not reduced 
to the subject, but was left within its own qualitative individual state, 
its Hegelian potentiality thus being preserved: 
Eine Sache selbst begreifen, nicht sie bloß einpassen, auf dem Bezugs- 
system eintragen, ist nichts anderes, als das Einzelmoment in seinem 
immanenten Zusammenhang mit anderen bewahren. 25 
As a result of this insight, Adorno's philosophy endeavours to avoid con- 
structing a systematic logic into which things are fitted. To do so, it has 
to guarantee the precedence of the object in another manner as well. Con- 
fronted by a society that is 'false' in that it is founded on identifying 
thought, Adorno's philosophy protects non-identity within the society by 
saving the particular26 as the qualitative side of the object. The preced- 
ence of the object comes to be grounded in philosophy's preservation of the 
object as the non-identical in all its particularity. Adorno concluded: 
"Insofern wäre das Nichtidentische die eigene Identität der Sache gegen 
ihre Identifikation. "27 The presence of a monochromatic society thus forced 
knowledge, in A's opinion, to become a mimetic knowledge of the particular 
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if it was to resist the universal 'veil of blindness'. Adorno asserted 
categorically of all knowledge: "Erkenntnis geht aufs Besondere nicht aufs 
Allgemeine. "28 Philosophy, in Adorno's view, had to don a redemptive quality, 
for otherwise it could not extract that particular from the general, but 
would forever subsume the former under the latter. 
In Dialektik der Aufklärung truth could only be realized in a concrete, 
true society by means of an 'Eingedenken' of the subject, i. e. by means of 
second reflection. This, in turn, was only possible if one presupposed the 
existence of subjectivity although such a state was factually threatened by 
the closed world. In other words, Adorno and Horkheimer placed their hoped 
in the development of a new subjectivity and yet could locate no subject 
which might so develop. This vicious circle reappears in Adorno's philosophy 
as is witnessed by his almost despairing reliance on a vague "Überschuß des 
subjektiven Anteils. "29 The very universe of discourse in which the subject 
moves and constitutes itself, i. e. its language, is invaded in a crushing 
manner by the closed world, so that Adorno is forced to conclude that lang- 
uage could now only express truth when it communicated the non-identity of 
expression and its intended message. 
30 
However, as both language and therefore philosophical concepts formulated 
in it were potentially ideological constructs Adorno had to locate truth 
and, with it, subjectivity, elsewhere. This he did in the notion of the 
constellation, 
31 
a group of thoughts which when viewed together but not 
subordinated to that unity, presented the truth. This truth was, however, 
non-communicable; or to put it in philosophical terms, it remained undeter- 
mined or completely abstract. Adorno was only able to suggest that: "Die 
32 
Idee von Versöhnung (the truth) verwehrt deren positive Setzung im Begriff. " 
The reconciliation of subject and object as the true state that society 
should aspire to, or might in the future become, can only be defined nega- 
tively. It is defined as a constellation of expression in opposition to the 
static closed world, and since it is in opposition, it has to be grounded 
outside it, undialecticall as the undefinable. Since this reconciliation y, 
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not be grounded within the closed society, Adorno maintained that could 
it could only be thought of, i. e. posited, negatively, in second reflection. 
What Adorno meant by this is best illustrated by a point he made in critic- 
ism of Hegel: "Zur Versöhnung von Allgemeinem und Besonderem hülfe die 
Reflexion der Differenz, nicht deren Extirpation. "33 The use of the verb 
'to help' and of the subjunctive form would seem to indicate that even this 
process is not a guarantee that reconciliation can or will occur. In the 
absence of such a guarantee Adorno undertook to situate truth in a certain 
'contemplative' attitude of which he stated: "Kontemplatives Verhalten, das 
subjektive Korrelation der Logik, ist das Verhalten, das nichts will. "34 
By wanting or intending nothing, such an attitude cannot by definition dom- 
inate and therefore approximates true thought, which, in turn, grasps the 
object without subsuming it under an exterior logic. 
This attitude reflects the enforced passivity of the thinking subject when 
enclosed in a hermetic world, for contemplation of a non-communicable truth 
amounts to a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that life cannot be changed 
for the better. Adorno's view of a closed world at this point creates dis- 
tinct problems for his dialectical philosophy, as it condemns philosophy 
to possessing only a vision of the future. This is the case because Adorno 
asserted that only if one was passive and contemplative could one think of 
a picture of a reconciled world. This picture remains abstract, however, if 
perhaps optimistic, for such reconciliation would depend on an active sub- 
ject changing the social world. Such active subjectivity is, however, by 
definition dominative and thus incapable of recognising the state of recon- 
ciliation to be achieved in the first place. 
Thought remains the only form of praxis possible in Adorno's philosophy. 
This logical, if astounding conclusion is essentially pressed upon Adorno in 
his attempt to found or find an internal opposition to state capitalism, a 
seeming contradictio in adjecto and substantivo. 
35 
Neither his definition of 
freedom as the concrete negation of the present state of unfreedom nor his 
conception of it as preserving non-identity are grounded in society. 
36 Rat- 
her, they must of necessity remain ideational, for if they were not they 
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would either contradict the socio-theoretical basis of the philosophy or 
else be absorbed by the universal 'veil of blindness'. They are condemned 
to remaining flashes of lighte in a dark one-way tunnel, i. e. to being 
completely transient: 
Der Gestus der Hoffnung ist der, nichts zu halten von dem, woran 
das Subjekt sich halten will, wovon es sich verspricht, daß es dauere. 37 
The only further avenue of hope or truth (and Adorno likened the one to the 
other) that Adorno's philosophical construction allows is a quasi-anthropol- 
ogical argument reminiscent of Marcuse's writings on hedonism. Adorno sugges- 
ted that human happiness as a 'metaphysical' property secured the preserva- 
tion of the particular in the form of the interior subjectivity of a person 
in opposition to its external objectification; i. e. a person's wish for 
happiness might be forever unfulfilled, but it could not be 'confiscated' 
by state capitalism's direct domination. 
38 
This argument mirrors the 'psycho- 
logical' materialism of the conception of 'Eingedenken' as presented in 
Dialektik der Aufklärung although it contradicts the suggestion made there 
that needs can be completely manipulated. In a manner also similar to the 
structure of Aderno and Horkheimer'"s philosophy in Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
Adorno concluded Negative Dialektik by indicating that one image of the 
future society did indeed exist. (despite his preceding assertions that 
truth, as the image of a future society, was unportrayable and only negative- 
ly accessible to the thinker39). This image was contained in art. The appear- 
ance ('Schein') of art gained metaphysical, transcendental relevance in this 
context, 
40 
Adorno argued, for it was by virtue of art's appearance that it 
was both real, i. e. a mediation of subjective and objective impulses, and 
an instance of second reflection. 
41 Furthermore, art's appearance signalled 
a state that had no appearance of seeminglessness. 
42 
Since that which has no appearance is that which has not as yet existed 
socially (only the 'for-itself' is appearance) Adorno must have meant that 
art presented a concrete image of something not based on domination. In 
this context he proposed that art came to the rescue of philosophical truth 
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lending it corarete form, by showing that "es sei nicht alles nur by 
nichts. " In other words, a philosophy which had to contend with a 
43 
-closed society needed art if truth were to be retained in a tangible 
form. It now remains'to examine how art and aesthetics relate back to 
philosophy and social theory and what questions the last two fields pose 
for aesthetics, that is, to inquire how it is that Adorno can assert that 
art provides, in its appearance, an image of the 'non-appearing'. 
2. Aesthetics and the Artwork 
Studies of Adorno's work have frequently treated either his philosophy, 
especially Negative Dialektik, or his aesthetics. Furthermore, research on 
Adorno's aesthetics has tended to rely only on his Ästhetische Theorie 
44 
or, 
at most, has also resorted to the occasional reference to his writings on 
music. This approach is probably preferred to alternatives, such as looking 
at his -numerous essays on literature or on art, because the Ästhetische 
Theorie provides a compendious, albeit non-systematic, account of his 
thought on the subject as it developed from the early 1960s until his death. 
In works paying attention only to the Ästhetische Theorie, however, it is 
often remarked that Adorno does not address himself to particular artworks. 
This objection, while true of the Ästhetische Theorie, ignores the detailed 
analyses of particular artworks which are to be found in the prolific writ- 
ings on literature, art and music. It is characteristic of contemporary 
research that only one book has tackled exclusively Adorno's Noten zur 
Literatur, 45 although by excluding the solely theoretical writings, such 
an approach gives a one-sided view of Adorno's work. In order to avoid the 
lopsidedness of these differing approaches, the following analysis will 
draw both on the Ästhetische Theorie and on Adorno's numerous essays. Such 
eclecticism is of paramount importance for the critical reconstruction of 
Adorno's thought, as his theoretical statements are derived from his prior 
study of individual artworks. 
The fact that these 'empirical' studies are in the form of essays rather 
than lengthy tracts should not detract from their quality; indeed, according 
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to Adorno's logic it should enhance it. On various occasions he championed 
the cause of essay-writing, seeing in the essay a fragmentary procedure 
which was appropriate to a fragmented society, 
46 
and which desisted from 
subsuming the subject matter under concepts foreign to it. 
47 The essay's 
weaknesses, he argued, were weaknesses of non-identity itself when viewed 
from the perspective of a dominatory logic and should not, therefore, be 
held against it. 
48 
The reliance on Adorno's essays means ignoring, for the 
moment, the various charges made against such an approach: namely that in 
the essays in question sociological questions are collapsed into aesthetic 
problems, 
49 
that no dividing line is made in the theory between art and soc- 
iety when studying the artwork, 
50 
that the essays are, in fact, not about 
artworks but trace social antagonisms or the physiognomy of society within 
artworks, 
51 
and, finally, that the interpretations Adorno offers are foisted 
arbitrarily on the artworks under scrutiny. 
52 The omission of the majority 
of Adorno's writings on music is in part a result of their somewhat technical 
nature (although the Alban Berg monograph is a notable exception here), but 
also because there is a wealth of data to be gleaned from the other essays. 
Music is all too often seen as the sole basis of Adorno's aesthetics, so 
that by centring on Adorno's essays on literature and art a modest counter- 
balance will be established. 
It is necessary at the outset to define what Adorno meant by the term 
'aesthetics' and in what way it is to be differentiated from his writings 
on art. His writings on aesthetics are concerned with the theory of art, 
whereas his writings on art, while applying a theory, address artworks 
themselves. The difference between a concept of art and a concept of aesthe- 
tics becomes more marked once one looks at the definitions Adorno offered. 
He stated categorically that art resisted any definition, for it could only 
be defined in relation to its past and/or future or negatively in its 
opposition to reality. 
54 However, it could not be considered to be completely 
part of that reality, as vulgar Marxists and empirical art sociologists 
suggest, for it was more than the sum of existing artworks: "Sondern Kunst 
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selber hat gegenüber dem bloß Seienden... zum Wesen, Wesen und Bild zu 
sein. "55 Equally, art could not be regarded as purely that which went to 
make up its material, 
56 
for it required thought to decipher that matter 
and its forming. Ian other words, Adorno maintained that art could not be 
defined positively but had to be viewed not only by taking society into 
consideration but also by means of a theory of its material, namely 
aesthetics. 
It was possible, however, to define aesthetics, unlike its object of in- 
quiry, but Adorno provided only a definition of what aesthetics could be 
at present, not of what it was as a discipline: 
Die Fähigkeit Kunstwerke von innen, in der Logik ihres Produziertseins 
zu sehen - eine Einheit von Vollzug und Reflexion,... ist wohl die 
allein mögliche Gestalt von Ästhetik heute. 57 
Aesthetics had thereby to view art not just historically - in connection with 
a theory of the present - but also to pay attention to each artwork's 
'internal content' (what Adorno termed its 'Gehalt'), 
58 
by which he 
meant both 'form' and 'content' in their traditional usage. Adorno defined 
aesthetics not just in its temporal 'how' but also according to what it 
did in observing and analysing the internal content of a work. Aesthetics, 
he claimed, reflected on the object 'art' and its transformation by the 
artist's adaptive use of the artistic material as well as on the time and 
place of production. Ifl so doing aesthetics brought to life the process 
that had originally been invo-lyed in artistic production, and as a conse- 
quence, aesthetic knowledge could be accorded an important epistemological 
status: 
Erkenntnis von Kunst heißt, den vergegenständlichten Geist durchs 
Medium der Reflexion hindurch abermals in seinem flüssigen Aggregat- 
zustand zu versetzen. 59 
Adorno therefore defined aesthetics as follows: "Ästhetik heißt soviel wie 
den Bedingungen und Vermittlungen der Objektivität von Kunst nachgehen. "60 
Precisely what he understood by 'objectivity' remains to be seen, but it is 
possible to say at this point that such a definition of aesthetics steels 
it against any reduction to a pursuit of the beautiful, 
61 
and also locates 
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it in the same philosophical, epistemological frame as negative dialectics, 
between Kantian and Hegelian thought 
62 Parallelling his siting of negative 
dialetics between'transcendentality and historical relativity, Adorno's 
aesthetics is situated theoretically between viewing art from the stand- 
point of the observer/beholder and seeing it as an embodiment of some trans- 
cendental property (i. e. of history) that is sublated in the artist's 
moulding of the artistic material. Adorno's aesthetics, like Kant and 
Hegel's thought on the subject, addresses the art-work, but does so in order 
to analyse the manner in which the piece of art is a product of labour; 
i. e. it examines the transcendental qualities present in an artwork's 
production which then in part determine the manner of its observation by 
others. 
63 
Aesthetics, to Adorno's mind, had therefore to study what he termed the 
'historically-sedimented' content of the artwork, i. e. its transcendental 
properties, and the manner in which this was handled by the producer accord- 
ing to an internal, 'artistic' logic. This indicates once more Adorno's 
rejection of any aesthetics based on empirical sociology or Stalinist 
diamat, and of idealist variants which discussed the artwork's beauty with- 
out attempting to explain how that beauty was produced. The aesthetics Adorno 
devised consequently rested on both of the fundamental propositions of 
Dialektik der Aufklärung and Negative Dialektik: it was founded on a 
'second reflection' of objectivity and on avoiding any historical, socio- 
logical or idealist reductionism. In other words, it took the socio-philos- 
ophical assumptions of Dialektik der Aufklärung and Negative Dialektik into 
account in its very theoretical structure. What needs to be examined there- 
fore is the problems these assumptions posed for Adorno's definition of art 
and the manner in which the two fundamental notions that informed Dialektik 
der Aufklärung were located in his aesthetics. 
3. Artistic Autonomy, Objectivity and Technics 
Art was in Adorno's definition the social antithesis of society, but 
could not be defined by or deduced completely from society. 
64 
That is to 
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say, although antithetic it was of the same social structure as society 
and therefore formeda dialectic with it. (If this were not the case an 
historical materialist understanding of art would be impossible, as art 
would be situated in'a sphere independent of society and thereby idealist. ) 
This opposition to society meant that, in Adorno's view, art's existence 
was always problematic, in that it wished to be of society and yet to 
oppose it. Consequently, all the properties he detected in art are not only 
to be understood positively but they are also to be seen as negative. In- 
deed, frequen. tly he described. art in terms of diametrically opposed concepts, 
with art sliding from one pole to the other in the course of its problematic 
existence. Something in art prevented it being deduced simply from its 
social substance and existence; for otherwise this would mean that art pos- 
sessed no 'in-itself'. Rather, art was mediated by the dominant social whole 
at the time of its production, 
65 
and the expression of this within the 
work's interior was the primary social quality of the artwork. Adorno 
argued: 
Die Immanenz der Gesellschaft im Werk ist das wesentliche gesellschaft- 
liche Verhältnis der Kunst, nicht die Immanenz von Kunst in der Gesell- 
schaft. 66 
Adorno thus defined the real relation to society as one discernible within 
the artwork, not external to it. This definition was intimately bound up 
with his judgement of art's position under capitalism as being one of 
'autonomy' and with his suggestion that art possessed a 'double character', 
for the artwork was both 'autnomous' and yet also part of society in that 
it was a fait social. 
Artworks were autonomous because they obeyed their own internal artistic 
logic and opposed their mere pleasurable consumption67 rather than being 
subject completely to the law and logic of commodities. Adorno defined 
'autonomy' in an inversion of the Kantian maxim on purposiveness as "Zweck- 
mäßigkeit ohne Zwecke., 
68 
Adorno argued that artworks opposed society by 
rejecting a 'positive' purpose69 and were therefore autonomous for they 
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did not follow the external purpose of society - the market - but obeyed 
an internal purpose. Their purposiveness consisted of their being internally 
structuredin such a fashion as to ensure that rather than the general domi- 
nating the particular, the two coincided . In other words, it was from its 
autonomy that the artwork derived those negative properties which Marcuse 
had contrasted to its affirmative existence, and as such autonomy was 
specific to bourgeois art. Adorno highlighted the innate negative stance of 
art in his statement: 
Die rücksichtslose Autonomie der Werke, die der Anpassung an dem 
Markt und dem Verschleiß sich entzieht, wird unwillkürlich zum 
Angriff. 70 
However, this inherent negativity was problematic for art, in that it pre- 
vented art from intervening in society. This is not to say that the concept 
of autonomy can be equated with the doctrine of fart pour fart, but 
rather that the production of the artwork, the very manner in which the 
content is formed, involving vestiges of art's magical origin, 
71 
prevents 
its absorption into society. Since autonomy is deemed to be necessary if 
art is to be transcendent of society and thus genuine, Adorno indirectly 
equates genuine, or as he termed it 'authentic', art with autonomous art. 
72 
What is more, since autonomous art is produced only under liberal capitalism 
we seem to be concerned exclusively with bourgeois art. This equation of 
art with bourgeois autonomous art is borne out in his concept of the 
'modern'. 
Adorno explicated the nature of 'modern' art both socio-historically and 
aesthetically. He discerned the origins of modern art in Charles Baudelaire's 
Fleurs du Mal which has led some commentators to suggest that Adorno located 
the inception of modern art in 1850 at the beginning of high capitalism, 
73 
although according to Adorno the origins of its antithesis, the culture 
industry, date back to the early 18th century. 
74 
Adorno argued that Baude- 
laire had attempted to grasp the essence of the 'modern', 
75 
that is, to 
describe the essence of the French society in which he had lived, by creating 
-226- 
completely 'artificial' art. Modern art must therefore be judged to have 
arisen within liberal capitalism and to have ceased with the advent of 
state capitalism and a fully-fledged culture industry, for at this juncture 
autonomous art would have become theoretically impossible. 
As his remarks on Baudelaire suggest, Adorno determined the nature of modern 
art according to its internal production. The modern, he suggested, sought 
to establish "das historisch Fortgeschrittene, Neueste als das zu bewährende 
Urphänomen. , 76 Elsewhere he defined this as treating art's material in such 
a fashion as to create an 'objectivity of the second power', 
77 by means of 
"Mimesis ans Verhärtete und Entfremdete. "78 Modern art, in other words, 
applies the programme of negative dialectics to itself via an internal, 
artistic logic. In this respect it cannot be equated with autonomy, for 
Adorno held Goethe's works to exhibit such autonomy and yet to be traditional.! 
According to Adorno, contemporary art reflected and elaborated on such a 
logic primarily through its relation to tradition. Because Adorno assessed . 
ji 
tradition to be the earlier existence of this artistic logic in artworks, 
an artwork's reflection of tradition was concomitantly a reflection on the 
nature of such logic. An artwork could therefore be judged to follow artis- 
tic tradition when it adhered to such internal logicality. 
79 Tradition's 
use of immanent artistic logic allowed a relation between material and art- 
work to be established that was self-evident and clear. Owing to the univer- 
sal 'veil of blindness', Adorno stated, contemporary art had lost any such 
self-evident relationship and had to reflect on this loss by reflecting on 
tradition: 
An dem avancierten Bewußtsein wäre es, das Verhältnis zum Vergangenen 
zu korrigieren, nicht indem der Bruch beschönigt wird, sondern indem 
man dem Vergänglichen am Vergangenen das Gegenwärtige abzwingt und 
keine Tradition unterstellt. 80 
The old use of artistic logic can thus only be understood correctly if 
placed in relation to the present, for it enables the contemporary artist 
to realise that a change in the relation between artwork and material or 
between artwork and society has occurred. Adorno's concept of modernity 
parallels Benjamin's discussion of the artwork's auratic property both in 
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the ahove argumentation and at another level. The concept leads, via 
Adorno's reflections on historical change, to a questioning of art's phys- 
ical relation to society. Similarly, Benjamin's analysis foresaw a new 
relation of art to society, one in which auratic art ceased to exist. The 
concept of modernity and the era of auratic art thus coincide at this point 
both chronologically and logically. 
81 1 
Adorno took up this problematic existence of autonomous art in the Ästhetische' 
Theorie, which he commenced by problematis. ing the contemporary artwork in 
a vein strikingly similar to the first statement of Negative Dialektik: 
Zur Selbstverständlichkeit wurde, daß nichts, was die Kunst betrifft, 
mehr selbstverständlich ist, weder in ihr noch in ihrem Verhältnis zum 
Ganzen, nicht einmal ihr Existenzrecht. 82 
That the problematis-ation of art's existence is not deduced from theory 
alone but frorn. astudy of historical change is emphasised in Adorno's essay 
on post-rar cultural criticism and society where he stated: "nach Auschwitz ! 
ein Gedicht zu schreiben, ist barbarisch., 
83 Faced by the culture industry, 
as described in Dialektik der Aufklärung, the autonomous artwork's existence 
was endangered: "Dem reinen Werk droht Verdinglichung und Gleichgültig- 
keit ,, 84 The universal 'veil of blindness' prevented an image of society 
being produced that was able to depict the truth of society as had been 
possible in the age of autonomous art. Since it cannot aspire to portraying 
truth in such a manner the existence of art is itself cast into doubt un- 
less it can find a new way of penetrating the veil in order to gain access 
to truth and then depicting it. The problem presented itself to Adorno as 
one of the end of autonomous art, i. e. it rests on the hypothesis that the 
culture industry in particular and state capitalism in general destroy the 
basis for the truth of autonomous art, and thus destroy art itself, Since 
art was defined as mediated by the social whole, social theory's problems 
thus become aesthetic theory problems. 
It must be said that Adorno neglected to analyse any: forms of autonomous 
art within the culture industry, for he saw this as by definition impossible, 
since under the culture industry art was deprived of autonomy. However, in 
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this context Adorno also ignored the empirical, institutional and institut- 
ionalised framework of high culture art in its concrete social existence 
after 1945, which leaves him open to the charge that his equation of auto- 
nomous art with art produced under liberal capitalism could onlybe bought 
at the cost of an ahistorical approach. He sacrifies the phenomenon of art 
for the noumenon of 'artistic truth'. Indeed, an admission of the continued 
existence of autonomous art (or art at all) would have challenged the thesis 
that society was closed and yet it was precisely to prove this by means of 
art's truth content that Adorno granted the noumenon impunity when con- 
fronted by the culture industry. That art could continue to exist as 'true' 
art in any fashion, he declared, was a consequence of its 'double character', 
i. e. the resistance the artwork offered to the closed world derived from 
its dual existence as fait social and as autonomous. He juxtaposed the 
autonomous character based in the immanent, artistic logic of the artwork 
to the work as fait social (a product that is sold). Yet precisely this 
juxtaposition ensured its affirmative nature: 
Indem die Kunstwerke der Empirie sich entgegensetzen, gehorchen 
sie deren Kräften, die gleichsam das geistige Gebilde abstoßen, es 
auf sich selbst zurückwerfen. 85 
He drew two conclusions from this. Firstly, because the affirmative charac- 
ter had become so overpowering under the culture industry of late capitalism, 
art had to deny its commodity-character - its fait social - by renouncing 
social communicability. 
86 Secondly, art had no need to reflect society in a 
Lukäcsian sense, for its truth content depended just as much on the fact 
that it was part of society as that it still obeyed its autonomous, aesthetic 
logic. Neither of these points can be clarified, nor can the question of 
art's claim to a truth content be made more specific until the (somewhat 
nebulous) notions of objectivity and material constantly implied in the 
above argument as well as their foundation in 'aesthetic logic' have been 
examined more closely. 
Adorno viewed objectivity in the artwork as informed by a triangular relat- 
ionship between producer, technics and material, a relationship which, for 
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its part, was determined by contemporary society and yet also predicated 
by art: "Nichts in der Kunst,... was nicht aus der Welt stammte; nichts 
daraus unverwandelt., 
87 In other words, the above triad both brings 
society into the artwork and yet is also the means by which the artwork 
is qualitatively more than the sum-total of its social determinations. 
Expressed theoretically this relationship presents itself as one of sub- 
jectification as well as objectification. Objectivity wis, in Adorno's 
eyes, only attainable in an artwork if this was permeated by subjectivity, 
i. e. subjectivity was the location of an artwork's objectivity, 
88 
or, as 
Adorno put it: 
Die Negativität des Subjekts als wahre Gestalt von Objektivität kann 
nur in radikal subjektiver Gestaltung, nicht in der Supposition ver- 
meintlich höherer Objektivität sich darstellen. 89 
Objectivity was formed therefore by the retention of subjective expression 
in the artwork. Such objectification by means of the artist presenting 
the matter of the artwork in such a manner that his subjective forming 
of that matter was readily visible was the sole guarantee of objectivity 
according to the understanding of the terms offered by Negative Dialektik. 
This subjective objectification is not equatable with the intention of the 
artist - intentionality involves domination but occurs only at the point 
at which subjective intention ceases. Adorno's position, therefore, opposes 
the superimposition of form on an artwork as was practised by the Formalists. 
Adorno designated the internal content to be the central point of such 
activity. Thus in a sense the artist becomes a functionary of the tasks 
thrown up by the artistic material he works upon in that he tries to stamp 
the material with his individuality and to follow the steps necessitated 
by the artistic logic. The tasks thus embody the relation between art and 
society, for artistic logic reflects on what art has to be like in order 
to avoid becoming completely fait social and in so doing is socially 
determined. 90 The necessity of adhering to the artistic logic ensures 
that subjectivity is not in itself a guarantee of either objectivity or 
aesthetic quality except when objectified in the artwork's material. In 
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this manner Adorno narrows the term objectivity to mean a state in which 
nothing in the artwork appears accidental (in terms of artistic whim), but 
where all the details seem, and indeed are, necessary from the artist's 
and the artwork's point of view. 
Adorno grounded this concept of objectivity in two properties, spirit 
('Geist') and collectivity. An artwork's spirit, he stated, was its 
'immanent mediation', a quality by virtue of which artworks became 
more in their appearance than the sum of their factual parts. Put differ- 
ently, it is the spirit which enables the artwork to prefigure something 
metaphysical and by means of which the artwork opposes external physical 
reality. The objectivity of the work, its internal consistency, both re- 
sults from this opposition and informs it. Spirit must be understood, there- 
fore, to be the predominantly 'intellectualised' or 'transcendental' 
character of the physical object 'art'. However sensuous the artwork appear- 
ed to be , Adorno claimed, its meaning nevertheless remained ideational 
and could only be unravelled by comprehending its intellectual 'becoming', 
91 
what he termed the artwork's 'process character'. Spirit is accordingly 
that which permeates each part of the artwork and fuses it into a whole. 
Adorno based the objectivity of this intellectual character of art in 
the language out of which artworks were constructed, although this res- 
tricted the applicability of his analysis to literature. 
92 The objecti- 
fication of subjective knowledge passed through a language whith was by 
nature collective, for it had developed via interaction. By being founded 
in such language, artworks became based in collectivity. This collective 
character gave a certain transcendent objectivity to the subjective prod- 
uction of artworks over and above its spirit. It was the objectivity that 
resulted from spirit and collectivity, Adorno proposed, which ensured 
that artworks contained truth in a variety of ways. 
The shape such objectivity took in practice was situated by Adorno not 
in the content used to produce the artwork but in the forming of it. The 
forming of the artwork determined whether it could appear as truly incom- 
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patible with a 'false' society and occurred via the agency of style, 
of which Adorno stated: "In Wahrheit sind sie (artworks) Kraftfelder, in 
denen der Konflikt zwischen der anbefohlenen Norm und dem ausgetragen wird, 
was in ihnen Laut sucht. "93 In other words, --to 
Adorno's mind the forming 
of the objective artwork from a subjective artistic view consisted of a 
battle fought between stylistic tradition and what the artwork wished to 
say. The stylic form resulting from this conflict was the very basis of 
non-identity in the artwork in-that it allowed the portrayal of both object- 
ivity and historical specificity. Adorno suggested that as a consequence 
"Form konvergiert mit Kritik. Sie ist das an den Kunstwerken, wodurch diese 
sich als kritisch in sich selbst erweisen... "94 By virtue of their form 
artworks criticized society and yet criticized their own inability to 
change society without their ceasing to be art. This dual criticism centred 
around form reflecting on past traditions of form (its historicity) the 
subjective attempt to create a new aesthetic image in the working of the 
artistic material relevant to society now. This fusion generated an objective 
form which involved a truth about society (i. e. its difference to past 
society) and concomitantly portrayed that truth because the artist as 
historically-specific in time and place could only couch his view of art 
in one particular form (a view also by definition socially and historically 
specific). In this manner, Adorno proposed, the artwork became internally 
a force-field between past and present, from which, therefore, the state 
of the present (as contemporary society) could be abstracted: 
Nur in der Kristallisation des eigenen Formgesetzes, nicht in der 
passiven Hinnahme der Objekte konvergiert Kunst mit dem Wirklichen. 
Erkenntnis ist in ihr durch und durch ästhetisch vermittelt. 95 
The aesthetic truth (of the 'objective' artwork) and the sociological truth 
(of the society in which the artwork is 'objective') converge in Adorno's 
deduction of truth from form. That this truth is bought at a certain cost 
is inavoidable, for aesthetic form sanitises the artwork, permitting its 
ready consumption. Form is thus a negative and positive quality. 
Adorno labelled artworks 'monads' on account of this objective truth which 
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they carried within them. In its Leibinizian meaning the monad was the 
smallest possible unit from which a body was constructed. In social terms 
this corresponded to the isolated individual who was aware of his social 
nature and yet also reflected society's composition. The monad was simul- 
taneously physical and intellectual and was thus a symbol of subjective 
objectification: "Erst durch Subjektivierung wird die Objektivation des 
Kunstwerks, als einer in sich durchgeformten Monade, recht möglich. " 
96 
Artworks were, owing to their objectification, 'windowless' - they were 
not consciously aware of being social indicators - and yet they presented 
('vorstellen') as microcosms society as it was at the time of their prod- 
uction. In this context Adorno differentiated a further, more abstract 
level of objectivity from that permitted by the form adopted by the artist. 
Art, like every individual, was social in character; it was internally a 
mediation of the intellectual subject with the sensuous social object. In 
this respect, the artwork mirrored the problematic constitution of individ- 
uality mentioned in Dialektik der Aufklärung. There, individuality was 
conceived of as being part subject and part object. Adorno and Horkheimer 
had argued that the object-side had come to dominate the subjective wishes 
of the individual. Artworks, Adorno suggested, openly discussed - and there- 
fore overcame - this purported division in that the form was a balance 
between subjective and objective forces and therefore presented a picture 
of second reflection. This is Adorno's final definition of objectivity. 
Adorno further grounded the artwork's objectivity in his concept of 
artistic material. The artistic material of which artworks were thrmed was 
'sedimented history'. Material, that is the language, form, notes, colours 
etc. (all intimately connected to traditions in art's history) used in 
producing an artwork, embodied the state of their historical development 
and therefore were not neutral, each having evolved owing to specific causes 
which were reflected in their present composition. Adorno argued that to 
use this material correctly would entail treating it as historical and 
endeavouring to develop it beyond its present state: "Fortgeschrittenes 
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Bewußtsein versichert sich des Materialstandes, in dem Geschichte sich 
sedimentiert bis zu dem Augenblick, auf den das antwortet. "97 Adorno 
based this notion of material as an all-embracing category for artistic 
production on Negative Dialektik's construction of the 'object': 
Das Objekt öffnet sich einer monadologischen Insistenz, das Bewußtsein 1; 1 I der Konstellation ist, in der es steht: die Möglichkeit zur Versenkung 
ins Innere bedarf jenes Äußeren. Solche immanente Allgemeinheit des 
Einzelnen aber ist objektiv als sedimentierte Geschichte. 98 
As we have seen, Adorno's concepts of spirit, objectivity, form, and the 
monadological character of art all accord with this definition of the 
object in that they embrace the history and matter of this production of 
the artwork. Adorno's conception of artistic material thus provides a 
further, more general foundation of the historical objectivity of the 
individual artwork. Adorno thereby implants a general social category 
of historicity in a specific aesthetic context and yet in so doing obscures 
whether such historicity is specifically authentic or not. He does not 
state whether the sedimented history of the material is apparent in the 
artwork or not, although he assumed this to be the case for authentic art- 
works. In this manner the concept of material signifies yet another reject- 
ion of any need for direct social commentary within the text, because 
social commentary is present willy nilly in the artwork from the very 
moment it is created, out of material. Adorno thus conceives of the prod- 
uction of artworks, i. e. the forming ('Gestaltung') of the material, in 
keeping with Marx's Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy, for 
the material's shaping determines from the outset what consumption of the 
artwork is possible. 
Adorno compensated for the generality of his concept of material by res- 
tricting it to that which is worked on by 'technics' ('Technik'), a concept 
which embraces the act of forming the artistic material into an artwork. 
Technics is a broad term that describes the composition and construction 
of the artwork, the creation of the artistic as well. as the productive 
forces which Adorno perceives in art. Only via technics, he stated, could 
n 
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the intention of the objective material be realised, a view which allocated 
a key role to the development of the technical productive forces in the 
construction of objective truth in art. By exercising this function tech- 
nics served as the mediator of the artwork's content and its objective 
appearance; it was the force that tried to balance the two so that one did 
not impose itself on the other. Adorno had in passing thus formulated an 
argument that refuted any aesthetics based on a notion of the artist as 
'genius', since technics could not be attributed to brilliant insight, but 
rather to craftsmanship. Technics was related temporally and spatially 
to the society in which it occurred: 
Im Stand der jeweiligen Technik reicht die Gesellschaft in die Werke 
i; 
hinein. Zwischen den Techniken der materiellen undkünstlerischen il 
Produktion herrschen weit engere Affinitäten, als die wissenschaftliche 
Arbeitsteilung zur Kenntnis nimmt. 99 T 
Adorno did not define the nature of this 'affinity' any closer, thereby 
il 
leaving unspr-ific just how social and artistic technics were related. 
Technics had to be left undetermined in this respect, for only thus was 
Adorno able to grant it a certain 'metaphysical' property that would other- 
wise have been reduced to the physical. He contended that it was the tech- 
nics which made the artwork metaphysical and from which it was constituted. 
Furthermore, technics rendered artworks not only rational but also non- 
conceptual ('begriffslos'). 
100 
By virtue of these characteristics, technics, despite being social, created 
a truth that was transcerdertal for it protested the present society by 
being non-dominative: 
Das Organisierte der Werke ist gesellschaftlicher Organisation ent- 
liehen: worin sie diese transzendieren, ist ihr Einspruch gegen das 
Organisationsprinzip selbst, gegen Herrschaft über innere und aus- 
wendige Natur. 101 
Technics was non-dominative precisely because it reconciled the artwork's 
social appearance with the objective artistic content in such a manner 
that neither part was over-emphasised at the expense of the other. 
ý; I iý Adorno leaves this definition vague in order to be able to depict one 
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specific relation as existing, although this cannot be determined more 
closely, namely the relation between the non-identical technics of art 
and dominative social technics. 
The realm of technics can be subdivided into the creation of artistic 
expression, the artwork's construction and the question of 'productive 
forces'. Adorno opposed expression to the appearance of wholeness that an 
autonomous artwork offered or rather faked, for expression was in his view 
the mark of subjectivity, of individual i ty, in the artwork, i. e. of the 
particular within that whole. The expression contained in an artwork was 
thus to be equated with the artist's choice of form in the presentation 
of content (which evidences the inter-determination of Adorno's various 
concepts). Because the above process meant that the artist's particularity 
was bound and subject to the artistic material, it designated and expressed 
individuality forcibly reconciled with the totality. Thus Adorno defined 
expression as the dissonant within the whole, 
102 
or as the opposing and 
yet generative force within the artwork. 
103 Such individuality in autonomous 
art was threatened, however, by the present 'construction' of the artwork. 
In order to defend itself against the culture industry's tentacles, Adorno 
argued, the artwork had to seal itself off by being so constructed that 
each part within it was subsumed under the whole. 
104 Expression was then 
exhibited by the individuality of the artwork as an individual entity in 
opposition to the culture industry as the 'false' whole. However, the 
expressivity of an artwork was thereby limited to something outside itself 
and its individuality became degraded to the global opposition of art to 
society. Like most of his concepts', Adorno's notion of expression flips 
over into a concept of non-expression once he takes the culture industry 
into consideration. The concept is thus dialectical in that it contains 
its antithesis within it. 
Construction can be understood to refer in Adorno's work to a rational 
composition of the artwork which permits the lines of its rational manu- 





the complete alignment of parts and whole as was necessitated by 
the onslaught of the culture industry, concealed a deep problem for auto- 
nomous art. It forced the artwork to forego inner tension between parts 
and whole by imposing internally a: ='primacy of inter-connectedness', 
105 
i. e. spirit dominated the material rather than taking the latter's needs 
into account. Contemporary artworks became, in this sense,: -paradoxical, 
for it forfeited-its right to be art, and yet the manner of its continued 
existence was contained in this very paradox: 
Das Spannungsfeld aller fortschrittlichen Kunst heute ist geradezu 
, definiert durch die Pole radikaler Konstruktion und ebenso radikaler 
Auflehnung gegen sie: oft geht beides ineinander über. 106 
In other words, the construction of autonomous artworks had, prior to the 
birth of the culture industry, achieved a balance between expression and 
content whereas at present it was forced to reify construction so as to 
avoid slipping into the snares of the culture industry. 
The fact that the presence of the culture industry:: alters the artwork's 
necessary construction implies that it also endangers the existence of 
any specifically artistic productive forces. Adorno's own argument thus 
reopens, ýthe question of technics, understood as the productive forces of 
art, and their relationto society. Adorno had conceived of technics, seen 
in terms of the productive forces of art, as only being possible once 
the artwork had become autonomous: 
Erst nachdem die Technik nicht mehr unmittelbar am gesellschaftlichen 
Gebrauch sich maß, wurde sie recht zur Produktivkraft: ihre arbeits- 
teilige, methodische Trennung von der Gesamtgesellschaft war die Be- 
dingung ihrer gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung nicht anders als in der 
materiellen Produktion. 107 
Leaving aside Adorno's allusion to technical development as class develop- 
ment, it is clear that he correlated the development of technics with the 
change in the social position that art underwent as a tsult of the simult- 
aneous change to a capitalist society. He did not, then, equate artistic 
productive forces with material productive forces. The causal logic may 
be the same in the determination of each, but Adorno did not derive the 
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artistic from its material counterpart, except to the extent that he 
considered the material productive forces to themselves bring about a 
division of labour. 
Except when speaking of Bach, who lived on the border between feudal 
and capitalist modes of production, 
108 
Adorno never stretched the relation 
of the artistic productive forces to society any further than in the above 
definition. Society was considered to determine artistic autonomy, and 
thus the productive relations of art, in accordance with the material 
relations of production themselves, but was not seen to control what the 
productive forces of art were. In this fashion Adorno conceived of the 
culture industry largely as having effected an alteration in the artistic 
production relations. The change Adorno outlined can be correlated to 
the changes in the economy Pollock had detected, for in the sphere of 
artistic production Adorno deduced an end to autonomy from the presence 
of the culture industry. 
109 
Adorno did not use the term aesthetic productive forces very specifically. 
110 
Although locating these historically in the bourgeois era, and restricting 
them to the bourgeois artwork's production - since they arose out of the 
artwork's autonomy - he did not define their relation to society any closer 
other than to mention that they 'paralleled', 'converged with', 'coincided 
with' or 'bore an affinity to' the material productive forces. 
ill Perhaps 
this indicates. the inherent limitations of any historical materialist 
theory of art, for if aesthetics relates the two kinds of productive forces 
more directly it reduces the artwork to being nothing more than a commodity 
and cannot found 'truth' or even 'beauty' (assuming it must) within it. 
112 
But by leaving the relationship vague aesthetics must remain equally - un- 
satisfactory in logical terms. Adorno recognised this problem and so addres- 
sed the 'materiality' of the artwork itself. This shift of focus was, 
however, itself not fro-of problems. By defining the 'Modern' in terms 
of the origins of the aesthetic productive forces, and then seeing the 
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task of the artist to be the application of these forces to the material, 
Adorno implied that progress within art was linear, if not indeed auto- 
matic, in respect of the productive forces. Because of Adorno's omission 
of any notion of productive relations specific to art alone, these must 
be judged to interact with the production relations only when society 
changes. Hence, the autonomous artwork's productive forces are seen as 
emancipatory, and yet it is precisely autonomy itself which inhibits 
these from having any effect on society as a whole. The relation between 
the affirmative and negative character of art is drawn anew in Adorno's 
work as consisting of the inherent contradiction between the productive 
forces developed in art and the overall passivity of the artwork. 
Adorno elaborated very specific artistic categories in order to be able 
to define the relation between art and society in terms of the internal 
structuration and production of the artwork, from which he then derived 
the concepts of objectivity and truth content. These last were, in turn, 
used to define art in the first instance. The intentional circularity of 
Adorno's approach becomes apparent in this sequence. Furthermore, the 
specificity of his various categories must not be allowed to divert atten- 
tion away from the imprecise nature of Adorno's project. It is unclear 
whether or not 'artistic logic' is to be defined as the inherent logic 
of the objective conditions of the material available, i. e. thermnner in 
which the material demands to be applied only in a certain form if it 
is to remain objective. According to what criteria and by whom are these 
demands defined? Such a definition also means that in order to write a 
novel now, it is first necessary to study the depiction of society in 
previous novels and to deduce from these new modifications to be made to 
writing now so as to describe present society in the material as opposed 
to merely giving expression to the stage of society previously operative 
in informing the material. Writing would virtually become a pursuit of 
the literary historian if this were the case. 
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Immanent artistic logic may appear to be specified in Adorno's categories 
of technics, material and objectivity, but for all the finesse of Adorno's 
argument as to a particular artwork's temporal appropriateness the defi- 
nition verges on dissolving into the empty claim that 'art innately has 
to be so and not otherwise'. To some extent this problem of specificity 
is not restricted to Adorno's aesthetics alone, but is shared by historical 
materialist aesthetics as a whole. I shall now turn, therefore, to an 
examination of the concepts of ideology and truth that Adorno extrapolated 
from his conception of the artwork's constitution, in order to determine 
whether these help'lexplain or even overcome the general overall imprecision 
of his otherwise specific categories. 
4. Art, Ideology and Truth 
Using the concepts of objectivity, artistic material and aesthetic technics 
Adorno was able to construct a concept of ideology as false consciousness 
in art. He thereby designated an artist's attitude as ideological if the 
latter allowed the societal forces and relations of production to impose 
themselves on the internal artistic productive forces, thus limiting the 
validity of the artwork's internal logic: "Ideologisch ist Musik, wo die 
Produktionsverhältnisse in ihr über die Produktivkräfte den Primat erlan- 
gen. ', 
113 Art was to Adorno's mind ideological wherever social rather than 
artistic factors governed the artwork, be it through the agency of the 
artist superimposing his subjectivity on the work's objectivity or be it 
by his according contemporary social preferences an overriding influence 
in the shaping of the artwork. The first case would not only mean that 
the artist treated his subjectivity as something ahistorical and thus 
absolute, it would also signify an overpowering of construction by expres- 
sion. The second case simply entailed problems in the immanent construction 
of an artwork because the artwork pandered to social wishes rather than 
adhering to the task of establishing an internal balance between expression 
and material. This involved the artist not comprehending the objectivity 
of art and had as its consequence the reification of the artwork's 
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productive forces. Similarly, anyone viewing an artwork of this type 
would gain a false estimation of the relation that should obtain between 
forces and relations of production. 
In the light of this definition of ideology, a 'true' artwork would show 
ex negativo the present use of the forces of production to be negative 
in the sense that the real potentiality of these is more than the present, 
dominated use to which they are put. (Adorno's conflation of tradition 
and the remembrance of suffering are to be understood in this context. ) 
The appreciation of part artworks is centred on knowing that the artistic 
productive forces are conditioned by production relations (i. e. autonomy) 
and are thus prohibited from pertaining to a social use, just as material 
productive forces have been chained to capitalist production relations and 
have been prevented from obviating real suffering. 
Before examining Adorno's determination of true productive forces more 
closely, an outline of his notion of 'true' consciousness must be given 
in some detail, for a concept of false-consciousness necessarily presup- 
poses a knowledge of correct consciousness. Adorno arrived at a concept 
of ideology as a false use of the artistic productive forces by an imma- 
nent examination of the artwork. However, this last analysis centred on 
his reliance on a notion of potentiality which conjoined immanent crit- 
icism and an ideology critique. Only in this way was Adorno able to define 
an artwork as true if in producing it the artist had not imposed his 
subjective needs on the material, but had made use of the material as, 
in conjunction with history, it innately required. Adorno remarked: 
Die Einziehung der ästhetischen Distanz im Roman, und damit dessen 
Kapitulation vor der übermächtigen und nur noch real zu verändernden, 
nicht im Bilde zu verklärenden Wirklichkeit, wird erheischt von dem, 
wohin die Form von sich aus möchte. 114 
Accordingly, the artist could not surrender to the (subjective) wishes 
of his audience or public, but had to stand fast against the temptation 
to sacrifice objectivity to consumerism, for consumerism formed one 
of the contemporary material relations of production: 
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Der soziale Gehalt von Kunstwerken selbst liegt zuweilen, etwa kon- 
ventionellen und verhärteten Bewußtseinsformen gegenüber, gerade im 
Protest gegen soziale Rezeption; von einer historischen Schwelle an, 
die in der Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts zu suchen wäre, ist das 
bei autonomen Gebilden geradezu die Regel. 115 
Adorno contended further that the immanent logicality of an artwork's 
construction would be prejudicially affected by it having a social 
message embedded within it. (On these grounds he attacked and abhorred, ' 
both Sartrean 'engagement' as well as Lukäcs' preference for realism. ) 
To Adorno's mind direct inclusion of contemporary social reality in 
the artwork by a reproduction of external reality was ideological, because 
it denied or obscured the subjective transformation of such reality in 
the artwork through the medium of the artist. 
116 Focussing an artwork on 
a didacticism foreign to it was also no better than this. Firstly, such a 
stance married the artwork: -to a particular social grouping - as in 
'Tendenzliteratur' - detracting from its general nature as objective social 
material. Secondly, it evinced coercion within the internal construction of 
the artwork precipitated by the authorial wish to intervene directly in 
an external, social affair. However laudable such a wish might be, in the 
context of a society based on alienation, 
117 
if such authorial direction 
resulted in the material being dominated, then it had to be considered 
false. Such an intervention would imply a renunciation of autonomy and 
would therefore signify an imposition on the artistic productiveforces. 
Adorno argued: 
Je weniger aber die Werke etwas verkünden müssen, was sie nicht ganz 
sich glauben können, so stimmiger werden sie auch selber: desto weniger 
brauchen sie ein Surplus dessen, was sie sagen, über das, was sie 
sind. 118 
This rejection of engagement, 'realism and consumerism for the sake of the 
artwork's objectivity identifies such objectivity as: the 'truth' of the 
artwork. 
Adorno's argumentation with regard to 'true' consciousness and objectivity 
permits a preliminary investigation to be made of the connection he draws 
between immanent criticism and ideology critique. He grounded ideology 
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critique in immanent criticism's category of artistic productive forces. 
Because this category was not reducible to that of the material productive 
forces, it was able to open the way for a concept of the non-identity of 
society with society "s own claims. 
119 Authentic artworks are immanently 
true to the material they use and of which they ate composed, and therefore 
they innately criticize and contest a false, ideological use of productive 
forces, be these by extension those of society or those specific to art. 
In particular Adorno argued, contemporary society was characterised by a 
false use of the material productive forces. Therefore the compatibility 
of--productive forces and relations which he denoted in authentic art was 
not only non-identical to the relationship between the two in society, but 
- more importantly - proved this last relationship to be false. 
From the point of view of the individual beholder this relation can be 
described as follows. In society as a whole the individual views objects 
in the manner in which they appear-to him or as they avail themselves to 
his manipulation of them. However, in artworks he encounters something 
that goes beyond this physical existence. Artworks, by dint of their being 
both social objects and metaphysical on account of their 'double character', 
project something more than they actually physically amount to, a process 
that was once referred to as art's 'magic'. The artworks thus challenge 
the common way of 'seeing' objects, for they can be shown (by immanent 
analysis) to be more than what they appear to be. In this sense Adorno 
insisted that the artwork "postuliert das Dasein eines nicht Daseienden, '"120 
i. e. the artwork points toward a state where the subjectivity in man-made 
objects is not disguised. Immanent criticism thus preserves the non-identity 
of the artwork's construction with that of society and is thereby an ideology- 
critique. Whereas Negative Dialektik could only locate non-identity in 
thought qua praxis, artworks provide a concrete instance of it. 
121 
The prod- 
uction of artworks is therefore a 'true' activity, for artistic production 
centres on an 'Eingedenken' of subject and object, i. e. of technics and 
nature. 
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If, from the standpoint of its production, an artwork is non-identical, 
then surely the society in which it exists cannot be closed. From a socio- 
'logical standpoint, art's presence therefore disproves the thesis of society's 
static nature; immanent criticism of the artwork becomes social theory in 
that it implies that non-identity can be founded, namely in art. 
122 Adorno 
thus not only connected immanent criticism of the artwork with an ideology 
critique, he forged a unity of the two. 
Because the category of artistic- objectivity is opposed innately to societal 
falsehood, society, as the opposite of art, is unobjective and therefore 
ideological. Nevertheless, this is not to forget that art, in turn, is ideo- 
logical in that it is a part of this ideological society. However, this 
ideological character has a positive side, for, by being both the opposite 
of society and part of it, art recreates an, admittedly ideational, dialectic 
of itself and society, observable by the individual. 
The specific characteristics that were noted above as 'indeterminate' now 
come into their own. If the artistic productive forces had been reduced to 
material productive forces no juxtaposition of art and society would have 
been possible and Adorno would not have been able to prove the non-identical 
nature of society. Such deliberate prior indeterminacy, however, lends 
Adorno's aesthetics the tone of a circular, self-fulfilling prophecy. More- 
over, any dynamism of society is restricted to theory in that the friction 
between artistic productive forces and social production relations in pre- 
sent society is not equatable with an awareness of such a conflict between 
social relations of production and social productive forces. Nevertheless, 
the non-identical quality of the artwork is perceivable for the observer and 
thus can function as the instigator of an awareness of the predominantly 
ideological character of society. The artwork is both a preserve for non- 
identity and a reason for rejecting society as it is together with its 
purported one-dimensionality. In this way art has a latent political meaning 
for Adorno, and thus needs to make no explicit political statements. 
The theory of art once more comes to complement the theory of society, in 
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that art grounds the epistemology (in Negative Dialektik) in concrete 
reality by finding evidence for the existence of non-identity in a universe 
otherwise judged not to be dialectical. The non-identical can therefore be 
postulated and yet this reveals the paradoxical nature of Adorno's social 
theory, for the resolution of the problem of society's closed nature can 
only be thought of in a conception which denies precisely such closedness 
as having existed in the first place. The aesthetics Adorno presented, 
although complementing his philosophical anti-system, inadvertently dis- 
proves the starting point of his social theory, which makes his philosophy 
and the aesthetics itself redundant. The conception of social ideology 
derived from his analysis of the artwork shows the purpose of Adorno's 
aesthetics to be unnecessary. 
The above notion of ideology allowed Adorno to locate an historically 
general concept of truth in art. The artistic productive forces, and by 
extension the artwork itself, were 'true', for they opposed ideology. The 
truth they revealed was - as we have seen-- that society could not be 
closed because it contained art and art was not reducible to society, but 
rather possessed a potentiality that transcended its own appearance. 
123 
Adorno stated that this general truth approximated to (sociological) 
knowledge: 
Kunst erkennt... dadurch, daß sie vermöge ihrer autonomen Konstitution 
ausspricht, was von der empirischen Gestalt der Wirklichkeit verschleiert 
wird. 124 
This is not to say that the artwork's location within the`dialectii Of, the 
affirmative and the negative is suspended. Adorno did not, however, view 
this affirmative moment of art as necessarily false, but only as false in 
the sense that it was imposed on art by a false society; i. e. the fait 
social was not per se a negative feature: 
Ist Affirmation tatsächlich ein Moment der Kunst, so war selbst sie 
so wenig je durchaus falsch wie die Kultur, weil sie mißlang, ganz 
falsch ist. 125 
In fact, it was its affirmative character that allowed the artwork's 
internal structuring to conflict with society. 
126 
In other words, despite 
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In other words, despite 
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and yet also by virtue of their affirmative character, artworks remained 
'true'. 
Adorno's concept of truth functions as the criterion by which he judged 
artworks: a good artwork could not - by definition - be 'untrue'. Good 
or, to use Adorno's term, 'authentic' artworks had to fulfil those criteria 
in accordance with which artworks were able to lay claim to 'truth'; if 
they met the objective demands of the material, rejected their easy con- 
sumption and refrained from 'engagement'. By way of definition, we can say 
that Adorno believed the authentic artwork to be one which revealed the 
true non-identity of society, 
127 
i. e. the artwork had to uphold its non- 
ideological character. In so doing it negated the normative social system 
of the day regardless of whether this was the intention of the artist or 
not, for the artwork's truth content was contingent solely on the object- 
ivity of the artwork's form in relation to the social structure at the 
time of its production. 
With the exception of the assertion that the artist had to endeavour to do 
justice to the objective requirements of the artistic material Adorno did 
not derive the general sociological truth of art causally from the artist's 
subjective intentions. Correct development of artistic material was, never- 
theless, not to be confused with an automatic guarantee of truth, for 
sociological truth arose from the general opposition of art to society 
(although the authenticity of an artwork cannot be grounded adequately in 
this relation). Adorno used the example of Schönberg's twelve-tone system 
to argue this point, for his later music, Adorno proposed, no longer fur- 
thered musical development. Adorno thus deduced the artwork's authenticity 
from its double character which, in turn, he based on the nature of artistic 
productive forces and the internal objectivity of artworks, for if he had 
derived an artwork's internal character from society he would in so doing 
have eradicated its opposition to society. Art's productive forces and its 
objectivity he held to survive and evolve according to art's autonomous 
character, in other words, on account of but not caused by art's social 
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character. In the final instance, Adorno deduced the general truth the 
authentic artwork offers from social instances although, with the term 
the double character of art, he tended to disguise this deduction as an 
interactive relation. This once again reveals the deeply problematic 
character of autonomy; it allows the artwork to uncover the truth about 
society and yet such autonomy is but part of that society. 
Adorno's conceptualisation of the internal structuring of the artwork is 
not exhausted in his sociological categories. He put forward a further set 
of mutually determining concepts to explain the artwork, all of which 
point to a further truth content inherent in art over and above the socio- 
logical truth it provided. The concepts in question, namely the 'apparition' 
and the 'processual character' ('Prozeßcharakter') on the one hand and the 
artwork's 'enigmatic character' ('Rätselcharakter') and 'nominalism' on the 
other are founded in the artwork's objectivity, and provide an answer to 
the question as to what Adorno meant by 'artistic logic' when describing 
objectivity. However, objectivity cannot be considered as an a priori assum- 
ption on which these four concepts are based, for they underpin its charac- 
ter, and yet it has to be postulated as given in conceiving of them. Such 
argumentational circularity indicates the extent to which Adorno himself 
practises a non-reductionist logic although reference to this logic cannot 
excuse the problematic construction of Adorno's argument. 
Adorno compared the immediacy of the artwork's relation to its consumer 
with an 'apparition', for the artwork only sparked off a feeling of immediate 
proximity, which then dissolved into nothingness. In this context Adorno 
described the artwork as a 'feu d'artifice', referring obliquely to the 
staggering beauty of a firework display that disappears in the very act of 
its appearing. He coupled this transient nature of artworks to the imposs- 
ibility of any factual existence of immediacy: 
In der industriellen Gesellschaft wird die lyrische Idee der sich 
wiederherstellenden Unmittelbarkeit, wofern sie nicht ohnmächtig 
romantisch Vergangenes beschwört, immer mehr zu einem jäh Aufblitz- 
enden, in dem das Mögliche die eigene Unmöglichkeit überfliegt. 128 
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In this manner the apparition enabled subjectivity to be experienced in 
the artwork and ccnsequently opposed domination in the form of objectifi- 
cation since, in this 'sparking off', the singularity of the artwork 
became apparent. In theoretical terms the apparition preserves a partic- 
ularity which cannot be subsumed under a generality, thus creating a quality 
Adorno described in Negative Dialektik as 'hope'. 
129 This resistance to its 
subsumption by the momentary, fleeting experience of subjectivity ensured 
that the artwork successfully prevented its incorporation into a linear 
logic or into society. The apparition inherent in authentic art obstructs 
the artwork's subjection to the principle of exchange-values, as momentary 
subjectivity provides little basis for commodification. In this sense the 
'feu d'artifice' embodies a real use-value in opposition to current use- 
values. 
This ability to create a real use-value - namely true subjectivity - by 
means of the apparition in the artwork is bound up with what Adorno labelled 
the artwork's 'processual character': "Das Kunstwerk ist Prozeß und Augen- 
blick in eins .,, 
130 
The artwork was a process in that its content unfolded 
linearly, and yet this linear progression was generated by a continual 
reference to what had gone before, 
131 
i. e. progression through concentric 
circles. At each point the beholder of the artwork was able to stop and yet 
each point was only comprehensible in the context of the whole. The 
procesual character therefore forged a unity or an identity of the non- 
identical (each separate point) and the identical (all those points as a 
whole). In this respect it described a non-subsumtive logic, yet one that 
can be experienced, because it is physically perceivable in art. Adorno 
stated: "Kunst erfahren heißt soviel wie ihres immanenten Prozesses gleich- 
wie im Augenblick seines Stillstands innezuwerden. , 
132 
This experience of the non-identical as the non-subsumtive is the epistem- 
ological truth of art, and it is this feature which Adorno saw as providing 
the symbol of real use-values. Both the apparition and the processual 
character guarantee that the artwork cannot be consumed as a commodity 
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because any consumption can only occur in the momentary 'sparking' of the 
subjective. The artwork is essentially 'useless', from which Adorno con- 
eluded that: 
Die raison d'etre aller autonomen Kunst... ist, daß einzig das Unnütze 
. einsteht 
für das, was einmal das Nützliche wäre, der glückliche 
Gebrauch, Kontakt mit den Dingen jenseits der Antithese von Nutzen 
und Nutzlosigkeit. 133 
In this inherent orientation towards the future the artwork prefigured by 
means of: =its 'intentionlessness'134 a real use-value untainted by the need 
for exchange. It was internally structured not according to laws of sale 
and consumption but in. --line with the law of the preservation of singularity 
(which I shall term a'non-subsumptive logic') that governed both apparition 
and processual character, i. e. the artwork's epistemological truth. 
The concepts of the artwork's 'enigmatic character' and its 'nominalism' 
determine this'non-subsumptive logic' from a different angle - not by anal- 
ysing. -how the artwork is experienced, but by concentrating on the theoreti- 
cal conceptualisation of such experience. Adorno held artworks to be enig- 
matic in the sense that they said something about society and yet hid what 
it was that they said, i. e. they identified the non-identical. 
135 The art- 
work's purpose he thus defined as "die Bestimmtheit des Unbestimmten. "136 
This determination proceeds by means of the artwork's nominalism, an idea 
that derives from the Medieval mode of thought of the same name, which 
judged 'generals' (i. e. concepts) only to inhabit the mind and not physical 
reality. Adorno maintained that artworks were nominalist for they contained 
a multiplicity of meanings and were therefore not reducible to a general 
concept. He wrote of "die objektive Fülle von Bedeutungen..., die in jedem 
geistigen Phänomen verkapselt sind. "137 This nominalism ensured that, although 
the artwork determined something, it did so in a fashion that permitted the 
determinate 'thing' to be viewed in different ways. It left its object un- 
determined.:, which illustrates once again particularly in the notion of 
'conceptualisation' that he used, the connection between aesthetics and 
negative dialectics. 
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Adorno attributed the artwork's internal indeterminateness to the language 
of art, which he regarded as non-significative. 
138 Owing to art's use of 
. such a 
language, each particular within the artwork remained a particular, 
despite its being part of the whole. The whole itself, Adorno argued, 
became a particular because it was run through by particularity: 
Das Ganze jedoch wird, je mehr an Detail es absorbiert, seinerseits 
gleichsam zum Detail, zum Moment unter anderen, zur Einzelheit. 139 
The artwork's nominalism thus guarantees the precedence of the object so 
important to Adorno in Negative Dialektik. Taken together nominalism and 
the enigmatic charater, as well as the apparition and processual character, 
all serve to ground an hon-subsumptive1,, 'aesthetic' logic within the interior 
of the artwork. 
It is now possible, drawing on the above categories, to define 'aesthetic 
logic' more closely and to establish the epistemological truth content inher- 
ent in art that arises from it. We have already stated that the internal 
logic of the artwork is non-. subsumptii. e in its treatment of the general and 
the particular, in its mediation of subjectivity and objectivity, as well 
as in the anti-dominative 'intentionlessness' of the fleeting gpearance of 
immediacy that it offers in the process of its unfolding. The four categ- 
ories create a constellation which describes 'artistic logic'. The artwork's 
truth content is, in this respect, Hegelian in origin, since it bears on 
the potentiality -exhibited by certain components of the artwork and not 
on their present application alone. Adorno merged the point of view of the 
beholder and the internal structuring of the artwork in a manner that 
surpasses reception theory's one-sided approach and from this coalition he 
forges the pivot of artistic logic. 
This artistic logic is to be seen most clearly in Adorno's definition of 
art's purposiveness (the basis of its autonomy): 
Zweckmäßig sind die Werke in sich, ohne positiven Zweck jenseits ihrer 
Komplexion; ihre Zweckhaftigkeit aber legitimiert sich als Figur der 
Antwort aufs Rätsel. Durch Organisation werden die Werke mehr als sie 
sind. 140 
The purpose of an artwork was thus not an instrumental one, but consisted 
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in merely its existence as an object to be beheld, to be contemplated. This 
external stance of anti-domination founded in its internal purposiveness 
evoked-the artwork's opposition to society, a "Protest gegen die Herrschaft 
der Zwecke über die Menschen . 
'ý141 The artwork was an end in itself by virtue 
of its internal logical construction and its thoroughly subjectified object- 
ification, i. e. its determination of the undetermined. 
142 In its own reconcil- 
iation of parts and whole the artwork thereby offered internally an image of 
potential social reconciliation. In keeping with the logic of Negative Dial- 
ektik, Adorno considered such a construction of the parts and the whole to be 
rational, because it opposed the negative relation between the two that pre- 
dominated in the closed society, and yet to oppose this relation the artwork 
had to imitate that society's logic of 'parts' and 'whole'. 
This 'non-subsumtive logic' not only grounds the opposition of art to society 
but also informs the epistemological truth content of art which Adorno defined 




The artistic logic defined the indeterminate by providing an 
image of how a 'non-subsumtive logic' functions, this image beig. its truth. 
Furthermore, this truth inherent in the artwork allowed art to be considered 
as a branch of knowledge: "Erkenntnis ist sie durch ihr Verhältnis zur Wahr- 
heat; Kunst selbst erkennt sie, indem sie an ihr hervortritt. 144 This status 
as knowledge tranformed art into a criticism of other prevalent forms of 
knowledge, i. e. into a critique of cognition ('Erkenntniskritik'), for these 
became inadequate when compared to it. The knowledge art offered in its 
image of non-subsumption was a negative knowledge of society, namely a know- 
ledge of what society was not: 
An der immanenten Stimmigkeit partizipiert ein richtiges Bewußtsein-vom Auswendigen; der geistige und soziale Standort eines Werkes ist nur durch 
seine inwendige Kristallisation hindurch auszumachen. Kein künstlerisch Wahres, dessen Wahrheit nicht übergreifend sich legitimierte; kein Kunst- 
werk richtigen Bewußtseins, das sich nicht in sich der ästhetischen Qualität nach bewährte. " 145 
The authentic artwork was thus defined as one which presented this image of 
non-subsumption, an image of what society was not. 
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The non-subsumtive logic that to Adorno's mind informed the authentic art- 
work might be negative inithat it opposed the present society, but with 
regard to the future it was positive. The artwork's truth content presents 
a paradigm for the theoretical foundations of a future, free society; free, 
because it would be based on a non-subsumtive logic and therefore not domi- 
native. By virtue of this truth content, the authentic artwork embodied 
an eidetic, non-conceptual image of what Negative Dialektik could only hint 
at abstractly. Adorno further located this future-oriented intention in the 
appearance of wholeness and completeness that the form of the artwork pro- 
duced: 
Schein sind die Kunstwerke dadurch, daß sie dem, was sie selbst nicht 
sein können, zu einer Art von zweitem, modifiziertem Dasein verhelfen. 146 
Because their autonomy prevented them from being part of society, artworks 
compensated for their problematic existence by presenting an appearance of 
what society could be. This appearance parallels the statements in Negative 
Dialektik on the 'appearance of the non-appearing'. 
147 The future society 
has no appearance yet, and if brought about would still have none, for in it 
subject and object would not be dissociated but would coincide for each 
would be allowed to exercise its own potentiality to the full: it would be 
what it appeared as. It was this orientation towards a future state, Adorno 
insisted, that enabled the artwork to be general: 
Sondern die Versenkung ins Individuierte erhebt das lyrische Gedicht 
dadurch zum Allgemeinen, daß es Unentstelltes, Unerfaßtes, noch nicht 
Subsumiertes in die Erscheinung setzt und so geistig etwas vorwegnimmt 
von einem Zustand, in dem kein schlecht Allgemeines, nämlich zutiefst 
Partikuläres mehr das andere, Menschliche fesselte. 148. 
Consequently, Adorno referred to the processual character as a model of 
possible future praxis. 
149 
The most important feature of the artwork's epistemological truth was this 
future orientation, for it enabled Adorno to claim that the artwork produced 
an image of a conceptually-unexperienceable truth that was, nevertheless, 
still visible in the physicality of the artwork. The physical shape of the 
artwork thus depicted truth by presenting an allegory of a non-subsumtive 
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logic but crucially did not identify that logic in conceptual terms. This 
image can also be seen as a non-conceptual description of a non-subsumtive 
technics, approximating to that within the artwork, which opposes the rat- 
ionality and technics of domination described in Dialektik der Aufklärung. 
The truth content, in other words, shows how 'Eingedenken' is possible. In 
particular, Adorno cited Schönberg's early twelve-tone work as an example 
of such a portrayal of non-identity within identity. 
150 In summary, art's 
epistemological truth can be defined as a presentation in a non-conceptual, 
but perceivable fashion of the possibility of the non-identical. Adorno's 
aesthetics thus complements Negative Dialektik in that it finds a solution 
to the problem social change faces in a closed world. Aesthetics locates in 
authentic art's truth a readily perceivable, albeit non-conceptual image of 
a form of rationality on which the future could be built, namely by means 
of artistic logic itself. However, this truth is bought at the cost of the 
negative side of art's autonomy. 
Adorno was not content to restrict art's truth to being a portrait of the 
form of rationality which could be used as the basis of a new society, for 
, 
he stated in outlining the enigmatic character of art: "Das Rätselbild der 
Kunst ist die Konfiguration. von Mimesis und Rationalität. " 
151 He did not, 
however, understand mimesis in the traditional Aristotelian meaning of the 
term. To the latter mimesis ('imitation') meant transposing parts of the 
social world external to art into art through the medium of the artist. The 
writer, for example, created in words something composed of images of objects 
or persons external to art in that they existed in real life. For Aristotle 
the artist imitated reality by this subjective and therefore 'emotional' 
creation of something new, whereas the scientist reproduced the objects 
without changing them. Mimesis described this process of the artist 'holding 
a mirror to nature' so as to reorder it in his own terms. 
152 Imitation for 
Aristotle therefore signified this reconstruction of reality. 
Adorno, however, used the category of mimesis in his philosophy in a different 
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and far more specific way. He defined it as the positing of an object 
without a concomitant objectification of that object; in other words mimesis 
is 'Eingedenken' or the application of a nbn-subsumtive logic. In this 
respect, mimesis is a shaping of nature only in its own image and there- 
fore it is irrational in that it bows before nature. Like his concept of 
autonomy, Adorno's notion of mimesis is both negative and positive. Mimesis 
in an aesthetic context must be considered to be the application of artistic 
logic within the artwork, for we have seen this logic to be non-subsumtive. 
Again Adorno derived a major category of his aesthetics from the concept 
of material, for artistic mimesis can only be conceived of if thought of 
as the production of meaning beyond tie sum-total of the artwork's parts 
(i. e. quality) through the artwork's treatment of its material, i. e. quan- 
titative parts. However, determining how mimesis is brought about does not 
explain what artistic mimesis consists of. 
Adorno specified that artistic mimesis amounted to an 'imitation of 
natural beauty153 by the artwork. Natural beauty ('das Naturschöne') he 
then defined as follows: 
Das Naturschöne ist die Spur des Nichtidentischen an den Dingen im 
Bann universaler Identität. Solange er waltet, ist kein Nicht- 
identisches positiv da. 154 
Natural beauty could not, therefore, exist as such, except in its em- 
bodiment in artistic mimesis. Natural beauty could thus no longer be viewed 
as beautiful in the form in which it occurred in nature, for nature existed 
only in a form that had been subjected instrumentally to social ends. Adorno 
suggested that artistic mimesis, as the imitation of natural beauty (by 
artistic beauty), was able to retain an image of real nature155 otherwise 
not available to mankind. Accordingly depicting real nature as the origin 
of subjectivity became the aim of the artwork's imagery and by extension 
the aim of a non-dominative society, or what Adorno meant when he stated 
J56 "der'Ursprung ist das Ziel. However, since this aim did not itself 
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originate in art, in a sense it forced theartwork to disobey its own laws. 
The total mediation of the parts with the whole, of the form with the 
material in the artwork, was in Adorno's opinion the basis of the mimesis 
of natural beauty by the artwork. In other words, total mediation created 
an eidetic image of an image, for natural beauty itself did not and could 
not exist positively. 
157 
This application of artistic logic to the artwork's 
material produced the conjuncture of mimesis and non-identity in art as, 
for Adorno, the rational character of art was forged from this image of an 
otherwise non-existent property: 
Fortlebende Mimesis, die nichtbegriffliche Affinität der subjektiv 
Hervorgebrachten zu seinem Anderen, nicht Gesetzten, bestimmt Kunst 
als eine Gestalt der Erkenntnis, und insofern ihrerseits als 
'rational'. 158 
Because such mimesis was not, in fact, rational in the strict sense but 
only a reproduction of nature, the image presented by art was always vague 
and could never replace true knowledge. Nevertheless, to Adorno's mind, 
the 'true' rationality hereby embodied by the artwork approximated to 
true behaviour as mimetic behaviour. 
159 It was in this matrix that Adorno 
located art's third level of truth. 
The ability to produce an image of natural beauty in artistic beauty 
rested on the artwork's constructedness by virtue of which it created 
subjectivity. Adorno proposed that: "Das Lückenlose, Gefügte, in sich 
Ruhende der Kunstwerke ist Nachbild des Schweigens, aus welchem allein 
Natur redet .,, 
160 
The subjectification of the material of art - i. e. its 
state of being both subjective and also object - was thus the foundation 
of natural beauty: "Durch Vollendung, die Entfernung von ungeformter 
Natur, kehrt das naturale Moment, das noch nicht Geformte, nicht Artiku- 
lierte. wieder. "161 By this Adorno meant that the artwork's material was 
worked on, but that this was not as a result dominated. He suggested fur- 
ther that subjectification, by means of which constructedness was able to 
reveal natural beauty, was un-natural, in the sense that it involved human 
activity: "Je strenger die Kunstwerke der Naturwüchsigkeit und der Abbildung 
von Natur sich enthalten, desto mehr nähern die gelungenen sich der Natur': 
162 
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Real nature, as symbolised by natural beauty in artistic beauty, was only 
understandable to Adorno as a nature aware of its own mediated character, 
the fact that it was 'worked'. 'Eingedenken', of course, centres on a know- 
ledge based on this insight. Adorno identified the natural beauty contained 
in the mimetic quality of an artwork with the artwork as a whole163 the 
artwork symbolised 'Eingedenken'. 
In his philosophy and social theory Adorno had posited that such a future 
ztate had to be founded on 'Eingedenken' (on an overcoming of the mind-body 
problem). It is precisely this category of 'Eingedenken' that he found was 
embodied in art's mimetic production of natural beauty, a process he labelled 
the anamnesis of repressed nature; 
164 Artworks were'anti-conservative'; they 
showed an "Absage ans Herrschaftliche, an die Herrschaft zumal des eigenen 
Ichs über die Seele .,, 
165 
Artworks thus intended what nature could only pro- 
mise innately. 
166 Moreover, such truth, although pertaining to a future 
society, was grounded in the present, since the image of natural beauty - 
and thus of 'Eingedenken' - was constructed out of components of contempo- 
rary society, taken up and transformed by the artist. Adorno specified this 
in the following statement: 
Die Opposition der Kunstwerke gegen die Herrschaft ist Mimesis an 
diese. Sie müssen dem herrschaftlichen Verhalten sich angleichen, um 
etwas von der Welt der Herrschaft qualitativ Verschiedenes zu produ- 
zieren. 167 
However, this mimetic generation of something new out of parts of the old 
is still anchored in the old; in the final instance it, too, rests on a 
false rationality. Nevertheless, the subjectification and the constructed- 
ness inherent in the artwork, by virtue of which mimesis is produced, can 
therefore be considered the sole indication of what the new might be like 
in Adorno's work. 
168 The main property of the new society, Adorno considered, 
would be the "Rettung von. Natur oder Unmittelbarkeit . ý, 
169 If an image of 
the future can be created in art in such a manner that it can be experienced, 
then it follows that society can no longer be adjudged closed, for art 
facilitates in potentialis a consciousness of the new. 
170 In this respect 
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Adorno's conception of artistic truth resembles Schelling's suggestion in 
the System des transzendentalen Idealismus that art is a consciousness of 
the identity of nature (as the unconsciousness) with freedom (as the cons- 
cious), i. e. a consciousness of 'finite infinitude'. In Adorno's opinion 
art produced (and therefo Ta-potentiality was) a consciousness of the true 
identity of nature (the unconscious id) with the individual (social ego) 
as 'Eingedenken' and therefore as freedom. 
We designated art's truth content as the non-conceptual depiction of a 
non-subsumtive logic within the artwork's construction, by virtue of which 
the artwork was able to point to an unattained, future social state, that 
was a potential inherent in the present of which the artwork was a part. 
The third level of truth Adorno outlined in his aesthetics was the truth 
offered by the aesthetic experience of natural beauty as it appeared mime- 
tically in the artwork. 
171 The artwork's portrayal of natural beauty accords 
with an experience of an application of non-subsumtive logic. 
172 Art's 
truth, in other words, is this eidetic image of the future that the beholder 
can experience sensuously, an image, furthermore, that acts as an allegory 
of the future that it culled from the past (like Benjamin's interpretation 
of Paul Klee's picture Angelus Novus). 
Aesthetic experience becomes in Adorno's work an experience of 'Eingedenken' 
and thus an experience of the xeil truth of society, for it exhibits a form 
of knowledge of a new society. Art furnished a knowledge of the state of 
reconciliation that Adorno's philosophy could only postulate abstractly. 
However, because the truth art offers in its presentation of natural beauty 
pertains to a future society, the knowledge it affords the beholder of the 
present society is predominantly negative. Adcrno formulated this qual- 
173 
ity as follows: "Indem Dichtung als Ausdruck sich zu dem der für sie zer- 
fallenen Realität macht, drückt sie deren Negativität aus. "174 Adorno rela- 
ted such negativity to Kant's epistemological concept of the sublime, as, 
in effect, negativity was transcendent in its epistemological orientation 
towards the future. 175' 
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This third form of artistic truth establishes most clearly the connection 
we had assumed to exist between Ästhetische Theorie and Negative Dialektik 
and clarifies the discussion of art in Negative Dialektik's closing pages. 
Thought, Adorno contended in Negative Dialektik, had become praxis. 
176 This 
statement could be supplemented to include praxis as an experience of art. 
By extension, Adorno propounded that philosophy had to rely on art, or 
rather-aesthetics, and thus Adorno's aesthetics supplies the solution to 
the problem which the closed society posed for his philosophy. This connection 
of Ästhetische Theorie and Negative Dialektik raises two major questions. 
First of all, it is unclear whether for Adorno art is now a buffer against 
the closed society, or is intended to describe society's actual openness. 
Secondly, if society is closed, how can art'be appreciated or produced, 
since the subjectivity these processes require is being eroded by society. 
Adorno is seemingly faced with two dire alternatives: either to declare the 
end of art or to. abandon the thesis cj which his intellectual edifice was 
erected, namely that society is closed. 
5. Autonomy and the Closed Society 
It is apposite at this point to reconsider the problem Adorno highlighted 
in the first sentnece of Ästhetische Theorie, namely that art's very exist- 
ence was no longer a matter of course. In this context he referred to 1910 
as the time when this process of threatened survival commenced, thus dating 
the end of autonomous art to coincide with the beginnings of the Surrealist 
and avant-garde movements. The artworks he had labelled autonomous were 
drawn exclusively from periods pre-1933 and thus antedate the evolution of 
totalitarianism and the version of it Pollock termed state capitdism, i. e. 
they date from periods before the end of traditional liberal bourgeois 
society. Adorno's vision of autnomous artworks must therefore be understood 
to originate from a viewpoint looking back on autonomous art after the end 
of its production, although this need not necessarily be taken to mean that 
art itself has ended. What it does imply, however, is that Adorno's conception, 
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of autonomous art centred on such artworks' dissynchrony. That is to say, 
Adorno avocates the importance of the Modern for the post-Modern period. 
Accordingly, the three levels of truth so far discerned in Adorno's 
writings on autonomous art all owe their existence solely to the latter's 
dissynchronous character. The second two levels of truth obtain in autono- 
mous artworks only because these date from an era when an image of the 
future could be constructed. The sociological truth of art shows the non- 
identity of the closed world, i. e. its factual falseness and truth, whereas 
the other two forms of artistic truth i 
a past social formation betrayed by the 
In this sense 'great' artworks await an 
deemed and transplanted into the fabric 
1lustrate the true potentiality of 
present structure of society. 
177 
age when their image will be re- 
of society itself. 
178 
The dissynchronous character of autonomous artworks does not, then, alter 
the theory of late capitalism as a closed society, unless one assumes that 
the continued existence of such; -,. artworks itself breaches the hermetic nature 
of the social universe. The elements of the autonomous artworks, from which 
a non-subsumtive logic and its application are constructed, belong to a past 
age and do not, as a consequence, manufacture the image of the new out of 
contemporary material. Contemporary material would not avail itself to such 
a production since it forms the basis of the closed society and must be held 
to resist any dialectical synthesis. This shows that what we originally 
detected to be circuitous argumentation by Adorno is in fact quite logical. 
This theory of dissynchrony inherent in Adorno's proposals on autonomous 
art highlights once again the intimate relation between his aesthetics and 
social theory. Adorno wrote his Ästhetische Theorie against the backdrop 
of what he believed was the factual existence of the closed social unierse. 
Since the closed universe offered no elements whereby a synthesis of parts 
of that society could result in a new society, Adorno had to search for 
agents of such a synthesis elsewhere, namely in the past. The philosophical 
search conducted in Negative Dialektik culminated in the sparse closing 
comments on aesthetics there, and it was in this discipline that he subse- 
quently founded such elements of change, specifically in his conception of 
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autonomous art. Adorno deemed the artwork to be autonomous as a dissyn- 
chronous entity because only thus was he in a logical position to speak 
of a truth in art that transcended the boundaries of the closed society. 
Consequently, the truth content of artworks is deeply historical as is 
Adorno's aEEthetics itself. 
179 Since the second two levels of truth to which 
autonomous artworks pertain only have meaning in their opposition to the 
dominant forms of thought and production in the closed world, it follows 
tl 
that Adorno's design of the category of autonomous art is dependent on the I'. 
theory of the closed world for its starting point. 
In the light of the above it can be argued that Adorno's aesthetics are not 
only historical in their specificity, but also reflexive. The aesthetic 
theory set out approximates to the social theory from which its point of 
departure was drawn because not only does the location of truth in dissynch- 
ronous artforms comment on the absence of truth in present society, it also 
indicates both the precarious position of any artworks now and the problem 
which theories founded on subjectivity themselves face. In a sense one could 
therefore speak of Adorno's conception of dissynchronous art as a metatheory 
of society on account of its treatment of a social object that transcends 
theoretical and historical frontiers. An intimation of this is contained 
in the following statement: 
Indem das Kunstwerk nicht unmittelbar Wirkliches zum Gegenstand hat, 
sagt es nie, wie Erkenntnis sagt: das ist so, sondern: so ist es. 180 
By deliberately constructing his aesthetics to complement his conceptions 
both of philosophical knowledge181 and of philosophical truth - but as 
irreducible to such knowledge or truth - Adorno was able to ground a truth 
in art that was transcendent, i. e. metaphysical. This truth takes on a physi- 
cal form now as the essence of a future society. Adorno's aesthetics thus 
spans the past and the future, but omits the present other than as the 
vantage point from which the other two are seen, a vantage point so important, 
for example, to Benjamin in his concept of 'Jetztzeit'.., 
If truth is only to be found in past artworks, then this fact is itself a 
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comment on the lack of truth in present society and on the problematic 
role played by contemporary art. Not surprisingly (with, the notable 
exception of his lengthy essay on Beckett)-Adorno left the work of con- 
temporary artists relatively unmentioned. Instead he described the culture 
industry that confronted them, although never in a systematic fashion. 
182 
He juxtaposed autonomous art to the culture industry, but refrained from 
considering in detail the fate of authentic, non-autonomous art in the 
face of the culture industry, preferring to present autonomous art and 
the culture industry as two unrelated. although coexistent, static but 
opposing poles. 
At the one end of this spectrum the culture industry proclaimed the ideo- 
logy of the closed world in order to contest the truth contained in auto- 
nomous art situated at the other end. This ideology functions as the oppo- 
site to that promulgated by the liberal, bourgeois public, who had permitted 
and encouraged the rise of autonomous art because of the latter's affirma- 
tive character. Instead, the population is now supplied with information 
rather than members of it producing or selecting art themselves. 
183 Such a 
direct distribution of information from above enforces the will of the 
controllers of the distributive apparatus - an idea we have met in Pollock's 
work. This conception led Adorno to state: "Anpassung tritt kraft der Ideo- 
logie der Kulturindustrie anstelle von Bewußtsein. , 
184 
The strength of this 
conformism lay in the fact that ideology could no longer be perceived as 
false consciousness, for society itself was now false, i. e. the very struc- 
ture of the life-world dictated conformism. 
Adorno declared in the light of this change that "Ideologie heißt heute: 
die Gesellschaft als Erscheinung. "185 Ideology had become what Adorno termed 
'the threatening face of the world', 
186 for the normal person was no longer 
able to differentiate between reality and the fiction propagated by the 
culture industry. 
187 
He asserted that television, for example, prevented 
people from attaining or indeed knowing anything other than the function- 
alized life they led, an argument reminiscent of Dialektik der Aufklärung 
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and Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft. 
188 The net result of this 
ideology of conformism, if one can any longer speak meaningfully of 
ideology, is, Adorno claimed, that "nichts darf sein, was nicht ist wie 
das Seiende. "189 The culture industry, in other words, is able to influence 
people indirectly in that it occupies leisure time available to them, 
ensuring that the time in which they could relax is taken up with something 
'ever-similar' to their working lives, 
190 
namely conformism. 
This conception of the culture industry ghosts its way through Adorno's 
writings as a continual point of contrast and reference, one absolutely 
central to his aesthetics. In its centrality as the diametrical opposite 
to autonomous art, and as the reason for Adorno's construction cf the latter, 
the concept of the culture industry indicates the continuing relation to 
the Dialektik der Aufklärung that persisted throughout Adorno's writings. 
He referred to this connection between the culture industry and a society 
Pollock had described as static in a discussion of jazz: 
Je vollständiger die Kulturindustrie Abweichungen ausmerzt und damit 
die Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten des eigenen Mediums beschneidet, um so 
mehr nähert sich der lärmend dynamische Betrieb der Statik an. 191 
Adorno's various remarks on the culture industry in the course of his work 
further resemble the analysis presented in Dialektik der Aufklärung in that 
they illustrate how Adorno derived the culture industry's shape and its 
resilience from the economic backers it possessed. 
192 
The spectre of Dialektik der Aufklärung is equally present in Adorno's 
depiction of the new technics developed and employed by the culture industry. 
Not only did he maintain that these were not to be confused with the technics 
of the artwork, but he also claimed that such technics fed parasitically off 
the commodity production of the stagnant planned production. 
193 Technics as 
applied in the culture industry served to facilitate and hasten the consum- 
ability. of its products: the planned production of these ensured that they 
did not possess any truth content. Adorno remarked: "Ästhetische Technik als 
Irrbegriff der Mittel zur Objektivierung einer autonomen Sache, wird ersetat 
durch die Fähigkeit Hindernisse zu nehmen., 
194 Consequently, products of 
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the culture industry could not be termed artworks and since the culture 
industry was all-powerful, autonomous artworks could not exist within it: 
"Die Autonomie der Kunstwerke,..., wird von der Kulturindustrie tendenziell 
beseitigt. "195 Adorno thus conceived of the culture industry as the opposite 
of autonomous art because it prevented the production of such artworks. 
Adorno spoke of this process generally as an "Entkunstung der KUnst. "196 
Art either lost its qualities as autonomous art to avoid the culture indus- 
try, or became part of it. In either case, Adorno proposed "Kunst wird ent- 
kunstet: sie tritt selber als ein Stück jener Anpassung auf, der ihr eigenes 
Prinzip widerspricht. "197 The autonomous artwork still present within the 
network of the culture industry was turned against itself and thus ceased 
to be art. This being the case, even dissynchronous artworks were confronted 
by. a" merciless opponent that threatened to make them extinct. Adorno suggested 
that they could only do one thing to avoid this existential: dilemma: 
Um inmitten des Äußersten und Finstersten der Realität zu bestehen, 
müssen die Kunstwerke, die nicht als Zuspruch sich verkaufen wollen, 
jenem sich gleichmachen. 198 
Artworks had to emulate the conformist one-dimensionality of state capitalist 
society if they were to continue to exist per se. In other words, they had 
to abandon their autonomy since this had already become, objectively speaking, 
both redundant and impossible. This meant, however, that artworksdivested 
themselves of their double character and thus of their truth content. 
To avoid this predicament, Adorno endeavoured, in his study of Beckett, for 
example, to redefine autonomy. In the contemporary authentic artwork, he 
claimed, autonomy became a question of communication. An artwork that did 
not conform to dominant patterns of communication was autonomous. In this 
sense Adorno tried to found a'synchronic dissynchrony. He analysed the 
authentic artwork (I shall term this the 'post-autonomous' artwork) in the 
same manner as the autonomous artwork, i. e. he examined its immanent constr- 
uction. Its technics, material and construction he held to be similar to 
those of its predecessor. These had now to be applied in a slightly differ- 
ent manner, for "jedes Kunstwerk heute müßte vollends durchgebildet sein. ' 
199 
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Significantly, Adorno now adopted a prescriptive stance towards the 
post-autonomous artwork, one foreign to his earlier analysis of autonomy. 
He avowed that the artwork had to be hermetic vis-ä-vis the external 
world if it were to be an artwork at all. By its renunciation of comm- 
unication the work expressed the breach between art and the social world 
and thereby portrayed the social world's closed character. 
200 Such hermetic 
non-communication not only made any 'engagement' or realism pointless, but 
also rendered to the artwork a quality of 'non-art', in that it dismantled 
the appearance of art. Further, Adorno contended that such hermeticism 
pointed up the world's negativity in its own absolute negation of the social 
f 
world. For example, in a discussion of Beckett's omission of references to 
the social world in Endgame he suggested that: 
Die protestlose Darstellung allgegenwärtiger Regression protestiert 
gegen eine Verfassung der Welt, die so willfährig dem Gesetz von 
Regression gehorcht, daß sie eigentlich schon über keinen Gegenbegriff 
mehr verfügt, der jener vorzuhalten wäre. 201 
Adorno. reiterated this completely problematical nature of the present rela- 
tion between art and soci-ety- when proposing that the artwork had to mirror 
society in order to expose it: 
Erhebt in den neuen Kunstwerken Grausamkeit unverstellt ihr Haupt, 
so bekennt sie das Wahre ein, daß vor der Übermacht der Realität 
Kunst a priori die Transformation des Furchtbaren nicht mehr sich 
zutrauen darf. 202 
Post-autonomous art had to renounce the truth levels attained by autonomous 
art for the social material at its disposal could no longer be worked into 
artistic form. The material from which the new artwork was produced had to 
be hermetic, that is to say, 'unconsumable'. 
Two alternatives availed themselves in this context: either the artwork is 
purely subjective or it relinquishes any meaning in contemporary linguistic 
terms. Beckett adopted the second approach, since his plays, according to 
Adorno's interpretation at any rate, renounced communication: their meaning 
consisted of their ¶eaninglessness'('Sinnlosigkeit'). This renunciation, 
Adorno averred, created one possible foundation for non-ideological artworks: 
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"Daß Werke der Kommunikation absagen, ist eine notwendige, keineswegs die 
zureichende Bedingung ihres unideologischen Wesens. " 
203 
Although non- 
communication could not prevent the incorporation of artworks into the 
culture industry' public sphere, it was able to guarantee these a certain 
inaccessability in that they were no longer 'culinary'. 
204 The inherent 
dange ; in artworks being silent and bereft of an expressive language 
('sprachlos') was, however, that they shed any sensuous mantle they ever 
had and so ceased to be art. 
205 
Adorno struggled to justify this interpretation of non-communication as a 
positive feature of contemporary art by arguing that under late capitalism 
the mental and physical spheres had become separated. He proposed that as 
a consequence art had to portray the divide beteen idea and sensuousness 
by forfeiting its previous reliance on the second of these. The divorce 
of the two culminates in the abstract art Adorno then considered to be 
art's negative depiction of precisely that separation, although he had to 
concede that such art was no longer in keeping with his definition of art. 
Since opposition cannot be physical, it could at best, he argued, be mental. 
Clearly, Adorno's argumentation on this point is circular and self-justi- 
fying. 
Despite its frequent reiteration, Adorno's ardent espousal of non-communi- 
cation cannot disguise the insubstantial content of his analysis. He is 
unable to ground a non-ideological or anti-ideological stance in non-commu- 
nication and yet persists in claiming such silence to be the only appropriate 
avenue open to art: 
In der verwalteten Welt ist die adäquate Gestalt, in der Kunstwerke 
aufgenommen werden, die der Kommunikation des Unkommunizierbaren, 
die Durchbrechung des verdinglichten Bewußtseins. 206 
Essentially, the chickens of Pollock's theory of state capitalism have come 
home to roost with a vengeance: in a non-theory of contemporary art. Adorno 
is forced by the unrelenting logic of his own position to relapse into 
slogans, as'in the pronouncement that "noch im sublimiertesten Kunstwerk 
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birgt sich ein 'Es soll anders ein'. "207 Adorno endeavoured feebly to 
make a necessity into a virtue: "Neue Kunst ist so abstrakt, wie die Be- 
ziehungen der Menschen in Wahrheit es geworden sind., 
208 
This cannot detract 
from his own admission that abstractness and non-communication presented an 
"Emaskulierung von Kunst im Angesicht der Möglichkeit, ihr Versprechen real 
einzulösen. "209 The promise of past art, that society would be constructed 
according to the, principles of non-domination, is factually possible with 
the productive forces of the present, but prevented from coming about by 
the closed world and its culture industry. 
Adorno raised the elitist, non-communicating and esoteric character of 
contemporary art to the status of a truth, excusing the elitism as being 
necessitated by the closed society. 
210 The new abstract art was true, he 
argued, because it provided - by means of its absolute negation of societal 
norms -a picture of society's closedness otherwise unavailable to the 
individual: 
Je totaler die Gesellschaft, je vollständiger sie zum einstimmigen 
System sich zusammenzieht, desto mehr werden die Werke, welche die 
Erfahrung jenes Prozesses aufspeichern, zu ihrem Anderen. 211 
Adorno founded this artificial creation of the other as the vantage point 
'outside' society on the "technical consistency"212 of the contemporary 
artwork, whereby it obeyed only rules of its own technics, form and material 
and refrained from including social content. The truth content of contem- 
porary art could, he therefore proposed, be judged to be its self-determined 
'meaninglessness as meaning' in contradistinction to the false meaning 
inculcated in society by the culture industry. Being"'meaningless', the 
contemporary artwork lost any use-value and could thus oppose the false 
use-values generated by the culture industry, namely exchange-values. 
Adorno held the meaninglessness of Beckett's Endgame to portray truth 
and artistic technics, for the play resisted the patterns of consumerism 
and conformism enforced by the culture industry. In short, because the 
play allowed no space for the culture industry's blanket dictation of 
meaning, Endgame, Adorno argued, aspired to truth. However, he did not 
extend his analysis to other contemporary artwork&, 
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regarding-, the culture--industry as affirmative, for in its conformism 
it could not even qualify as culture: "Die Negation des Begriffs des Kul= 
turellen selber bereitet sich vor. "213 In Adorno's view Freud was correct 
to detect an innate psychic "Unbehagen an der Kultur, 
214 because such cul- 
ture had given birth to a monster in the shape of the culture industry. This, 
in turn, could not be brushed off as a fleeting aberration, for it was 
embedded, Adorno proposed, in the very logic of liberal bourgeois culture: 
"Was an Kultur Verfall dünkt, ist ihr reines Zu-sich-siber-kommen., 
215 Prod- 
ucts of this new anti-culture contained no dialectical properties, for they 
fostered only conformism. 
Adorno neglects, however, to take the step of locating the origin of such 
conformism in the affirmative character of autonomous artworks, and this 
despite stating: "Ist Affirmation tatsächlich ein Moment von Kunst, so war 
selbst sie so wenig je durchaus falsch wie die Kultur, weil sie mißlang, 
ganz falsch ist. "216 He simply dissolves the dialectical interplay of affir- 
mative and negative elements that had existed under bourgeois culture and 
replaces it with a static opposition between the conformist and the non- 
conformist. Since he views society as static, bereft of any dynamism, oppo- 
sition cannot be founded in it, but must be external or marginal to it, such 
as in the allegorical opposition that he identifies in Beckett's dramatic 
portrayal of non-communication. 
Since the t th of contemporary artworks resides solely in their non-commun- 
icative character, a void is left in-the present, for no artistic truth to 
complement the philosophical truth of Negative Dialektik is now apparent, 
as it was in autonomous artworks. If Adorno's 'system' is not to fail to 
ground truth with respect to the present, then Adorno must situate truth - 
as the image of 'Eingedenken' - in the past. The dissynchronous autonomous 
artworks triumph in this respect over their synchronous post-autonomous 
counterparts. This triumph is, however, shortlived, for Adorno is unable 
to locate - even in terms of a logical account of their empirical existence - 
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autonomous artworks in the present, or to prove the presence of an aesth- 
etic subject capable of understanding them. 
217 In effect, he avoids the 
topic altogether and for good reason: how, after all, could the autonomous 
persevere in the closed world? Contemporary society prohibits the production 
of artworks which contain an image of a non-conceptual truth such as Adorno 
detected in autonomous art. The abstract post-autonomous artwork is concept- 
ual, in the manner in which it exhibits truth. Adorno's thought is caught 
up in a vicious circle: art has to disengage from society if it is to oppose 
it, he claims, and yet in disengaging it loses any claim to be art, for it 
contains no social truth. Adorno's conception of non-conformism is drawn 
in such stark contours that it negates itself; it is at worst aporetic, at 
best exhortative. 
What is more, the conception of non-conformism is inaccurate in the excessive 
obeisance it pays to a closed society, because empirically society is not 
completely closed, as Adorno was himself to admit in the last years of his 
life. In Ohne Leitbild he commented on artists and their position in society: 
In der verwalteten Welt brauchen sie zum selben Zwecke große Institut- 
ionen, die einsichtig genug sind, ihnen Unterschlupf zu gewähren und 
damit etwas wie Korrektur an. sich selbst zu üben. 218 
He omitted, nevertheless, to pursue why this might be the case, although 
the above quotation would seem to hint that the culture industry needs 
legitimation, a quality unnecessary in a hermetic world of direct domination 
and diktats. Adorno tried to attribute the cracks in the culture industry's 
seal to a critical remnant in the psychology of the masses: 
Nur ihr tief unbewußtes Mißtrauen, das letzte Residuum des Unter- 
schieds von Kunst und empirischer Wirklichkeit in ihrem Geist, erklärt, 
daß sie nicht längst allesamt die Welt durchaus so sehen und akzeptieren, 
wie sie ihnen von der Kulturindustrie hergerichtet ist. 219 
In the last essay Adorno completed before his death he expressed these 
second thoughts more clearly, although time prevented him from even ad- 
justing his 'system', let alone changing it completely. He wrote: 
Die Integration von Bewußtsein und Freizeit ist offenbar doch noch 
nicht ganz gelungen. Die realen Interessen der Einzelnen sind immer 
noch stark genug, um, in Grenzen, der totalen Erfassung zu widerstehen. 
Das würde zusammenstimmen mit der gesellschaftlichen Prognose, daß 
-268- 
eine Gesellschaft, deren tragende Widersprüche ungemindert fortbestehen, 
auch im Bewußtsein nicht total integriert werden kann. 220 
It is perhaps fitting that Adorno found the empirical 'openness' of 
society to be evidenced in the realm of popular culture. 
7. Conclusion 
Regardless of whether Adorno finally came to amend his theory of the closed 
world, the fact remains that his aesthetics was designed against the back- 'i 
drop of the assumed existence of such a hermetic society. Adorno trans- 
forms aesthetics into a theory of knowledge, for only thus can it provide 
the non-cönceptual truth of society which both Negative Dialektik and 
Dialektik der Aufklärung were unable to ground. 
221 Consequently, Adorno's 
aesthetics becomes simultaneously an ideology-critique (sociological truths 
of autonomous and post-autonomous art) and a theory of the communication, 
application and possible experience of a non-conceptual logic. In this way, 
Adorno's aesthetics approximates to his social theory. His theory of con- 
temporary art at once both reflects and justifies his theory of the closed 
world, while his theory of past, autonomous art. paints a picture of possible 
future social change. Moreover, the aesthetic concepts attest to the deep 
flaw in Adorno's theory of state capitalist society, for such a theory must 
be seriously defective if it requires an aesthetics to explain the social 
world comprehensively. 
As we have seen, Adorno interlinks-' his aesthetics with his philosophy in 
an effort to overcome the problems of his static theory of society. The 
theory of autonomy plays a central part in this context, for it provides 
the foundation of social change and a stimulus to a change in consciousness. 
This interdetermination of the aesthetic and the philosophical fails, how- 
ever, when applied to contemporary society. How, in a situation in which 
artworks are forced to be abstract because society is closed, can other 
artworks exist and provide the location of non-conceptual logic and its 
application? The immanent criticism Adorno develops to analyse past artworks 
and from which he then derives his appraisal of Beckett, sows the seeds 
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of its own destruction precisely when applied to Beckett. The abstract 
character of the latter's work would seem to suggest that at best the 
autonomous artworks latently preserve the basis of the new until such time 
as these can be taken up, and that, at worst, they will cease to exist 
under the aegis of the culture industry. 
In Adorno's construction, post-autonomous art coexists with autonomous art, 
but without any apparent connection being made between the post-autonomous 
artwork's disclosure of present society's falsehood and the eidetic image of 
a future society inherent in autonomous art. The only connection Adorno 
suggestsAs that post-autonomous art requires its autonomous counterpart 
since it can no longer show what the latter was able to portray. Such a 
connection is highly abstract and far from historical, with the result that 
Adorno's work falls into two separate halves: a study of autonomous art and 
a study of the post-autonomous variant. 
Nevertheless, his aesthetics furnishes his philosophy with a theory of know- 
ledge that the philosophy is not able to posit. 
222 
This theory of cognition 
is that of a negative knowledge because art contains an image that is non- 
conceptual. Whether this image is 'knowable' ('erkannt') but simply not 
'recognisable' ('erkennbar') remains uncertain. The implication of Negative 
Dialektik is that cognition should no longer be 'knowing' in the traditional 
sense, but 'recognition' as in the mutual recognition of subject and object, 
human and nature in the process of 'Eingedenken'. What is certain, is that 
this equation of aesthetics and a theory of cognition is deeply problematical, 
for if aesthetics as the 'knowledge of art' is modelled into a moral theory 
of what perception should be, it can hardly be regarded as an aesthetics (if 
this is understood to centre on the study of the beautiful). 
223 
Furthermore, 
even if Adorno's theory is considered an aesthetics, the form of cognition 
necessitated renders the attempt quietistic, for non-communication cannot 
it any sense be held to provoke a change in society. 
Adorno also runs the danger of reducing aesthetics to a philosophical inquiry 
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into the basis of knowledge. Epistemologically, Adorno situates the art- 
work, as did Kant, between the purely sensuous and the purely intellectual, 
thus determining that the artwork cannot be grasped adequately either by 
an empirical philosophy or by a philosophy of consciousness, the two poles 
Negative Dialektik endeavours to steer between. Thus Adorno avoids the 
problem that Lukäcs, for example, faced in distinguishing between art and 
science, in that-he founds art in a concept of objectivity different to 
that of science, namely one based on reflexivity. Art, he proposes, is its 
own form of inquiry, for its truth is unconceivable in any other discipline. 
Its claim to objectivity resides in this singular truth content and not in 
an attempt to reflect the empirical world in a direct fashion. 
224 However, 
by situating art within a nexus of social production Adorno circumvents the 
positions adopted by Idealist theorists on which his aesthetics would other- 
wise have bordered. 
The theory of cognition he offers in his aesthetics becomes a theory of 
communication when seen in the context of the closed world. The aesthetics 
discusses the possibility of communicating oppositional 'Meaning' and thus 
hinges on the question of what is 'meant' not 'by' but 'in' the artwork and 
`how this meaning is then communicated. The 'knowledge' art offers of the 
world is thus discussed in terms of whether it can be communicated or not - 
with the resulting insight that since the world is closed, art is prevented 
from communicating meaning and consequently must divest itself of any. Meaning 
in the artwork is accordingly derived not from content (which is overt commu- 
nication and therefore by definition imposed by society) but from the numer- 
ous interlocked relations of the component parts of an artwork, these being 
held to be both 'natural' and social. 
Adorno shifts the emphasis of aesthetics away from an analysis of beauty 
towards a theory of the technical production of art's 'magic', i. e. of its 
non-conceptual promesse de bonheur. Accordingly his theory is an aesthetic 
theory, that is, a theory of how art can be produced from the viewpoint of 
the social constraints and influences surrounding it. Adorno's aesthetic 
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theory does not, therefore, concentrate on a judgement of what is to be or 
what should be considered beautiful, but focusses on how the production 
of art opposes dominant social production in producing beauty, i. e. on how 
the beautiful is, intentionally or otherwise, critical of social ideology. 
This is why his theory is defined against both Kantian and Hegelian aesthe- 
tics and, ironically, in opposition to Aristotle. For Adorno it is uninter- 
esting, if not banal, whether or not the artist produces personal, mimetic 
images of his environment and forms them into art. What is interesting to 
him is the process whereby this is accomplished and the extent to which the 
image created confronts the world with an allegory of diminuative - thought 
and an assertion' of what society is not. At a time when, in Adorno's opinion, 
the sphere of distribution has been eradicated, he constructs a model of 
alternative production to oppose the domination of the sphere of production. 
In so doing he changes the direction of aesthetics. 
Since a comparison of this change in aesthetics and other contemporary. 
aesthetics will be undertaken in the concluding chapter to this thesis, I 
will restrict myself here to a few preliminary remarks. Adorno's theory of 
art avoids the most obvious shortcomings of theories based only on a recep- 
tionist, Idealist or structuralist approach, as well as eschewing. the simp- 
lifications of empirical art sociology. Adorno situates the recipient's 
viewpoint in the received object, grounds this on the historically-specific 
materiality of the artwork, which in turn is determined by the society of 
which it is part. This makes discussions of 'relative autonomy' appear some- 
what unwieldy in their attempts to avoid determinism. However, does Adorno's 
more abstract standpoint, drawing pluralistically on insights gained by 
these other approaches= produce a superior theory, let alone azhistorical 
materialist one? The main question to be asked with regard to the internal 
logic of his aesthetics is whether or not his theory combines immanent 
criticism and social theory effectively. We have seen in the analysis of 
the autonomous artwork that such a task is accomplished with exceptional 
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intricacy and devotion. 
225 However, the starting point of such a combination 
is a social theory inadequate to the task of describing contemporary society, 
namely Pollock's theory of state capitalism, and this places the results 
of Adorno's theory on a completely unsound footing. As a consequence of this 
basis, the conclusions of Adorno's aesthetic theory are idealist in the 
sense that they do not countenance the artwork's engagement in society, but 
rather only its abstract disengagement. The individual supposedly so en- 
dangered by state capitalism cannot look to artworks fr help or use them 
to effect a change in his or her life-world, because, Adorno insisted, that 
artworks - and indeed praxis itself - has to be contemplative. Thus Adorno's 
work, while providing a fruitful insight into a problem deep at the heart 
of historical materialism, can provide only a barren counter to Enlightenment 
reason, for the solution Adorno offers involves abandoning Marxism's theory 
of revolution. The combination of immanent criticism and social theory is, 
in other words, damned from the outset as a result of the constraints 
Pollock placed on social theory with his concept of state capitalism. 
Nevertheless, Adorno's treatment of capitalist art is attractive and 
historically specific because of the distinction he made between the auto- 
nomous and the post-autonomous as the respective sides of the totalitarian 
caesura in Germany from 1933 - 1947/8. Even if Adorno's analysis of late 
capitalism is inaccurate it still acknowledged the fact that post-War West- 
ern society has been radically separated from its predecessor by a new 
global state of affairs which centres on multinational companies and Amer- 
ican rather than European cultural hegemony in the Western world. 
It is also noteworthy that Adorno's work forms a pioneering attempt to 
incorporate what is now termed deconstructionism within an historical 
materialist framework. In his analysis of the autonomous artwork Adorno 
'deconstructs' meaning in the artwork, for he views, authorial intent as 
secondary to the objective meaning of the artwork which he constructs out 
of both the historical use and the inherent history of material and technics. 
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In essence he removes the subject/artist from its position as the final 
determinant of the artwork and replaces it with socio-historical properties 
specific to art. He confronts form and content, even in poetry, with their 
historically changing, objective social meaning even to the extent of 
providing careful analyses of the words used, e. g. he finds Goethe's use 
of language now to be revolutionary. 
226 However, once he has specified that 
the age of autonomous artworks has passed, 'deconstruction' becomes the 
understanding of non-identity and non-communication and therefore dissolves 
itself. 
Regardless of this advantage, the central pillar of Adorno's theory, the 
connection between immanent criticism and ideology critique, is a double- 
edged a$air. Some critics now argue forcefully that ideology critique is 
anachronistic, either because there is no one dominant ideology at present 
227 
and most certainly no bourgeois ideology, or, and less convincingly, because 
social theory should not be the basis of objectivity. 
228 Ideology critique 
as Adorno practises it has the advantage, nevertheless, of not specifying 
one (class) ideology as dominant. Rather it addresses its efforts to deter- 
mining what the counter to such an ideology is and also, by extension, to 
describing positions of non-identity within hegemonic institutions or ideas. 
In this undertaking, however, the theory out-argues itself, for it can no 
longer ground the concept of non-identity on which it was based, but has to 
posit this in allegorical form. Moreover, Adorno's theory debunks itself in 
adducing to the culture industry a hegemony it does not in fact exert, and 
thus Adorno's deduction of the autonomous artwork suffers in content and 
efficacy. However, the aesthetic categories conceived of in order to describe 
the autonomous artwork are not thereby rendered defunct in form and con- 
ception, for they were not deduced from the presence of the culture industry. 
Rather, coupled with an accurate social theory, they could emerge unscathed 
by the above criticism. A critique of Adorno's work need not reject out of 
hand the categories he developed to use in immanent criticism, but could 
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sublate and accommodate them within a contemporary, accurate social 
theory. (A preliminary step in this direction will be taken in the 
conclusion to this thesis. ) 
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CHAPTER 10 : MARCUSE'S AESTHETICS 1942-1978 
Post-war critical theory has been associated mainly either with Dialektik 
der Aufklärung or with the later work of Herbert Marcuse. This may seem 
surprising given the close affinity between Horkheimer and Marcuse's 
Zeitschrift writings on critical theory. This separation between Marcuse, 
Adorno and Horkheimer could, however, be justified on geographical rather 
than theoretical grounds. After Horkheimer and Adorno had departed from 
New York, MArcuse was to join them only for a short time in California, 
electing to remain in or around New York for the duration of the Second 
World War, rather than participating in the research work surrounding the 
Studies in Prejudice. After leaving the State Department's Office of Strat- 
egic Services, where he had been involved in denazification projects, 
instead of returning to Frankfurt with Adorno, Horkheimer and Pollock, he 
preferred to embark on an American academic career. 
In recent years this physical separation has generally been interpreted to 
signify underlying theoretical differences that arose during or after the 
completion of Dialektik der Aufklärung. Marcuse's decision to remain in 
the United States is somehow read to imply a theoretical rather than an 
Atlantic Rubicon that he refused to cross. 
1(Jürgen Habermas and Thomas 
McCarthy are the sole commentators to have suggested that the work Marcuse 
undertook after 1941 bears a significant relation to Adorno and Horkheimer's 
writings of the same period. ) A brief philological examination of Marcuse's 
main books from the years 1941-1978 reveals the existence of numerous impor- 
tant lexical similarities with the language of Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
particularly in the recurrence of such key terms as 'total mobilization', 
'totalitarianism' and 'the administered society'. 
2 
Martin Jaya and Morton 
Schoolman, 4 nevertheless prefer to draw a connecting line between Marcuse's 
work and Franz Neumann's interpretation of Nazism in Behemoth, rather than 
referring to Pollock or Horkheimer. They educe the evidence for this from 
I 
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Marcuse's 1941 work Vernunft und Revolution (pages 361 and 372) where 
Marcuse footnotes Neumann's work, but such sparseness of proof turns their 
own case against them. The biographical evidence of Marcuse and Neumann's 
close friendship perhaps influenced this argument and is read as implying 
theoretical identity. Schoolman has gone so far as to suggest, somewhat 
contradictorily, that the Institut(e)'s work on fascism had little influence 
on Marcuse's substantive work. 
5 The citations from Vernunft und Revolution, 
however, cannot be regarded as conclusive. Quotations can all too easily 
be countered by other quotations, for example, the remarks on pages 361,370 
and 371 of the same book which all point away from Neumann's work and firmly 
in-the direction of Pollock's theory of state capitalism. 
In order to avoid a fruitless debate based on such a use of quotation and 
counter-quotation, the following chapter will argue, by means of an analysis 
of the central themes in Marcuse's writings, that a close relation existed 
between the social theory informing Marcuse's aesthetics and that of Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Pollock's respective work. Such an undertaking is not alto- 
gether unproblematic. First of all Marcuse's works Vernunft und Revolution, 
Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft, Die Gesellschaftslehre des Sowietmarxismus, 
One-Dimensional Man, An Essay on Liberation, Konterrevolution und Revolte 
and Die Permanenz der Kunst confront the researcher as a set of seemingly 
unconnected and disparate projects. This wealth of material, threaded through- 
out with a variety of themes which often appear in a completely different 
form from one work to the next, is then extended by the countless essays 
Marcuse wrote in the post-War years. Secondly, in the case of Marcuse's 
writings, his observations on social theory and aesthetics are intertwined 
in the above mentioned works. Thus, in order to explicate the relation of 
Marcuse's social theory both to that expounded by Adorno and Horkheimer and 
to his own aesthetics, an artificial separation needs to be made between the i 
two fields. Thirdly, the social theory itself appears in two distinct versions. 
one proposed in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft, the other put forward in 
One-Dimensional Man; a compromise between the two. is elaborated in An Essay 
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on Liberation and Konterrevolution und Revolte. As a consequence, the arti- 
ficial separation of the respective strands of social theory from the body 
of his work runs the danger of obscuring the reasons for its nature. These 
two distinct views of society and also the interlinking of aesthetics and 
social theory in Marcuse's work is perhaps a result of the connection his 
writings bore to contemporary politics. In this context, the element of 
p iaxis, supposedly so lacking in Adorno and Horkheimer's theory of society, 
has been frequently lauded in discussions of Marcuse's work. 
This practical dimension is easily visible in the explicit political content 
of some of these works and can be detected in the hidden political intentions 
of the more abstract writings. It will 1P: argued in what follows that while 
this attention to contemporary political matters distinguishes Marcuse from 
Adorno and Horkheimer, the 'engagement' his work provided was bought at a 
high theoretical price. 
In order to overcome the difficulties just outlined, Marcuse's writings 
will be compared to his first major work after leaving the Institut(e), 
Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft, after having assessed the relation between 
this text and Dialektik der Aufklärung. Thus, a point of comparison will 
be established between Isarcuse and Adorno and Horkheimer's respective work 
which still permits a detailed outline of his aesthetics to be undertaken. 
Three underlying themes will be addressed in the course of this discussion, 
namely Marcuse's refounding of the concept of reason in Triebstruktur und 
Gesellschaft, his subsequent alteration of the concept in his notion of 
'one-dimensionality' and the centrality of 'automation' to his work. These 
will then be related to his aesthetics. In this fashion, chronological 
changes in Marcuse's writings resulting from his political analysis of 
society will become appar. ent and yet will not be accorded overriding 'import- 
ance in the interpretation of his work in general and his aesthetics in 
particular, as has often been the case. 
The political side to Marcuse's work lends his social theory an ambiguous 
tone evidenced particularly by his concept of 'technology', an ambiguity, 
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moreover, which cannot be simply brushed aside, for it becomes crucial 
to his theory of art. In that this level of Marcuse's work is lost in a 
non-chronological approach, the analysis is-confronted with consierably 
more difficulties than was the case with Adorno's work. The act of separa- 
ting his social theory from his political theory has the disadvantage that 
it prevents a clear view of the origin of the three themes and conceals 
the fact that they each possess the character of a political 'thesis' deve- 
loped at a particular historical juncture. 
Two specific purposes are fulfilled by outlining the three themes just 
mentioned. Firstly, they allow a fundamental relation to be established bet- 
ween Marcuse's work and Adorno, Horkheimer and Pollock's writings. Once 
this underlying connection has been delineated, Marcuse's aesthetics can 
be understood in a different light to that thrown on it by research thusfar. 
The remarks on aesthetics in his writings can be shown to rely on an inner 
system of thought that also . underpin his social theory. What is more, the 
aesthetics can then be shown to play a very specific role in his social 
theory, a connection we have already found in Adorno's work. On this basis 
it will be possible, finally, to compare Adorno and Marcuse's respective 
aesthetics. 
1. Eros and Reason 
In the 1954 postscript to Vernunft und Revolution, the last work he com- 
pleted whilst a member of the Institut(e), Marcuse commented (quite in 
keeping with Adorno and Horkheimer's thought in Dialektik der Aufklärung): 
Von Anbeginn enthielten Idee und Wirklichkeit der Vernunft im modernen 
Zeitalter die Elemente, die ihr Versprechen eines freien und erfüllten 
Daseins gefährdeten: die Versklavung des Menschen durch seine eigene 
Produktivität; die Glorifizierung des hinausgezögerten Glücks; die 
repressive Beherrschung der menschlichen und außermenschlichen Natur; 
die Entwicklung der menschlichen Anlagen innerhalb des Herrschafts- 
gefüges. 6 
A few lines previously he had stated that both the Hegelian and Marxian 
ideas of reason were no closer to being fulfilled than before. The reason 
of rationality that prevailed in present society was, he suggested, com- 
pletely irrational if measured againsst society's potentiality (i. e. its 
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possible shape): 
Und wenn Rationalität in der Verwaltung verkörpert und nur dort 
verkörpert ist, dann muß diese gesetzgebende Macht irrational sein. 7 
In other words, however 'planned' and efficiently administered society 
might be, this could not detract from its underlying irrationality. From 
1941 onwards Marcuse was preoccupied with demonstrating the irrationality 
of the planned society, just as Adorno and Horkheimer had devoted 
Dialektik der Aufklärung to the same subject 
8. The rationality that 
Marcuse denounced as irrational was so, he maintained, because it was 
based on domination, namely that of the object by the subject. Marcuse 
declared that "Reason as conceptual thought and behaviour, is necessarily 
mastery, domination"9. In Vernunft und Revolution and elsewhere Marcuse 
deduced this form of domination from the closed society that he specified - 
as had Adorno and Horkheimer - was founded on administration. 
Marcuse's logical deduction of irrationality also mirrored Adorno and 
Horkheimer's, for he judged that, as a result of its being imposed from 
above, the rationality of the closed society was irrational per se. Reason 
became mythical in the sense that myth had always been regarded as the 
opposite of 'reason': "The process of civilization invalidates myth 
(this is almost a definition of progress), but it may also return 
rational thought to mythological status. "10 In other words, like Adorno 
and Horkheimer, Marcuse perceived the Enlightenment to have been negated 
by the very core of Enlightenment thought itself and believed 'reason', 
when fully developed to reveal itself to be 'un-reason'. If this is the 
case, then it follows that a 'dialectical concept of reason no longer 
avails itself to philosophy. Philosophy cannot, therefore, call on reason 
when attempting to negate society. Nor can it even depict the difference of 
present appearance and its essence whose inherent potential could be 
realized as a future coincidence of essence and appearance, i. e. in a 
free society. The power of Adorno and Horkheimer's and also Marcuse's 
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argument swept away any basis for a critical analysis or critique of 
society. The immanent methodtogy practised by ideology critique was as a 
consequence redundant, for reality itself being ideology, any confronta- 
tion of ideology with reality became impossible. Marcuse was faced with 
the alternative of either abandoning critique. altogether or turning to a 
metaphysical ethics of the 'ought' in opposition to the 'is'. - 
He did neither, but rather took the loss of any critical standard of reason 
as the starting point for all his post-War writings. These became imbued 
with the attempt to refound the concept of reason in such a manner as to 
ensure that it regained its critical edge. Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft 
is not only the first instance of this refoundation, but is also the only 
study-devoted entirely. -to this project; Marcuse's subsequent writings all 
refer back to Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft as their point of departure. 
Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft is essentially a treatise on both Freudian 
metapsychology and the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of the ind- 
ividual. Writing against a backdrop. of tendential totalitarianism and 
complete domination, 
11 Marcuse set out to determine (by examining the philo- 
sophy of psychoanalysis) whether Freud's analysis of repression permitted 
one to conceive of a society free of repression. This examination led him 
to historicize the ontogenetic structure of repression, for by so doing he 
was able to locate a sociological level of investigation at the centre of 
the concept of repression. 
Marcuse commenced his interpretation of Freud by accepting that the pleasure 
principle and the reality principle necessarily collided with one another. 
12 
However, this collision of opposites could, he maintained, be shown by close 
analysis to be less absolute than Freud had supposed. So as to be able to 
specify this feature, Marcuse devised two new psychological concepts, those 
of the 'performance principle' and 'surplus repression'. Whereas Freud had 
asserted that the individual necessarily repressed certain desires directed 
by the pleasure principle in order to submit, via the median agency of the 
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ego, to the demands of reality and thus to survive, Marcuse claimed that 
'necessary repression' was far more precise a quality than Freud's expan- 
sive notion conceived of it as being. Marcuse termed necessary repression 
'basic', i. e. that which had to exist if the individual were to eat, drink 
and procreate. 'Surplus repression', on the cth_er hand, was that form of 
repression which was brought about by a particular historical organisation 
of society and was necessary only for that society's continued existence: 
Diese zusätzlich-Lenkung und Machtausübung, die von den besonderen 
Institutionen der Herrschaft ausgehen, sind das, was wir als 
zusätzliche Unterdrückung bezeichnen. 13 
By implication, such forms of psychological domination as are used solely 
to uphold contemporary society can be dispensed with. In other words, Mar- 
cuse considered that a free society could be constructed on the basis of 
'necessary repression' (i. e. labour not alienated in the capitalist mode 
of production) and not as Freud had believed, namely that repression was 
per se negative. 
14 This allowed Marcuse to define the rationality of the 
contemporary order of society as irrational, for that which forms the 
basis of surplus repression could not, by definition, be rational. Contem- 
porary society achieved this enforcement of surplus repression by means 
of what Marcuse labelled the 'performance principle'. The performance Mar- 
cuse signified with this term was that of Weberian purposive rationality, 
which Marcuse, in common with Adorno and Horkheimer, regarded as domination 
15 
Logically, the pleasure principle Freud had spoken of had to be opposed to 
the performance principle and by extension to surplus repression, but not 
necessarily to basic repression. Equally, therefore, the pleasure principle 
could be held to coexist with the reality principle as long as the latter 
was not based on the performance principle and thus provided the basis for 
a free society. In this fashion, Marcuse was able not only to determine the 
irrationality of present society, but also to construct a paradigm for an 
ideal future state using psychoanalytical categories. 
Marcuse paid some attention to the manner in which the performance principle 
involved an objectification of the world external to the acting person. 
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Firstly he derived - somewhat tenuously - technological domination from 
the destructive diive generated by the id in the course of its repression 
by the ego. Secondly, he maintained that surplus repression was not visible 
to the individual, for it had become the very substance of the life-world, 
i. e. the life-world was itself ideological: 
Die Unterdrückung verschwindet hinter der großen objektiven Ordnung 
der Dinge, die die fügsamen Individuen mehr oder weniger entsprechend 
belohnt... 16 
Contemporary society endeavoured by means of such an ideological blanketing 
of reality to prevent the 'Wiederkehr des Verdrängten', i. e. the unleashing 
of repressed drives in a destructive form. Otherwise, Marcuse claimed: 
... würde die dem Es entsprechende Energie sich gegen ihre immer mehr 
veräußerlichten Beschränkungen auflehnen, würde danach drängen, ein 
immer weiteres Feld ecistenzieller Beziehungen zu ergreifen und zu 
überfluten, und würde so das Realitäts-Ich und seine verdrängenden 
Leistungen sprengen. 17 
In the light of his remarks on basic repression it is clear that Marcuse 
did not view such an explosion as a necessarily negative development, as 
Freud had done. The thrust of Marcuse's argument is to the effect that 
culture (and civilization, for he did not distinguish between the terms 
here) need not be negatively repressive in the fashion Freud had assumed 
had to be the case. 
is 
Marcuse proceeded to demonstrate how such a change in repression could 
be effected and the implications such a possible change of society would 
have for a critical philosophy. He attempted first to provide a proof of 
the possibility of such change by means of a discussion of the symbolical 
figures of Orpheus and Narcissus. Whereas in the standard psychological 
interpretations of these two figures they were both judged to be alienated 
from the world, Marcuse suggested that in fact they evinced properties which 
connected them integrally with the world in the sense that they symbolised 
an overcoming of a society in which subject and object were separated from 
one another. Orpheus and Narcissus represented a reconciliatory state of 
cooperation - one of 'Eingedenken', to use Adorno and Horkheimer's term - 
between mankind and nature. 
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In the common understanding of Freud's work such a view would be untenable 
in psychological terms, for labour and culture are both held there to be 
repressive per se and therefore eternally-irreconcilable with nature. Mar- 
cuse tried to show, however, via a discussion of Eros and sexuality, how 
labour (work) could be a libidinous and thus liberating aactivity, so long 
as it was expended for the common good. He argued: "Nur als soziales Phän- 
omen kann die Libido den Weg zur Selbst-Sublimierung nehmen: als ununter- 
drückte Kraft... "19 This process would signal a reconciliation of mind and 
body, and in such a changed social situation it would be possible to con- 
ceive of no drive-opposition existing between work and play, as Marcuse was 
quick to assert: 
Die Arbeit als freies Spiel-kann nicht der Verwaltung unterstellt 
werden, nur die entfremdete Arbeit kann durch rationale Routine 
organisiert und verwaltet werden. 20 
Work and play would coincide in forming the basis of a free society. This 
notion of work coinciding or-indeed merging with play, i. e. a merging of 
instrumental rationality with a subjective rationality of 'Eingedenken', 
was examined further in Marcuse's outline of the relation between Eros, the 
life-drive, and Thanatos; the death-drive. He found that a state in which 
physical pain and need were eliminated would allow both for a non-repressive 
sublimation of the id and for a reconciliation of Eros and Thanatos in the 
Nirvana principle. 
21 If society, in other words, were so organised as to 
eliminate poverty, death would not oppose life and man would no longer need 
to strive for death as a consequence of the $-ustration of life. 
Having painted this picture of a future libidinous society, Marcuse cast 
about for an agent that would set in motion such social change as would 
bring about this libidinous state. He determined first of all that any 
change had to involve a remembrance of the id's wishes: 
Ohne die Freisetzung der verdrängten Gedächtnisinhalte, ohne die 
Lösung der befreienden Macht der Erinnerung ist eine nicht-repressive 
Sublimierung unvorstellbar. 22 
He defined remembrance as "a mode of dissociation from the given facts, a 
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mode of 'mediation' which breaks, for short moments, the omnipresent 
power of the given facts. " 
23 
Thus, memory kept awake a knowledge of past 
promises made to mankind. 
24 However, even assuming these contents had been 
remembered and this Has not just a remembrance of psychological properties, 
the individual still would have no conception of the form this future 
society should take. Marcuse located the forming of such an image in the 
imagination (deploying a notion similar to the' Existentialists' concept of 
projection): "Die Phantasie sieht das Bild der Wiederversöhnung des Einzelnen 
mit dem Ganzen, des Wunsches mit der Verwirklichung, des Glücks mit der 
Vernunft. "25 This imagination was to be formed in and by art, in art's 
"Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck, " its "Gesetzmäßigkeit ohne Gesetz. "26 Artistic 
form portrayed a reconciliation of the general and the particular, of the 
intellect and the senses (i. e. of id and ego) by virtue of being "durch 
die Ordnung der Sinnlichkeit bestimmte Form. "27 
Having proved to his own satisfaction that a libidinous society could indeed 
exist, there being agents which could raise the necessary catalysts from 
the depths of the id into consciousness, Marcuse went on to test the degree 
to which the concept of Eros (which embraced both the life-drive and the 
libido) could be used critically. In so far as society could be founded 
in line with the concept of Eros - basic repression leaving much scope for 
the libido - present reality had to be found lacking owing to the non-libi- 
dinous character of contemporary rationality when compared to the concept of 
Eros. In other words, despite the presence of immediate material satisfaction 
provided as an anaesthetising palliative that disguised the present ideo- 
logical character of society and reality, a critical standard nevertheless 
existed which unmasked precisely this ideology. 
Further to this debunking, critical edge that the concept possessed, the 
concept of Eros also functioned to ground a notion of interest, namely the 
interest of mankind. If the new society was to be centred on the libidinal 
satisfaction of all, and Marcuse averred that this had to be the case, then 
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the existence of such a society could be considered to be in the interest 
of everyone's very nature in instinctual terms. The new society could thus 
be called rational, and equally the concept of Eros was rational for it 
also hinges on mankind's interests. Marcuse asserted that in the future 
rationality would be defined in this manner: "Vernünftig ist nun, was die 
Ordnung der Befriedigung unterstützt. 28 
The concept of Eros is both rational and critical and thus recuperates the 
properties Adorno and Horkheimer had shown did not inhere in Enlightenment 
rationality. The definition of rationality irr the concept of Eros avoids 
the reduction of rationality to a purposive instrumental form which was 
the problem latent in the Enlightenment version. Erotic rationality is only 
purposive in the vague sense that it is intended to inform the creation of 
a just social universe beneficial to the whole of humanity. In this manner 
Marcuse devised a concept which not only cannot be enmeshed within the 
dialectic of Enlightenment, but which also assails Cartesian thought for 
being ideological in its, opposition to Eros. Marcuse thus refounded the 
concept of reason. 
29 
In complete accordance with Adorno and Horkheimer Marcuse regarded contem- 
porary rationality as irrational. Instead of despairing in the face of such 
a tragic perception and the effects the irrational society had on the 
constitution of individuality (and by extension on Freudian psychology), 
he refounded the concept of reason with the aid of Freudian metapsychology. 
In doing so Marcuse did not, however, depart greatly from the route laid 
down by critical theory, as many have taken the optimism of the refoundation 
to imply. As he put it in 1979, Marcuse moved Marxism towards psychology: 
Was sich ändern müßte, wäre der Unterbau unter der ökonomisch-politischen 
Basis: das Verhältnis zwischen Lebens- und Destruktionstrieben in der 
psychosomatischen Struktur der Individuen. 30 
The concept of Eros as true rationality - because it is founded in the 
material (and biological) interests of mankind - neither involves a Pan- 
glossian turn in Marcuse's thought, nor does it rest on some metaphysical 
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view of man as 'innately' good, but on a recognition that mankind can now 
be good, as critical theory had always maintained. 
31 
If mankind can be good, however, does this-mean that people can escape 
Enlightenment rationality and live in true freedom, in coexistence and 
(re-)conciliation with nature? Marcuse insisted that mankind would be free 
in a libidinous society, because human beings would recognise this freedom 
as such and as a freeing of their own nature. Mankind would have effectively 
recreated its naturalness and by playing rather than working to achieve 
this end would no longer dominate external nature. External nature would 
be 'eingedacht', i. e. thought of in the very act of positing one's own self, 
for that 'self' would be regarded as natural. In this fashion a libidinous, 
free society really could avoid the clutches of the dialectic of Enlighten- 
ment and the concept of Eros would provide the foundations for a new critical 
and dialectical philosophy. This does not mean to say that Marcuse's con- 
ception is unproblematic. I shall leave aside the objections that could be 
raised against Marcuse's reading of Freud and concentrate instead on diffi- 
culties within his argumentation. His reading of Freud is well-documented 
elsewhere. Moreover, arguments against it normally rest on differing readings 
of Freud, and as such do not consitute an immanent critique of his thought. 
The relation between the present and future world appears to have to be 
vuluntaristic in Marcuse's conception. He referred frequently to his work 
as a 'transcendent project', i. e. as an effort to find forms in the present 
that will generate a future. Such a project had, he insisted, to continually 
be on its guard against accepting as transcendent any forms tainted by 
Enlightenment rationality; it had to ignore the elements of the past inher- 
ent in the present: "Die Vergangenheit bestimmt die Gegenwart, weil die 
Menschheit noch immer ihre eigene Geschichte nicht gemeistert hat. "32 A 
similar problem lies at the core of Marcuse's conception of the id in that 
we cannot know the drives that are repressed and yet it is upon them that 
the future is to be founded. Equally, we cannot know whether the mythical, 
natural content of the drives can prevail against Enlightenment rationality 
-287- 
and provide for the needs of all when allowed to run free. Marcuse's trans- 
cendent project remains consistently indeterminate in order to be trans- 
cendent, with the notable exception of his reference to art. 
Marcuse had wished to break away from the suffocating cocoon of Enlightenment 
reason which was seated in the supposedly objective, instrumental character 
of such thought. The concept of reason Marcuse devised was therefore situated 
in the subject, in a, philosophical conceptualisation of the subjective psych- 
ology of mankind as a whole. As such, it was a counter-concept. However, 
Marcuse had to try to avoid the reductio ad hominem that was the fatal un- 
doing of Cartesian logic and Enlightenment philosophy. Rather than grounding 
his concept of reason in the subject, Marcuse took great pains to establish 
the equally objective character of Eros (in the sense that it is meta-sub- 
jective). In order to circumvent the fickleness of instrumental rationality 
Marcuse conceived of a philosophy grounded in the 'Gattungssubjekt', the 
species-being: mankind. In this fashion the concept of Eros avoids notions 
of intersubjectivity now in vogue by (as it were) viewing mankind as a 
macro-subject. This line of argument is, however, not without its own dan- 
gers. When Marcuse spoke of a "Unterbau unter der ökonomisch-politischen 
Basis, "33 he imbued Eros with an absolute quality and reduced the life-world 
to this first principle, the wish to experience pleasure: "Dasein ist dem 
Wesen nach das Streben nach Lust. "34 The concept of Eros thus acquires an 
ontological character foreign to a Marxist analysis of society. 
If. life is the 'wish to experience pleasure' and this, in turn, is regarded 
as the guiding principle of life itself, then life can only be analysed in 
terms of whether or not it is pleasurable. The question that must be raised 
in this context is whether such an analysis of pleasure is quantitative or 
qualitative, for there, is a tendency in Marcuse's work to treat Freud's 
drive theory in terms of numerical quantities. The decrease of erotic energy 
in society as a consequence of the sublimative culture under which we cur- 
rently live, and the interchange and counterbalancing between erotic and 
thanatic en'gy both seem to be considered by Marcuse in an arithmetic manner. 
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Finally, Freud's thought had opposed mankind to society, whereas Marcuse 
posited the future unity of social forces and human beings. Freud's concep- 
tion was linear and static as he regarded the above bipolar opposition as 
absolute, mankind's innate wishes being eternally incompatible with society. 
Marcuse altered this construction, for he viewed human beings and society 
as being dialectically opposed, as a result of which conception he was able 
to contemplate a synthesis of the two. To achieve this within the concept of 
Eros Marcuse had both to accept the notion of an archaic heritage informing 
the id and to reject Freud's postulation of an unvarying, ahistorical Oedipus 
complex. 
35 Marcuse's detour around the Oedipus complex raises problems for 
an understanding of ego-development and for the incursion of the reality- 
principle into the domain of the id, just as Adorno and Horkheimer's com- 
pression of ontogeny and phylogeny had done. Indeed, Marcuse's dscription 
of ontogeny and phylogeny follows that laid down by Adorno and Horkheimer 
in Dialektik der Aufklärung. 
This problematic conceptualisation of the ego leads on to a wider problem 
thrown up by Marcuse's theory of Eros, namely the concept of ideology pro- 
mulgated by that theory. On the one hand Marcuse's concept of ideology no 
longer matches that devised by Marx, for it can no longer refer simply to 
a false consciousness. Ideology now involves a repression of drives and 
thus signifies a false consciousness both of libidinous needs as well as of 
the social structure. On the other hand, society offers no basis for ego- 
development - Marcuse's theory is hazy on this point - so that it is not 
clear whether there can indeed be a 'true' consciousness either of society 
in general or of libidinous drives in particular. After all, if libidinous 
drives were conscious to the individual or species through the intermediary 
of the ego, it would be questionable whether these drives could then really 
be regarded as libidinous. 
2. Eros and Dialektik der Aufklärung 
It has become clear in the course of our discussion of Triebstruktur und 
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Gesellschaft that Marcuse turned to Freud's metapsychology in order to 
elicit from Freud's work a rationality which was impregnable to the dial- 
ectic of Enlightenment. Freud, it should be remembered is not alien to 
Marcuse's thought, having ghosted through the pages of 'Über den affirmat- 
iven Charakter der Kultur' and 'Zur Kritik des Hedonismus'. Marcuse used 
Freud's categories to sharpen the conception of happiness and interest pre- 
sented in these essays to such a point that the ensuing concept of Eros is 
a conscious foil-to the dialectic of Enlightenment and, by extension, to 
Dialektik der Aufklärung. 
In this project Marcuse accepted that the social formation that had replaced 
monopoly capitalism was closed, allowing its citizens no knowledge of its 
real essence. He believed futhermore that the social structure was able to 
anchor a counterrevolution in the very instinctual structure of individuals 
36 
However, he also argued that buried beneath this counterrevolutionary strand 
there existed a (Chomskian) deep structure of libidinous drives that could 
- potentially at least - burst the social fabric asunder. Marcuse assumed 
that such social change would follow a de-reification, that is a subjectifi- 
cation of mankind's own nature, by means of 'Eingedenken', which was thus 
not just an ideal but also a practical possibility. Although he referred to 
art in this context, it was not necessary for him, as it had been for Adorno. 
to centre his projection of a future society on it. In Dialektik der Auf- 
klärung., and Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft Adorno and Horkheimer had 
traced logic to an aporia inherent in the dualism of self and self-preserva- 
tion. By using the Freudian categories of id, ego and super-ego they were 
able to discern a fundamental impasse in Cartesian logic, from which, how- 
ever, they could not extricate themselves. Equally, they remained dogged in 
their postulation of non-dominatory thought by the hangover of Pollockian 
socio-economic concepts in their work. We have seen that this last influence 
extended as far as the cul-de-sac of Adorno's Negative Dialektik and the 
self-contradictory nature of the Ästhetische Theorie. Adorno and Horkheimer 
found difficulties-in pursuing an historical materialist path that steered 
between the barrier reefs of Stalinism and positivism. Marcuse, however, 
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remained undaunted and with Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft took up the 
task of establishing a liberating and emancipatory epistemology by sifting 
through the Freudian ashes of Dialektik der Aufklärung's discussion of the 
id (i. e. the'remarks on Odysseus) and raking from their embers a phoenix: 
a theoretical refoundation of rationality as Eros completely uncountenanced 
by Adorno and Horkheimer. (This refoundation, as we shall see, culminates 
in a new aesthetics, divergent from that of Adorno. ) It remains now to 
determine the exact relation between Marcuse's work on Freud and the work 
of Adorno and Horkheimer, in particular their Dialektik der Aufklärung. 
Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft can be interpreted both as a rejoinder 
to Dialektik der Aufklärung and as a complement to its theoretical design. 
Such an interpretation contrasts starkly with the usual discussions of 
Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft which tend to view this work as 'seminal' 
to Marcuse's thought and 'unusual' in its subject matter, and yet do not 
attempt to explain why Marcuse came to analyse Freudian material and re- 
fashion it. It is hoped that the connection to be made below between Trieb- 
struktur und Gesellschaft and Dialektik der Aufklärung will successfully 
reveal the intellectual heritage of Marcuse's book. 
There are three main connections to be made between Marcuse's work and 
Dialektik der Aufklärung. Firstly, Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft amounts 
to a proof of Adorno and H orkheimer's assumptions but in psychological terms, 
a characteristic of Frankfurt School work notably lacking in Dialektik der 
Aufklärung itself. Although Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft marks a contin- 
uation of Marcuse's interest in the 'catastrophe of human existence, '37 it 
places this catastrophe firmly in the context of the dialectic of Enlighten- 
ment, i. e. the dialectic of the domination of nature, whose sublation Marcuse 
described in the last article he published as: 
La tranformation de la societe n'est pas seulement une transformation de la nature humaine, mais aussi bien de la nature exterieure. 38 
It is this relation between the internal and external domination of nature 
that Marcuse elaborated in psychoanalytical terms in Triebstruktur und 
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Gesellschaft. He therefore referred to the drive structure of human beings 
as their 'second nature', "welche die gesellschaftliche Erscheinung seiner 
ersten Natur ist. "39 He claimed that Freud had provided an image of this 
dialectic of domination in the eternal circle the latter had drawn of patri- 
cide and the introjection of authority. 
40 Marcuse equated this description 
with the dialectic of domination in terms of the portrait it presented of 
the true "vicious circle of progress .,, 
41 
In Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft Marcuse's discussions of ontogeny, phylo- 
geny, of the libidinous self in opposition to non-libidinous self-preser- 
vation and of sublimation as alienation all served to underpin in psycho- 
analytical terms the following claim: 
The forms and content of freedom change with every new stage in the 
development of civilization, which is man's increasing mastery of 
man and nature. In both modes, mastery means domination, control: more 
effective control of nature makes for more effective control of man. 41 
Marcuse's concept of Eros was postulated as a counter to the irrationality 
of such repression as reinforced the dialectic of domination. Enlightenment 
rationality was, in other words, discovered to be rooted in the phylo- 
genetic development of the psyche. 
43 
It is at this point that Marcuse abandoned Freud's linear conception of 
history and archaic history, for had he accepted the inevitability of the 
Oedipus complex and the validity of the 'primitive horde' theory he would 
not have been able to conceive of a way of breaking the hermetic sal of 
the dialectic of repression and introjection. However, in its discussion 
of domination Marcuse's work complements Dialektik der Aufklärung, for his 
interpretation of Freud lent reinforcement to Adorno and Horkheimer's theory 
of civilization. At first sight this appears ironic because Adorno and 
Horkheimer saw little further use for Freudian categories, having assumed 
that the ego had now decomposed completely: progression had always been 
regression. On the one hand Marcuse accepts this (in Triebstruktur und 
Gesellschaft and Die Gesellschaftslehre des Sowjetmarxismus for example), 
although he persists in still using psychoanalytical terms to describe, on 
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a metrological level, the subjugation of nature as the subjugation of the 
real self, i. e. society's repression of libidinous, natural drives. On the 
other, he rejected the validity of Freud's concept of the ego, for Marcuse 
considered it to function as a median quality, not as the self-conscious, 
composed self that Adorno and Horkheimer conceive of it as. The ego for 
Marcuse can aid the real self, the id, to attain a realisation of the id's 
desires. Therefore, the present 'decomposition' of the ego can only be 
understood in Marcuse's work to denote the ego's redundancy in the face of 
a gargantuan social super-ego. 
This obsolescence of the ego can, nevertheless, be interpreted in a positive 
light in that it allows the self's true desires to shine through the outer 
layers of social conditioning. The labelling of Marcuse's work, particularly 
Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft, as a 'marriage of Freud and Marx' is, in 
this respect, reductive. Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft uses both Freud 
and Marx to analyse the 'pre-history' of repression in terms of the Dialektik 
der Aufklärung, not in terms of Das Kapital or Jenseits des Lustprinzips. It 
is the social theory of Dialektik der Aufklärung that Marcuse sought to 
explicate and amend. 
Despite its complementary nature, Marcuse'a theory of the historical nature 
of repression also has radical consequences for Dialektik der Aufklärung. 
If surplus repression is lifted in a future state that is governed by Eros 
and basic repression is held to be compatible with Eros, then the pessimism 
of Dialektik der Aufklärung is unfounded. Under the sway of Eros the laws of 
logos would cease to apply, i. e. Dialektik der Aufklärung's ineluctable 
dead-end can be countered by a possible form of non-instrumental, critical 
rationality. 
Marcuse's theoretical challenge to the conclusions of Dialektik der Aufklä- 
rung remains idealist, however, not just because it only has practical imp- 
ortance in some hazy future, but, more importantly, because Marcuse deduces 
future change from hypothesised, mental drives. (This admittedly has the 
advantage of protecting his notion of change from any empiricist reduction. ) 
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Despite this idealist cloak, Marcuse's position goes beyond just comple- 
menting Dialektik der Aufklärung, for it bursts Adorno and Horkheimer's 
philosophy of history by relocating 'potentiality' and the 'interest' of 
mankind in the individual species being's id qua the representative of 
Eros. 
44 
Twenty three years later Marcuse was still to say: 
L'enracinement de Popposition dans une structure pulsionelle 
liberatrice doit rendre possible le transformation qualitative, 
la revolution totale 
and further 
Seulement par le vecu individuel, 1'experience de chacun, qui brise 
la coquille de la conscience subalterne et qui amene l'individu, 
qui l'oblige, ä voir, ä sentir, d penser les choses et les gens 
d'une maniere differente. 45 
Even if couched in an idealist form, what Marcuse offers is a concrete 
antithesis to Dialektik der Aufklärung: the libido as a base behind the 
material base. 
The materiality of the psychologicd_drives thus provides the possibility 
of a future synthesis of thought and being, namely in the Eros-governed 
society. In other words, Marcuse was able to construct a way out of Dialektik 
der Aufklärung's theoretical dilemma by virtue of the concrete form that he 
imparted to the concept of 'Eingedenken' in his discussion of the dialectic 
of history and civilization. However, this "Tiefendimension menschlicher 
Existenz, "46 the material base behind the base, is not concrete in any 
meaningful sense, for it can only be embraced in abstract-theoretical 
categories. It is, as noted above, metaphysical or idealist and had to be 
sounded by Marcuse in aesthetics and in remembrance. 
In this respect, Marcuse's attempt to found concrete change in the libido 
brings him into difficulties that Adorno had also encountered. He had, 
namely, to ground his theory in an aesthetics. However, this is itself 
problematic, because, owing to the fact that unrepressed drives cannot be 
known without them changing from libidinal into ego-drives, they cannot be 
recognized in art. Moreover, despite Marcuse's claim that "hinter der 
sublimierten ästhetischen Form kommt der unsublimierte Inhalt zum Vorschein: 
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die Verhaftung der Kunst an das Lustprinzip, "47 art cannot be judged to 
be a guarantee of the continued ideal existence of this dimension. Indeed, 
Marcuse himself pointed this out inadvertently when discussing the closed 
society: 
Im gegenwärtigen Zustand, im Stadium der totalen Mobilmachung, scheint 
selbst diese höchst ambivalente Opposition nicht mehr lebensfähig. Die 
Kunst überlebt nur dort, wo sie sich selbst aufhebt, wo sie ihre Sub- 
stanz rettet, indem sie ihre traditionelle Form verleugnet und damit 
auf die Versöhnung verzichtet: wo sie surrealistisch und atonal wird. 48 I I'll 
It would seem that Marcuse's counter to Dialektik der Aufklärung was 
stranded with his aesthetics on the beach where Adorno's lay washed up by 
its insistence on incommunicability. 
This pessimism in Marcuse's writings can be seen in his use of the category 
of remembrance. Although he meant it to be understood positively (whereas 
it signified a remembering of the horror of the past in Adorno and Hork- 
heimer's work) remembrance remains - like the concept of art - practical 
and causal only in the future. The practical thrust of the category is 
stemmed at present by what Adorno called the 'universal bane of exchange- 
values' and will stay in such a state until an antidote consisting of non- 
reified forms of perception has been developed to combat the bane. In con- 
temporary society one can at best conjecture as to what the libidinous 
drives might be that would inform the new society and at worst only impute 
their existence; they cannot be remembered. Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft, 
despite appearing at first sight to offer a real escape from the dialectic 
of Enlightenment proves on closer inspection*to be as deeply pessimistic as 
Dialektik der Aufklärung. Freedom, in the shape of an 'erotic' society, is 
only the stuff of dreams, dreams which are imaginings about the future. The 
I'. 
closed society continues unaffected by such phantasies. 
Regardless of Marcuse's initial rejoinder, Pollock, Adorno and Horkheimer 
are in the final instance proved to be correct in their pessimism. In fact, 
their pessimism is reinforced by Marcuse's work, for the future society can 
only be dreamt of, not even thought of. Perhaps this is part of the reason 
why Marcuse never mentioned Marx in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft, despite 
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the clear degree of correspondence between the arguments in Triebstruktur 
und Gesellschaft and Marxist thinking. He neither wanted to deify Marx as 
the final authority on all matters (as had Stalinism), nor did he believe 
Marxism was able to bring about a change in society. 
At the narrower level of research methodology, Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft 
provides a corrective to Adorrd and Horkheimer's work in the Studies in 
Prejudice and to Fromm's later writings. In complete contrast to their work, 
it is precisely the idealism and the anti-emipiricist slanting arising from 11 
Marcuse's study of Freud's metapsychological texts that provides the basis L 
for his critique. Marcuse may bestow empirical, concrete form on philosophicall 
concepts, e. g. at the level of an anthropology, and yet this very process 
ii 
is imploded because Marcuse mischievously takes up in his discussion those 
elements of Freud's work which even Freud knew contradicted empirical evi- j 
dence, e. g. the concept of archaic heritage. 
49 
Empirical psychology, in 
other words, is subverted, for in the case of Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft 
science is used as theory's tool and not vice versa. Triebstruktur und 
Gesellschaft thus reconstitutes Hegel's speculative philosophy in the shape 
of an anthropological social theory. 
3. Reason Reinstated? 
In his social theory Marcuse found an opening for Eros which, however, 
ultimately transpires to be illusory. Irrespective of the outcome of these 
mergersi-of social theory and psychoanalysis, Marcuse is far more specific 
and empirical in the construction of his social theory than Adorno and 
Horkheimer had been with theirs. Marcuse had addressed problems of planning 
and technology in his work on social theory published prior to Triebstrukutr 
und Gesellschaft and specifically in his last essay for the Institut(e), 
'Some Social Implications of Mödern Technology'. It would be wrong to suppose 
that this train of thought was suddenly abandoned once Freud came to the 
fore in Marcuse's writings. Indeed, the concepts of planning and technology 
play a crucial role in Marcuse's interpretation of Freud and constitute an 
important link between Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft and both Marcuse's 
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non-psychological writings and the writings of the Frankfurt School after 
1941. The implicit presence of a discussion of planning and technology is 
evidenced by a seemingly innocuous, throw-away remark in Triebstruktur und 
Gesellschaft: 
Die Eliminierung menschlicher Möglichkeiten aus der Welt der 
(entfremdeten) Arbeit schafft die Vorbedingung für die Eliminierung 
der Arbeit aus der Welt der menschlichen Möglichkeiten. 50 
Labour is understood here in both its Marxist and its Freudian meaning (i. e. 
as repression). The implications of the sentence are thus shattering: an 
abolition of 'labour' and of repression is foreseeable. 
The manner in which such an 'elimination' could occur bears directly on the 
subject to which Pollock addressed himself after returning to Frankfurt in 
1949, namely cybernetics or automation. In three lengthy essays written 
between 1955 and 1958 based primarily on work undertaken in the United 
States, 51 Pollock had approached the question of the impact automated or 
semi-automated production processes would have on society and whether, in 
fact, a second Industrial Revolution was under way. In order to clarify the 
relation Marcuse's work had to them, a brief examination of the main points 
of these essays is necessary. 
The introduction of automation was seen by Pollock as giving rise to two 
major themes, for both of which he fourda wealth of empirical evidence. On 
the one hand, Pollock suggested that automation created a tendency to over- 
produce. In order to ensure sales of the commodities thus produced the owners 
of the means of production had to control both the free time available to 
the workforce and the development of needs. 
52 The social form that such a 
society had to take would be centred on an "autoritären militärischen 
Hierarchie"53 the automative society thus matched that of state capitalism. 
In this context he detected that a correlation obtained between automation, 
structural unemployment, the heightened destructive potential of the ever- 
expanding armaments industry and "sinnentleerte und mechanische" labotr. 
54 
On the other hand, Pollock had attempted to remedy the flaw in his earlier 
analysis by conceiving of state capitalism as dynamic. He specified that 
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automation could have other effects than those listed above, for it could 
be used to abolish poverty in the whole world if "von den heute gegebenen 
Möglichkeiten ein vernunftmäßiger Gebrauch gemacht würde". 
55 However, he 
judged that such a beneficial use of automation could only occur if the 
classical market mechanism was to be removed 
56 by planning: 
Würde in einem gesellschaftlich ausschlaggebenden Maße der Wille 
bestehen, die neue Produktionsweise unmittelbar und planmäßig für 
das Wohl der Menschen nutzbar zu machen, dann könnte sie tatsächlich 
den Segen bewirken, den heute viele allzu optimistisch von ihrer un- 
kontrollierten Entfaltung erwarten. 57 
This statement is deeply paradoxical, for Pollock himself had pointed out 
that capitalism could continue uninhibited in a planned form, while Adorno 
and Horkheirnr had found planning itself to be domination. Accordingly, there 
was no logical reason to suppose that a planned society would necessarily 
abolish poverty unless this were in the interests of profit. Pollock had to 
remain ambiguous in the final instance on the question of whether planning 
was positive or negative. 
Marcuse did not share this ambiguity. In the 1960 Preface to Die Gesell- 
schaftslehre des Sowjetmarxismus he wrote of the application of automation: 
Da dieser Optimalzustand (social wealth, full employment) von der 
Fähigkeit der Gesellschaft abhängt, die materiellen und geistigen 
Lebensbedürfnisse aller ihrer Mitglieder mit einem Minimum an auf- 
erlegte Arbeit zu befriedigen, erfordert er Planung und Kontrolle der 
Wirtschaft im Hinblick auf diesen Zweck, er erfordert überdies eine 
Umschulung im Hinblick auf die Austauschbarkeit der Funktionen sowie 
eine Umwertung der Werte, die eine repressive Arbeitsmoral beseitigt. 58 
In this context, quantitative change could bring about qualitative change. 
A concept of planned automation thus forms the background to the concept of 
potentiality Marcuse put forward in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft, for it 
provides evidence of social potentiality that would facilitate the creation 
of a libidinous society. 
Automation, Marcuse argued, could permit transcendence from the social 
conditions, if it itself were put to a different end, for it provided a 
technology which could cater for all mankind's needs without relying on 
human intervention. This opened the way for a libidinous, non-instrumental 
approach to life. Marcuse contended in 1978: 
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Technischer Fortschritt ist objektive Notwendigkeit für den 
Kapitalismus sowohl wie für die Emanzipation. Letztere ist abhängig 
von einer Weiterentwicklung der Automation bis zu dem Punkt, wo die 
herrschende 'Ökonomie der Zeit' (Bahro) umgestürzt. werden kann: 
freie, schöpferische Zeit als Lebenszeit. 59 
Society at present appeared in a light which was all the more irrational 
for the fact that the repression it enforced was redundant in terms of its 
own productivity. 
60 What Marcuse suggested was that basic repression had 
itself become almost unnecessary, for automation could provide the neces- 
sities of life. Automation, instrumental reason par excellence could flip 
over into its opposite by facilitating the abolition of labour. Any work 
time which at present existed for mankind could be used for play, i. e. 
dedicated to erotic pursuits. In this fashirn, the discussion of automation 
permits Marcuse to reintroduce an immanent analysis of society into his 
argument. The potentiality of the means of production can now beopposed to 
reality;. society can be proved to be irrational, because it has been out- 
grown by the potentiality of its own internal form. 
61 
If labour, in an 
alienated or non-alienated form, can be abolished by the introduction of 
full automation, then Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft is not based on idealism 
but on a practical change that could be effected in society. 
It follows that Marcuse's concept of Eros (as a critical measure of the 
present against a better, potential future) can pnly be conceived of against 
the backdrop of automated production. Indeed, the research work and thought 
Marcuse put into Die Gesellschaftslehre des Sowjetmarxismus, where he first 
discussed automation, date from the early 1950s (1952-53 and 1954-55), 
precisely the time when he was also preparing Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft. 
This link in epistemology is perhaps best illustrated by the title of an 
article he wrote at the time: 'Progress and Freud's Theory of Irstincts. 
62 
The chronological coincidence reflects the merging of the two strands of 
his thought. In other words, the very design of Marcuse's interpretation 
of Freud hinged on an assessment of technics and automation and, by extens- 
ion, it rested implicitly on themes that were being discussed at the reopened 
Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt. 
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Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft was written against the background of 
German totalitarianism and the continued existence of what Marcuse saw 
as the tendency towards totalitarianism. 
63 
The potentiality of technics 
and automation that permitted Marcuse to reinstate Eros as an immanent 
analysis of society in that it showed society to be dynamic does not dis- 
prove the thesis of the closed world, it only asserts that dialectical 
potentiality persists within that society, even if the society endeavours 
to suspend any change. 
64 
As a consequence, Marcuse never stated firmly 
whether automation was positive or not, whether or not a rational organ- 
isation of the sphere of production would create the basis for an erotic 




The immanent analysis of the means of production reinforces logically the 
optimistic concept of Eros, aligning theory once again to the changes in 
society and thus avoiding the dilemma Marcuse saw many theories to be 
faced by: 
Eine Theorie, welche die Praxis des Kapitalismus nicht eingeholt hat, 
kann schwerlich eine Praxis einleiten, die darauf abzielt, den 
Kapitalismus aufzuheben. 66 
Marcuse's consideration of automation allowed him to oppose Eros to the 
closed society from within that society, i. e. he was able to show this 
social form to be dynamic. Nevertheless, this supposedly proven dynamism 
still remains purely conjectural, for it depends logically on a future 
change in society which is, in turn, dependent on a change in consciousness. 
4. One-Dimensionality and Technology 
This last question, namely whether Marcuse believed that human beings could 
come to think of themselves as part of nature ('Eingedenken') in view of 
the power state capitalism possessed to shackle technology to its own pur- 
poses, can only be answered by means of a closer analysis of Marcuse's con- 
ception of society. Marcuse's conceptualisation of the closed society can 
best be discussed under the label of 'one-dimensionality', the name he 
gave to the social structure analysed in his most popular book, One Dimen- 
sional Man. Marcuse set out to explore a society which was founded d"two 
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opposing tendencies, the one wishing to contain change, the other serving 
as the basis of change. 
67 
The coexistence of these two tendencies has been 
seen above to originate in Pollock's discussion of automation, so their 
interconnection will be left aside for a moment; the analysis of one-dimen- 
sionality will concentrate instead on the forces of containment. 
For Marcuse, society was 'one-dimensional' in the sense that it precluded 
opposition by means of the control it exercised over the productive and 
distributive spheres in the manner described by Pollock. 
68 Marcuse specified 
that the profit maxim inhabited every walk of life and that both mind and 
body were kept in a state of permanent mobilization in order to prevent 
any view or way of thinking other than in terms of profit. Marcuse described 
such a crushing of opposition in a manner that reminds one of Adorno and 
Horkheimer's concept of the culture industry: 
The most effective and enduring form of warfare against liberation 
is the implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate 
obsolete forms of the struggle for existence. 69 
He argued that the social structure effecting such a "social determination 
of consciousness" was enforced by "total capitalist administration". 
70 
It 
was also to be considered a global occurrence: "Die Fusion ökonomischer, 
kultureller und politischer Kontrollen ist ein internationales Phänomen. " 
71 
This fusion was at least in part caused by the technology of such a one- 
dimensional society which could not, therefore -be isolated from the use to 
which it is put. He took this into account by defining one-dimensionality 
as a state in which both the dominators and the dominated were subjugated 
bythe production apparatus. 
71 
Marcuse analysed this one-dimensionality in four different ways: two socio- 
logical, one anthropological, and one socio-psychological. At a sociological 
level Marcuse spoke of the integration of mankind into the one-dimensional 
society, which he attributed to "structural economic-political processes. "73 
These absorbed any political opposition society might encounter from the 
working class, by offering the proletariat material rewards in the form 
of consumer articles. As a consequence of these, the working class became 
I 
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instilled with "systemimmanente Bedürfnisse und Aspirationen", thus 
guaranteeing the "Reproduktion des Bestehenden durch die Beherrschten. "74 
Marcuse observed: 
Und wo die etablierte Gesellschaft die den Lebensstandard erhöh- 
enden Güter liefert, erreicht die Entfremdung denjenigen Punkt, 
auf den selbst das Bewußtsein von ihr weitgehend unterdrückt ist: 
die Individuen identifizieren sich mit ihrem Sein-für-Anderes. 75 
Accordingly, this material integration could be considered a "freiwillige 
Knechtschaft"76 that formed the basis of a "gleichgeschaltete" society. 
77 
Marcuse maintained that this integration was reinforced psychologically 
because the one-dimensional. "; society encouraged its members to think of 
themselves as individuals only to the extent that they were members of the 
mass society. 
78 
This coalescence of ego and super-ego -a main theme in 
earlier Institut(e) writings - led to alterations in the constitution of 
the psyche: 
In the mental apparatus, the tension between that which is desired 
ai'that which is permitted seems considerably lowered, and the 
Reality Principle no longer seems to require a sweeping and pain- 
ful transformation of instrumental needs. 79 
By promoting what Marcuse termed a 'happy consciousness', the one-dimensional 
society absorbed any opposition to society still extant in the instinctual 
structure of the individual. 
80 Marcuse tried to trace this destruction of 
individuality with his concept of 'repressive desublimation', 
81 
which desig- 
nated the levelling out of the antagonism between culture and social reality. 
Instead of culture being created by a sublimation of libidinous energy, a 
release of this energy was actuated by, for example, commodities being pro- 
duced that bore a libidinous attraction for the consumer. 
82 Individuality 
was "verstümmelt, verkrüppelt und frustriert"83 by this process of desub- 
limation, for ego-development was impeded as was the aspiration for more 
than what already was. Marcuse declared that as a consequence of its 
stultification of the ego "society has surpassed the stage where psycho- 
analytical theory could elucidate the ingression of society into the 
mental structure of the individuals... "84 In the absence of an ego, one- 
dimensional man could no longer be embraced in categories pertaining to 
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the balance between id and ego. 
Marcuse measured this collapse of individuality against the individualist 
high culture of bourgeois society, for he judged the latter cultural form 
to cause a fruitful sublimation of libidinous energy. The combination of 
repressive desublimation with the process by which individuals were integ- 
rated into one-dimensional society eroded the traditional distinction between 
civilization and culture. The two could not be separated at a sociological 
level any longer for if the normal world had become ideological, 
85 
as Mar- 
cuse contended it had, then no distinction could be made within that world 
between productive time and free time. Leisure time as solely a reflex of 
production's desired sales. Equally, it was impossible to distinguish 
fruitfully betweenbase and superstructure. As Pollock had originally suggested 
twenty years earlier, the two had merged; the market as a regulator had 
disappeared to be replaced by the closed society. 
Anthropologically, one-dimensional society's levelling out of the various 
differences and dualities of liberal society results in the complete 
dominance of instrumental rationality in people's lives. Marcuse's analysis 
thus parallels the way Adorno and Horkheimer derived the same occurrence 
from Pollock's notion of the closed society. Marcuse's statement that "die 
Entfremdung der Arbeitsleistung ist fast vollständig"86 highlights this 
intrusion of a rationality into all walks of life that perpetuates mankind's 
domination of its own 'naturalness', just as it enforces mankind's domination 
and corruption of external nature. Marcuse remarked that: 
Nous pouvons maintenant formuler plus concretement 1'idee que la 
domination et l'exploitation capitaliste de la nature sont, en tant 
que telles, domination et exploitation des hommes. 87 
In the light of this conception of domination, Marcuse's appeal to Eros 
seems. as hopeless as had Adorno's espousal of the non-communicative art- 
work, for qualitative change can neither be anchored in the instrumental 
rationality of automation nor can it hope to oppose such a rationality. 
Two points can be raised in this context. Logically, Marcuse's analysis 
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should not involve an analysis of the dialectical properties of automation, 
for how can there be a sublation of the technological rationality on which 
automation is based, without such a sublation breaking Marcuse's dialectic? 
Furthermore, many observers have claimed that if Marcuse's analysis were 
accurate, he would not be able to account for his own existence as an 
oppositional theorist. 
88 Both these criticisms, however, are inaccurate, 
for Marcuse provides a "historische Analyse der Tatsachen, die eine kritische 
Analyse von Tendenzen einschließt, von geschichtlichen Möglichkeiten, die in 
irgendeiner Weise demonstrierbar sind. "89 Since the analysis is purely theo- 
retical and not based on empirical fact, its recounting of the nature of the 
facts is also ideational, i. e. it describes a tendency, not reality. 
90 
That Marcuse was not sure of whether society and with it technology were 
dominative per se is reflected by the fact that, during the 1950s and the 
1960s, he wavered between two assessments of society. On the one hind, he 
viewed society as having potential for change (i. e. as being dynamic) while, 
on the other, he regarded it as static and completely closed. 
91 In treating 
society as dynamic Marcuse had to revise what he perceived as the inner 
contradiction of capitalism: 
Es ist von äußerster Wichtigkeit festzustellen, daß Marx-die Abschaff- 
unf des Privateigentums ausschließlich als Mittel zur Abschaffung 
der entfremdeten Arbeit im Auge faßt und nicht als Selbstzweck. 92 
Marcuse situated capitalism's inherent dynamism in the conflict between 
the productive forces and the productive relations, believing the former 
to be fettered to the latter in terms of their ownership, development 
and application. 
93 
He found this conflict to be particularly acute under late capitalism in a 
number of ways. Firstly, technological rationality itself demanded a move 
towards its own 'consummation ,, a trend countered by "intensive efforts to 
contain it. "94 Marcuse noted a contradiction between technology and the 
profit principle: 
If capitalism does not succeed in exploiting these new possibilities 
of the productive forces and their organization, the productivity of 
labour will fall beneath the level required by the rate of profit. And 
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if capitalism meets this requirement and continues automation 
regardless, it will come up against its own inner limit: the 
sources of surplus value (human surplus 
labour) for the main- 
tenance of society will dwindle away. 95 
Secondly, social productivity and wealth rebelled against the division 
of labour. Marcuse deduced this from technological improvements and 
innovations in production: "If the exploitation of physical labour power in 
the process of production is no longer necessary, then this condition of 
domination is undermined. "96 Thirdly, the consumer society produced such 
affluence that an internal barrier was soon reached, a saturation point of 
the stock and commodity markets. 
97 
As a consequence, the rate cf profit 
followed an even tighter course, forcing ever greater problems on individual 
capitalists. 
98 Marcuse was quick to point out that this variation on classical 
Marxism should nct be mEn to imply an automatic collapse of capitalism. However, 
he envisaged the contradiction between the potential of the productive forces 
and the productive relations to be one that people might become aware of. It 
is the development of such an awareness that the one-dimensional society 
attempts to preclude by levelling out any knowledge of qualitative difference. 
This is what Marcuse meant in his statement that: 
Auf dieser Stufe (that of administered totalitarianism) ist der Wider- 
spruch zwischen den Produktivkräften und den Produktionsverhältnissen 
soweit und so offenbar geworden, daß er rational nicht mehr bewältigt, ' 
nicht mehr ausgedrückt werden kann. Kein technologischer, kein ideo- 
logischer Schleier kann ihnmehr verhüllen. 99 
Marcuse equated this contradiction with late capitalism's production of in- 
satiable needs in the population. Since Marcuse held that the sphere of 
consumption in one-dimensional society determined consciousness, the con- 
sumerism it fostered had to be satisfied if that consciousness were to 
be upheld, and yet if it were to do so capitalism would not remain profit- 
able owing to the wage increases necessary if people were to be able to 
spend more. The fact that production was geared to consumer production could 
not detract, in Marcuse's eyes, from the potential inherent in the productive 
forces. He remarked: 
If the productive apparatus could be organised and directed towards 
the satisfaction of vital needs, its control might well be centralized; 
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such control would not prevent individual autonomy, but render 
it possible. 100 
The 'vital' needs he derived from the basic possibilities offered by auto- 
mation: 
The dynamic of human existence is self-preservation and growth, 
i. e. not only satisfaction of biological needs but also development 
of the needs themselves in accordance with the possibilities which 
emerge in the constant struggle with nature (and with man). 101 
This principle, in turn, allowed him to conjecture on what form the new 
needs would take: 
Moralische und ästhetische Bedürfnisse werden zu grundlegenden, 
vitalen Bedürfnissen und verlangen nach neuen Beziehungen zwischen 
den Geschlechtern, den Generationen, den Männern und Frauen und der 
Natur. 102 
Although Marcuse couched his description of a controlled form of production 
in the future conditional tense and, as we shall see, left it to aesthetics 
and the concept of Eros to define the character of 'vital' needs, he never- 
theless regarded this future society as inherent in late capitalism and as 
rational, as the "Verwirklichung des Begriffs aller Dinge. 103 
The productive forces in this context have come to mean not just any form 
of technology, but specifically automative processes104 as can be seen in 
the following statement: 
Der technische Fortschritt ist Fortschritt in der Möglichkeit mensch- 
licher Freiheit. Das heißt: technischer Fortschritt ist Reduktion und 
Abschaffung entfremdeter Arbeit, Beseitigung der Armut und der Un- 
gleichheit, Schaffung einer freudvollen Lebenswelt. 105 
By viewing automation in this way, Marcuse forewent any application of the 
labour theory of value to automation or to the productive forces. 
106 Rather, 
these are investigated for their emancipatory content in order to prove that 
freedom is possible if it is built upon such automation and if the techno- 
logical forces are used for Utopian ends. 
107 Despite this view of society 
as being dynamic owing to the potential of automation, at certain stages (e. g. 
from the early 1960s) Marcuse supported the thesis that technology was itself 
ideological and, as a consequence, society had to be regarded as static. 
108 
In a discussion of Max Weber Marcuse averred that: "Nicht erst ihre Verwen- 
dung, sondern schon die Technik ist Herrschaft... "109 Marcuse attributed this 
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negative property to the nature of technological rationality as an exten- 
sion of instrumental rationality and viewed the technological apparatus as 
authoritarian in itself 
110in 
that it was founded on domination. Technological 
rationality and its products had therefore to be considered ideological. The 
underlying thought behind this position thus parallels the approach taken 
by Adorno and Horkheimer. Here the base of society itself is perceived by 
Marcuse as ideological whereas (specifically in An Essay on Liberation and 
Konterrevolution und Revolte) it was precisely in the base that he had 
founded the potential of automation and therefore of change. In contra- 
distinction to his view of automation he now believed society was static, 
for it exhibited no potentiality, i. e. it would continue as it was. The 
scientific-technological conglomerate lauded in Marcuse's analysis of auto- 
mation he now damned: 
Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through 
technology, but as technology, and the latter provides the great 
legitimation of the expanding political power which absorbs all 
spheres of culture. 111 
It was thus possible to derive one-dimensionality from the technological 
apparatus itself. 
There are distinct problems in such a 'technocracy' thesis. Marcuse's con- 
cept of technological rationality is unspecific, for - like Adorno and 
Horkheimer - he bundled together all technologies in his equation of tech- 
nology with domination. 
112 He was no longer able to specify which forms of 
technology pertained solely to capitalism and which surpassed the barriers 
inherent in capitalism. 
113 Consequently, there was no reason for him to 
suppose that a future, just society would ever exist, if it were barred 
from using technological or instrumental rationality to provide for its 
members' subsistence. In the light of this proposal, Marcuse could not 
maintain that the future could exist on the basis of a refashioned, eman- 
cipatory technics. He endeavoured to argue that such a refashioning was 
possible, but this goes against the logical grain of his argument. His 
picture of a future society became an arbitrary, voluntaristic 'Entwurf', 
114 
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an existentialist projection or choice between 'good' on the one hand 
and 'bad' on the other. 
On occasion Marcuse reverted to a third, intermediate position, one redo- 
lent of Adorno's work, namely that a new society had to be founded on 
a new technics: 
Die Umwertung der Werte und Zwänge... könnte sehr wohl schon in der 
Konzeption der Technik selbst, im Aufbaudes technisch-wissenschaft- 
lichen Apparats wirksam werden. 115 
This implied using technical knowledge but creating a different technology: 
... und die Errungenschaften der technischen Zivilisation anders zu 
verwenden: zur Befreiung von Mensch und Natur, vom zerstörerischen 
Mißbrauch von Wissenschaft und Technik im Dienst der Ausbeutung. 116 
Such a liberation would have to involve the concept of Eros, for it entailed 
a rediscovery of nature's "lebenssteigernden Kräfte, der sinnlich-ästhetischen 
ualitäten. IJ 
17 W ether this suffices to Q guarantee that the new technics are 
not founded on an instrumental rationality is a moot point, for Marcuse's 
argument here is based more on conjecture than logic. 
118 
Additionally, the 
transcendence of the domination of nature went hand in hand, Marcuse believed, 
with a "pacification of existence", 
119 
a label that points to the quiescent, 
non-instrumental, perhaps even Nirvana-like character Marcuse foresaw the 
new technics as having. He suggested that this sensuous-aesthetic quality 
had to become the informing principle of the new technics: 
The rationality of art, its ability to 'project' existence, to 
define yet unrealized possibilities could then be envisaged as 
validated by and functioning in the scientific-technological 
transformation of the world. 120 
Once more, Marcuse's social theory has to turn to his aesthetics for a 
solution to its and society's problems. 
If society is closed and static, in the sense. that it contains no inherent 
potentiality, technological or otherwise, then the instigators of a new 
rationality must come from outside that hermetic universe. In 'Der, Begriff 
der Negation' Marcuse devised an epistemological basis for this assertion: 
"Das Allgemeine bleibt... außerhalb des Systems der bürgerlichen Gesell- 
,, 121 schafts. In the course of his writings Marcuse turned to the 1960s 
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student movement, to the black population in the United States and to 
the Third World in the search for a group of socially-marginal individuals 
who might prove to be such a catalyst for-change, for he considered social 
marginality to be a guarantee of such groups' exclusion from society. In 
the last five years of his work Marcuse then addressed his attention spec- 
ifically to feminism and the women's movement, seeing in them a potential 
for qualitative change. 
This conception of catalysts led Marcuse to adjust the concept of revolution 
in order to centre it on those vanguard or catalysts groups which, in his 
view, constituted a conscious opposition to society. Conscious opposition 
to the closed society amounted, he believed, to the determinate negation 
of one-dimensional society, for any questioning of that society was equiv- 
alent to its negation. The sole example in existence of such a form of 
determinate negation perceivable to the beholder was, he affirmed, to be 
found in art. In this manner his aesthetics became at times a 'Tendenz- 
ästhetik', for it was allied to his political diagnosis of society. In 
art, hestated: 
The tension between the actual and the possible is transfigured into 
an insoluble conflict, in which reconciliation is by grace of the 
oeuvre as form: beauty as the 'promesse de bonheur'. In the form of 
the ceuvre, the actual circumstances are placed in another dimen- 
sion where the given reality shows itself as that which it is. Thus 
it tells the truth about itself,... Fiction calls the facts by their 
name and their reign collapses... 122 
As was the case in his socio-psychology and his theory of one-dimension- 
ality, Marcuse's theory of a new technics and a new form of revolution 
hinges in the final instance on his conceptualisation of art's trans- 
historical properties. It is to this field that we shall now turn. 
5. The Dual Character of Marcuse's Aesthetics 
As a 
. 
consequence of its position in relation to the two strands of his 
analysis of society, Marcuse's aesthetics also divides into two branches: 
one pointing to a possible future, the other concerned with the closed 
society. The one branch is founded on his conception of a new, libidinous 
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society being potentially possible given the achievements of automation, 
whereas the other variant, centres on preserving an image of erotic 
reason in the one-dimensional. 
Marcuse's discussion of a possible, libidinous future was based not only on 
his study of Freud but also on the interpretation of Kant and Schiller that 
he propounded in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft. There Marcuse made use 
specifically of both Kant's notion of 'purposive purposelessness' and 
Schiller's conception of an 'aesthetic State'. Using these two ideas he 
established a political aesthetics which considered art to be the paradigm 
of a future society founded on play rather than alienated labour and which 
thus showed society to be dynamic. This first aesthetics therefore referred 
to what can be gained from an experience of art and did- not concentrate 
on an interpretation of artworks themselves; it can thus be considered a 
theory of asethetic experience. 
Marcuse derived this intimate connection of art and playfulness from his 
study of Freud. First of all, he suggested, art was governed by Eros and 
therefore bound up with what he termed real necessity. 
123 Accordingly, he 
viewed both art's production and consumption as libidinous forms of activity, 
an assertion which allowed him to claim that artistic labour, by virtue of 
its being libidinous in character, was free of repression: 
Künstlerische Arbeit, wo sie echt ist, scheint aus einer verdrdng- 
ungslosen Triebkonstellation zu erwachsen und verdrängungslose 
Ziele und Zwecke anzustreben... 124 
Ignoring for the moment the problematic construct of ' authenticity' we can 
turn to the effect attributed to art in Marcuse's conceptualisation. Since 
art was 'free play' in a libidinous sense, Marcuse maintained it showed in 
its form what a future, non-repressive society could be and opposed the 
present state of things in the sense that 'free play' was not compatible 
with an administered society. 
125 
Despite this orientation towards the future, Marcuse's aesthetics is not 
similar to Adorno's theory of aesthetic experience, for the concept of 
-310- 
the non-identical here is based causally on a conception of artistic 
alienation as Freudian sublimation, 
126 
and not on a study of the inner 
construction of the artwork. Although Marcuse emphasized the centrality 
of aesthetic form in the constitution of an image of non-repression, he 
did not deduce his findings in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft from a study 
of particular artworks, as Adorno had done. Rather, he discussed the 
asethetic form in general with a view to discovering the properties inherent 
in beauty that accentuate an experience of what could be a non-repressive 
future. Marcuse remarked: 
Hinter der sublimierten ästhetischen Form kommt der unsublimierte 
Inhalt zum Vorschein: die Verhaftung der Kunst an das Lustprinzip 
... 
Ästhetische Form ist sinnliche Form. 127 
By virtue of its being bound up with the pleasure principle aesthetic form 
could be taken as the astral governing principle on which to erect a future 
society, because such form could be extended to incorporate either the 
life-world beyond automation or even the labour inherent in automation 
itself. The foundations of a future, utopian society could therefore, Marcuse 
suggested, be laid on the basis of an experience of art. 
128 Hence society 
could be changed and should not be considered closed. 
Marcuse's second aesthetic position differed radically from the first in 
that it was not oriented towards the future, but was situated in the present, 
and accorded with his analysis of technological rationality. Rather than 
attempting to formulate a new concept of philosophical reason, as Adorno 
had done, Marcuse resituated reason in Eros. In the face of the one-dimen- 
sional society meta-psychological ideas became revolutionary 
129 
and their 
preserve Marcuse 1oc ad in art. Thus in the one-dimensional society art 
became the sphere in which a knowledge or image of the reality behind the 
veil of ideology was kept alive: 
The aesthetic dimension still retains a freedom of expression which 
enables the writer and artist to call men and things by their name 
- to name the otherwise unnameable. 130 
Marcuse attributed this ability to pierce ideology to the artwork's 
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one addresses the present, the other draws from this present something for 
the future. The combination of outer and inner person Marcuse mentions 
attests to the continual interface in his writings between aesthetics and 
social theory. 
Marcuse's thesis on technological rationality's inherent domination can, 
unlike his analysis of automation, only make use of the second aesthetic 
position. Since there is no possibility of a different future one can at 
most only hope that the idea of 'anotherness' hibernates within the hermetic 
society, ready to be resuscitated at a later date. Only at a remote time in 
the distant future could a utopia based on aesthetic experience be contem- 
plated. In other words, the one aesthetics' orientation towards the 
future can, in the context of the one-dimensional society, only be contem- 
plated from beyond that social system, whereas in Marcuse's earlier social 
theory it was a projection within that system. This difference will become 
clearer with an elaboration of the respective aesthetic positions. 
6. The Theory of Aesthetic Experience 
Marcuse located his aesthetics of experience in the one-dimensional society. 
By virtue of an experience of art, he maintained, the stranglehold of the 
culture industry could be broken and society could subsequently be changed. 
Marcuse grounded the means of attack - art - in the imagination, a concept 
which is thus central to his aesthetics. Imagination, Marcuse argued, was 
on the one hand closely connected to the pleasure principle 
133 
and on the 
other hand formed the very basis of art. It was therefore by virtue of the 
imagination that erotic content became instilled in art. Equally, the ima- 
gination opposed instrumental reason in that it mediated between sensibility 
one the one side and theoretical and practical reason on the other. 
134 
In 
other words, the imagination was hybrid, for it was both sensuous and idea- 
tional, both erotic and sublimated. From this positioning Marcuse was able 
to deduce the existence of two forms of emancipatory knowledge in the imag- 
ination - and, by extension, in art. He stated first of all that: 
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Phantasie bewahrt - als Erkenntnis - das Bewußtsein der unauf- 
löslichen Spannung zwischen Idee und Realität, zwischen Möglich- 
keit und Wirklichkeit. Das ist der idealistische Kern des dialekt- 
ischen Materialismus. 135 
Secondly, he coupled this form to another aspect of knowledge found in 
the imagination: 
Die Phantasie sieht das Bild der Wiederversöhnung des Einzelnen 
mit dem Ganzen... Die Analyse der erkennenden Funktion der Phan- 
tasie wird so zur Ästhetik. 136 
The theory of aesthetic experience, i. e. that embracing both art's applic- 
ation to the future and art as a symbol of what is false in society now, 
was thus judged by Marcuse to be a result of its production by the 
imagination. 
137 
As a consequence of the two forms of knowledge that it involved, and its 
subversion of reality as a result of the 'language' it used, 
138 
the exper- 
ience of art, for Marcuse, broke the total alienation of the mind as well 
as keeping alive the possibility of a new, free society. Since a new society 
could be created on the basis of automation a cultural revolution, founded 
on the properties of the imagination present in art and led by a small elite, 
could bring about the necessary change of the social structure. This would 
open up society to the possibility of a different use of the base, if not 
an actual change of the base, Marcuse being ambiguous as to whether only 
production relations or also the productive forces would be altered. 
This conception of the experience of art as the cornerstone of a cultural 
revolution is indebted both to Schiller's writings and to early Hegelian 
and German Romantic thought. Although in his later thought Hegel was to 
turn away from 'aesthetic experience and behaviour', in his early writings 
e. g. the Systemfragment' of 1793-97 - he allotted art a central furttion. As 
is the case in Marcuse's theory of aesthetic experience, Hegel held art 
to contain a future-orientated facility for reconciliation by virtue of 
which it became the hub potentially of an 'ethical totality' that could 
overcome Modernity's division of the world into physicality and spirituality. 
Reason, for Hegel as later for Marcuse, became an 'aesthetic act', sensuous- 
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ly tangible metapoesis. 
Marcuse's aesthetics also mirrors the concern of Novalis and the Romantics 
with recreating the unity of life by poeticizing existence. For Marcuse, 
art depicted an 'ought' which had still to become an 'is', an idea similar 
to the Romantics' notion of 'sein' and 'sollen'. A world inhabited by Eros 
would offer a 'totality of life-meaning' and would also be based on the 
'non-conceptuality' ('Nichtbegrifflichkeit') of free existence espoused by 
the Romantics and Marcuse alike. 
The conception of aesthetic experience or, alternatively, aesthetic judge- 
ment must be distinguished from the concept of judgement that Kant devised. 
Kant had seen aesthetic judgement as a necessary and beneficial median 
between and complement of theoretical and practical reason in that it was 
intuitive and yet ethical. 
139 For Marcuse, however, aesthetic judgement 
became the basis for an implementation of practical reason, for an injection 
of the 'sublime' into human existence, because aesthetic experience allowed 
for a new theoretical understanding of the world, namely one aligned to 
Eros not Logos, and thus provided the foundation for a new society. 
Artistic form is connected in two ways to the establishment of a new 
society in Marcuse's work, both resting on the assumption that a conscious- 
ness of artistic form can prompt the erection of the new society (without 
this implying that art in the future will become reduced to society). 
140 
On the one hand, Marcuse argued that the form of art could be applied to 
the life-world, so that society would be informed by art's libidinous and 
non-dominatory principles. In essays in Neues Forum and New Left Review he 
spoke of "die Gesellschaft als Kunstwerk". 
141 Such a relation between art 
and society would mean the abolition of surplus repression and the unleashing 
of human creativity, but it also implied that basic repression would still 
be required in the form of labour in order for necessities to be produced. 
142 
The underlying rationality of production (e. g. automation) would therefore 
143 
remain unaffected by art's role as the informing principle of society. 
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On the other hand, Marcuse also suggested that the aesthetic dimension 
should invade the sphere of material production, precisely to change the 
otherwise dominatory rationality of the production of necessities. His 
description of "the aesthetic as the possible Form of a free socity"144 
thus takes on a new meaning. Intellectual and material production would 
merge, as a result of which the division of labour would cease to be an 
"Umgestaltung der Wirklichkeit". 145 Because Marcuse spoke of the xperience 
of the aesthetic he was able to suggest that such an aesthetic consciousness 
could infiltrate and thereby subvert and sublate material production, whereas 
an aesthetic of the artwork, as is found in Adorno's writings, would resist 
such an extension to the material realm. 
146 Art, in Marcuse's view, could 
become a "gesellschaftliche Produktivkraft .,, 
147 There is a problem with this 
conception, for Marcuse lauded aesthetic experience for its quiescent, con- 
templative approach to life, and yet it is this same attitude which is to 
influence the production of the necessities of existence. This paradox of 
the active being passive and vice versa led Marcuse to reexamine the con- 
cepts of 'praxis' and 'necessity' in the context of his conceptualisation 
of the twofold application of aesthetic experience. 
Marcuse deployed the concepts of freedom, necessity and praxis in a different 
way to their traditional usage within Marxist phil ophy. Insteal. of the 
aesthetics compensating for difficulties encountered by a system of philos- 
ophy, as was the case in Adorno's work, Marcuse altered his philosophical 
framework out of an interest in aesthetics. The new concept of production 
in Marcuse's theory of aesthetic experience engendered a notion of praxis 
indebted to aesthetics that is concrete in a manner more physical than that 
found in classical Marxism, because praxis comes to be grounded in the 
libido and the senses. By fusing Kantian aesthetics and Marxist politics 
Marcuse defined praxis as a "Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zwecke", a "Gesetzmäßigkeit 
ohne Gesetze. "148 Aesthetics thus becomes the basis for Marcuse's political 
philosophy. 
His conceptualisation of praxis, however, meets with two difficulties. 
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Firstly, if Marcuse intended his notion of bourgeois art to contrast with 
instrumental praxis, how would production of anything other than artworks 
be possible in the future society? If, nevertheless, aesthetic experience 
governs production, then one must assume that the future society would be 
rendered one-dimensional in character. It would absorb art's form and style 
into its fabric and thereby prune art of any transcendent properties. 
149 
Secondly, the treatment of nature and the environment as equal subjects 
rather than as objects implies a passive coexistence with nature instead 
of a 'working upon' it: 
All joy and happiness derives from the ability to transcend Nature - 
a transcendence in which the mastery of Nature is itself subordinated 
to liberation and pacification of existence. All tranquility, all 
delight is the result of conscious mediation of autonomy and contra- 
diction. 150 
Because of its grounding in art, the new form of praxis is quietistic - 
centring on reaction, not action - as had been the case in Adorno's work. 
151 
By any meaningful standards Marcuse's concept of 'aesthetic' praxis 
reveals itself to be a conception of non-praxis, of thought, as it was 
in Adorno's work: 
Freedom originated indeed in the mind of man, in his ability to 
comprehend his world, and thus comprehension is praxis, in as 
much as it establishes a specific order of facts. 152 
Marcuse's refounding of reason via a passage through aesthetic experience 
culminates in the replacement of a praxis of appropriation by a mentalized 
praxis on the part of the beholder of art. Eros opposes Logos, which in the 
original Greek meant 'action'. Hence, the opposite of Logos must also oppose 
action. Any change of society must surely be decidedly limited if founded 
on such a contemplative stance and yet Marcuse set out to find an appropriate 
catalyst which would generate change using precisely this new notion of 
praxis. His redefinition of praxis involved Marcuse redefining the category 
of necessity in aesthetic terms. If praxis and technics are held to be 
qualitatively other than those at present dominant, then the impetus that 
produces them will also be new. In this context Marcuse also maintained that 
necessity took on anew form in present society. Since society was reps sive, 
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libidinous needs remained unfulfilled, the main need thus being for the 
social structure to be changed. 
153 The need for change became true necessity, 
for without such a change no life could be-true in aesthetic or libidinous 
terms. Marcuse stated: 
If freedom is man's ability to determine his own life without 
depriving others of this ability, then freedom has never been 
a historical reality - to this very day. 154 
In this sense freedom and necessity are closely allied in Marcuse's work. 
As a consequence, he had to rethink the traditional Marxist opposition of 
the two categories and the aesthetics again intervene in his social theory 
and cause it to be modified. 
Two possible relations could obtain between freedom and necessity if the 
aesthetic and libidinous moments were the constituents of freedom, for, as 
we have seen, Marcuse conceived of such a society in two distinct ways: 
with automation either affected or unaffected by the aesthetic-libidinous 
element. One the one hand, if material production is held to be separate 
from the aesthetic-libidinous social structure, which is by definition 
free, then the former can be judged to provide for necessity. Necessity 
and freedom would in this case be completely separated, whereas in late 
capitalism they are held to interplay. On the other hand, if present tech- 
nology is perceived to be ideological and the productive forces were thus 
changed to accord with aesthetic-libidinous criteria in the new society, 
then within that society freedom and necessity could, and indeed would 
coincide. Marcuse stated in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft: 
Es ist die Sphäre jenseits der Arbeitsteilung, die die Freiheit und 
die Erfüllung definiert, und es ist die Definition der menschlichen 
Existenz im Sinne dieser Sphäre, die die Verneinung des Lustprinzips 
ausmacht. 155 
In other words, by altering the productive forces to accord with aesthetic- 
libidinous criteria, the very distinction between freedom and necessity 
would become obsolete. 
156 
Marcuse thus used aesthetics to aid his social theory. The aesthetic- 
libidinous criteria although, as we saw above, essentially passive, ensure 
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that ideology critique is injected with a subjective moment that is lost 
in vulgar materialism. In his vision of subject and object meeting in a 
change of the base Marcuse reintegrated the subjectivity of Marx's Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts into a critique of political economy. However, 
this interlinking of a theory of aesthetic experience with his theory of 
society and his philosophical categories is not without its drawbacks for 
the theory as an aesthetics. The interconnection of political and aesthetic 
statements deprived Marcuse's work on art of any claim it might otherwise 
have laid to providing an aesthetics. 
157 In the manner in which they are 
presented in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft and An Essay on Liberation, 
Marcuse's remarks on art do not form an aesthetics, for they do not specify 
how one is to judge artistic properties, rather they ascertain in what 
fashion art could form the substance of a future life. Art is examined not 
as a compensation for the cul-de-sac reached by social theory but for the 
paradigmatic manner in which it shows that social theory in general to be 
still valid. Unlike Adorno, Marcuse did not outline the current form the 
aesthetic qualities took, but was interested in their general application 
in term§ of the future. Accordingly, Marcuse did not address the questions 
central to a Marxist aesthetics, namely the positioning of art as an object 
in society and society's infiltration into art. Instead he produced a theory 
of society and then a theory of art's future function within it derived 
from art's general properties. 
158 These criticisms will be discussed once 
the relationship between the two strands of Marcuse's aesthetics and his 
political philosophy have been treated in greater depth. 
The first link between Marcuse's aesthetics and his political philosophy is 
formed by the reliance of his aesthetics on his concept of Eros. The found- 
ing of Eros in art, and thus the construction of an image of an alternative 
society, must be seen from this perspective. Here a parallel exists between 
Marcuse and Adorno, for Marcuse attempted by means of the image of an aesth- 
etic-libidinous society to refound the critique of society, just as Adorno 
resorted to aesthetics in order to preserve the critique. The philwphical 
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concepts of nature and instrumental rationality that Marcuse provided are 
both inadequate to this task with the result that only by using the theory 
of aesthetic experience was he able to ground the theoretical critique 
offered by his elaboration of the concept of Eros. 
159 The social theory 
cannot stand on its own two feet, and, consequently, neither can the aesth- 
etics. Marcuse tried, nevertheless, to examine artworks historically in 
order to give his aesthetics substance. Despite his detaching of aesthetics 
from an interpretation of artworks, as in the statement: "Nach meinem 
Begriff ist die Kunst nur Ästhetisierung von Inhalten, 
J60 Marcuse still 
located artworks according to time and place. This is to be seen both in 
his characterisation of the political moment of art, namely that the art- 
work had a progressive political function to play in certain historical 
situations, and in the proposal that in certain situations the sublimation 
of artistic energy which made art possible was a positive feature in that 
it opposed the prevalent 'repressive desublimation'. This historical spec- 
ification, it must be said, applies only to the function, not to the form 
or quality of art. 
A conservative strand inheres in this concern with the possible functions 
of art. The political function of art was found by Marcuse to be a solely 
aesthetic property; 
161 he situated it in art's transhistorical form. Con- 
sequently he rejected such avant-garde artforms such as Surrealism, for he 
found that the de-aestheticisation which these promoted ran counter to an 
emancipation of the sensesin society. Although this may have been far from 
the Surrealists' intentions, Marcuse argued that "jede unsublimierte, unmit- 
telbare Darstellung ist zur Unwahrheit verurteilt. 
J62 He thus repeated 
Schiller's warning against any emancipation of the 'idea' at the cost of 
an emancipation of the senses. 
Marcuse found the two forms of emancipation balanced in the liberal bour- 
geois artwork in contrast to most 20th century avant-garde art where this 
balance was altered quite radically. Unlike Adorno, Marcuse rejected most 
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avant-garde and 'progressive' artforms on the somewhat lame grounds that 
a merger of art and revolution had to occur in "der ästhetischen Dimension, 
in der Kunst selbst. , 
163 But it is precisely this fusion that most avant-garde 
art archives., Surrealism (the main target of Marcuse's criticisms) included. 
At most, therefore, Marcuse's charge can be levelled only against overtly 
political art, which, be it street theatre or cabaret, documentary theatre 
or agitprop, automatically lost any status as art if one applies Marcuse's 
definition (although he was on occasion to praise it). Marcuse's theory of 
aesthetic experience thus relies on a definition of art culled from the 
liberal bourgeois artwork rather than from art in general. It is here that 
the connection of the theory to the other strand of Marcuse's aesthetics, 
namely his interest in affirmative culture, becomes most apparent. 
Marcuse's writings on art have been seen above to be political in character. 
To the extent that they can be called an aesthetics at all one would have to 
speak of a 'Tendenzästhetik'. 
164 His critique of reason as unreason changed 
in line with overt political considerations at the time of writings, 
165 
and, as Heinz Lubasz has observed: 
Das vielleicht anfälligste Phänomen an dem Wechsel in Marcuses Posit- 
ionen ist, daß er keineswegs von theorieimmanenten Entwicklungen der 
Kritischen Theorie selbst herrührt, sondern aus der Praxis. 166 
Hence Marcuse's statements on aesthetics changed in the course of the post- 
War era-. In Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft and again in An Essay on Liberation 
Kant and Schiller's ideas were adopted and adapted in an optimistic theory 
of aesthetic experience that culminated in Marcuse's, conception of a 'new 
sensibility'. Art was considered to be the instigator of a change in con- 
sciousness, but was restricted solely to this role. 
In contrast, in One-Dimensional Man, Konterrevolution und Revolte and, lastly, 
in Die Permanenz der Kunst, Marcuse changed his approach for those political 
considerations render his writings more pessimistic in tone. Although still 
adhering to the fundamental relation between free nature and art, he retract- 
ed his claim that aesthetic experience could change the world: 
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Als ästhetisches Phänomen hebt die kritische Funktion der Kunst 
sich selbst auf. gerade das Verhaftetsein an die Form entkräftet 
und verfälscht die Negation der Unfreiheit in der Kunst. 167 
He came instead to view bourgeois art as a preserve of truth, thus inverting 
his 1937 analysis of affirmative culture. In the face of a closed society 
bourgeois art was held to be progressive: "... der rückschrittliche, politi- 
sche Inhalt wird absorbiert, aufgehoben in der künstlerischen Form: im Werk 
als Literatur. " 
168 
The bourgeois canon of literature was now regarded not 
as the source of the future but as the sine qua non of literature. Marcuse 
championed the 'form' of art in opposition to the 'artwork' as an historical 
entity and universalized artistic form for its transcendent properties. 
Before embarking on further criticism, however, it is necessary to investi- 
gate more closely this jettisoning of an aesthetics of experience in favour 
of an aesthetics of bourgeois art. 
7. Affirmative Culture Revisited 
In his various discussions of bourgeois art Marcuse suggested that the 
essence of art was its portrayal of an unfulfilling society; this portrayal 
linked aesthetic form and Eros. Despite the fact that art itself inevitably 
functioned as wish-fulfilment. he argued that it nevertheless had a demyth- 
ologizing, materialist function: 
Wo diese Spannung zwischen Affirmation und Negation, zwischen Freude 
und Leid, zwischen höherer und materieller Kultur nicht mehr besteht, 
wo das Werk die dialektische Einheit dessen, was ist, und dessen, was 
sein kann (und sollte), nicht mehr aushält, hat Kunst ihre Wahrheit, ja, 
sich selbst verloren. 169 
On the basis of this definition of art Marcuse was able to propose that 
the relation between art and reality was one of art's transcendence of 
society: "Das authentische Kunstwerk steht unter dem Gesetz des Bestehenden, 
indem es dieses Gesetz übersteigt. , 
170 Fiction, founded on a metalanguage, 
171 
created a 'reality' that contested the validity of social reality. This, 
for Marcuse, was artistic transcendence. 
As early as Die Gesellschaftslehre des Sowjetmarxismus, however, Marcuse 
ascertained that the closed or one-dimensional society threatened such art- 
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is tic transcendence: 
Ihrer gesellschaftlichen'Basis Widerstand zu leisten, beraubt ist 
die Kultur zu einem Zahnrad in der Maschine geworden - Bestandteil 
des verwalteten privaten und öffentlichen Daseins. 172 
The one-dimensional'society signalled this end of art in a number of ways. 
Firstly, it tapped the sublimating energies necessary for the production of 
art by means of 'repressive desublimation', 
173 thus eliminating the faculty 
of imagination. Secondly, the one-dimensional society made impossible any 
174 
artistic depiction of itself, since its totalitarian nature could not be 
communicated. In summary: 
Das Absterben der Organe für künstlerische Entfremdung ist das Ergebnis 
materieller Prozesse. Die totalitäre Organisation der Gesellschaft, 
ihre Gewalt und Aggressivität sind in den inneren und äußeren Räumen 
eingedrungen, in dem die extremen Qualitäten von Kunst noch erfahren 
und guten Glaubens akzeptiert werden könnten. 175 
The more liberal bourgeois art lost its socially dominant position, however, 
176 
the more dissynchronous and in so doing the more negative it became. By 
judging art's dissynchronicity to be negative, i. e. positive, Marcuse simul- 
taneously criticized art's opposite, material culture. Material culture was 
negative precisely because productive forces lagged behind what could be 
made of them. It is because of this dissynchronous quality that Marcuse 
places so much faith in the liberal bourgeois artwork (unlike Lukäcs, of 
course, who championed the work of bourgeois writers such as Tolstoy pre- 
cisely on account of the totalising property he discerned in their work). 
Indeed, Marcuse commenced the central chapter on art and revolution in 
Konterrevolution und Revolte by quoting Marx on dissynchronicity. 
177 This 
quality was generated, he maintained, by the structure of fiction from 
which an artwork drew its vitality: 
Die Fiktion schafft ihre eigene Realität: eine Welt von Bedeutungen, 
die gültig bleibt, auch wo sie von der bestehenden Realität Lügen 
gestraft wird. 178 
It is to the validity of this central position which the dissynchronous 
character of liberal bourgeois art is accorded in Marcuse's conception of 
a cultural revolution that we shall now turn, for surely it can be objected 
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that bourgeois artworks do not contain only transcendent properties 
but also something of the needs of bourgeois society from whence they 
originated. 
Marcuse grounded the artwork's dissynchronicity in his category of remem- 
brance (the connection between aesthetic and psychological remembrance being 
suggested in the last sentence of Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft). In the 
one-dimensional society aesthetic remembrance, in which past artworks jolted 
and stimulated the memory, jarred the observer into critical thought. 
179 At 
a point in time where 'civilization' dominated 'culture', remembering 'culture' 
had become a subversive activity and it was the dissynchronous character 
of the bourgeois artwork, Marcuse argued, which kept such subversion alive. 
In its opposition to the one-dimensional society, the bourgeois artwork 
could be seen now as revolutionary in so has as it negated present reality: 
Die Theorie bringt die Wirklichkeit auf ihrem Begriff; die Kunst 
ist Versinnlichung des Begriffs, das bedeutet, verändernde Ent- 
wirklichung der gegebenen Realität. 180 
Marcuse supported this claim by stating that the erstwhile affirmative 
values were now objectively negative, i. e. positive with regard to the 
future. These values persisted in an image of society's 'otherness' by means 
of the artistic, sublimating form in which they were embedded. This recalls 
Marcuse's suggestion that artistic form could no longer present such trans- 
cendent values, because the production and understanding of such form was 
precluded by a one-dimensional understanding of the world. In other words, 
Marcuse contended that as of 1945 (i. e. with the end of overt totalitarian- 
ism) it was no longer possible to produce artworks. His theory thereby takes 
up Adorno's dictum that after Auschwitz no poetry could be written as well as 
subscribing to the thesis that the end of art had come. This teleological 
argument thus refers back to the mainpoint iiade in Marcuse's discussion of 
the dissynchronous artwork, namely that the form of art was the transcendent 
value inherent in art. 
In the absence of current artistic production, Marcuse maintained, affirmative 
artworks exhibited a series of qualities lost in the one-dimensional society., 
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Primarily, they reminded the beholder that a private sphere did once 
exist, even though this realm of individuality was itself threatened by 
liberal capitalism. 
181 
At the same time these anachronistic artworks 
showed the harmlessness of Idealism by indicating that nothing could be 
achieved if individuality were established only in the realm of fiction. 
182 
They indicated that a future artistic sensibility could pervade individuality 
creating a positive 'unity' of individual and society, whereas at present 
mass culture's ever-widening domain created a 'negative unity' of the 
same. 
More fundamentally, Marcuse proposed that the autonomous liberal bourgeois 
artwork was itself an entity that could not be subsumed under society, 
183 
an opposition mirrored in the artwork's remembrance of individuality. Unlike 
Adorno, Marcuse did not, however, trace this quality within the contours of 
the artwork's construction. All these qualities attributed by Marcuse to 
affirmative artworks are based on certain presuppositions that he made 
about the character of art. A precondition for the negating properties of 
these artworks is, for example, that they can be understood to be oppo- 
sitional, that is to say, that the values they bear are recognisable. Indeed, 
all Marcuse's remarks on the dissynchronous artwork rely, somewhat paradox- 
ically, on the assumed existence of a beholder of the artwork who is able 
to view these the artworks in this manner, namely to be able to abstract 
from the particularity of the artwork's fiction to a more general, universal 
theoretical attitude. However, Marcuse's conceptualisation started from 
the assumption that such recognition was impossible. His argumentation that 
affirmative artworks are now positive would thus indicate that he did not 
believe society was factually closed, but was only tendentially becoming 
so, for artworks, at least, function to prevent such an outcome. His aesthe- 
tics thus proves the starting point of his social theory to be wrong. 
In Die Permanenz der Kunst, his last work, Marcuse addressed only the ter- 
rain marked out as dissynchronous culture. As had been the case in Konter- 
revolution und Revolte and One'Dimensional Man, he played Surrealism off 
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against past liberal bourgeois art on the grounds that Surrealism broke 
with the artistic form that was necessary if art were to oppose reality. 
What the outline of dissynchronous art thus essentially depicts is an 
aesthetics of past art since none can be made in the present, there being 
no contemporary art. This is quite the opposite of the bridge between 
theory and praxis that surely had to be provided if the aesthetics of exper- 
ience were to be anchored in the dissynchronous artwork. In this regard, 
C Fred Alford's remark is most apt: 
In The Aesthetic Dimension, he (Marcuse) comes to terms with the 
fact that certainelements in his vision of liberation, particularly 
those pertaining to the 'resurrection of nature' will never be 
realized. 184 
The theory of aesthetic experience and the aesthetics of dissynchronous art 
do not coalesce, as we had initially supposed, but remain two separate 
approaches to the question of art's relation to the closed society. 
The divergence between the two strands of his aesthetics is most noticeable 
when Marcuse turns to the connection between artistic beauty and natural 
beauty. Marcuse's argument had been that the portrayal of beauty as aesthe- 
tic form approximated to the portrait of beautiful (as free) nature both 
in and external to mankind. The nature presented in artistic beauty pertains, 
however, only to the future: "it (art) presents as being that which is 
not. "185 Art is thus mimetic in the sense Adorno gave the word. Art's 
purposive purposelessness mirrors that of a future nature, it mediates 
between mankind and a future treatment of nature. 
186 Consequently, in 
Marcuse's opinion, nature and art merged only when viewed from the stand- 
point of a 'new sensibility', i. e. of aesthetic experience. The transcen- 
dence innate in artistic form allowed for a transcendent attitude towards 
nature, freeing reason from naturalisation, i. e. instrumentality. 
187 
This relation of art and nature implies, however, an opposition between 
history on the one hand and nature and art on the other, for nature has 
to be construed as a quality or quantity outside man's perception of it 
(otherwise it could not be regarded as transcendent). Precisely this meta- 
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physical property is omitted from Marcuse's discussion of the relation 
of art to nature in his analysis of dissynchronous culture where he held 
nature to exist in a form beyond that accessible to artistic form. He was 
unable, therefore, to draw a parallel between artistic beauty and natural 
beauty with regard to bourgeois art: 
The beautiful as Form of such a totality (of life) can never be natural, 
immediate, it must be created and mediated by reason and imagination 
in the most exacting sense. Thus it is the result of technique..., a 
technique freed from the destructive powers. 188 
Thus, his aesthetics of experience cannot be grounded in his aesthetics 
of bourgeois art. 
This does not mean to say that Marcuse was only able to conjecture as to 
the relation of art and nature, or between art and history, in his discus- 
sion of dissynchronous art. The opposition between art and history in Mar- 
cuse's analysis of dissynchronous culture is not reducible to the glaring 
lack of periodization in his writings, 
189 but must be regarded as an unfor- 
tunate logical consequence of his having implanted his notion of 'transcen- 
dency' in affirmative culture. Bereft of such transcendency, affirmative 
culture would retain no truth content and the stark opposition Marcuse con- 
structed between anti-capitalist capitalist art and late capitalism would 
be forfeited: "Als 'Ideologie' setzt Kunst die herrschende Ideologie außer 
Kraft. "190 Marcuse failed to reflect on this relation in terms of the 
historicity of artistic form, as had Adorno, so that he was unable to explain 
what forms were anti-capitalist and what made them so. (His over-generalised 
remarks on Surrealism are particularly revealing in this context. ) Rather, 
for Marcuse, all artistic form per se was anti-capitalist, and all artistic 
form was dissynchronous, 
191 
I. e. no art existed other than past, bourgeois 
artworks, or artworks obeying the rules of these dissynchronous pieces of 
art. Admittedly, Marcuse is more consistent than Adorno on this point, but 
he pays a heavy theoretical price for such consistency, as his theory becomes 
a complete generalisation. 
The discussion uncovers a central problem in Marcuse's aesthetics of bour- 
r 
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geois art. Marcuse held authentic, i. e. liberal bourgeois, art to trans- 
cend 'history' (understood as social history)192 without, however, seeing 
fit to grant its own authentic history. He argued: 
Diese ästhetischen Formen sind geschichtliche Formen der kritischen 
Transzendenz, mit der die Kunst die Veränderung der Gesellschaft 
begleitet. 193 
Form itself was thus accorded no internal development, but hypostatis. ed in 
contrast to the de-aestheticisation or deformation of art that Marcuse 
perceived, for example, in Surrealism. Consequently, Marcuse opposed art 
to society without relating them, whereas Adorno, Benjamin and Lukäcs, for 
example, all devoted much of their work to this problematic relation. 
The opposition of art to society and social history must be specified some- 
what further. The artistic form that Marcuse opposed to society was the 
form of affirmative culture understood as aesthetic form in general. Yet, 
when speaking of such affirmative culture Marcuse referred to early bour- 
geois culture, to the culture of liberal capitalism. (his references to 
Brecht, particularly in Konterevolution und Revolte and One-Dimensional Man, 
cannot be taken as an exception to this rule, partly because of their dis- 
astrous maltreatment of Brecht's central ideas and partly because the 
quotations are meant to depict an ephemeral, intangible image of freedom 
rather than aesthetic form itself). The opposition he envisaged between art 
and society must be regarded as being between dissynchronous culture and 
late capitalism. Marcuse observed in Die Gesellschaftslehre des Sowjetmarx- 
ismus that: 
Je mehr die Basis auf die Ideologie übergreift und mit der bestehenden 
Ordnung gleichschaltet, desto mehr wird die ideologische Sphäre, die 
von der Wirklichkeit am entferntesten ist (Kunst, Philosophie) eben 
wegen dieser Entfernung zur letzten Zufluchtsstätte der Opposition 
gegen diese Ordnung. 194 
He thus saw a liberal ideology existing alongside a later ideology. The 
generalisations Marcuse drew from this specific historical context are 
untenable in that they belie the specificity of such an opposition. Thus, 
the period of transition from liberal to late capitalism represented in 
and exemplified by the works of, for instance, Kafka, Joyce and Proust, 
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or even the Surrealists, is not only left relatively untouched by Marcuse, 
but reduced falsely to innate properties of artistic form Marcuse derived 
from the opposition of art to society. 
195 
It was an awareness of the importance of this transitional period and of 
the implications of the three aforementioned authors that led to the antago- 
nism between Adorno and Lukäcs and to the interest Benjamin and Brecht showed 
in the period. Whereas Marcuse avoided Adorno and Lukäcs' repetitive cham- 
pioning of one particular genre to the detriment of others by spanning in 
his work all of early bourgeois art, he nevertheless offered little more 
than a tentative piece of literary criticism of that art. 
196 In Marcuse's 
construction of an opposition between past art and present society such art's 
form should have a social history, for the form must at least in part be the 
result of the past society in which it originated. However, Marcuse ignored 
any consideration of such historicity except for his occasional mention of 
early bourgeois ideals; he engaged in no discussion of the characteristics 
of, say, autonomy. 
197 
In this context he failed to mediate the antagonism 
of art to society in terms of two inter-related, albeit epistemologically 
separate spheres. He relegated the content of the artwork to social history, 
while holding the form to be transcendent, although quite how it is so 
remains unexplained, 
198 for often Marcuse's explanations were no more than 
mere assertions, as for example: "Die künstlerischen Bilder haben an der 
bestimmten Negation der bestehenden Wirklichkeit und damit an der höchsten 
Freiheit festgehalten. 11199 The quality of transcendence is asserted, but not 
explained causally, in terms of the bourgeois artwork's autonomy. 
This lack of causal explanation is attributable to the function Marcuse 
judged affirmative art's form to possess in the present. Marcuse deemed early 
bourgeois artworks to negate the present because of the symbolic value they 
bore in opposition to the present. This construction of a symbolic opposition 
goes some way toward explaining why Marcuse offered no socio-historical 
discussion of artistic form, and yet Marcuse's portrayal of the opposition 
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of art to society is still devoid of any rigorous historical foundation. The 
opposition of past art to present society is symbolic and will always be so, 
even when opposition to society is founded on aesthetic experience, for 
otherwise Marcuse would reduce art to society in the future free state. In 
other words, Marcuse's two aesthetics are flawed not just because of the 
inaccuracies they reveal in their point of departure (the theory of the 
closed society) but above all in their very linkage. Marcuse's aesthetics of 
experience can only be erected on general symbolic properties and, as a 
consequence, his aesthetics of the bourgeois artwork is emptied of any hist- 
orical materialist content. Art, for Marcuse, can only be a pditical force 
200 
as art, but this does not excuse his omission of any mention of art's 
social constitution. Just as the theory of aesthetic experience was found to 
contribute little to an historical materialist aesthetics, in the same way 
the renewed attention that Marcuse paid to affirmative culture created more 
difficulties than positive new initiatives for such an aesthetics. 
8. Conclusion 
It follows from the above outline of the problematic character of Marcuse's 
two aesthetics that a distinction between 'political' and 'aesthetic' causa- 
tion lies at the heart of his work. HIs explicitly aesthetic writings are 
informed by a 'political' intention rather than a wish to further an aesthe- 
tics. Hence the hybrid term 'Tendenzästhetik' is an accurate label for his 
writings on aesthetics. Unlike Adorno, who resorted to aesthetics in the 
erroneous sociological and epistemological belief that no other form of 
knowledge of truth was possible, Marcuse made use of aesthetic categories 
to underpin his social theory, 
201 
or rather his view of social change. The 
result is not an aesthetics that can stand on its own but instead two dis- 
parate theoretical strands both of which rely on overtly political writings 
for their legitimation. Die Permanenz der Kunst, as a book solely treating 
of aesthetic questions, ma y seem to provide an exception but closer scrutiny 
reveals its indebtedness to the more specifically socio-political texts, 
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Konterrevolution und-Revolte and 'Protosocialisme et Capitalisme'. Further- 
more, the manner in which Marcuse fused his remarks on aesthetics with his 
thoughts on feminism is typical of his use of aesthetics since Triebstruktur 
und Gesellschaft. 
202' 
His political intentions go some way towards explaining 
the drift away from a theory of artistic production in the direction of a 
theory of art's reception which characterises Marcuse's work203 and at the 
same time marks it off from Adorno's writings, despite Marcuse's reference 
to Adorno's aesthetics as his guiding principle. 
204 They do not, however, 
detract from the evident weaknesses of his aesthetics. 
The dominant factors that influenced Marcuse's aesthetic writings were un- 
doubtedly the Cold War, his theory of Eros, the 1960s student movement, and 
that movement's petering out and refoundation in the 1970s in the ecology 
and peace movements. It is in the aftermath of the student movement that 
Marcuse rejects so radically any activist art but, as we have seen, this 
pessimistic view of such art coexisted with an optimism with regard to Eros. 
Indeed, the category of Eros essentially links Marcuse's theory of aesthetic 
experience and his conception of dissynchronous artworks, welding the two 
together in a concept of aesthetic-political truth. 
205 The value of artistic 
form resides in it being imbued with pleasure and sensuality, i. e. the mannerI 
in which the beholder is affected by it, how he perceives it. 
Beauty, the central determinant of art for Marcuse, is thus a beauty of an 
erotic nature. 
206 
This beauty dons a political mantle in Marcuse's work, 
207 
for the erotic qualities of beauty are judged to provide a liberating, eman- 
cipatory image of a possible future reality, although Marcuse always insisted 
that the beauty of art was grounded by means of artistic form in the dial- 
ectical opposition of affirmation and negation, 
208 i. e. in the present. Art's 
radicality, the power of its beauty, lies in artistic form, for only by 
virtue of its form can art transcend social determination. 
209 Marcuse, 
however, proceeded to hypostatise this opposition between art and society 
by declaring that art always had been and always would be diametrically 
opposed to society210 (although, as we saw earlier, this general position 
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is derived from a specific historical situation and is actually contradicted 
by Marcuse's claims for the future society). With the advent of the 20th 
century, form, as the unification of the general and the particular, of 
nature and man, no longer seemed possible for Marcuse, for the contemporary 
artwork was no longer able to generate an image of 'otherness', of the 
'universal', as had earlier narrative fiction. 
Marcuse based this hypostatisation of art's opposition to present society 
on art's innate opposition to any society, owing to its adherence to Eros, 
a category so fundamental he termed it the 'base beneath the base' . 
211 None- 
theless, Marcuse also argued that artistic form itself could only express 
such conflicts at a certain historical juncture, at a point when the shield 
of affirmative reception allowed the production of a particular form of art. 
In other words, the theories of aesthetic experience and of dissynchronous 
art culminated and converged in Marcuse's location of such external libidi- 
nous material qualities in one particular historical artform, one which - 
moreover - he did not regard as historical. The ontological undertones of 
Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft and Dialektik der Aufklärung come to the fore 
in this meeting-point of the two strands of his aesthetics. The difficulties 
Marcuse faced in grounding concrete change in an ideational sphere have in 
a sense taken their toll on the epistemological supports of his social 
theory. 
The statement in Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft that death is "ein Ausdruck 
des ewigen Kampfes gegen Leiden und Unterdrückung , 
212 
contains in nuce the 
fatal blow Marcuse delivered to his own aesthetics. The insurmountable 
differences between an historical materialist theory of society and a psycho- 
analytical philosophy stultifies the aesthetics at their most crucial point 
of development, namely when the specificity of art is to be made responsible 
for art's transcendence of society. The hidden discourse on the relation 
between mankind and nature that forms the epistemological basis of Trieb- 
struktur und Gesellschaft also extends to Marcuse's writings on aesthetics 
after 1941. The attempt to refound the concept of reason in the concept of 
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Eros and thus in the concrete nature of the artwork led to a loss of 
specificity, if not, indeed, to the creation of a vicious circle in Marcuse's 
analysis of art. He was not able to characterise artistic forms as historical 
artefacts without forfeiting the transcendent properties of Eros, and yet 
he could only describe Eros in concrete form by pointing to specific past 
instances of art. 
Marcuse's solution does not escape from the circularity of his pre- 
dicament, for the suggestion that a past artistic form is artistic form per 
se does not remove the difference between the historically particular and 
the transcendent metahistorical general. Perhaps the flaw can be traced to 
that point in Enlightenment thinking when art was situated between reason and 
nature. Marcuse's attempt to ground materialistically art's position as one 
of intermediary between the two concepts (since to Marcuse's mind reason 
and nature both obey the rule of Eros) follows the same path, for it begs 
the question of how, in an historical materialist aesthetics, art can be 
regarded as both subject and object, as both rational and irrational, as both 
historical and yet transcendent of history. Here again the problem which both 
Adorno and Marcuse tried to solve becomes apparent, but their respective 
solutions are not ultimately adequate to the task. At most they mark out for 
future research the avenues of inquiry to be avoided. It remains now to 
analyse how Löwenthal faced up to the problems of Pollock's social theory 
in the period following the dismantling of the Institut(e) in New York. 
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CHAPTER 11 : LÖWENTHAL : LITERARY SOCIOLOGY AND MASS CULTURE 
As was the case with Marcuse's work, situating Löwenthal's work in the con- 
text of post-War critical theory is made difficult by his geographical 
separation from the Institut(e). Löwenthal parted company with the Institut(e); 
at Morningside Heights at roughly the same time as Marcuse but worked with 
Adorno and Horkheimer on the last section of Dialektik der Aufklärung and to 
some extent on the Studies in Prejudice project, producing with Norbert 
Guterman a description of fascist agitation. However, he preferred to remain 
in the United States rather than return to Frankfurt in 1949, working first 
in New York for the 'Voice of America' and then as a Professor of Sociology 
at Berkeley, University of California, where he still lives. In the last few 
years he has emerged into the limelight once occupied by Adorno, Horkheimer 
and Marcuse, and his work is now being studied for its own sake rather than 
as a key to Institut(e) matters in general and critical theory in particular. 
It is, though, precisely the connection of his work to Adorno and Horkheimer's 
later work that we wish to study here. 
The work that he undertook after 1941 can be divided into two related fields: 
an elaboration and elucidation of his sociology of literature and an invest- 
igation of the background to popular culture. However, the work he has done 
in both these fields has gone relatively unnoticed. 
' Bar a Festschrift for 
his 80th birthday, a few reviews of his books and tie occasional footnote 
referring to them, 
2 
work on the sociology of literature or on popular cul- 
ture has tended to cite either Adorno or Horkheimer when speaking of the 
Frankfurt School and thereby to ignore Löwenthal's contribution, a neglect 
of his works after 1941 which also persists in most readers and texts on 
the Frankfurt School. In a sense W. Martin Lüdke's comment is representative 
of attitudes towards Löwenthal: 
Sein Begriff der Ideologiekritik ist noch an einem, Hegel wie Marx 
gleichermaßen verpflichteten, Verfahren der bestimmten Negation orien- 
tiert. Löwenthal teilt hier noch nicht die Adornosche Annahme eines 
'universellen Verblendungszusammenhangs'. 3 
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Lüdke refers here solely to Löwenthal's work on the sociology of literature 
and regards it as bearing no connection with the writings on popular culture 
Löwenthal authored. As will be outlined below, such a separation seems 
arbitrary. In the examination of his earlier work we detected a singular 
purity in his approach to ideology critique and non-identity theory and 
one which was alien to the alterations in the theories implemented by Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Marcuse. This need not imply that this distinctness is upheld 
after the disbanding of the Institut(e) proper. Indeed, a brief glance at 
Löwenthal's first essay after leaving the Institut(e) Terror's Atomization 
of Man and at some of his remarks in the interview Helmut Dubiel conducted 
with him shows that these do not bear out Lüdke's suggestion. In discussing 
Nazi terror, and its attempt to effect a "complete forgetting of history" 
and its partial success in making the victim lose "his consciousness of the 
gulf between himself and his tormentors, "4 Löwenthal moved in territory 
similar to that of Dialektik der Aufklärung. In Mitmachen wollte ich nie , 
he spoke of the new quality of fascism as being neither its political economy 
nor its petit-bourgeois mythology, but its thorough politicisation of society, 
i. e. its 'total mobilization' of the population. It was this last quality, 
Löwenthal maintained, that members of the Frankfurt School found to be 
fascism's most terrible feature. 
In contrast to our findings, he considered the School to have been influenced 
by this aspect of fascism more than by the theories of Pollock and Neumann 
and he thus denied the existence of any rigorous connection between political 
economy and the global historico-political sweep of Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
attempting instead to force a merger of Marcuse's social theory with that of 
Adorno and Horkheimer. 
Despite his inaccurate assessment of Dialektik der Aufklärung's origins the 
similarity between his views and those of Adorno and Horkheimer extends 
beyond their theory of anti-semitism. He stated in Terror's Atomization 
of Man: "Mankind today has so tremendously improved its technology as to 
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render itself largely superfluous. "5 He went on to mention the ttmnes Pollock 
had elaborated on, potential mass unemployment, manipulated production by 
the state etc., and to adjudge these to be a precondition for future terror 
and institutionalised administration. In words reminiscent of thechapter in 
Dialektik der Aufklärung on the culture industry Löwenthal remarked: 
It is not so much that people believe in these configurations of 
stereotypes as that they themselves become stereotyped appendages of 
this or that big cultural or political monopoly... The cultural mono- 
poly, integrating a whole chain of attitudes, itself exercises a 
psychologically terroristic impact to which the individual yields... 
The dreams of Western civilization may still become reality if man- 
kind can free itself from its use of human beings as surplus or 
commodities or means. 6 
The concepts of instrumental rationality and of administered culture clearly 
converge in the above passage. In the following discussion we will therefore 
endeavour to pinpoint exactly how this influence exerted by Dialektik der 
Aufklärung is reflected in Löwenthal's writings and in what manner it coexists 
with the 'determinate negation' Lüdke correctly perceives as forming the 
framework of Löwenthal's work on literature.? In this way the relation 
between Löwenthal's work after 1941 and that of his erstwhile colleagues 
will become clear. 
The relation to Dialektik der Aufklärung has to be traced in two separate, 
albeit interrelated fields, for Löwenthal distinguished starkly between a 
sociological approach to art on the one hand and to popular culture on the 
other. He asserted that the two contained different forms of truth and 
that these truths could only be uncovered by means of divergent strategies. 
8 
The different forms of truth inherent in the two fields were, in other words, 
taken by Löwenthal as his respective definitions of 'art' and 'popular 
culture', and these truths were then subsequently shown to exist by applying 
the two distinct methodiogies in their respective fields. The definitions 
of 'art' and 'popular culture' therefore predetermined their respective 
qualities whereas precisely these were supposed to first be established in 
the course of research. 
Löwenthal took an 'immanent' approach to art, one much the same in character 
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as the methodology Adorno adhered to. Löwenthal explained this methodology 
as follows: 
Emphatically stated, the analysis of literature, even for the 
sociologist, remains and ought to remain one of immanence. It 
begins and ends with the artist's statement... an attempt to study 
the social ambience o. f intimate and private matters in literature 
and to try to show that... these are specifically conditioned and 
determined by ... a specific social climate and ethos. 9 
That is to say, Löwenthal commenced his study of literature from within the 
artwork and attempted to pursue the 'artist's statement', rather than, as 
is now common in sociolcg}cal approaches to literature, perceiving the art- 
work to be located in a wider social context andexamining this context. 
10 
This wider constellation, however, 'is not ignored, for Löwenthal scrutin- 
ised it carefully in his work on popular culture. Conversely, he suggested 
that mass culture could be studied and understood reductively, i. e. it could 
be held to be a direct reflection of society whereas the same could not be 
said of art. 
11 Consequently, an investigation of mass culture provided a 
description of the framework in which art existed and therefore the defini- 
tions of art and popular culture became interlinked, just as the separate 
studies of each determined one another. 
12 
Löwenthal defined popular culture both as signifying spatially the (physical) 
surroundings of the artwork and also in terms of its content and structure 
as that which could not be examined by means of the criteria applied to an 
analysis of authentic artworks. It was, in other words, art's antithesis. 
Since it could not be examined in the same manner as art, Löwenthal had to 
conclude that what characterised popular culture was its lack of immanence. 
The fact that popular culture had a different truth to that possessed by 
art was a result of its different structure. The truth that defined it was 
accordingly purely sociological and had no epistemological status. Adorno 
and Hörkheimer had found that mass culture obeyed laws different to those 
which informed art in that mass cultural products were produced as commodit- 
ies. Löwenthal took this difference a priori to be the definition of mass 
culture, rather than subjecting mass culture to critical investigation, as 
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Adorno and Horkheimer had done, so that it remains to be seen whether this 
definition can be accorded any other status than that of an assumption. Such 
an approach, however, has the tactical advantage that it leaves Löwenthal 
more room to explore the structural functions of popular culture in society 
instead of having to concentrate on determining its constitution. 
The main disadvantage in Löwenthal's definition is that it forced him to 
define art in terms of it being constitt*fed as "the counterconcept to popular , 
culture": 
Today, artistic products are losing the character of spontaneity 
more and more and are being replaced by the phenomena of popular 
culture, which are nothing but a manipulated reproduction of 
reality as it is... 13 
This statement can be construed to signify that art, by virtue of the 
immanence of its form, surpasses a reproduction of society: it is transcen- 
dent. Consequently, art can be defined as that which possesses such a trans- 
cendent form. Moreover, according to Löwenthal this form allows mankind an 
"increase in insight" and "genuine experience as a step to greater individual 
fulfilment. "14 Why this should be the case has still to be assessed. First 
of all, however, the question must be addressed of whether Löwenthal deter- 
mined the existence of these qualities in art or whether they- were implied 
a priori by the immanent methodology he used. 
Löwenthal did not analyse art either for its contemporaneity or for its 
dissynchronicity but sociologically, i. e. outside the framework of a pre- 
ls 
scriptive or a political aesthetics as elaborated respectively by Adorno and 
Marcuse. Löwenthal avoided both these positions for two specific reasons. 
Firstly, he argued, a work's conformism or non-conformism could not be 
decided solely by means of an. immanent analysis of the artwork in question, 
16 
and, secondly, he considered that to treat an artwork purely as a piece of 
'culture', e. g. as 'beautiful' form, reduced its "oppositional thrust and 
impact., 17 Unlike the approaches adopted by Adorno and Marcuse, Löwenthal's 
sociological method, although functioning from a centre within the artwork, 
sought to pay attention to a work's reception and to external influences on 
the author. 
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Löwenthal applied this method to a wide range of literature starting with 
the writings of Lopez and Cervantes, moving via discussions of Shakespeare, 
Goethe, Racine and Voltaire onto the German Romantics and Post-Romantics, 
and ending with studies of the Naturalism of Strindberg and Ibsen. Löwenthal 
examined the dominant themes in the texts of these authors from a sociologic- 
al point of view. He outlined the course he wished to take as follows: 
Die gesellschaftlichen Tatsachen der Epoche, in der sie (artworks) 
geschaffen wurden, und die gesellschaftliche Analyse der Charaktere 
selbst geben uns das Material, mit dessen Hilfe Sinn und Funktion der 
Kunstwerke verstanden werden kann. 18 
He connected this project, perhaps best referred to as a literary sociology, 
19' 
to studies of literature's social function, reflections on the social posit- 
ion and attitude of the author as well as judgements on the social deter- 
minants of a given book's success. Above all, Löwenthal placed some emphasis 
on an analysis of the interaction of an artwork and its reception in order 
to ascertain the artwork's social position and effect, and it is here, of 
course, that the study of popular culture is important. 
At a methodological level, this literary sociology - for first and foremost 
Löwenthal addressed the social character of the artwork's material - is to 
be distinguished from sociology of literature as it is commonly practised, 
in as far as Löwenthal's method insisted on the priority of the artwork in 
the analysis, an importance he derived from his conception of artistic truth. 
Löwenthal's literary sociology was founded on the assumption that each art- 
work was both private and social in nature. 
20 
An artwork was prbate in the V 
sense that its production was the intimate concern of one person, "Kunst- 
werke sind immer von einzelnen Individuen hervorgebracht worden, "21 partic- 
ularly as the author was an "auf den Einzelmenschen spezialisierter Den- 
,, 22 Löwenthal claimed that the artwork was equally social in its constit- 
ution, for it was possible to reconstruct the general social climate and 
the specific socio-cultural relations, "die Leute bewegen, über bestimmte 
Sujets auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise zu schreiben. "23 Löwenthal hoped 
that this literary sociology would reveal certain sociological character- 
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istics of the inhabitants of the society in which a text was written that 
were not to be found via other forms of sociological analysis. In other 
words, he carried the artwork into society, instead of society into the 
artwork as is usual in contemporary sociological studies of literature. 
In keeping with critical theory, Löwenthal used psychoanalytical tools 
in his literary sociology, for above all he judged artworks to retain an 
image of the psychology of the particular period that was objective and not 
just attributable to the subjective traits of the author. He spoke of "Lit- 
eratur als Dokumentation der gesellschaftlichen Vermittlung des psychischen 
Innenraums. , 24 Society's infiltration of each person could therefore be 
traced both in the artwork's overt description of a character's attitudes 
and in the assumptions about society on which the description was based. 
Löwenthal stated in this context: 
What I believe is unique to literature is that it can help us to under- 
stand the successes or failures of socialization of individuals in 
typical moments and situations in history. 25 
As a consequence, Löwenthal paid great attention to such themes as 'love' 
or 'sorrow' in various works of literature. In the case of Ibsen, for instan- 
ce, Löwenthal studied the manner in which Ibsen had portrayed how the laws 
of the market-place had entered into human relationships and completely 
transformed them. 26 
In addition to this psychological mode of enquiry Löwenthal argued at an 
epistemological level that 'great' literature showed the audience of its 
time important images of human 'types' which portray the essence of humanity 
The greater the author, he, suggested, the more accomplished the portrait 
of humanity, and how it was viewed at that particular time. (Greatness in 
Löwenthal's terms is determined idealistically as the presence of this 
property). An analysis of these types was fruitful, he observed, because 
"die Analysen solcher Werke können die zentralen Probleme-aufdecken, von 
denen der Mensch sich in verschiedenen Zeiten betroffen fühlte 
27 
When analysing literature Löwenthal concentrated on only one historical typg 
of literature, namely that which can be classed as bourgeois, and restricted 
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his study to two genres within this type, namely the novel and the play. 
Löwenthal viewed this investigation into bourgeois literature as in keeping 
with a critical theory of society that wished to understand contemporary 
society, for he claimed that: 
Das Wichtigste an bürgerlicher Kunst ist, daß sie das Schicksal des 
Individuums in der modernen Gesellschaft unter der Perspektive seiner 
Bedrohung schildert. 28 
In effect, then, Löwenthal's study of bourgeois literature took as its 
starting point the conclusions which the authors of Dialektik der Aufklärung 
had reached. He related the specific quality he attributed to bourgeois liter- 
ature to a general property of literature which he considered to be its 
'truth': 
Die Literatur weckt in den Lesern immer wieder das Bewußtsein für 
den unüberbrückbaren Abgrund zwischen den Kontrollansprüchen der 
gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und den wahren Interessen der 
Mehrheit der Menschen. 29 
In this sense, Löwenthal globally held all literature to be 'progressive' 
in that it was adjudged by definition innately to criticize society, 
although he had deduced this quality from one historical form of 
literature. It follows from this that either only the latter constitutes 
literature or his definition must be considered ahistorical. 
Literature's sociological 'truth' could be discovered, Löwenthal 
maintained, by means of a sociological explanation being given both 
for the form this inherent artistic criticism of society took in a work 
of literature and for its absence at a particular time and place. Thus, 
by conducting a study of literature at certain historical junctures, a 
series of diachronic and hence comparable sociological truths could be 
established that were both theoretical and 'empirical' (i. e. exhibited 
in the texts in question). 
30 
Löwenthal's main writings on bourgeois 
literature involved precisely such a series of studies, the purpose of 
which was: 
Die Werke der künstlerischen wertvollen Literatur als Hauptquellen für 
die Interpretation der Vorstellungen über das Ich und die Gesellschaft 
zu benutzen. 31 
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Although the logic behind the pre-given concept of artistic value is 
far from transparent, this statement indicates the critical intention 
mentioned earlier, just as the titles of Löwenthals work do, namely 
that Löwenthal studied literature in order to discover what it 
revealed about a particular society at the time either of writing or of 
reading. The sociological truth he found concealed in literature is one 
pertaining to the relation between individual and social environment, 
for as he remarked pertinently of bourgeois art: 
Die bürgerlichen Schichten wünschten zwar, sich im Spiegel zu sehen, 
sie wünschten aber zugleich, daß ihr materialistisches Ich in zarten 
Gefühlen verhüllt und dadurch anziehender gemacht wurde. 32 
This investigation of society through the medium of art involved Löwen- 
that studying various forms of the relation between the two, but rather 
than consider all the works Löwenthal interpreted the discussion will 
focus on a number which illustrate his main findings. 
In Das Bild d6s Menschen in der Literatur, Löwenthal devoted much praise 
to Cervantes, seeing Don Quixote as the first depiction of bourgeois 
individuality which was positive in that it did not involve an affirmation 
of society: 
Don Quixote symbolisiert einen Konflikt, in dem das Individuum am Ende 
an der Gewalt der gesellschaftlichen Gegebenheiten zerschellt. Dieser 
Konflikt sollte ein durchgängiges Motiv in der Literatur während der 
folgenden Epoche der Neuzeit werden. 33 
It is typical of his work that Löwenthal regarded Cervantes' characters 
as symbolizing certain properties. Löwenthal paid as much attention to 
symbolization as he did to the content of that which was actually 
symbolized and refrained from searching for a direct correspondence 
between content and social critique. This process of symbolization was 
described as follows: 
Cervantes ist, kurz gesagt, in allen seinen Werken auf dem Wege zur 
Entdeckung der menschlichen Natur. Der Prozeß ist kritisch und non- 
konformistisch, realistisch in der Methode und idealistisch in der 
Intention. 34 
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Unlike, for example, Lukacs' comments on literature, the symbolism 
Löwenthal referred to cannot be attributed solely to realistic portrayal 
in the narrative, but derives from a variety of factors such as time, 
place, time of interpretation, authorial intention, and the code of 
the fiction. Löwenthal interlinked all these qualities in his work and 
did not single one of them out at the cost of the others. While in one 
context he might underline the first two, for example in his comment on 
classical French plays "sie entspringen im zunehmenden Maße der Beziehung 
des selbstbewußten Menschen zu seiner Gesellschaft, 
35 he did not then 
proceed to derive the other categories from the first two. This 
equivalency of the categories is illustrated in a remark Löwenthal made 
on Mörike: 
Er leidet an dieser Welt, und er haßt sie, weil er aufgrund der 
herrschenden gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse das Leben eines Spieß- 
bürgers in ihr führen muß. 36 
Löwenthal thus uncovered a causation underlying Mörike's non-conformism 
different to that informing Cervantes' work and went on to demonstrate 
how this causation affected Mörike's style. Löwenthal suggested that 
Mörike wrote melancholically and psychologistically, but did not reduce 
this form of writing to his position in society. Löwenthal discussed 
Mörike's works precisely because they provided a good example of a 
literature that could not be allocated comfortably to any one specific 
social class. Indeed, Löwenthal speculated elsewhere that: 
it is exactly in marginality, that is to say in a situation overtly 
as far removed as possible from social reality, that the social 
character of feeling and actions in literature becomes most visible. 37 
The critical tone of Mörike, or Cervantes, or for that matter 
Shakespeare, was deduced from this social marginality, as was the 
dissatisfaction that accompanied their critical attitude. In other words, 
to Löwenthal's mind it was not the place in society, but the absence of a 
place in society that determined good literature. 
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Löwenthal did not, however, try to investigate the positive social 
characteristics to be gained from a sociology of literature. This be- 
comes particularly clear in the studies he made of the 'Junges Deutsch- 
land' movement. It is noticeable that Löwenthal detected in such works 
certain negative qualities of the dominant social structure of the time. 
Löwenthal remarked that in the character of Wally, Gutzkow, for example, 
unwittingly criticized the grand bourgeoisie of his time partly through 
a realistic appraisal of extant social power relations and partly 
because Wally represented "ein Ausdruck der Unsicherheit des deutschen 
Bürgertums über seine eigenen Interessen., 
38 The realism of the mid 19th 
century, Löwenthal concluded, symbolized the growing "ideologisation of 
social conflict; "39 i. e. the gradual intrusion into literature of an 
explicit delineation made according to social class. From this point 
onwards an underlying, ideology could be identified in German literature, 
for instance in Gustav Freytag's work Löwenthal found that "Der selbst- 
zufriedenen Haltung des Bürgers entspricht die Schilderung der wirt- 
schaftlich unselbständigen Klasse .,, 
40 
Löwenthal's study of these hidden ideologies can be summed up as 
representing a critical portrayal of social conformity in literature. 
It forms the opposite of his remarks on critical bourgeois individuality 
in the works of Cervantes, or even of Ibsen, and remains true to his 
project of creating a socially critical literary sociology that unearths 
ideological and non-ideological positions. The period of conformity he 
studied stretches from the beginning till the end of the 19th century. 
Löwenthal mooted that such conformity, expressed by, as it were, 
'inauthentic' literature might at least have been triggered off by the 
influence of new modes of the mass production of literature. For the 
wider the potential audience, the greater the effect literature could 
have and thus the stronger the pressure on the author to produce texts 
that serve to legitimate the status quo. In other words, for Löwenthal 
it was only at this point that affirmative culture came into its own or 
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indeed came into being, whereas Marcuse in his essay on the subject 
had considered all bourgeois culture to be affirmative. Löwenthal 
observed: 
Die zugrundeliegende Frage war, ob das 19. Jahrhundert mit seiner 
starken materialistischen Prägung ein guter Nährboden für die Ent- 
wicklung von Größe sein konnte. 41 
This chronological precision can be seen, for instance, in the fact 
that while in Moliere's work Löwenthal had found conformity to be 
healthy in that it furthered individuality 
42, 
because of the time of 
its writing Goethe's Wilhelm Meister lay "on the borderline between 
conformism and individual protest., 
43 Löwenthal proposed more generally 
that: 
Hinter aller Tragik, die sich durch das Drama der deutschen Klassik 
zieht, liegt letztlich ein tiefes Vertrauen in allgemein anerkannte 
Tugenden und Werte verborgen. 44 
In this sense Löwenthal drew a line from social conformity as depicted 
in literature and tacit authorial agreement with social values or customs. 
This connection between affirmative character and authorial intention 
is the focus of Löwenthal's studies of Spielhagen and Keller. Spielhagen 
was found to be a non-conformist precisely because he had refused to 
follow social trends and find a 'deep' meaning in life, despite the 
political attitudes he may have had. 
45 
Rather, Spielhagen tried to present 
society as accurately and as objectively as possible, even down to his 
use of first person narrative. Löwenthal traced an opposite tendency, 
namely a "Prozeß der endültigen Einordnung ins schweizerische Kleinbür- 
gertum"46 in Gottfried Keller's disparagement of all matters economic 
and his espousal of 'natural', 'organic' ties: 
Die organische Einordnung des individuellen Lebens ist von Kellers 
kleinbürgerlicher Haltung aus gesehen die Aufnahme des Menschen in 
einen 'mütterlichen' Schoß oder in väterliche Führung. 47 
For Löwenthal, this amounted, nolens volens, to a legitimation of 
conservative world views antagonistic both to social change and to an 
awareness of the world's true essence. Keller thus created an ideology 
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in the sense of a veil cast over an object to hide its true meaning. 
This coupling of conformity and ideology, of non-conformism and 
criticalness, permitted Löwenthal to posit a concept of truth in 
literature different in causality and construction to those constructed 
by Adorno and Marcuse. 
48 Like Marcuse, Löwenthal stated: 
Kunst ist wirklich die Botschaft der Spannung, des gesellschaftlichen 
nicht Erlösten. Kunst ist in der Tat das große Reservoir des geformten 
Protestes gegen das gesellschaftliche Unglück, der die Möglichkeit des 
gesellschaftlichen Glücks durchschimmern läßt. 49 
He suggested, as had Marcuse before him, that this was the case because 
art provides a 'promesse de bonheur': 
Die Frage, die der Künstler der Menschheit stellt, ist, ob Schmerz und 
Angst notwendige Elemente menschlichen Schicksals oder bloß eine Folge 
der gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen sind. 50 
Löwenthal thus held artistic truth to be the image presented in 
literature of the human condition in a"state of 'Eingedenken' beyond the 
immediate confines of time and space. From this definition of artistic 
truth he concluded that art provided a form of knowledge otherwise 
unattainable: "Deshalb ist es der Künstler, der das darstellt, was 
wirklicher ist als die Wirklichkeit selbst. 51 In Löwenthal's conception 
it was only in this sense that art is transcendent, i. e. in its critical 
examination of the interaction of individual and society. 
The artistic portrayal of such interaction was more 'real' precisely 
because its validity was of a transcendent quality. Cervantes' description 
of non-conformism, which Löwenthal uncovered by contrasting Cervantes' 
portrait of individuality to the suffocating confines of feudalism, was, 
like Shakespeare's Tempest, for Löwenthal the exemplification of the true 
artwork in its weaving of such a transcendent, symbolic image. Thus, 
although such literature was and continued to be socially affirmative, 
it nevertheless also broke the boundaries of its own affirmative 
character: 
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Obwohl auch die Literatur immer wieder zur Rechtfertigung der 
gesellschaftlichen Machtverhältnisse dient, hält sie trotzdem 
immer jenes Sehnen des Menschen lebendig, das im allgemeinen 
in der bestehenden Gesellschaft keine Erfüllung finden kann. 
Kummer und Trauer sind die wesentlichen Elemente der bürgerlichen 
Literatur. 52 
Löwenthal clearly viewed this process of de-affirmation as having 
continually to reassert itself. This would seem to imply that the 
dominant social ideology needs to be constantly reiterated if it is 
to be effective, which in turn suggests that the affirmative character 
of art can never be completely negated by its criticalness. In this 
manner, Löwenthal deduced the symbolic truth of art from a positioning 
of that truth in social marginality (a conception dissimilar to Adorno 
and Marcuse's respective grounding of artistic truth) and simultaneously 
uncovered the nature of the dominant social ideology. Not only does this 
conception of sociological truth complement the truth of anti-domination 
inherent in the artwork, but it also implies a particular notion of 
ideology. Löwenthal defined the experience of beauty as "sich von der 
überwältigenden Herrschaft der Natur über den Menschen zu befreien. 53 
An ideological position in literature thus consisted in his view both 
of an advocacy of conformism (either in the content or in the form) and 
of an adherence to a certain instrumental logic vis-ä-vis nature. 
54 
Löwenthal did not, however, investigate the ideology within 'artistic' 
nature, the closest he came to it being a discussion of the portrayal 
of nature in Strindberg, 
55 
or the concept of beauty itself. Indeed, 
when Löwenthal mentioned ideology he meant by that an ideology external 
to the artwork which was then carried into the artwork. Artistic form, 
for instance, cannot be classed as ideological in such a frame of 
reference. Löwenthal's analysis thus tends to suggest that artworks are 
per se non-ideological. Löwenthal founded the ideological character of 
certain pieces of literature, i. e. 'inauthentic' literature, in their 
implicit championing of the dominant social class: 
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Im tatsächlichen Geschichtsverlauf fügt sich die Literatur recht gut 
in den gesamten Herrschaftsapparat der herrschenden Schicht ein. Denn 
die Literatur dient immer vornehmlich dazu, ein gesellschaftliches 
Bewußtsein zu schaffen, das mit den Interessen der herrschenden 
Mächten übereinstimmt: 56 
This accommodation of the artwork by its integration into society 
via its treatment as a 'cultural' object, and therefore the artwork could 
exercise no influence on the shape of the social structure: 
Die oppositionelle Stoßkraft radikaler Literatur und radikaler Tenden- 
zen in der Literatur wird erheblich verringert, indem man sie bloß 
als Kulturinhalte, als amüsante Zerstreuung oder gar als schöne Form 
hinstellt. 57 
Paradoxically, artworks were defined by Löwenthal as being beautiful 
form. Nevertheless, according to the above quotation, all art would seem 
by definition to be non-ideological until used or treated by society in 
a particular manner. If literature is at least in part defined by its 
reception, then Löwenthal must consider it as passing from a virgin non- 
ideological state to an ideological phase, the meaning of the artwork 
also changing with the passage of time. This being the case, art's truth 
must also change, and how can art then be distinguished from mass/popular 
culture? 
Löwenthal's inexactitude is, however, quite deliberate. By avoiding a 
discussion of the intrinsic ideology or non-ideology of art, or to be 
more specific, literature, Löwenthal was able to present a determinate 
negation of the explicit class ideologies symbolised in particular works 
of literature. He was then able to define art as the platform from which 
the "Stimme der Verlierer im Weltprozeß58 made itself heard. Since all 
the works he treated were from the 18th or 19th century, and most 
certainly pre-1945, he was able to find an ideology either in them or, 
in an understanding of them, and what is more it was an ideology that could 
be negated. . He applied the method to Modern literature only rarely 
and to pest War literature not at all, and for good reason: the method 
could not be applied to modern literature. 
59 
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Although Löwenthal was ambiguous as to whether art was still 
forced to affirm society (i. e. in keeping with Marcuse's work he left 
the question open of whether or not dissynchronous art and truth still 
existed) it followed from his definition of authentic art that any 
art produced in a closed society would possess no clear class ideology: 
it would itself be ideology. If such art is ideological, then - at least 
in Löwenthal's construction - it cannot be art. In other words, in tacit 
agreement with Dialektik der Aufklärung's hypothesis of a closed society, 
Löwenthal considered that art could no longer be produced, for it could 
not be so without ceasing to be art. Therefore the lack of an investi- 
gation of 20th century literature is not a quirk or predilection for 
earlier literature, but evidence that Löwenthal assumed society after 
1945 tendentially to be closed. It is hardly surprising that in Mitmachen 
wollte ich nie he returned to Adorno: "Adornos Position, daß die Kunst 
immer mehr in Defensivpositionen hereingedrängt wird, ist nach meiner 
Ansicht vollkommen berechtigt. 60 Adorno offered an analysis of various 
forms that could oppose society whereas Marcuse discussed how artistic 
form per se opposed society. Löwenthal complemented these arguments in 
that he described how the social origin of one particular form of 
bourgeois literature led to such literature possessing dialectical 
properties both at the time of its production and in the present. The 
bourgeois novels and dramas he discussed are, if 'authentic', both 
affirmative and negative, because of the society in which they arise 
and the completely affirmative character of the present. In effect, 
then, Löwenthal did not construct an aesthetics, but rather perfected 
a certain type of literary sociology. 
This literary sociology, the tracing of'society in the immanence of 
the artwork, is expanded to become a sociology of the artwork in 
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Löwenthal's analysis of popular culture. 
61 
It is in this latter 
analysis that the ambiguity he showed towards the question of the 
closed nature of present society is somewhat clarified. When approaching 
popular culture, Löwenthal used analytical techniques different to those 
deployed in his discussion of literature. 
62 
In his work on popular 
culture he resorted far more to empirical-evaluative methods such as 
were used in critical theory's post-War appropriation of American 
sociological techniques. He justified this change by assuming a priori 
that popular culture was of such a nature that it could only be treated 
reductively, suggesting, for example, that "Die kulturelle Massen- 
produktion dient uns in erster Linie als Hinweis auf die sozialpsycho- 
logische Struktur der Masse. "63 However, he refrained from restricting 
himself to an investigation of the psychological effects of mass 
culture on its consumers64 and instead, took into account that a study 
of mass culture was a study of mediation of the social and the personal, 
so that to concentrate only on one side of this relation would be to 
ignore its bipolar nature. 
In order to avoid such an error Löwenthal implanted the analysis of 
socio-psychological effects within a general historical and cultural 
theoretical framework. 
65 
He then constructed a set of criteria according 
to which the nature of mass culture could be evaluated: the effect of 
the dissemination of mass culture, the relation between it and the 
social conditions of the lower classes, the effect it had on serious 
art, the relation it bore to contemporary criticism, the question of 
whether it was a solely economic phenomenon or not and, finally, the 
general social climate and conditions surrounding intellectual and 
cultural production as a whole. 
66 
The conclusions at which Löwenthal 
arrived having applied these criteria to the study of mass or popular 
culture - the two are synonyms in Löwenthal's work - will be interpreted 
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with respect to the relation they bear to the concept of the 
'culture industry'. 
The very titles of Löwenthal's essays on popular culture imply a 
correcticn. to Adorno and Horkheimer's concept of the culture industry, 
for Löwenthal altered significantly the time span in which popular 
culture was judged to exist, thus challenging the 'culture industry' 
hypothesis on mass culture's sudden increased influence. "Die populäre 
Kultur als solche ist keine spezifisch moderne Erscheinung, "67 Löwenthal 
argued, it only seemed so because of the preoccupation all critics had 
with high culture and that despite the fact that undeterred the public 
continued to buy bestsellers. 
68 
Löwenthal even went so far as to suggest 
that popular culture was as old as human culture per se. 
69 However, in 
his actual analysis he limited the time span and concentrated on the 
manner in which the debate on the effects of popular culture first arose. 
He traced this discussion, and with it the existence of mass culture, 
back to the, opposing positions Pascal and Montaigne had taken on the 
subject. 
70 He frequently referred to these two opponents for they had, 
to his mind, laid the ground for all subsequent debate on whether popular 
culture was, as Montaigne believed, 'good', or whether, as in Pascal's 
position, it was 'bad' for mankind. Löwenthal also pointed out that 
Goethe anticipated modern criticisms of organised entertainment when com- 
plaining. about the public's desire for novelties. 
Empirically, Löwenthal studied the origins of popular culture in 18th 
century England, or to be exact, in the first case of marketable 
literary goods "produced to meet the interests and demands of the new 
reading public"71 there. He propounded: 
In short, the decisive change which took place in the world of 
literary communication in the seventeen hundreds was the change, 
substantially, from private endowment and a limited audience to 
public endowment and a potentially unlimited audience. 72 
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Löwenthal did not, therefore, derive the advent of popular culture 
as a mass event primarily from a technical change (as is implied in 
the concept of the culture industry) but from the presence of both a 
market and consumers. 
73 As a consequence of the existence of a 
potential market, the production and dissemination of literary works 
became profitable, facilitated by the upsurge in the number of people 
who could read. The nature of popular culture, Löwenthal asserted, 
was determined not by a wish to limit deliberately the information 
available to the lower classes but was tailor-made to suit their 
abilities: 
Das neue Publikum besaß keine gediegene klassische Bildung, und es 
interessierte sich mehr für Schaustellung von Gefühlen als für 
vernünftige Argumente. 74 
This deriving of popular culture from its potential reception parts 
company with Adorno and Horkheimer's concept quite radically. Whereas 
the latter had pinpointed electronic reproduction as being of key 
importance for the existence of popular culture, Löwenthal's analysis 
reveals that changes 
grow from the social subsoil of middle class society; they 
clearly demonstrate that the whole controversy, far from depending 
on the introduction of electronics, is part and parcel of the histo- 
rical development. 75 
Popular culture in its present form is thus situated in the evolution 
of the petit-bourgeoisie as a class after the Reformation. 
Not only does Löwenthal's argument contradict Adorno and Horkheimer's 
assumptions with regard to the origins of mass culture (unless we are 
to understand 20th century mass culture to be something utterly 
different from that to the popular culture that had gone before it) 
but Löwenthal challenged their conclusions as well. He pointed out in 
a letter of February 1942 to Horkheimer that his study of popular 
biographies showed that 
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this phenomenon also contains the dream of a future mankind who 
might center its interests around happiness not in the harshness 
of work and labour but in the enjoyment of sensual goods in the 
broadest meaning of the term. 76 _ 
Popular magazines were thus bestowed with qualities Löwenthal had 
otherwise reserved for art. Further to this potential insight accorded 
to popular culture Löwenthal also believed that as a structure it could 
benefit mankind, a sentiment quite opposed to the views of Adorno and 
Horkheimer. Löwenthal ironically enquired: 
Da die Verdammung der populären Produkte immer einhergeht mit einer 
Verurteilung der Massenmedien, könnte man schließlich fragen, ob die 
Massenmedien unwiderruflich dazu verurteilt sind, nur als Vermittler 
minderwertiger Produkte zu dienen. 77 
Clearly, he felt that the mass media could be instilled with an emanci- 
patory content and thus rejected Adorno and Horkheimer's belief that 
the very substance of the mass media was ideologically negative. 
At this point the question arises as to why Löwenthal nevertheless usually 
spoke of 'popular culture', rather than using the term 'mass culture' and 
the reason for the terminological differentiation would seem to be of the 
utmost importance for Löwenthal's assessment of the culture industry. Löw- 
enthal often referred to the 'mass media' when speaking of popular culture 
after 1945. This mass culture was held by Löwenthal to oppose psychology, 
for it destroyed any interiority mankind might possess. 
78 Such mass cul- 
ture, he suggested, could be studied completely reductively; it was no 
longer necessary to study what, for example, 'taste' was, for the important 
thing was how it was administered to the masses. In this sense post-War 
mass culture was completely ideological, creating a commodity-like facade 
to veil its emptiness. Even the language it used and propagated was commo- 
dified, to the extent that it was effected by planned obsolescence. 
79 
The sparse comments on 'mass culture' scattered in Löwenthal's writings 
form a sort of empirical base in support of the chapter on the culture 
industry in Dialektik der Aufklärung. Löwenthal's remarks in 'Biographies 
in Popular Magazines' on falsified appearances of individuality which are 
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then in turn destroyed would fit this interpretation, as would his mention 
of stereotypy, advertising and standardisation as hallmarks of mass culture 
in 'Historical Perspectives of Popular Culture', although these all jar 
with the tone of his letter to Horkheimer. In 'Historical Perspectives of 
Popular Culture' he asserted: 
We want to know what standardization means in industry, in behaviour 
patterns, and in popular culture. We think that the specifically 
psychological and anthropological character of popular culture is a 
key to the interpretation of the function of standardization in mod- 
ern man... We want to know the mechanisms of interdependence between 
the pressures of professional life and the freedom from intellectual 
and aesthetic tension in which popular culture seems to indulge... We 
hold that the stimulus and response is preformed and prestructured 
by the historical and social fate of the stimulus as well as of the 
respondent. 80. 
This statement reads like an outline of empirical research to be undertaken 
to prove the "validityr of Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis on the culture 
industry. The popular culture to which reference is made in this passage, 
thus showing some inconsistency in Löwenthal's use of the term, differs in 
structure from that which Löwenthal had discussed in his study of 18th 
century English popular culture insofar as he now examined only the effect, 
so that the original bipolar concept became one-dimensional, for he now 
considered the wishes of the audience no longer to be of any importance. 
In the same vein, Löwenthal emphasized technical changes in his examina- 
tion of popular culture after 1945, whereas the significance of these was 
disregarded for earlier periods. In the study of 18th century English popu- 
lar culture Löwenthal had attributed only limited importance to industrial- 
isation, namely for its mechanisation of paper production. 
81 In modern 
society he assumed a different pattern to exist and viewed mass culture 
as a "specific outgrowth of the technological, political and economic 
conditions and interest of the masters in the sphere of production. "82 He 
declared: 
Es könnte also durchaus sein, daß schon allein die Produktions- 
bedingungen, (i. e. in the productive forces) unter denen die 
Massenkunst für eine moderne Gesellschaft hergestellt wird, die 
echte Kunst... daran hindert, in diesem Bereich Eingang zu finden. 83 
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The technics in question no longer encourage a coexistence of popular 
culture and authentic art under ameliorated conditions, but tendentially 
cut off art's social existence, and thus its existence altogether. 
Löwenthal's characterisation of technological progress engendering a 
change in the nature of popular culture and in the structure of culture as 
a whole accords with the views of Adorno, Horkheimer , Marcuse and Benjamin. 
84 
If art can no longer exist, in the sense that its truth content can no longer 
be produced, then the realm of culture has become (or is becoming) one- 
dimensional. This careful differentiation within Löwenthal's work allows a 
clear view to emerge of the manner in which Löwenthal's analysis supports, 
even if it does not prove, Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis of the culture 
industry's establishing and perpetuation of a closed society. Löwenthal's 
work can thus be held to reaffirm Dialektik der Aufklärung's main epistem- 
ological claims, in that Löwenthal described in empirical terms the change 
which tranformed the central premise of Diälektik der Aufklärung. He stated, 
for example: 
Massenkommunikation baut auf der ideologischen Sanktion der Autonomie 




Kommunikation ist Teil der Konsumentenkultur geworden, in der die, die 
produzieren,. und die, die verbrauchen, nur schwer zu unterscheiden 
sind, weil sie beide als Hörige eines Lebensstils der Konformität 
und Regelhaftigkeit erscheinen. 85 
Although Löwenthal's work initially relativises the validity of Dialektik 
der Aufklärung, and of the concept of the culture industry, it does so in 
such a manner as to render the concept more precise in its temporal validity 
and offers an approach that can ascertain the exact nature of the culture 
industry's effects. This precision in the dating of mass culture is, in turn, 
borne out by Löwenthal's writings on literature, namely in the transition 
he made from a literary sociology to a sociology of literature when studying 
the 20th century. 
In his discussion of art and mass culture Löwenthal described the interaction 
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of the two in the 18th and 19th centuries without lambasting mass culture. 
Indeed, he granted it certain positive qualities: 
Dieser Wunsch der Leserschaft und des Theaterpublikums nach immer 
Neuem machte es beinahe jedem Schriftsteller möglich, einmal für 
einige Zeit Popularität zu erringen, vorausgesetzt daß er sein Pub- 
likum überzeugen konnte, er biete etwas noch nie Dagewesenes. 86 
As Robert Sayre points out, this provides the basis for an historical theory 
of reception 
87 
which, it must be said, would not dissolve into a literary 
history as Hans Robert Jauss' work tends to. Prior to the advent of the 
mass culture of the post-War era, the interaction of mass culture and liter- 
ature, of mass public and literature, did not necessarily effect literature 
negatively. Despite its continued wish to consume something new, the presence 
of mass culture's public did not, in Löwenthal's view, endanger literature 
or authorial or aesthetic intentions, even if it did highlight the dilemma 
in which intellectuals and artists found themselves. 
88 
In the final instance, 
however, Löwenthal failed to address the question of whether the structure 
of popular culture from the outset encouraged passivity from the audience, 
as Adorno and Horkheimer assumed it did. 
This relation of art to mass culture changed significantly after 1945, for 
now mass culture was judged to have a highly detrimental effect on art, encroa- 
ching on it and robbing it of its territory: 
Wenn man dieses Material (comics etc. ) dann mit dem ideologischen 
und emotionalen Inhalt der traditionellen, bürgerlichen Literatur 
vergleicht, könnte sich noch klarer erkennen lassen, wie sehr der 
moderne Leser hin- und herschwenkt zwischen der Ntwendigkeit, die 
Mechanismen der Anpassung und des Konformismus zu erlernen, und den 
Tagträumen von einem glücklicheren, obwohl unerreichbaren oder hist- 
orisch nicht mehr möglichen Lebensstil. 89 
A sociology of literature was more important now than it was for the analysis 
of 18th and 19th century literature. Whereas these past literary products 
could be studied for their internal social content and the effect of their 
environment was not radical with respect to their construction and existence, 
literature after 1945 has to be regarded from the viewpoint of its surroun- 
dings, its outerdirectedness. This was the case because the surroundings, 
the socio-cultural matrix in which literature was embedded, threatened to 
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engulf literature and suffocate it: 
The counterconcept to popular culture is art. Today artistic products 
are losing the character of spontaneity more and more and are being 
replaced by the phenomena of popular culture, which are nothing but a 
manipulated reproduction of reality as it is; and, in so doing, pop- 
ular culture sanctions and glorifies whatever it finds worth echoing. 90 
Planning eroded the very basis of spontaneity in art, which itself becomes 
nothing more than a planned commodity and thus divested of any facility 
for transcendence it might have formerly had. 
Clearly in this emphasis on a sociology of literature Löwenthal perceived a 
stark difference between pre-War and post-War popular culture. The first 
allowed art to flourish, the second closed off the space art had inhabited. 
If one treats these two periods as the Modern and the post-Modern, then it 
would seem that, in agreement with Marcuse, Löwenthal saw art in the post- 
M olern era as being restricted to that which was produced in earlier periods. 
This interest in dissynchronicity is reflected both in Löwenthal's inter- 
pretations of bourgeois literature, explaining his particular interest in 
non-conformity, and his use of literary sociology and a sociology of 
literature. The transcendent truth he identified in bourgeois literature 
is designated as transcendent as much with regard to the present as to the 
past. The sociological investigation of the absence of art in the post-War 
era of popular culture's domination thus complements the theory of 'trans- 
cendence as art' set out by the literary sociological investigation of the 
eariler period. 
Despite his comments to the contrary, Löwenthal's work is clearly linked 
both to Adorno and Horkheimer's philosophy and to Marcuse's conception of 
art. Indeed, close consideration of the ambiguities in Löwenthal's work leads 
to the conclusion that Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse's theories serve as 
the basis for Löwenthal's own theoretical framework. The dialectic of 
Enlightenment functioned as the starting-point from which Löwenthal looked 
back on bourgeois literature and forward to art's present and possible 
future. Marcuse's theory of dissynchronicity informed this analysis. This 
is not to say that Löwenthal's literary sociology and sociology of mass 
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culture are not problematic. Löwenthal asserted that a difference existed 
between art and popular culture, but did not ground this difference in the 
course of his work on 18th and 19th century literature. Rather the differ- 
ence increasingly assumed the status of an a priori. This assumed opposition 
between art and popular culture was examined for its effects on art, an 
examination which formed the clearest point of convergence with Adorno and 
Horkheimer's theory. Löwenthal's examination created an absolute opposition 
of mutual exclusivity between art and popular culture that was then projected 
back into the 18th and 19th centuries and undermines his own comments on 
the possible emancipatory function of the massmediä. The argument becomes 
Pascalian in its treatment-of popular culture after 1945 as purely detri- 
mental, although this is simply the consequence of Löwenthal's initial 
absolutisation of the difference between art and popular culture as the 
definition of the two. 
Löwenthal failed to devote sufficient attention to the interconnection of 
mass culture and art after 1945. His remarks in this area remain completely 
programmatic, for he raised questions which may be valid but which were left 
unanswered. 
91 Accordingly, he was unable to found any theory of dissynchro- 
icity, for there is no apparent reason in his construction to explain why 
previous artforms should continue to exist in the present. It is here that 
his use of determinate negation becomes problematic. Determinate negation 
is possible between an artwork in the 18th and 19th centuries and society 
now, for no concept of ideology avails itself if everything is ideological. 
The only theoretical justification for assuming that such artworks deter- 
minately negate the present would be if one were to regard artistic trans- 
cendence as completelyahistorical, 
92 
as was clearly the assumption in Mar- 
cuse's work. Society now tendentially incorporates all artworks and robs 
them of their negative value. In his historical determination of artistic 
transcendence Löwenthal could not conceive of ahistorical transcendence 
without simultaneously contradicting himself. 
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In his study of past bourgeois literature Löwenthal made use of a literary 
sociology that took full account of the interconnection between literature 
and popular culture, from the point of view both of the author's choice 
of material and approach and of the effect that popular culture had both 
directly and indirectly on the artistic product. 
93 
Nevertheless, the problem 
of the constitution of artistic truth arises in this context also. Al ough 
Löwenthal described quite accurately the processes whereby such cultural 
structures evolve so as to permit the production of what is usually termed 
autonomous art, 
94 
and the manner in which that art interacts with popular 
culture, he could not determine why autonomous art should have precisely 
such a truth. The relation between autonomy and truth is left unexplained, 
for Löwenthal approaches artistic truth only from the angle of its socio- 
logical impact, thus assuming its a priori existence. If it were purely 
sociological, it could not be transcendent, and yet being transcendent it 
burst the structures of a literary, historical analysis. Löwenthal was able 
to state in sociological terms why truth occurred but not, despite his own 
admitted interest in the question, why it took such a shape. 
95 In Löwen- 
thal's work, literary sociology is thus confronted by its own limitations. 
The a priori assumption of a mutual exclusivity between popular culture 
and literature (although Löwenthal frequently denied having made any such 
assumption) can be derived from the stark opposition in the present between 
the two, hence the mention earlier of 'back-projection'. As a consequence 
of this opposition, Löwenthal only studied popular culture for its difference 
to art, i. e. reductively for its socio-psychological influence, and art was, 
in turn, studied for its 'truth', namely the difference between it and pop- 
ular culture. Whether products of popular culture could be art was left 
unexamined. Löwenthal thus ignored certain historical problems that may 
arise from his approach, e. g. that social indicators of truth may have in- 
deed been or become market products and yet nevertheless have retained their 
power of negativity. The spheres of production and consumption are examined 
only for their products and not for the constraints that they exert on each 
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other, for Löwenthal, in line with Pollock, held the second sphere to be 
completely informed and dominated by the first. Distribution has in this 
configuration ceased to exist. 
96 
This omission of 'a discussion of autonomous art and the death of autonomy 
is perhaps attributable not just to the underlying influence of a Pollockian 
paradigm of contemporary society, but also to the difficulties involved in 
merging the approaches of a literary sociology and of a sociology of litera- 
ture, as well as then connecting these to a theory of social change that 
requires transcendent images to keep the theory alive. What can be said is 
that Löwenthal's immediate rejection of the idea that art can coexist with 
post-War popular culture, indebted as it is to Adorno and Horkheimer's 
theory of a closed society and yet more consistent inthe conclusions it drew 
from this than Adorno's own aesthetics, posed insolvable problems for Löwen- 
thal's sociological approach. As a consequence of the death-knell he sounds 
to autonomous art, his theory of an historical artistic truth, so central to 
his whole enterprise of creating a literary sociology of bourgeois liter- 
ature, appears somewhat hollow, if not indeed in a state of complete collapse 
since it is based on the assumption that such truth still persists today. 
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CHAPTER 12 : CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this dissertation has been -twofold. 
First of all, it is meant 
to provide a systematic chronological and epistemological account of the 
divergent aesthetic theories devised by members of the Frankfurt School. 
Secondly, it is intended as a refutation of the charge frequently levelled 
at the Frankfurt School that it possessed no theory of the base of society, 
an accusation allowing critical theory to be omitted from consideration of 
Marxist aesthetics. Thus. "far, little space has been devoted explicitly to 
this criticism, for the discussion has consisted of developing a case which 
points in precisely the opposite direction. This strand of criticism arose 
in the mid-1960s and persisted in the secondary literature on critical 
theory throughout the 1970s. It is to be encountered both in works dedicated 
to studies of individual theorists and in the small number of investigations 
of the School as a unity. 
The first significant statements on the subject of the Frankfurt School's 
attitude to the base of society are to be found in two articles on Marcuse. 
In an influential discussion of One-Dimensional Man for the journal Merkur, 
Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner declared that Marcuse had restricted his analysis 
to the superstructure, a fact which rendered his work idealist. Marcuse's 
position is derived in this context from Fourier and utopianism, rather than 
from Marx. ' A few months later Hans Heinz Holz put the case even more 
strongly. In a monograph on Marcuse's utopianism he argued: 
Weil Marcuse eine- Analyse der ökonomischen Basis versäumt, kommt er 
zu einer grundsätzlichen Fehleinschätzung der im Überbau wirkenden 
Kräfte... 
and 
Marcuses Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesell- 
schaft bleiben selbst ideologisch: sie enthalten sich nämlich der 
Analyse der ökonomischen Basisverhältnisse. 2 
By 1970 this line of argument had also taken root in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
In a comparison quite typical of the time, namely of Marcuse and Marx, 
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Edward Andrew found Marcuse indebted to Fourier rather than Marx and 
concluded from this: 
Thus Marcuse is not concerned with a transformation in what Marx 
called the 'base' or the infrastructure of society but only with 
the 'superstructure'. 3 
This form of categorical rejection missed the point that Marcuse was trying 
to show a shift in Marxism to be necessary if it were to retain its scien- 
tific validity as a theory of society. 
This approach was not confined to studies of Marcuse, for Winfried Schoeller's 
1969 edition of essays on Adorno's work adopts a similar stance. In it 
Frank Böckelmann, for example, suggested: 
Adornos Anspruch, der zumindest implizite der marxschen Orthodoxie 
die Behauptung von einer Verwandlung des Wesens der kapitalistischen 
Gesellschaft im 20. Jahrhundert entgegenstellt, wird nicht eingelöst. 
Dieser läßt sich um so bündiger bestreiten, als Adorno sich, im Gegen- 
satz zu Habermas, auf eine Problematisierung der marxistischen Polit- 
ischen Ökonomie gar nicht erst einläßt. Deren Geltung im Spätkapital- 
ismus ist vielmehr ein integrales Moment seiner theoretischen Kon- 
struktion. 4 
Böckelmann maintained that not only did Adorno not try to examine how the 
base might have changed, but that he also could only assert that such 
a change had indeed occurred. Konrad Boehmer described another aspect of 
this argument in his essay on Adorno's musicology. Firstly, he argued that 
Adorno's view of human history was "bar ökonomischer Einsicht, zum Werk 
eines Weltgeistes erklärt, ,5 and then deduced from this that: 
Der gesellschaftliche Überbau gewinnt hierdurch - allerdings nur 
theoretisch - ein Gewicht, das ihm zum Regulativ der Produktions- 
sphäre erheben soll. 6 
This criticism is carried over into the 1970s. In 1974 John Fry was to con- 
clude of Marcuse's work that: 
In sum, it appears that Marcuse's present analysis and long-term 
projections regarding the stability and prosperity of North Amer- 
ican capitalism significantly excludes consideration of numerous 
and often serious economic contradictions facing the system both 
now and in the future. 7 
This criticism is repeated in various studies of the Frankfurt School pub- 
lished in the 1970s and serves in each case to underpin a condemnation or 
rejection of critical theory. Michael Landmann's far-fetched and globalised 
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criticism of the Frankfurt School that forms the introduction to Zoltan 
Tar's monograph on the subject is perhaps the most antipathetic form the 
criticism takes in this period. Landmann claimed: 
In sum, one can say that the later Frankfurt School persisted in 
a political attitude that might have been plausible in the 1930s but 
failed to take into consideration worldwide historical developments 
I since then. 
and continued 
The late Frankfurt School offers a more ominous view: the misfortune 
of mankind is not the result of certain historical developments; it 
is something inherent in man's being. 8 
Christel Beier's close examination of the interweaving of social theory and 
epistemology in Adorno's work made the same point from a different angle. 
Having decided somewhat arbitrarily that Adorno did not analyse the contra- 
dictory forms of socialisation which arise owing to a particular production 
process. Beier proposed: 
Weil die kritische Theorie die Fortbildung ökonomischer Konzepte 
nicht zu ihrem Gegenstand macht, ist sie, gemäß ihren Vorstellungen 
von einer Konfrontationstheorie der Erkenntnis ..., darauf verwiesen, Gesellschaft aus der Perspektive geschichtsphilosophischen Erwägungen 
zu begreifen und zu kritisieren. 9 
Two recent English inquiries into Frankfurt School epistemology contain 
similar statements. Although couched in more cautious terms David Held 
nevertheless suggested that: 
There is something to be made of the oft-repeated charge that the 
Frankfurt School failed, ultimately, to integrate studies of the 
individual and social consciousness with political economy and 
institutional analysis. 10 
Paul Connerton's investigation into the complex structure of the dialectic 
of Enlightenment led him to assert that the critique of political economy 
was compromised by the 'myth of enlightenment'. 
11 He stated: 
For whereas Marx has connected the principle of commodity exchange 
with a specific system of property ownership, Adorno detaches com- 
modity exchange from a particular historical type of economic organ- 
isation, and views it instead as the most complete expression of 
instrumental rationality. 12 
The argument thus moves from the straightforward claim that the Frankfurt 
School ignored an analysis of the base, to a perhaps more subtle suggestion 
that the Dialektik der Aufklärung disengaged the critique of political 
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economy from a logical or epistemological foundation. This does not, however, 
alter the substance of the argument. Recent studies thus rarely put the 
case directly, but tend to present it in a disguised form or as a tacit 
assumption on whidithe argument each study has to offer is nevertheless 
based. 
Two further variants exist on this theme of the Frankfurt School's analytical 
predilection for the superstructure, which, while not stating that critical 
theory failed to attribute primacy to the base or that it did not even bother 
to pay it any attention, nonetheless assert that critical theory violates 
Marxism. The first of these is to be found in a misunderstanding of critical 
theory as an analysis solely fixated on one historical moment, namely fascism. 
The Frankfurt School's overall analysis is judged to be a generalised theory 
of fascism (as a consequence of this fixation), resulting in an omission of 
any general theory of society. Anselm Skuhra, for example, spoke of critical 
theory's criticism of fascism as only being an "Überbaukritik". 
13 Consequen- 
tly, he went on to propound the view that domination was no longer conceived 
of as economic in origin but as rooted in technological rationality. 
14 By 
deciding that fascism was the exclusive heuristic key to interpreting criti- 
cal theory, this approach foreshortened the Frankfurt School's field of 
vision for all other aspects recede in importance and become subordinated 
to the Institut(e)'s view of fascism. It goes without saying that this 
interpretation cannot do justice to the Pollockian elements of critical 
theory for, as we have seen, Pollock intended his theory to pinpoint a new 
stage of capitalism, not just to represent a reflection on fascism. This is 
not to detract from the importance which the very real experience of fascism 
undoubtedly had for the members of the School. 
The second variation - often met as a subposition of the first variant - 
is based on a reduction of a theory' -- of universal history and 
can be found particularly in discussions of the Frankfurt School which centre 
on the theme of domination and the dialectic of Enlightenment. In his examin- 
ation of Adorno's philosophy Gerd Kaiser suggested, for instance, that Adorno' 
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reduced social antagonisms to some primordial form of domination: 
Der Kapitalismus wird als Enthüllung des verhüllten Wesens der 
Geschichte gedeutet.. . In dieser Kritik an der Geschichte geht Adorno hinter den Marxismus zurück. 16 
Walter Jopke put a similar case when he wrote: 
Völlig falsch und vulgärökonomisch ist Adornos Auffassung, wenn 
sie den Grad der Naturbeherrschung unmittelbar, eindimensional, 
auf die Grundbestimmung der Menschen, ihre gesellschaftlichen 
Verhältnisse verlängert. 17 
In substance this argument rests on the claim that critical theory became 
unspecific by having supposedly addressed itself to 'society' 
18 
as an 
abstract entity, rather than to any contemporary concrete economic form of 
society. It is my contention that the strength of this criticism lies purely 
in its frequent repetition by various authors, for its accuracy is not sus- 
tained by a closer reading of the total theoretical output of the School. It 
cannot be the purpose of this summary to undertake an inquiry into the ori- 
gins of this argument in the debates amongst the various groups of the 
German Left in the 1960s although it is in this context that the argument 
must be understood. In a sense the political motivations behind views of 
critical theory (in the late 1960s) have stigmatised many subsequent studies 
of the Frankfurt School published in the 1970s. The imperatives of anti- 
authoritarian politics in the 1960s may have-informed the first debates on 
the Frankfurt School and may have gone a long way towards developing a wide 
audience capable of discussing critical theory, but such political interests 
cannot simply be transferred on to subsequent analyses which have since arisen 
in a different political and social climate. 
The argument that the Frankfurt School had no theory of the base has there- 
fore become the invisible hand that writes in later approaches to the mater- 
ial whereas, in truth, it has never occupied anything other than the status 
of an unverified assertion. The fact that this assumption has been quest- 
ioned over the last few years perhaps attests to a welcome change in the 
reception of the Frankfurt School. 
Current reception of the Frankfurt School has in a few cases emphasised the 
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economic foundation of critical theory without, however, embarking on an 
explicit rebuttal of the charge that critical theory was superstructure- 
oriented or 'un-Marxist'. In the course of this dissertation an attempt 
has been made to rectify this situation by demonstrating how critical 
theory envisaged a shift in the determining power of the base over the 
form of society. The Frankfurt School's analysis of the constitution of 
the base revealed it to be losing importance when compared to the super- 
structure. A genuinely Marxist approach to critical theory would take this 
asserted change as food for thought rather than condemning it out of hand 
as 'un-Marxist'. Burkhart Lindner and W. Martin Lüdke's close reading of 
critical theory's texts permits them to outline the framework for a more 
adequate reception of the Frankfurt School. They say of Horkheimer: 
Seine Aufsätze 'Juden und Europa' und 'Autoritärer Staat' markieren 
jedoch den Wendepunkt. Zum letzten Mal werden hier politisch/ökon- 
omische Kategorien als solche diskutiert... die ökonomischen Kategorien 
werden in einen geschichtsphilosophischen Rahmen gestellt.. 19 
Our study has endeavoured to show in what fashion this transformation of 
categories occurred and what effect this had on the aesthetic theories. 
In a sense this provides an explanation for the findings voiced in the 
following statement from Über Th. W. Adorno: 
So stark das kritische Engagement der kritischen Sozialtheorie ist, 
so verhältnismäßig mager ist das, was man als 'Theorie der Gesell- 
schaft' in ihr findet. 20 
In his systematic and sympathetic study of early critical theory Dubiel 
proposed that critical theory remained an 'unfulfilled programme'. 
21 He 
overlooked precisely the change in framework that Lindner and Lüdke detect 
and thus failed to see that for its producers critical theory could not be 
a completed project in its original form, but had to be altered to fit a 
new theory of society. The present study has concentrated on determining 
this change in critical theory by means of a comparison of the aesthetic 
positions held by the members of the Frankfurt School. It has been estab- 
lished in the course of this project that the various aesthetic theories 
devised by members of the Frankfurt School were all rooted in one body of 
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thought, namely in a particular theory of society. This rested in turn on 
the concept of state capitalism that Pollock had developed in the 1930s. 
As has been suggested here and argued rigorously by Moishe Postone and 
Barbara Brick in their discussion of Horkheimer's work, 
22 
critical theory 
can only be understood in the context of the Pollockian concept of the base. 
However, the ensuing social theory the Frankfurt School developed was 
highly problematical, for Pollock's socio-political theory leads only to an 
irredeemable theoretical position. Not only does the concept of state 
capitalism offer a wholly inadequate account of the configuration of late 
capitalism, it also allows only a static, pessimistic view of society to be 
erected on it. As a consequence the collocation of aesthetic theory and 
social theory exacts a high price from the individual theorists because 
their individual. aesthetic theories become flawed as a result of their 
positioning with regard to their social theory. 
Pollock's theory, despite having originated as a paradigm to describe the 
1930s, persists via Adorno and Marcuse's writings, regardless of Marcuse's 
oscillation with respect to the nature of technology, up until the 1970s, 
an era which it was not intended to portray. As a result, Adorno's aesthe- 
tics was forced into a vacuum for all its unique foundation of 'aesthetic 
knowledge' in mimesis, while Marcuse was compelled to retreat anachronist- 
ically into the art of the 19th century in order to avoid the consequences 
of state capitalist society. Löwenthal's work circumvented this problem of 
the social theory, but suffered from a resulting opacity in its conception 
of the mediation between social fact and artwork. Thus, the various branches 
of Frankfurt School aesthetic theory can only be judged properly if their 
engagement with Pollock's socio-political theory is examined carefully and 
in such a way that they can then be disentangled from it, for the aesthetic 
theories not only ground themselves in this social theory, significantly 
they also answer some of the questions posed by it. (The critics mentioned 
earlier were correct in the last instance in their sentencing of critical 
theory, but incorrect in their reasoning. ) 
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This is not to say that the three aesthetic positions outlined correspond 
to an equal extent with the Pollockian theory of capitalism on which they 
are founded. A chronological study of these aesthetics reveals various 
modulations and ambiguities with regard to the characterisation of late 
capitalism as state. capitalism. However, given the basic theoretical con- 
gruence with Pollock's work, one must view the School's aesthetic theories 
as forming a cohesive body of thought, although this unity does not preclude 
distinct differences between the individual aesthetic propositions. Indeed, 
precisely this differentiation between the aesthetic positions allows them 
to be located as alternative postulates or proffered solutions to one single 
problem, that of the continued existence and epistemological founding of 
critical theory. 
The aesthetic theories of Adorno and Marcuse, as well as Löwenthal's socio- 
logical theory of popular culture and literature, provide a mutually refer- 
encing set of concepts designed to pinpoint the function of 'high' bour- 
geois autonomous art in relation to the hermetically sealed society high- 
lighted in Pollock's theory. Both Adorno and Marcuse attempted to solve 
the epistemological problem presented by the conception of a closed social 
universe by counterposing autonomous art to such a society. It is this 
diametrical opposition that allowed them to challenge the closed society. 
To create this opposition they fused within art both reason and nature dis- 
solving these concepts' traditional theoretical separation so as to project 
a new form of rationality. However, in order to set up a barrier against 
the closed society they developed a conception of autonomous art (and/or 
modernity) that verged on the properties of such artworks being hypostatised 
as art per se. The works of both theorists were thus unable to solve the 
problem of how art was to be defined beyond its autonomous form, i. e. in the 
past or in the future, if it were to be both sensuous and intell tual, both 
Platonic 'eidos' and Aristotelian 'mimesis'. Löwenthal endeavoured to deduce 
a systematic solution to the problem from a socio-historical survey of the 
properties of popular culture rather than by means of an aesthetic perspect- 
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ive. Accordingly, his work will be omitted from the following 
discussion. 
The major question posed by the filtering of Adorno and Marcuse's 
aesthetic theories through Pollockian social theory is whether that 
theory is a necessary part of these, or whether they can be detached 
from it and are compatible with another more accurate analysis of 
society. Furthermore, it must be asked whether such a linking would 
indeed provide an example for the Marxist aesthetics Adorno sought 
to construct. If, for the sake of argument, one could detach Adorno's 
theory of mimesis and his concept of 'adequacy' from the Pollockian 
theory in which they have their origin, the further question would 
arise as to whether one could connect these two central ideas to a 
contemporary theory of late capitalism. (The compatibility of Adorno's 
concept of mimesis and current debates on ecology, for example, could 
then be considered. ) 
It is first necessary to look briefly at the main characteristics a 
Marxist aesthetics should exhibit since it is such an aesthetics that 
one would hope to build using either Adorno or Marcuse's concepts. The 
cornerstone on which an historical materialist aesthetics rests is its 
'objectivity', a term which in turn hinges on the concepts of reflexivity 
and of political commitment. Political engagement and influence cannot 
be deemed to divest an aesthetic theory of its objectivity, as long as 
that theory is able to reflect on its being embedded in a political 
analysis. Objectivity in aihistorical materialist understanding of 
the term thus bestows upon the theory aihistorically limited truth. It 
signifies a political and socio-historical analysis of a given set of 
circumstances with respect to the essence of the society at the time, 
an analysis, moreover, that reflects within its theoretical concepts 
that these were designed to describe precisely their own spatio-temporal 
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determination. Only if constructed in this fashion can an aesthetic 
theory hope to give a truthful, objective analysis of art. The 
important epistemological step involved in this definition of objec- 
tivity as truth is that by thinking both of the object of study and of 
oneself thinking of the object, the spatio-temporal position of concepts 
are taken into account in the act of thinking, that is in the act of 
positing them. Objectivity thus means grasping the objects of study, in 
this case artworks, both as concrete objects and as historically-deter- 
mined ideas of their concreteness, i. e. meta-historically. For an 
aesthetics to be objective in Marxist terms it therefore has simultaneously 
to think both of its determination and that of art. This process laysdown 
an exceptionally rigid framework for a Marxist aesthetics, because it 
permits only a historical truth to be discovered in art. Aesthetics 
would thus become in essence a subdivision of historical inquiry. In 
summary, the truth uncovered by such an aesthetics cannot be transcendent, 
as Marcuse tried to make it, but is restricted at most to mooting a 
future 'potentiality' inherent in the art of the present owing to art's 
current social position. 
The positioning of aesthetics within historical materialist theory has 
posed a problem ever since Marxists first started showing interest in 
aesthetics at the turn of the century. No systematic study of Marxist 
interest in this area exists to date, but such an investigation would 
undoubtedly reveal that the added attention paid to art went hand in 
hand with a shift away from more economistic theoretical models of 
society to theories placing greater emphasis on the role of the super- 
structure and on their own position within it. Lukäcs and Benjamin were 
the pioneers in this area. By the 1930s the European communists and 
socialists were paying far more heed to mass cultural movements and 
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theories of culture than had their nineteenth century predecessors. 
In the 'Expressionism Debate' in the 1930s questions were raised 
concerning the status of bourgeois culture (the bourgeois heritage) 
and the shape art had to assume in order to be progressive, thus 
taking up all the points which had been discussed by the Surrealists, 
Dadaists, Futurists and Constructivists in the 1920s. 
This connection between social and aesthetic theories was lost in the 
caesura in left-wing discourse caused first by the Nazi era and then 
by the Cold War. Debates on the subject were revived in the middle and 
late 1960s within the various anti authoritarian movements, but since 
the demise of these movements they have excited little interest outside 
the academic world. The interest in Frankfurt School writings that 
flared up in the 1960s waned abruptly in the 1970s, so that, broadly 
speaking, the coupling of aesthetics to a social theory was thus redis- 
covered only for it to be lost by the activist subjugation of aesthetics 
to social theory so characteristic of the post-1968 Left. 
Marcuse's work-can be most clearly distinguished from Adorno's in this 
context, i. e. according to the degree to which their respective work can 
be salvaged from the wreckage of Pollockian theory and grafted fruitfully 
on to a contemporary theory of society. From the study of Pollockian 
elements (that is, of a theory of the base) in Marcuse's writings we 
have discovered that, far from being absent, such a theory played an 
overwhelming role in his aesthetics. So central is this theory of the 
base to Marcuse's aesthetics that his analysis of art becomes completely 
saturated in the socio-political judgement to which they were intended 
as a response. His aesthetic theory is informed by the social theory- 
he developed to such an extent that the social theory no longer 
provides simply a background to the aesthetics but actively intervenes 
in it and becomes the foreground in Marcuse's thought. 
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Seen from this viewpoint Marcuse does not and cannot construct an 
aesthetics. His political theory determined the need for a future 
agent of change in society and located it in the erotic properties he 
had uncovered in art. Thus his aesthetics become steeped in activism, 
as if tailor-made to suit a political situation prevalent at the time 
of writing, but not transferrable beyond that moment. In other words, 
Marcuse designed an aesthetics that fed back into the socio-political 
theory from where it originated. Consequently, his aesthetics has no 
immanent level of reflexivity, a failing that we traced in Marcuse's 
problematic handling of art's transcendence of society. Anyone wishing 
to detach the one branch of his theory from the stem of socio-political 
theory thus faces insuperable difficulties. 
Adorno's aesthetics - which is the only aesthetics in the full meaning 
of the word that was written by a School theorist - contains elements 
potentially worthy of recuperation, despite the fact that critical 
opinion has most recently denied the value of such an undertaking. 
23 The 
fatal entrenchment of aesthetics in socio-political theory characteristic 
of Marcuse's writings does not occur in Adorno's work. It is my contention 
that as a result of the careful, selective methodology he sets up for it. 
Adorno's aesthetics surmounts, albeit unintentionally, some of the 
hurdles inherent in the concept of state capitalism. His concentrated 
focussing on aesthetic matters prevents his methodology from being 
submerged under Pollockian theory. This can be seen in the fact that 
Adorno's aesthetics is not politically informed to the same degree as 
Marcuse's and thus contaminated by contemporaneity. Admittedly, as we 
have seen, it was socio-political considerations that led Adorno to 
construct an aesthetics in the first place but these did not infiltrate 
that process. Adorno was, after all, adamant that art should not 
intervene in the course of society, but should reflect instead on 
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social change, just as he argued that conversely society should not 
penetrate into art overtly, As a consequence of what is often supposed 
. to 
be his elitism his aesthetics is not inextricably entangled in the 
underlying social concepts, the cornerstones of his theory. Indeed, his 
aesthetics itself constitutes a social theory in that it reveals social 
truths otherwise inaccessible to theory. It should be possible, then, 
to extract from Adorno's work, but not from Marcuse's, the concepts that 
are still valid and survive the social theory on which they were originally 
based and to assess whether these would serve as the foundations for a 
new Marxist aesthetics. 
Adorno's work stands out in aesthetic discussions as a persistent attempt 
at least to face up to, if not solve, the problem of connecting an 
aesthetics to a social theory. Indeed, it is this connection of art and 
socio-political analysis that can be reforged in Adorno's work. His 
aesthetics must be welded on to a different, dynamic view of capitalism, 
if some or all of the aesthetic concepts are to be recuperated and in- 
stilled with renewed vitality and validity. This is to ignore for the 
moment the unavoidable danger in such a refounding, namely that the 
aesthetics becomes grafted on to a social theory that is historically 
limited, i. e. the aesthetics becomes as before, meta-historical when 
compared to the social theory. 
Any analysis of late capitalism centred on both its corporate nature and 
the continuing presence of structural crises within it would suffice 
to refound Adorno's aesthetics. Painted in broad strokes such an 
analysis would outline the manner in which capitalism potentially 
generates its own antithesis within the contradiction of the productive 
forces and the relations of production, i. e. capitalism's dynamic 
character; which is not to say capitalism will automatically collapse. 
Above all, the analysis would have to address the problem of the 
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capitalist nature of tte productive forces themselves; in other words, 
it would have to pinpoint the extent to which certain forms of 
technology are in themselves capitalist. It is precisely at this 
point that Adorno's theory of mimesis as the antipole to dominatory 
technics could be utilized fruitfully by the main body of the social 
analysis. 
An analysis of late capitalism as a dynamic, contradictory social system 
possesses a further interface with Adorno's aesthetics, for both 
conceptions share a common notion of non-dominatory, intersubjective 
freedom. In this context, Habermas' attempt to elaborate a philosophical 
paradigm for a free society by means of a concept of communcative action 
provides a bridge which could join Adorno's aesthetics to a socio-economic 
analysis of late capitalism, 
24 
and yet prevent the overall analysis from 
degenrating into an abstract and cryptic exhortation of the 'new', as was 
the case with Adorno's social theory. A concept of intersubjectivity as 
communication (latent in Adorno and Horkheimer's work) provides a liberating 
link, hitherto ignored, between mankind and nature, or between man and men, 
for the concept does not position the subject, mankind - homo faber - in 
such a way that it is dominant logically over the object. 
Before a fusion of such an analysis of late capitalism and Adorno's aesthet- 
ics can be attemptedwe need to assess whether the methodology Adorno has 
bequeathed us is objective in the sense we have lent the term and can there- 
fore be disconnected completely from the Pollockian social theory. That is 
to ask, to what extent, for example, the central concept of mimesis as non- 
identity is still valid beyond the parameters of Pollockian theory and not 
merely a reflection on and of it, an excessively abstract one at that. Some 
critical attention must therefore be paid to the nature of the linkage bet- 
ween Adorno's aesthetics and his social theory. 
To a certain degree Adorno's aesthetics is tainted by its very merit, namely 
its historical reflexivity, which unavoidably raises doubts as to the valid- 
ity of his work. He had to adopt a metaphysical logic in order to posit his 
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theory in the first place, as otherwise his judgement of what was true 
would never have been constant and yet precisely these aesthetic constructs 
must be temporally limited. The meta-historical quality of these judgements 
within Adorno's theory must be determined more closely, if the objectivity 
of his methodology is to be assessed. 
The nature of the value judgements inherent in an aesthetics evidences their 
historical and objective nature. Two forms of value judgement are involved 
here: first of all, a value judgement based on particular political criteria, 1: 
which may be false, if that political preference rests on an inaccurate 
analysis of society; secondly, accurate value judgements, the truth content 
of which can itself be historically limited without that truth being invalid- 
ated. For instance, with his investigation of the commodity form Marx uncov- 
ered 'alienation' as 'exploitation' in the form of surplus labour, a finding 
that was based on empirical material taken from a particular period (and 
thus limited) and yet one that transcended the confines of such an historical 
examination. In a similar manner an historical materialist aesthetics has 
to judge both what constitutes capitalist and anti-capitalist art and simul- 
taneously determine what art itself is. The simultaneity of these two judge- 
ments means that the determination of truth and art may coincide. Such simul- 
taneity logically results in the claim that what is untrue cannot be art, 
and thus if only one form of art is good (true), i. e. anti-capitalist, then 
all other forms are not art, as they cannot be true. 
25 
An historical materialist aesthetics thus makes three judgements which are 
historically relative, a pattern Adorno's work follows. Firstly, he decides 
what art is-capitalist or ideology . For Adorno mass culture is an example 
of such 'art'. Secondly, his aesthetics identifies what constitutes anti- 
capitalist, i. e. ideologically true, art. For Adorno this alone is true 
art. Thirdly, assessments are made of past artforms. Adorno's equation of 
true art and the hermetic, non-communicative artwork is historically rela- 
tive in that he views such artworks as the necessary contemporary (1950s) 
response to the constraints Pollock had found in state capitalist society. 
r 
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However, his judgement that authentic, true art is, of necessity, anti- 
capitalist, transcends that historical moment, i. e. it is incorrect to 
allege that his aesthetics opposes communicative artworks. Adorno's political 
judgement on artworks may support such a case, but the core of his aesthetic 
concepts does not, for his judgement that artworks must be non-communicative 
now, suggests that this need not to be the case if society were different. 
Since society has, indeed, changed, Adorno's analysis of society is false, 
which means, furthermore, that there remains no need for his aesthetic theory 
to champion the cause of hermetic artworks. 
In other words, Adorno's investigation, and the concepts he devises to anal- 
yse its products, cannot be considered to be dependent on anhistorically 
relative judgement as to the particular material form artworks should 
assume at the time of his writing. His value judgements cannot necessarily 
be considered to implicate the methodology in which they are found and thus 
the methodology can still be objective. The thesis on the hermetic artwork 
is therefore to be regarded as an extension, but not as an essential compon- 
ent, of his theory of artistic technics and construction, even though this 
theory may have been deduced from a study of such artworks. A study of apes 
can lead to a theory of evolution, without mankind still having to be viewed 
misanthropically as apes. The thesis on the hermetic artwork is therefore 
to be regarded as false, but, since it is not part of the underlying method- 
ology, it cannot be held to infect Adorno's aesthetics, e. g. his particular 
theory of mimesis as non-identity. The value judgements of the theory are 
addenda to it, not the cornerstone of the theoretical edifice. 
This brief discussion of value judgements within aesthetics pinpoints a 
crucial problem that is faced by any contemporary attempt to design an hist- 
orical materialist aesthetics and one that has already been adumbrated in 
the discussion of objectivity: how is the artwork to be considered both, on 
the one hand, as a commodity produced at a particular historical juncture 
a specific geography and thus having only sociological importance, and on 
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the other hand, as art, and therefore as something more than a commodity? 
Can something be both historical and ahistorical, both a commodity at the 
time of its production and transhistorically beautiful for successive 
generations of beholders? No aesthetics has, as yet, solved this problem of 
the adequate definition of the artwork and perhaps one should ask whether 
indeed it can ever be resolved satisfactorily in historical materialist 
terms, or whether it must remain as a continuous thorn in the flesh of Marx- 
ist aestheticians. Perhaps the mediation of social essence and social appear- 
ance in the artwork cannot be adequately defined. 
26 
These questions cut to the core of Adorno's aesthetics, exposing the main 
problem it contains, namely the fusion of aesthetic and social judgement in 
his theory of the artwork. To remain objective, an historical materialist 
aesthetics has to avoid reducing the artwork to its socio-historical origin, 
a difficulty, for example, that plagued Lukäcs throughout his writings to 
the extent that he subsumed artistic knowledge under scientific knowledge. 
Such a reduction ignores any self-reflexive level in the theory with regard 
to the artwork. Equally, however, such an aesthetic must be careful not to 
hypostatise the 'ahistorical' side of the artwork as absolute -a tendency 
prevalent in Adorno's work. A view of the ahistorical nature of the artwork 
as absolute only serves to reject any self-reflexive moment in the theory 
and opens the floodgate to ahistorical definitions. Both these approaches 
involve singling out as all important one of the three value value judgements 
to the detriment of the remaining two. 
In this context a further, extremely important point arises, namely that in 
light of the above guidelines some justification exists for the assertion 
that the question of the historicity of art may be Sisyphean in an historical 
materialist aesthetics. Complete objectivity in the mannerin which we have 
defined it is'probably unattainable in an aesthetic theory owing to the 
very nature of the object of study. To this extent, Adorno's aesthetics 
remains within the tradition of Marxist aesthetic theory, but tries to 
V 
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provide a novel solution to its problems. 
Marxist aesthetics has always faced three aporetic choices. It could reduce 
art to its commodity form and thus attribute no importance to artistic 
beauty or aesthetic experience; or it could view art solely in terms of pol- 
itical ideas carried into the artwork from outside and thus not specific to 
art; or lastly it could jettison any such historical determinacy, and with 
it its Marxism, in order to define art by its bourgeois definition, i. e. 
by its beauty. In the first two- modes of analysis art's quality as art is 
granted no epistemological status other than one already found, formed 
and defined by sociology or social history. In this reading there could 
be no discipline of aesthetics in Marxism, and indeed usually this 
question has been avoided altogether - Marxists writing literary criticism 
rather than aesthetic theory. Structuralist Marxists, to their credit, 
have attempted to shake the assumptions inherent in these three 
approaches to the constitution of the beautiful by emphasizing less 
economic determinacy of the 'last instance', and creating instead a 
permeable membrane separating commodity existence and social knowledge 
from artistic beauty. (Unfortunately, they only manage to extend the 
historical time span of reflexivity, to be befallen by historical 
relativity in the final instance. ) It should perhaps be remembered 
that even Hegel, the founding father of materialist dialectics, was 
not able to accord art an independent status qua beauty in his philo- 
sophical system but had to subordinate it to 'Spirit'. Further, Hegel's 
instrumental logic becomes apparent in his aesthetics, where he 
allocates natural beauty no place whatsoever. Adorno's aesthetics is 
exceptional in this context, for it pushes back the barriers confron- 
ting any Marxist aesthetics and those that confronted Hegel, by 
returning to the Kantian impulse of positioning aesthetics between 
practical and theoretical knowledge, i. e. beauty becomes both reason 
and nature, the study of art both science and non-science. In so 
doing, Adorno's aesthetics treads gingerly along a line between 
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historical materialism and idealism, for the determination of the 
historical existence of the artwork is often somewhat neglected in his 
writings. Nevertheless, Adorno is able to claim that art, by virtue of 
its constructed mimesis of nature, approximates to truth and yet still 
remains a commodity. In this fashion he avoids collapsing art into its 
existence as a social artefact, stripping it of any quality as art, and 
instead grants it an epistemological standing far beyond its 'Ding- 
haftigkeit', i. e. its being as an object. In this manner, Adorno's 
aesthetics highlights problems which traditional Marxism was unable to 
address, such as the ideological nature of technics. 
Adorno's aesthetics is also unique in that not only does it locate both 
social knowledge and existence of the artwork from within an historical 
materialist framework, but it also manages simultaneously to bestow 
upon art an epistemological independence; art is judged as a social 
entity and yet at the same time as a meta-social property, namely beauty. 
Rather than collapsing aesthetics into literary criticism, Adorno 
provided the first example of an aesthetics that can justifiably claim 
to be Marxist and still remain an aesthetics. 
Before turning to the crucial question as to the artwork's truth, some 
preliminary remarks similar to those on objectivity need to be made on 
the notion of 'appropriateness'27. Thusfar the term has been used as a 
desideratum for an aesthetic position to be constructed around Adorno's 0 
concept of mimesis. The notion of appropriateness, however, refers also 
to the most debated component of Adorno's aesthetics, i. e. his advocacy 
of hermetic artworks. Those value judgements are 'appropriate' that are 
made out of political preference, e. g. the pronouncement that one 
particular art form is most 'appropriate' - or adequate - to society 
at one specific historical juncture. In other words, the concept of 
appropriateness assumes that art has a truth content which is communicable, 
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for it implies that one particular art form is true or rather that 
such a form unveils a social truth with regard to a particular socio- 
historical formation. The uncovering of this truth within the artwork 
is perceivable to the beholders of the artwork, even if the portrayal 
of truth is effected by the artwork's very attempt to prevent 
communication with its beholders. The question that immediately arises 
from this is whether such a truth is attained only by one particular 
artform at a given time, as Adorno and Lukäcs would both maintain, 
or whether it can exist in various forms at once. 
To clarify this question of truth and appropriateness a little space 
must be devoted to the similarity between Lukäcs' and Adorno's 
respective work, an important point that has up till now only be 
mentioned by Lindner. 
28 At first sight the writings of Adorno and Lukäcs 
seem diametrically opposed to one another, and yet an examination of 
their theoretical assumptions reveals that there'is considerable 
congruence in some areas. Adorno and Lukäcs both shared the view, for 
example, that artworks attained to a level of truth, although Lukäcs 
distinguished more precisely between scientific and artistic truth than 
does Adorno. 29 Even Lukäcs''more dogmatic writings of the 1950s evidence 
this shared conception that the artwork exposes the essence of society30 
(although Adorno and Lukäcs differ as to what precisely constituted this 
essence. ) However, Lukäcs conceived of the artwork's visualisation of 
the general in the appearance of the particular by means of a concept 
of aesthetic form which is quite the opposite to that devised by Adorno. 
Artistic form, Lukäcs suggested, occured as a generalisation of a 
particular, concrete circumstance, thus heightening the concreteness . 
of the event, 
31 
not as the result of a merging of the general with the 
particular. Lukäcs had to adopt a concept of particularity as the 
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central informing principle of art if the artwork was to be able 
to depict social essence in his construction: 
Nur die Besonderheit, als Mittelpunkt der ästhetischen Wieder- 
spiegelung der Wirklichkeit, ist imstande, die spezifische 
dialektische Einheit des subjektiven und objektiven Faktors als 
widersprüchlich bewegendes Prinzip der ganzen Sphäre zu erhellen. 32 
The difference between Adorno and Lukäcs' respective emphasis on the 
categories of truth, particularity and generality lies in the choice 
the two theorists made as to what constitutes an appropriate artwork 
in contemporary society. Lukäcs was scathing in his critique of the 
avartýgarde, accusing it of overweighting technics and of "abstract 
particularity. "33 The conceptual terminology of these criticisms is 
similar to that used by Adorno to prove the opposite case and to damn 
artworks that 'reflect' society directly. Lukäcs' advocacy at various 
times in his career of realism as practised by such as Tolstoy and 
Thomas Mann would thus appear to mark off his theorising from Adorno's. 
He remarked: 
Die Geschlossenheit des Kunstwerks ist also die Wiederspiegelung des 
Lebensprozesses in seiner Bewegung und in seinem konkreten bewegten 
Zusammenhang. 34 
Adorno and Lukäcs' choices of different 'appropriate' artworks are 
indeed diametrically opposed to one another owing to their different 
theories of society, but this cannot belie the similarity of their 
analyses of what artworks are. This similarity can be seen in Adorno's 
extension to all art in general of his definition of artistic truth 
as both a knowledge of society and a paradigm of the new, i. e. in 
his inconsistent and arbitrary reduction of truth to one particular 
art form; (the last step, as we have seen, was necessitated by Pollockian 
social theory. ) If Adorno's option for hermetic artworks such as 
Beckett's Endgame is, however, cast aside and with it his limitation 
of artistic truth to one specific art form at one given historical 
juncture (an argument, for which in any case he, like Lukacs, cannot 
-380- 
provide a binding proof), then the remaining methodology could 
serve as the core for contemporary aesthetics. His aesthetics could 
be upheld even though its conclusions have to be rejected. 
An acceptance of Adorno's methodology means taking up the approximation 
of aesthetic truth to philosophical knowledge contained in his alignment 
of sensuous experience and knowledge. Aesthetics for Adorno, is primarily 
a study of the beautiful, because it is through the medium of beauty - 
of sensuous appearance - that art approximates to truth, or at least 
to one form of truth. This relationship of beauty to truth permitted 
Adorno to construct various equivalent levels of truth. Surprisingly, 
a direct line leads from Adorno's concept of truth to work by Post- 
structuralists, who unwittingly resurrect in a different form the idea 
of beauty. Without naming the word beauty, Poststructuralism claims 
that the artwork pertains to various levels of meaning which are 
meta-subjective and not directly social in any way. 
In general, three possible avenues are open to a Marxist study of 
artistic beauty. Firstly, the interpretation of art can adopt a historical 
approach in the form of an ideology critique, exposing particular forms 
of beauty as hegemonic and class-specific at any one given time. Such a 
method differs only marginally from traditional literary history or 
reception theory as practised by Wolfgang Iser and Hans Robert Jauss. 
Secondly, a study of art can judge the form of beauty to be historically 
specific, as in an ideology critique, and yet also attribute to art 
historically transcendent properties. Thirdly, it could resituate 
aesthetics in the manner pioneered by Aristotle, i. e. it would treat 
art merely as a mode of production as 'techne', and would study it for 
the difference between artistic and scientific modes of ideational 
production. However, art cannot be judged as a non-scientific mode of 
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production without categorising it in scientific terms in order to 
undertake the comparison. Thus art would only be grasped in scientific 
terms, and science would therefore always be placed hierarchically 
above art. Yet, how is art to be defined in terms other than those 
designed by the natural sciences? 
Adorno had in common with Benjamin the attempt to provide a bridge 
between the three approaches outlined. A major difference between the 
two men lies in their respective evaluation of the current forms of 
these three approaches and their respective progressive or regressive 
potential. Adorno held artistic beauty to be a form of truth because 
of its depiction of the non-identical by means of mimesis. The limitation 
of this aesthetics lies in its concentration on the construction and 
production of the artwork. If one views it with the aid of Roman Jakobson's 
context 




becomes clear that Adorno and Benjamin address different areas. Adorno's 
aesthetics relies on formed content, i. e. social and technical codes and 
their relation to past codes, and all but ignores the receiver, the media 
through which the receiver receives, and the situation of the sender. These 
are, however, latent in Adorno's conception of artistic beauty. Benjamin 
does not make such an omission, although it can be said that he over-emphas- 
ises the technical codes without studying their historically limited charac- 
ter. 
Adorno has in common with Benjamin his treatment of aesthetics and literary 
criticism, although it is the equation of the two that explains his contrac- 
tion of the Jakobiani model and his restriction of art to music in Xsdetische 
Theorie. To put it in John Berger's terms, Adorno regards aesthetics as 'ways 
of hearing and reading', without thinking of the person engaged in these 
activities (by definition there are only a very few! ). Nevertheless, it 
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is the analysis of the internal construction of music and literature 
which permits him to elaborate concepts of mimesis and non-identity in 
art. The question must be asked, therefore, as to how his broad model 
of aesthetics and with it the aboxementioned concepts, would take shape 
in an up-dated version of his aesthetic theory. The concept of mimesis 
as 'Eingedenken' has clear affinities to the notions of alternative 
technics developed within the present ecological movement and might thus 
gain a new political validity, without this entailing a vision of a 
hermetically sealed world. In this manner the concepts could be used, 
but the judgements as to the concrete art form that corresponds to 
the concepts would have to be changed. 
If society is conflict-ridden, i. e. open, artistic form while still being 
based on Adorno's 'anti-logical' logic, must, nevertheless, be able to 
embrace and depict that openness. It is of note that Adorno started to 
modify - if not revise - his condemnation of film as he got older, for 
it is in filmic juxtaposition, i. e. in montage, that to my mind a 
depiction of an open society can be given which still follows the course 
of negative dialectics. The closed vacuum of the hermetic artwork cannot 
perform such a task, because it lacks the open-ended, multi-level 
generative capacity of montage. It is through this last category that 
Adorno's aesthetic theory can be salvaged and provided with a new home, 
however paradoxical such a combination might at first seem. 
Montage avoids the domination contained both in a person's 'objective' 
certainty that 'A is A' and in the artistic portrait of reality as a 
transparent entity. Reality, the Deconstructionists have claimed with 
some authority, is essentially opaque in nature and cannot be described 
by a crystalline approach, which would be in the final instance self- 
defeating. Only montage can be appropriate to the task of creating an 
artwork that is both open and mimetic, for only a juxtaposition of images 
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can both provide a constructed picture of reality while also leaving 
that portrait undominated by the hand of the artist, and thus over- 
determined. Furthermore, montage is mimetic in Adorno's sense because 
it generates from its images a- quite concrete - image of society, 
which each person creates or re-creates in the act of reading, hearing 
or viewing, and in which each part has a determining function on the 
whole and yet is equally determined by the whole. In this fashion, an 
artwork constructed according to the principles of montage is non- 
identical with itself and with. society both in its inner construction 
and in the image of an open, dynamic and fragmented society that it 
provides. Thus, montage, if fitted into Adorno's aesthetics, would seem 
to offer an answer to the question raised by contemporary aesthetic 
theory in general and literary theory in particular, namely the question 
of what an artwork should be. It would provide a concrete form for the 
36 
'decentring' of meaning advocated by Deconstructionist theory while still 
retaining a political link to the present. 
This reference of the Deconstructionists in a discussion of Adorno is not as 
out of place as it might seem. Deconstructionism, or Poststructuralism, 
regards the subject as something at present either objectified or opposed 
to other subjects. In like manner Adorno foresaw in his designing of a 
concept of non-identity in terms of damaged subjectivity a future state 
of resuscitated (or, to use his terminology, reconciled) subjectivity; 
Thus he also rejected rigorously logocentrism, but in terms of the future 
overcoming the necessity of adhering to such a form of thinking. Adorno 
regarded the Cartesian Ego as something mythic, since he judged it to 
be dominatory in its conceptualization of reason as a solely instrumental 
mode*of thinking. Logocentrism is another word for the same mode of thought. H 
Adorno's critique of instrumentality also rejects any concept of reason ! 'i 
based on such a false, uniform subjectivity, just as do the Deconstructio- 
nists. In other words, in his conception of mimetic subjectivity Adorno i! 
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displays assumptions common to the Poststructuralists with regard to 
a philosophical interpretation of the present. 
37 Equally, his concept 
of a 're-centred' subject of 'Eingedenken', that is a median of subject 
and object in the traditional understanding of the terms, rejects 
logocentrism. 
This rejection of Enlightenment subjectivity by Adorno (and, of course, 
by Horkheimer and Marcuse as well) not only prefigures Poststructuralism 
by three decades, but also culminates in a discussion of art and its 
construction. Adorno ignores authorial intention for the same reasons 
as the Deconstructionists have turned away from it to notions of 
intertextuality. Adorno considered such intention to be a domination of 
the text's manifold possibilities, and thus an interpretation of a text 
based solely on an interest in authorial intention dominates the text 
and diverts attention away from its construction. Adorno's concept of 
construction and its derivation from a notion of non-authorially intended, 
historical material is the logical obverse of a praxis of deconstructing 
artworks and, in addition, it treats the artwork's historicality from 
the outset, a feature less obvious in much Deconstructionist work. The 
idea of an artwork being constructed from historical material which takes 
on a different meaning at different historical junctures leads back to 
the question of what historical material is appropriate to the task of 
providing an image of mimesis in the present. Here, the line between 
Adorno and the Deconstructionists ends. 
The rejection of a positive or posited subject of knowledge implies 
relinquishing a view of ideology that considers such to be class-based, 
for numerous ideologies can now be defined beyond either bourgeois or 
working class ideology. Accordingly, the practice of ideology-critique 
wanes. In the absence of a determinate class ideology to negate as the 
consequence of both the above historical considerations and of the absence 
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of one specific dominant ideology characteristic of corporate 
capitalism, artworks cannot reveal the 'truth' of society in the 
manner Lukäcs had envisaged, but must turn to areas other than 
hegemonic ideology and its portrayal. Here again Adorno's concept of 
non-identity can be welded (so productively) on to the principle of montage. 
Montage is appropriate to the 1980s, for it takes a middle line between 
artistic determinate portrayal of reality and uncertainty. It reconstructs 
the world, and yet simultaneously deconstructs it in the juxtaposed 
images it provides. In so doing it generates a plurality of meaning 
through which society is teased into revealing parts of itself and its 
truth. The interdependence of the parts, and of the parts and the whole, 
serve to enhance the uncertain, oscillating picture that results. 
38 The 
presence in such artworks of an 'anti-logical' logic similar to Adorno's 
is often overlooked in this context because of Adorno's adamant rejection 
of the use of montage in art. Nevertheless, in his native Germany, 
literature making use of the principle of montage, such as that produced 
by Peter Chotjewitz, Gerd Fuchs or Heinar Kipphardt, is imbued with such 
a logic. 
39 
Such literature's inheriting of avantgarde forms which date 
from the first third of this century highlight the manner in which 
Adorno's own theory arose as a rejoinder to the thought of that period 
in history. If late capitalism is a continuation of high bourgeois 
capitalism by other means, then a contemporary aesthetics must examine 
the problems of the earlier period in order to understand the problems 
of the present more clearly. 
The principle of montage resumes the attempt to produce appropriate 
art, i. e. to describe current society and to provide an antithesis to it. 
It implicitly acknowledges two things in this undertaking: firstly, the 
necessity of producing communicative literature despite the predominance 
of a capitalist network of distribution and capitalist market relations 
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(both structures that render art pointless in Adorno's eyes); and, 
secondly, that the technics of writing are themselves potentially 
capitalist in origin and have to be used in a particular manner, i. e. 
according to the principle of montage, if they are to reflect on and 
thus break free from the yoke of affirmation. Montage achieves this by 
dismantling and subsequently reassembling pieces of reality. 
Artfarns: - which obey the principle of montage recognize the 'real' 
subsumption of the technics of art and yet also perceive optimistically 
that such subsumption is dialectical. For example, Peter Chotjewitz 
narrates in the traditional form and style of bourgeois novel writing, 
for he is well aware that only in this form will his work sell and be 
digested by awide public. However, because the traditional third-person 
and first-person narratives are presented in such a way that chunks of 
reality are juxtaposed and opposed to one another, sötlntneither narrative 
standpoint is made to hold sway over the text. As a result the determi- 
nation of reality is left open. At the same time, any affirmative web 
of meaning can be avoided. It should be remembered at this point that 
Adorno did not advocate that artwork had always to be non-communicative, 
but rather they had to be so only in order to confront the Cold War era 
of conservatism. Whether artworks need to readopt this tactic to counter 
New Conservatism is doubtful. Unlike the work of Beckett or the multiple 
possible meanings of the French nouveaux romans, the communication of 
meaning is not forfeited in such montage as is used in Chotjewitz's 
writing, despite its transcendence of individual-based, logocentric 
narrative. Thus, despite its external appearance, such work does not 
relapse into the bourgeois novel form. 
In being used for a new purpose and for different ends in the production 
of constructed artworks, capitalist technics of art can indeed, contrary 
to what Adorno thought, be made to reveal the extent to which they can 
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transcend such ideological limitations. Furthermore, the principle 
of montage allows a certain form of a value theory of art to be established 
that does not ignore art qua art. 
40 
Montage acknowledges that artworks 
possess an exchange value, i. e. are sold on a market to the extent that 
it deliberately sets out via a juxtaposition of images to prevent itself 
being sterilised in the act of its being sold. The existence of a market 
place can be taken to indicate that the contemporary artwork cannot be 
examined purely with regard to its consumption, as Adorno had assumed, 
but that a socio-historical framework of technics and production must 
be included in the examination. In producing an artwork constructed by 
use of montage the author accepts that the piece of art has an exchange- 
value, for he must assume that it can only exist within the capitalist 
cultural market, just as he himself exists within that market (the 
existence of small publishers or self-publishing facilities does not alter 
this, for the apparatus of distribution remains the same. ) However, the 
author also assumes that his artwork has a 'use-value', albeit one 
distinct from the immediate satisfaction to be gained from beholding it. 
This value lies in the transcendent quality which the artwork based on 
montage generates and is not to be confused with the Marxist concept of 
'use' value on which the capitalist bases his promotion of an artwork 
and ultimately his ability to make profit from it. The term here 
signifies a functional value inherent in the production of a constructed 
artwork and specific only to those commodities that are artworks. In 
this fashion, artworks are commodities and yet are not reducible only 
to exchange and use values. They possess both these values in the Marxist 
sense of the terms and yet they are inhabited by an overarching value 
that is neither of these, namely the 'functional' value of the artwork, 
what Adorno termed its truth content. 
This functional value is the causal origin of artistic transcendence and 
is created (as Adorno correctly perceived) by forming material into art. 
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A theory of this function of art, or artistic beauty, might help 
theorists to get close, to the problem of objectivity in historical 
materialist aesthetics, although it involves a vicious circle. If 
beauty is defined as transcendence of reality, and such transcendence 
is regarded as art, then art is beauty and vice versa: and the terms 
become self-defining. 
It is this functional value that montage attempts to produce in the face 
of a capitalist market wishing only to sell commodities. To the seller, 
the artwork is only interesting in so far as it is a commodity 
offering intellectual or libidinal satisfaction which people will buy. 
The fact that such a functional value of transcendence is possessed by 
the same artwork is usually irrelevant to the seller's calculations: 
autonomy persists in a new form. This is probably not the case if such 
transcendence is also encoded in a content that openly opposes the 
capitalist system, by virtue of which the seller is after all profiting 
materially, be it by his production, sale or distribution of artworks. 
In this manner, the concept of a 'functional' value has the advantage 
that it weds an aesthetic and a sociological view into one concept. 
In the light of these brief remarks montage can thus be considered as 
a principle of aesthetic construction which produces certain qualities 
within the artwork, namely an image of non-dominatory praxis, of mimetic 
juxtaposition, a portrayal of the world as not logocentric and a picture 
of society as a multi-levelled, open-ended system. Furthermore, the same 
artwork exists quite happily in a capitalist market, for its functional 
value cannot be subsumed under that market or system. Therefore the 
principle of montage can be used to depict the social system of late 
corporate capitalism in terms of its changeability and, in communicating 
this, the artwork claims to illustrate a social truth that is embedded 
in artistic form, just as Adorno had suggested artworks had to. 
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Accordingly, the principle of montage with its deliberate character 
of construction, its abdication of the author's overt intervention 
in or directing of the artwork in the face of the complexity of 
reality and the artwork's generation both of non-identity and of an 
image of mimesis, fulfils in an updated form the requirements Adorno 
made of authentic artworks. In so doing, however, montage breaks 
through the confines of Adorno's social theory and re-establishes his 
aesthetics on a new footing, one more appropriate to the present and 
one in which the fruitful concept of the culture industry does not 
stifle the equally fecund concept of artistic construction. 
t 
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GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS TRANSLATED 
befassbar conceivable 
begriffen that which can be described in terms of au ncept 
Doppelcharakter double or dual character 
erkannt conceptually understood 
erkennbar recognizable 
falsches Ganze false whole 
geschlossene Gesellschaft closed society 
Glück physical happiness 
Gesamtprozeß totality of social relations 
Genuß enjoyment 
Gehalt content, in terms of everything which gives the 




immanente Vermittlung internal constructedness or mediateness 
Kunstgewerb art manufacture 





Prozeßcharakter processual character 








umschlagen switch over into the opposite 
Vermittling mediation, intermediateness 
Vergnügen amusement, entertainment 
Verblendungszusammenhang a context within which everything is blinded, i. e. 
unable to penetrate ideology 
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56. 'The End of Reason', pp. 386 - 387; see Vernunft und Selbster- 
haltung, p. 54 for an identical statement. 
57. 'The End of Reason', p. 380 and Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung, 
p. 57. 
58. See Chapter 5. 
59. 'Art and Mass Culture', p. 290. 
60. See Chapter 2. 
61. 'Art and Mass Culture', p. 294. 
62. ibid, p. 296. 
63. Dubiel, op cit, p. 124. 
64. See his 'Notes on Institute Activities', SPSS, IX, 1941. James 
Schmidt in his essay 'Offensive Critical Theory? ' (Telos, 39, 
Spring 1979) remarks (p. 64) "It is clear that by the 1941 'Notes 
on Institute Activities', in which Horkheimer offered a concise 
redefinition of the conceptual basis of critical theory, this 
general approach had been replaced with something much closed to 
Adorno's notion of immanent critique.. " 
Chapter 4 
1. Susan Buck-Morss' The Origin of Negative Dialectics is an extensive 
study of precisely this relationship. 
2. James Schmidt argues (op cit) that the change in Horkheimer's work 
after 1938 occurred as a result of Adorno's influence on 
Institute affairs. As we have seen, however, the change is attributable 
primarily to the influence exerted by Pollock's work. 
3. From letter to Kracauer, 1.7.1930, all letters quoted with kind 
permission of the curators, Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach. 
4. Adorno stated in a letter to Benjamin of 2.8.1935 (in Briefe, 
Vol 2, Frankfurt/M., 1966) "Der Fetischcharakter der Ware ist keine 
Tatsache des Bewußtseins, sondern dialektisch in dem eminenten 
Sinne, daß er Bewußtsein produziert. " 
5. Clearly, this second level rests on a notion of freedom and 
necessity unlike that encountered in classical Marxism, which kept 
the two separate, (rather it is Hegelian in the sense that Adorno 
held a thing to be true and free if it was, - like 'Spirit' - 
what it could be, i. e. what it by necessity should have been. 
6. Lukäcs proposed in Literatursoziologie, (Berlin, 1961, p. 118), 
that the proletarian-revolutionary writer was not interested 
in pure art or Tendenzkunst' because these writers were able to 
depict society directly. 
7. The two exceptions to this are the essay 'Zur gesellschaftlichen 
Lage der Musik', (ZfS, I, 1932) and his Philosophie der neuen 
Musik, Frankfurt, 1958. 
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8. Adorno addressed this question specifically in 'Über den 
Raritätenladen von Charles Dickens' written in 1931 (in GS. 11). 
9. Much of this reconstruction of Adorno's work hinges on his 
analyzing artworks in terms of their. form. Indeed, form plays 
a pivotal role in Adorno's aesthetics. It has been suggested 
that this concern with aesthetic form resulted from Adorno's 
training as a musician. 
10. As an example, Adorno comments in 'Wirtschaftskrise als Idylle' 
written in 1932 (GS. 11) that Yeats views the idyll ideologically, 
for such a form is founded on a harmony alien to the cut-throat 
entrepreneurialism Yeats seeks to describe. 
11. GS. 11. This similarity to Benjamin's analysis of literary 
historians is not surprising, for both Adorno and Benjamin 
base their remarks on a notion of the artwork as a cypher. 
12. See Waltraud Beyer 'Tradition als Spur von Leiden', (Weimarer 
Beiträge, 25,1979, H. 2); Dieter Ulle 'Bürgerliche Kulturkritik 
und Ästhetik', (Weimarer Beiträge, 18,1972, H. 6); and Wilhelm R. 
Beyer, Die Sünden der Frankfurter Schule, (Frankfurt/M., 1971). 
13. ZfS, I, 1932. 
14. Adorno thus differentiates between the spheres of distribution 
and production, which refutes Giacomo Marramao's suggestion 
(op cit, pp. 76-78) that Adorno only spoke abstractly of the 
production process. 
15. 'George und Hofmannsthal. Zum Briefwechsel', written from 1939 - 
1040, published in the special mimeographed SPSS in 1942, and 
reprinted in Prismen, 1978. I have chosen to include this essay 
in my discussion of Adorno's earlier writings although it was 
written at a later date. Adorno's exposition of the categories of 
'market' and 'anti-market' art in the essay both clarify the meaning 
of the two terms and indicate that they were meant to describe the 
transition from liberal to monopoly capitalism and not late capitalism. 
Adorno perhaps selected this essay to dedicate to Benjamin's memory, 
for the latter's work on Goethe's Elective Affinities had been 
published under Hofmannsthal's sponsorship and explicitly criticized 
the ideology of the George-circle, which, according to Martin Jay 
(op cit, p. 204) "resulted in his being ostracized from the 
scholarly world. " 
16. In 'Über Jazz', ZfS, V, 1936, published under the pseudonym of 
Hektor Rottweiler, p. 237. 
17. See 'George und Hofmannsthal', op cit, where the term is used when 
describing monopoly capitalism in connection with the label 'markt- 
fähig', p. 272 ff. 
18. First printed in part as 'Fragmente über Wagner', ZfS, VIII, 
1939 - 1940, and then in total as Versuch über Wagner, Frankfurt/M., 
1952. 
19. Adorno said of Versuch über Wagner in his Ästhetische Theorie 
(Frankfurt/M., 1977, p. 421): "Das Buch interessiert sich an den 
objektiven Vermittlungen, die den Wahrheitsgehalt des Werks 
konstituieren, nicht an Genese und nicht an Analogien. Seine 
Absicht war philosophisch-ästhetisch, nicht wissensoziologisch. " 
20. In that it investigates the contradictions facing the bourgeois 
artwork, the monograph follows the path of study taken by Hork- 
heimer in his essay 'Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung', to which it 
was dedicated. 
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21. The term 'phantasmagoria' is borrowed from Karl Marx, who 
speaks of the social relations between people as having taken 
"für sie die phantasmagorische Form eines Verhältnisses von 
Dingen" (Das Kapital, I, M. E. W., Vol. 23, Berlin (GDR), 1977, 
p. 86). 
22. Versuch über Wagner, p. 84. 
23. In ZfS, VII, 1938. This essay was intended as a rejoinder to 
Benjamin's essay 'L'oeuvre d'art ä 1'epoque de sa reproduction 
mecanisee' (ZfS, _V, 
1936). Adorno's attempt to systematize his 
theoretical work can perhaps be attributed to the fact that he 
had started working on the subject of radio music for Paul 
Lazarfeld's Radio Research Unit which undertook mainly empirical 
work. Just as Horkheimer's later esays all centred around an 
analysis of the authoritarian state, so Adorno's later essays in 
the ZfS/SPSS also focussed on the nature of mass culture. The 
essays are 'On Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Love' (ZfS, VIII, 1939-40), 
'On Popular Music' (with George Simpson, SPSS, IX, 1941); 'Spengler 
Today' (SPSS, IX, 1941); and 'Veblen's Attack on Culture' (SPSS, 
IX, 1941). 
24. ZfS, VII, 1938, p. 332. 
25. Unpublished letter from the Max Horkheimer Archive, Stadt- und 
Universitätsbibliothek, Frankfurt/M. Printed here with kind 
permission of the custodians. 
26. G. S. 10.1, p. 98. 
27. See G. S. 8, p. 376 for remarks on this continued antagonistic 
character of society. 
28. We will meet this figure of thought again in Marcuse's writings, 
illustrating once more the manner in which certain topics were 
discussed by the inner circle of the School and then treated 
by the individual theorists in articles specific to their own 
discipline. 
29. See Heinz Paetzold, Neomarxistische Ästhetik, (Vol. 2, Düsseldorf, 
1974). Paetzold reachs similar conclusions on the role of technics 
in Adorno's work, but discusses this only with reference to 
Adorno's major works on aesthetics in the post-War era. 
30. G. S. 8, p. 396. 
31. This has led some observers to claim that Adorno reduces man to 
history, rather than positing man as interacting with nature in 
history. As can be seen from Adorno's discussion of the historical 
character of technics, this charge is inaccurate. 
32. This proposition runs counter to Benjamin's equation of 'demystifying' 
artworks with political progressiveness and opposes Brecht's 
reliance on the 'use-value' of the artwork as adequate criticism 
of commodified art. Both theorists imputed a neutrality to 
mechanized technics (whereas Adorno viewed this as a renewed 
mythologisation) and ignored the critical potential of specifically 
artistic technics in contrast to mass cultural technics. Adorno's 
'Über Epische Naivität' (G. S. 11, pp. 34-40) discusses this point. 
For discussions of this difference between Adorno, Benjamin and 
Brecht see Susan Buck-Morss, op cit; Michael Scharang, Zur Emanzi- 
pation der Kunst, (Neuwied/Berlin, 1971), and Lienhard Wawrzyn, 
Walter Benjamins Kunsttheorie, (Neuwied/Berlin, 1973). 
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33. Philosophie der neuen Musik, (Frankfurt/M., 1978). Originally pub- 
lished in 1958, it was completed in 1948.. The first half, dealing 
with Schönberg, was written between 1940 and 1941, hence its inclusion 
here. The only analysis Adorno undertook of what art had to be if it 
were to counter the challenge of state capitalism is to be found here. 
The findings on Schönberg's music must be considered to hold true for 
the avant-garde in general, for Adorno ascribed a paradigmatic charac- 
ter to the former's music. 
34. Philosophie der neuen Musik, p. 52ff. Adorno speaks of a 'Durchorganis- 
ation der Elemente", of "totale Durchführung" and of "die integrale 
Organisation des Kunstwerks. " 
35. See Philosophie der neuen Musik, p. 118 where Adorno states of radical 
modern art: "Sie ist keine Ideologies mehr. Darin kommt sie, in ihrer 
Abseitigkeit, mit einer großen gesellschaftlichen Veränderung überein. 
In der gegenwärtigen Phase, in der der Produktions- und der Beherrsch- 
ungsapparat miteinander verschmolzen werden, beginnt die Frage nach 
der Vermittlung von Überbau und Unterbau - gleich allen gesellschaft- 
lichen Vermittlungen - insegesamt zu veraltern. " 
36. ibid, p. 119. 
Chapter 5 
1. 'Philosophie und kritische Theorie', ZfS, VI, 1937. 
2. See Morton Schoolman, op cit, for a close study of Marcuse's existent- 
ialism. 
3. See Helmut Dubiel, op cit, p. 97. 
4. See Morton Schoolman, op cit, Chapters 1 and 2 for a detailed discus- 
sion of the two texts. 
5. ZfS, 111,1934. 
6. ibid, p. 174. 
7. ibid, p. 191. 
B. The essays for the ZfS/SPSS were: 
Der Kampf gegen den Liberalisums in der 
totalitären Staatsauffassung US, III, 1934 
Zum Begriff des Wesens ZfS, V, 1936 
Über den affirmativen Charakter 
der Kultur US, VI, 1937 
Philosophie und kritische Theorie ZfS, VI, 1937 
Zur Kritik des Hedonismus ZfS, VII, 1938 
An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy ZfS, VIII, 1939-40 
Some Social Implications of Modern 
Technology SPSS, IX, 1941 
9. See David Held's discussion of this point, op cit, p. 244ff. 
10. ZfS, V, 1936, p. 26. 
11. His work for the Institut publication AF follows this course, as he 
provided a history of ideas section on the notion of authority. 
12. This obersvation not only reflects Horkheimer's influence but also 
points forward to his last essay for the SPSS. 
13. KG. 1, pp. 112 - 113. 
14. See Helmut Dubiel, op cit, for an elaboration. 
15. Horkheimer Archive, printed with kind permission of the custodians. 
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16. in TT, p. 149. 
17: K. G. II, p. 63. 
18. ibid, p. 82. The plural use of 'authoritarian state' indicates its 
applicability to both East and West. 
19. ibid, p. 82. 
20. ibid, p. 64. 
21. See Jürgen Habermas, 'Bewußtmachende oder rettende Kritik - die 
Aktualität Walter Benjamins' (in Siegfried Unseld (ed), Zur Aktualität 
Walter Benjamins, Frankfurt/M., 1972). 
22. Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk, originally published in French in the 
ZfS, V, 1936. 
23. See Jürgen Habermas, op cit, pp. 183 - 184. Habermas' view that Marcuse 
wished to prepare a change in the relations governing life (p. 185) by 
exposing the sich-fulfilment embodied in art ignores this connection 
to the present state of totalitarianism and is thus somewhat over- 
simplified. This is not to deny the validity of Habermas' implicit 
analysis of the concepts of interest and happiness in Marcuse's 
concept of culture. 
24. See ibid, p. 182. 
25. 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', p. 421. 
26. ibid, p. 437. 
27. This makes Dubiel's argument, referred to in footnote 3, inaccurate. 
28. VR, (Neuwied, Berlin, 1977) pp. 24 - 25. 
29. Jürgen Habermas, op cit, p. 185. 
30. Lecture delivered at Columbia University, 1942. Quoted by Adorno in 
Prismen (Frankfurt/M., 1955), pp. 135 - 136. 
Chapter 6 
1. In 'Introduction to Löwenthal Tribute' (Telos, 45, Fall 1980). 
2. ' Individuum und Gesellschaft im Naturalismus' quoted from Notizen 
(Stuttgart, 1975). In the introduction to this book Löwenthal says 
the essay was written in the late 1930s. In a letter to me he says 
that it was not printed in the ZfS because parts were incorporated in 
his Ibsen essay (see below, footnote 10), meaning that it was written 
before 1936. 'Die Biographische Mode' Mss. 1938, quotations from 
Sociologica (eds. Th. W. Adorno and Walter Dirks, Frankfurt/M., 1974, 
2nd edition) a shortened version that contains all the substantial 
points. The essays were 
Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur ZfS, I, 1932 
Conrad Ferdinand Meyers heroische 
Geschichtsauffasung ZfS, II, 1933 
Das Zugtier und Sklaverei ZfS, II, 1933 
Die Auffassung Dostojewskis im 
Vorkriegsdeutschland ZfS, III, 1934 
Das Individuum in der individualistischen 
Gesellschaft ZfS, V, 1936 
Knut Hamsun. Zur Vorgeschichte der 
autoritären Ideologie ZfS, VI, 1937. 
3. 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage... ' is the only completely theoretical 
essay from which his methodology can be drawn. 
4. 'Die Aufassung... ', p. 343. 
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5. Notizen, p. 44. 
6. 'Conrad Ferdinand Meyers... '. 
7. 'Die Auffassung... '. 
8. ibid, p. 357. 
9. ibid, p. 362. 
10. It could thus be said that a certain psychologism lies at the heart 
of Löwenthal's sociology of literature. 
11. 'Das Individuum... '. 
12. ibid, p. 37.. 
13. ibid, p. 11. 
14. 'Knut Hamsun... ' . 
15. ; Die Biographische Mode'. It was not published in the ZfS because many 
of the authors discussed were Jewish refugees at the time. To have 
exposed their innate authoritarianism would have been in somewhat bad 
taste. 
16. ibid, p. 381. 
17. In this respect Löwenthal's work resembles that of Lucien Goldmann, 
who detected a parallelism between class ideology and literature (he 
termed this 'genetic structuralism'). 
18. See footnote 4. Goldmann's opinion that Löwenthal informs only about 
society,, not about literature (quote in Robert Sayre, 'Löwenthal, Cold- 
mann-and the Sociology of Literature', Telos, 45, Fall, 1980) and Sayre's 
assertion that Löwenthal elucidates social but not literary phenomena 
are both questionable if Löwenthal's use of two levels of analysis 
is kept in ming. Phil Slater's proposition (op cit, p. 119) that Löwen- 
thal never questions "the effects of that work within its s ciety", 
would appear, in the light of our discussion, to be completely unfoun- 
ded. David Gross raises a more serious point in his essays 'Löwenthal, 
Adorno, Barther: Three Perspectives on Popular Culture' (Telos, 45, 
Fall, 1980). Although approving of the historical dimesnion in Löwen- 
thal's work, hr questions whether literature is indeed a key to society 
19. Alfred Schmidt, op cit, p. 38. 
20. Join Hall, The Sociology of Literature (London, 1979, p. 48). 
21. Goldmann, Gross and Sayre all take this to be the case, so one must 
conclude that they assume all analyses of content for ideology are 
implicitly sociological and not aesthetic in character. I shall take 
up this argument in Chapter 11. 
22. Alfons Söllner, op cit, p. 19. 
Chapter 7. 
1. This mimeographed edition was circulated only privately and included 
the sole published version at the imte of Benjamin's 'Theses on the 
Philosophy of History'. 
2. Der Stratege im Literaturkampf: zur Literaturwissenschaft, (ed. H ella 
Tiedemann-Barthels, Frankfurt/M., 1972). 
3. The quote given to support this claim is out of context and in context 
does not support the assertion. The Horkheimer letter referred to is 
not in the Horkheimer Archive correspondence between the two, and a 
letter of the 6th of September, 1938 gives quite a different impression 
The latter letter suggest the Conference was only a meeting to be held 
between Institut(e) members and Benjamin. 
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4. Briefe, Vol. 2, p. 723. 
5. These are said to be housed in the Institut(e) Archives in Montagnola, 
Switzerland. 
6. Briefe, Vol. 2, p. 843. 
7. Letter from Horkheimer to Benjamin contained in the Horkheimer Archive 
and quoted with kind permission of the custodians. 
8. Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriftenl Frankfurt/M., 1977, p. 788. 
9. Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin, p. 266. 
10. Julian Roberts, op cit, pp. 2 - 5, and 70 - 75. 
11. It hinged on articles published in the Berlin journal Alternative. See 
Chapter 1, footnote 13. 
12. Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften II, pp. 798 - 9. In a recently 
published book Walter Benjamin und der Rundfunk (Munich, 1984) Sabine 
Schiller-Lerg has shown just how involved in cultural production Ben- 
jamin in fact was. The book documents and analyses the numerous radio 
plays and broadcasts Benjamin made. 
13. Briefe, Vol. 2, p. 665, to Adorno, 31st of May, 1935. 
14. See the discussion in Buck-Morss, op cit; Roberts, op cit and Wolin, 
op cit. 
15. See Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 19, (Frankfurt/M., 1967) 
p. 387. 
16. Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften III, p. 471. 
17. Briefe, Vol. 2, p. 785. 
18. ibid, p. 785. 
19. Quoted from Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire (Frankfurt/M., 1969)p. 149. 
20. Wolin, op cit, p. 178ff. 
21. ibid, p. 266. 
22. Roberts, op cit, p. 196ff. 
23. Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften I, p. 1225. 
24. Peter Sloterdijk's Kritik der zynischen Vernunft takes this remark 
(discussed by Benjmain in Das Kunstwerk, p. 74ff) as its starting point, 
without, however, mentioning Benjamin's original discussion of it. 
25. Das Kunstwerk, p. 76. 
26. Letter in the Horkheimer Archive, quoted with kind permission of the 
custodians. 
27. Das Kunstwerk, p. 69. 
28. ibid, p. 69. 
29. ibid, p. 70. 
30. ibid, p. 71. 
31. in Versuche über Brecht (Frankfurt/M., 1966). 
32. See Schiller-Lerg, op cit, for a descirption og Benjamin's personal 
experiences as a producer. 
33. Briefe, Vol. 2, p. 785. 
34. Löwenthal's 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur', for example, 
and Benjamin's . 
Literaturgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft' (1932 
and 1931 respectively) have a great deal in common. 
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Chapter 8 
1. I shall omit any discussion of the Studies in Prejudice for it was 
written both later and by a larger group of authors. Horkheimer's 
later work - largely a collection of-essays - will also not be 
discussed, primarily because it has no bearing on aesthetics, 
but additionally because Horkheimer changes his view of society 
quite radically in the post-War period. 
2. Dialektik der Aufklärung, (Amsterdam, 1947 and Frankfurt/M., 1971). 
Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, (Frankfurt/M., 1967), 
Minima Moralia, (Frankfurt/M., 1951). 
3. Anselm Skuhra, Max Horkheimer, Stuttgart, 1974. He suggests 
(p. 54 ff. ) that Adorno wrote the Exkurs I, and the chapter on 
the culture industry. Furthermore, he notes that Kritik der 
instrumentellen Vernunft is based on a series of lectures held 
at Columbia University from 1944 to 1945 on work done with Adorno. 
Jürgen Habermas suggests in his essay 'Die Verschlingung vom Mythos 
und Aufklärung' (in Karl Heinz Bohrer (ed) Mythos und Moderne, 
(Frankfurt/M., 1983, p. 405) that the Dialektik der Aufklärung is 
based on notes taken by Gretel Adorno of discussions between her 
husband and Horkheimer. 
4. Minima Moralia, pp. 11-12. 
5. Dialektik can safely be assumed to be the projected book on 
dialectics Adorno and Horkheimer had wished to co-author in the 
early 1930s. Work on the book, if not on paper, then at least in 
mind, commenced in 1938. Horkheimer wrote to Benjamin on 6.9.1938: 
"Ich selbst habe dabei die längst geplante Arbeit über Dialektik 
im Sinne" and this with reference to Benjamin's 'Fuchs' essay, 
showing once more the relation between that essay, TT, and 
Dialektik (Letter in Horkheimer Archive, printed with kind 
permission of the custodians). Dialektik is dedicated to Pollock 
the occasion of his 50th birthday. Among the drafts of the book 
in the Horkheimer Archive there are some dating from 1939 or a 
purely economic nature. These coincide with Horkheimer's work on 
the 'Autoritärer Staat' article. 
6. For the former point see Andräs Gedö in Johannes v. Heiseler (ed). 
Die Frankfurter Schule im Lichte des Marxismus, (Frankfurt/M., 
1970): Michael Landmann's introduction to Tar, op cit; and Slater, 
op cit. For the latter point see Trent Schroyer, The Critique of 
Domination, (New York, 1973), and Skuhra, op cit. 
7. See Therborn, op cit; Landmann, op cit; Connerton, op cit; and 
Heinz Matzat's review of Dialektik in Philosophischer Literatur- 
anzeiger, Vol. 1, H. 1, Oct. 1949. 
8. Dialektik, p. 1. 
9. ibid, p. 5, see pages 12 and 14 for identical statements, 
terminologically speaking. 
10. Kritik, p. 125, see also p. 104 ff. and Dialektik, pages 32 and 99. 
11. . Dialektik, p. 51. 
12. ibid, p. 15. 
13. ibid, p. 12; see p. 39, my italics. 
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14. see ibid, p. 16. 
15. ibid, p. 10. 
16. ibid, p. 18. 
17. see Kritik, p. 19. 
18. Dialektik, pp. 27 - 28. 
19. see ibid, p. 23. 
20. Kritik, p. 33. 
21. Therborn, (op cit, p. 82) states erroneously that 'The main 
offender is not the market and the relations of production, but 
the natural sciences and their empiricist counterpart in epistemo- 
logy. " His suggestion is related to his equally inaccurate critique 
of the Frankfurt School, which rests on his assertion of their 
'un-scientific' (sic) approach. 
22. see Dialektik, p. 84. 
23. see ibid, p. 85. 
24. ibid, p. 94. 
25. ibid, p. 109. 
26. Kritik, p. 84. 
27. Dialektik, p. 77; see also pages 75 and 76 and Kritik, p. 19. 
28. see Kritik, p. 61. 
29. ibid, p. 34; see also p. 74. 
30. Dialektik, p. 204. 
31. Kritik, p. 94. 
32. This is argued by Michael Theunissen, Gesellschaft und Geschichte, 
(Berlin, 1969, p. 18 ff. ); by Walter Jopke in (v. Heiseler, op cit, 
p. 55) and by Landmann, (op cit, p. XIV). All consider this point 
to encapsulate the 'essence' of the dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Alfons Söllner, (op cit, p. 190), remarks more pertinently of the 
critique of domination "In ihr wird der systematische Bezugspunkt 
greifbar, von dem her die gesamte Nachkriegsentwicklung der Frank- 
furter Schule und das für sie repräsentative Spätwerk vor allem 
Adornos verstanden werden muß. " 
33. See Chapter 10. 
34. See Minima Moralia's sub-title. 
35. ibid, p. 86; the concluding pages of 'Begriff der Aufklärung' in 
Dialektik bear this in mind in their construction, as does the 
semi-independence of the chapters of Dialektik from one another. 
36. See Kritik, p. 157. 
37. Minima Moralia, p. 57. 
38. Dialektik, p. 191; see also Minima Moralaa, pages 16,22,24,32 
and 58. 
39. Minima Moralia, p. 42. 
40. Dialektik, p. 169. 
41. See Minima Moralia, pp. 90 - 91. 
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42. See Dialektik, p. 173. 
43. See Kritik, p. 173; see also Dialektik, p. 278. 
44. Minima Moralia, p. 333. 
45. See Dubiel, op'cit, p. 100. 
46. Letter in Horkheimer Archive, printed with kind permission of the 
custodians. 
47. Letter in Horkheimer Archive, printed with kind permission of the 
custodians. 
48. Dialektik, p. 30. Connerton is thus mistaken (op cit, p. 131) in 
claiming that there is no precise connection between technology 
and economy established in the Dialektik. 
49. Skuhra (op cit, p. 67) relates in a vague fashion the ideology 
of the whole to the loss of the circulatory sphere. 
50. Dialektik, p. 79. 
51. ibid, p. 94. This point refutes Dubiel's proposal (op cit, p. 112) 
that political domination is regarded as no longer mediated with 
the economy. 
52. Dialektik, p. 188. 
53. See ibid, p. 194. 
54. Kritik, p. 101. 
55. Dialektik, p. 183. 
56. Gerd-Walter Küsters, Der Kritikbegriff der kritischen Theorie Max 
Horkheimers, (Frankfurt/M., 1980), p. 109 omits mention of this. 
Küsters' book provides a very detailed and otherwise thorough 
discussion of the philosophical premises of the Dialektik. Jopke, 
op cit, p. 51; Dubiel, op cit, p. 113 and Schroyer, op cit, p. 136 
all provide analyses that miss this point. 
57. Dialektik, p. 29. 
58. Connerton (op cit, pp. 127 - 128) proposes mistakenly that Adorno 
does not see commodity exchange historically. Connerton himself 
fails to see Dialektik historically, i. e. what it addressed itself 
to. 
59. This is the reason behind Lukäcs belief that the proletariat 
formed the subject and object of history, and thus innately 
possessed a knowledge of the truth of society. 
60. See Minima Moralia, p. 8. 
61. See Dialektik, p. 58 "Radikale Vergesellschaftung heißt radikale 
Entfremdung. " 
62. ibid, p. 36. 
63. See Minima Moralia, p. 286. 
64. Jürgen Habermas has argued decisively (in Bohrer, op cit, pages 
412 and 415 respectively) that because of this "Die Dialektik 
wird dem vernünftigen Gehalt der kulturellen Moderne, der in dem 
bürgerlichen Idealen festgehalten/... /worden ist, nicht gerecht. " 
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and that as a consequence, that book "verselbständigt der 
Kritik noch gegenüber den eigenen Grundlagen. Habermas takes 
this point as indicative of the Dialektik's indebtedness to 
Nietzsche's philosophy of power. 
65. Kritik, p. 133. 
66. ibid, p. 96; see also pages 97 - 100. 
67. Dubiel (in Bonß, op cit, p. 470) has tried to outline this 
staticism by situating it in a change in Adorno and Horkheimer's 
concept of culture that follows from this figure of thought. 
Culture, he claims, is no longer based in the mode of production 
of a particular historical epoch, but forms the "gesamte Kultur- 
geschichte der abendländischen Zivilisation. " We have seen, 
however, that such a change in the concept of culture does indeed 
involve a particular historical epoch in terms of an illustration 
of that culture's most dire form. However, the change in the concept 
of culture leads to a devastating change in the concept of ideology, 
which is no longer metaphysical and real, as it had been for Marx, 
but real in that it informs the whole life-world. 
68. Dialektik, p. 166. 
69. See Minima Moralia, p. 11, and Dialektik pages 11,168,176 and 198. 
70. It is consequently questionable whether 'objective reason' can be 
posited in individuality, as Adorno and Horkheimer seem to think 
it can. 
71. See Kritik, p. 145; Dialektik, pages 40,50,70 and 77, and Billig, 
op cit, for an excellent discussion of the psychoanalytical 
positions of the Frankfurt School. 
72. I shall outline this indebtedness only rudimentarily, since any 
more extensive discussion would lie beyond the bounds of my 
project. The concepts of remembrance, mimesis and suffering will 
be treated in detail in the next chapter. 
73. Kritik, p. 125. 
74. Dialektik, p. 51; see also pages 40,51 and 168. 
75. See ibid, pp. 94 - 95. 
76. See Kritik, pp. 105 - 110 and p. 113. 
77. See Dialektik, pages 72 and 20. 
78. See Kritik, p. 135. - 
79. See Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. 1, 
Frankfurt/M., 1981, p. 461 ff. ) for a reduction of Horkheimer's 
theory of individuality to a Weberfan model of internalisation. 
80. See Billig, op cit, p. 98 and p. 100 ff. 
81. See Dialektik, p. 182 and Kritik, p. 118. 
82. See Bonß, op cit, p. 409. 
83. Dialektik, p. 33. 
84. ibid, p. 15. 
85. ibid, p. 39. 
86. loc cit. 
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87. See Söllner, op cit, p. 194; Küsters, op cit. pages 96,98 and 
115; and Connerton, op cit, p. 75 for three other interpretations 
of this confounding of individual and social domination. 
88. For this and the following point I am grateful for discussions 
with Michael Billig. 
89. Marcuse adheres more strictly to Freud's own projection of 
history in terms of a linear development of the ego and of 
phylogeny as an expression of this in collective terms. 
90. See Russell Jacoby's review article (Theory and Society, I, 1974), 
where he argues that domination as a category complements the 
notion of class conflict. 
91. See, in particular, Kiisters, op cit, p. 124. 
92. Thus I cannot agree with Habermas' view (in Bohrer, op cit, 
p. 417) that Adorno and Horkheimer conceived of a symbiosis of 
production forces and relations. 
93. See Dialektik, p. 110. 
94. ibid, p. 108. 
95. ibid, p. 110. 
96. ibid, p. 119. 
97. ibid, p. 120. 
98. ibid, p. 118, my italics 
99. ibid, p. 108. 
100. See ibid, p. 149. 
101. ibid, p. 115. 
102 ibid, p. 110. 
103. ibid, p. 113. 
104. See ibid, p. 133. 
105. ibid, p. 112. 
106. ibid, pages 117 and 31; see also Minima Moralia, p. 267. 
107. See Küsters, op cit, p. 131 ff. -for a detailed discussion of this. 
108. Dialektik, pages 127 and 132; see also Kritik, pp. 149 - 151 and 
p. 136. 
109. Dialektik, p. 133. 
110. ibid, p., 136, my italics. 
111. See ibid, p. 143. 
112. ibid, p. 123. 
113. See loc cit. 
114. ibid, p. 131. 
115. See loc cit. 
116. Minima Moralia, p. 187. 
117. Dialektik, p. 114, my italics. 
118. See Slater, op cit, p. 135 "The analysis of manipulation is 
highly incisive. " 
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119. See Dialektik, p. 123. 
120. Minima Moralia, p. 267. 
121. Dialektik, p. 120. 
122. ibid, pp. 128 - 129. 
123. ibid, p. 130. 
124. ibid, p. 141. 
125. Benjamin, having detected this loss of 'aura', did not draw the 
same conclusions from it. Far from damaging mass society, he felt 
that the technology it created could lead to positive forms of 
art. See Chapter 7. 
126. Dialektik, p. 142. 
127. ibid, p. 142. 
128. ibid, p. 145. 
129. ibid, p. 145. 
130. See ibid, p. 144. 
131. ibid, p. 147. 
132. See Küsters, op cit, p. 131. 
133. Dialektik, p. 110. 
134. ibid, p. 135. Peter U. Hohendahl ('Critical Theory, the Public 
Sphere and Culture", New German Critique, 16,1979, p. 90) 
remarks "The theory of the culture industry remained abstract 
insofar as it assumed the existence and influence of organized 
capitalism without demonstrating it materialistically. " 
135. Dialektik, p. 150. 
136. See ibid, p. 117. 
137: Minima Moralia, p. 75. 
138. See Bonß, op cit, p. 403. 
139. Kritik, p. 167, N. B. It does not create a conceptual understanding 
of it. 
140. This perhaps shows the limits of Freudian theory. 
141. This is a combination of Kantian, Hegelian and Marxist forms of 
critique. 
142. This can be regarded as the paramount reason for the rejection 
of Critical Theory by the student movement in the Federal Republic 
in the late 1960s. 
143. Minima Moralia, p. 22. 
144. i. e. Kritik, p. 167, see footnote 132 above. 
145. Dubiel, op cit, speaks of Adorno and Horkheimer developing a 
hermeneutics of the culture industry that decyphers the true 
condition of society. 
146. Minima Moralia, p. 187. 
147. Dialektik, p. 19. 
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148. See ibid, p. 20. 
149. ibid, p. 20. 
150. ibid, p. 117. 
151. Kritik, p. 47. 
152. ibid, p. 47. 
153. See Minima Moralia, p. 301. 
154. See ibid, pages 159 and 298. 
155. See ibid, pp. 302 - 303. 
156. Dialektik, p. 142; see also p. 224. Skuhra (op cit, p. 65) terms 
this a "versöhnter Bezug zur Realität. " Landmann (op cit, p. XIV) 
for some reason finds this feature particularly objectionable. 
157. Dialektik, pp. 32 - 33. 
158. ibid, pp. 72 - 73, see also p. 125. 
159. ibid, p. 20. 
160. See Slater (op cit, p. 135) for he bases his whole analysis of 
the Frankfurt School aesthetics on this point. 
161. Nazism must therefore be viewed as only of limited importance for 
the genesis of their theory. Many observers place too much emphasis 
on the constitutive role played by Nazism and overlook or cannot 
account for the presence of the USA in the descriptions embodied 
in the chapters on the culture industry and anti-semitism in 
Dialektik. 
162. See Postone and Brick, op cit, for a thorough analysis of this 
point. I am deeply indebted to Moishe Postone for his observations 
on the limitations of Pollockian theory and for the fruitful 
discussions we had on this question. 
163. See Thomas Baumeister and Jens Kulenkampff, 'Geschichtsphilosophische 
und philosophische Ästhetik: Zu Adornos Ästhetische Theorie', 
(Neue Hefte für Philosophie, 5,1973), for an often ignored and 
highly incisive essay relating Dialektik to Adorno's Negative 
Dialektik. 
164. See Marcuse's description of a 'material base beneath the base' 
analysed in Chapter 10. 
165. Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, (Glasgow, 1970, p. 259), The VIIth 
Thesis on the philosophy of history. On the previous page, Benjamin 
stated in a manner reminiscent of and preceding the culture 
industry analysis: "There is no document of civilization which is 
not at the same time a document of barbarism. " Andreas Huyssen 
has recently asserted ('Critical Theory and Modernity', New German 
Critique, 26,1982, p. 5) of the Dialectic: "But it still 
represents one of the best developed, theoretically most 
sophisticated attempts to understand the problems of modernity, 
modernisation, and modernism in a 20th century setting. The 
Frankfurt School's theory (or theories) of modernity can still 
. be productive today in great part because it never 
lost sight of 
the project of mediation, a project which has been all but abandoned 
in recent French interpretations of modernity because of its 
alledgedly totalitarian and metaphysical logic. " 
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Chapter 9 
1. See Baumeister and Kulenkampff, op cit, for a brief attempt to 
relate Adorno's aesthetics and his social theory. 
2. Karl Markus Michel 'Versuche die Ästhetische Theorie zu ver- 
stehen' in Burkhart Lindner & W. Martin Lüdke (eds) Materialien 
zur ästhetischen Theorie T. W. Adornos. Konstruktion der Moderne, 
(Frankfurt/M., 1979) suggests the opposite to be the case. 
3. Günter Figal, T. W. Adorno: das Naturschöne als spekulative 
Gedankenfigur, (Bonn, 1977), rejects the existence of any connection 
between AT and ND. 
4. Baumeister and Kulenkampff, op cit, were the first to suggest 
the possibility of such a relation obtaining. 
5. Noten 2, p. 192. 
6. Christel Beier, Zum Verhältnis von Gesellschaftstheorie und Er- 
kenntnistheorie, (Frankfurt/M., 1977), rejects this socio-theoretical 
basis as does Franz Böckelmann, Über Marx und Adorno, (Frankfurt/M., 
1972). 
7. See his essay on 'Spätkapitalismus oder Industriegesellschaft? ", 
in GK. 
8. See GK, pages 163 and 172. 
9. See Martin Puder, 'Zur Ästhetischen Theorie Adornos', Die neue 
Rundschau, 82,1971, No. 3 and ND, pages 264 and 265. 
10. G. S. 8, pages 125 and 126. 
11. GK, p. 165. 
12. Salmagundi, p. 149; see further G. S. 8, pages 25,39,40 and 161 
as well as Jürgen Kuczynski and Wolfgang Heise, Bild und Begriff, 
(Berlin and Weimar, 1975). 
13. Prismen, p. 327; see also p. 339 and Burkhart Lindner 'Brecht, 
Benjamin, Adorno' in Text und Kritik, Sonderband Brecht, (Munich, 
1972) and 'Herrschaft als Trauma'(in Text und Kritik, Adorno, 
Munich, 1977). 
14. See Prismen, p. 329. 
15. G. S. 8, p. 175; see pages 172 and ND, p. 359. 
16. The essays in Winfried Schoeller Die neue Linke nach Adorno, 
(Munich, 1979), all try to deny this last point. 
17. ND, p. 15; see further pages 73, 74, 93,95,219,262,301,309, 
341 and 349 in particular. 
18. ibid, p. 17. 
19. See ibid, p. 159. 
20. ibid, p. 314. Remarks on this subject can also be found in 
Traugott Koch, 'Negativität und Versöhnung' Philosophisches Jahr- 
buch, (78,1971, No. 2); Thomas Mirbach, Kritik und Herrschaft, 
(Frankfurt/M., 1979); and Günter Wohlfart, 'Anmerkungen zur 
ästhetischen Theorie Adornos' in Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und 
allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, Vol. 22,1977, No. 1). 
21. Friedrich Tomberg, 'Utopie und Negation', Das Argument, (26,1963), 
bases his whole critique on this. 
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22. ND, p. 185; see further pages 187 and 193. 
23. See ibid, p. 385 "Nichtig ist Denken, welches das Gedachte mit 
Wirklichem verwechselt. " 
24. ibid, p. 55. 
25. ibid, p. 36. 
26. See ibid, p. 57. 
27. ibid, p. 164. 
28. ibid, p. 322. 
29. ibid, p. 99. 
30. See ibid pages 117 and 292 - 293. 
31. See ibid, p. 133. 
32. ibid, pp. 148 - 149. 
33. ibid, p. 341. 
34. ibid, p. 229. 
35. See Beyer (Wilhelm), op cit, who makes this equation of thought 
a praxis the sole focus of his critique. 
36. ND, p. 230; see ibid, p. 266. 
37. ND, p. 384, see Devra L Davis, 'T. W. Adorno: Theoretician through 
Negations', Theory and Society, (Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 1975); and 
No Frenzel 'Kritik und Verheißung', (Frankfurter Hefte, 2,1956). 
38. See ND, pages 346 and 367. 
39. See Über T. W. Adorno, with contributions by Kurt Oppens et al, 
(Frankfurt/M., 1968). 
40. See ND, pages 396 and 397. 
41. This contradicts W. Martin Lüdke's conclusions in Anmerkungen zu 
einer Logik des Zerfalls, (Frankfurt/M., 1981). 
42. See ND, pages 396 and 397. 
43. ibid, p. 396. 
44. Friedemann Grenz's Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen, (Frank- 
furt/M., 1974) would be an example of this fault. 
45. Norbert Bolz, Geschichtsphilosophie des Ästhetischen, (Hildesheim, 
1979). 
46. See G. S. 11, p. 25. 
47. See ibid, p. 32. 
48. See ibid, p. 18. 
49. See Schoeller, op cit, p. 91. 
50. Carl Dahlhaus, 'Musik und Gesellschaft', (Deutsche Universitäts- 
zeitung, 7,1953, p. 1195). 
51. Tichy, op cit, p. 134; and Martin Puder, 'Adornos Philosophie', 
(Neue Deutsche Hefte, 23,1976, pp. 3- 11). 
52. Karol Sauerland, Einführung in die Ästhetik Adornos, (Berlin, 1979). 
53. See AT, p. 11. 
54. See OL, pp. 186 - 187. 
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55. Noten 2, p. 164. 
56. See OL, p. 177. 
57. Noten 2, p. 43. 
58. See AT, pages 529 and 532. 
59. AT, p. 531. 
60. ibid, p. 397. 
61. See ibid, p. 406. 
62. See ibid, p. 528. 
63. See ibid, p. 513. 
64. See ibid, p. 19. 
65. See ibid, p. 313. 
66. ibid, p. 345. 
67. See ibid, p. 26. 
68. ibid, p. 428. 
69. See ibid, p. 188. 
70. G. S. 11, p. 425. 
71. See Kenyon Review, 7,1945, p. 680. 
72. Both Michel (op cit, p. 96) and Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, 
(Frankfurt/M., 1974, p. 83) criticize this equation. 
73. See Grenz, op cit, p. 14 and Manfred Jablinski, 'A. W. Adornos 'Kritische 
Theorie' als Literatur- und Kunstkritik, (Bonn, 1976, p. 83). 
74. See G. S. 11, p. 333. 
75. Noten 2, p. 162. 
76. See Noten 2, p. 162. Burkhart Lindner, 'Il faut etre absolutement 
moderne', in Lindner/Lüdke, op cit, p. 273 establishes that for 
Adorno the Modern is equatable with autonomous art. 
77. See ibid, pp. 49 - 50. 
78. AT, p. 39. 
79. See Prismen, p. 190. 
80. G. S. 11, p. 70. 
81. Lindner/Lüdke (op cit, p. 27) take this as the reason for Adorno's 
reconstruction of the Modern. Peter Bürger (op cit, pp. 83 - 84) 
has argued that Adorno's notion of modernity and the avantgarde 
is derived from a study of Schönberg and the Surrealists and that, 
as a consequence, it presents a lop-sided view of the Modern. 
Kaiser (op cit, p. 339) criticizes Adorno for he judges Adorno 
to use no other chronomology than that dating the Modern. 
82. AT, p. 9. 
83. GK, p. 65. 
84. Prismen, p. 223. 
85. G. S. 11, p. 425. 
86. See ibid, p. 505. 
87. AT, p. 209. 
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88. See OL, p. 45. 
89. AT, p. 370. 
90. See Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 228. 
91. See AT, p. 141. 
92. See ibid, pages 133 and 251. 
93. OL, p. 11. 
94. AT, p. 216. 
95. Noten 2, p. 164. 
96. G. S. 11, p. 436. 
97. AT, p. 287. ' 
98. ND, p. 165. 
99. Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 238. 
100. See AT, pages 317 and 322. 
101. Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 230. 
102. See G. S. 11, p. 98. 
103. See AT, p. 168 and G. S. 11, p. 14. 
104. Berman (op cit, p. 166) refers to this as the "underlying 
productivism" of Adorno's work. 
105. See AT, p. 85 and OL, p. 174. 
106. G. S. 8, p. 138. 
107. Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 232. 
108. See Prismen, p. 168. 
109. This contradicts the conception of Schoeller et al, op cit, 
pages 47,49,50 and 81 in particular. 
110. Peter Burger 'Das Vermittlungsproblem in der Kunstsoziologie 
Adornos' (in Lindner/Lüdke, op cit, p. 172) examines this loss 
of specificity in details. 
111. Kaiser (op cit, pages 316 and 318) has maintained erroneously 
that the two are equated with each other by Adorno. 
112. See Jürgen Fredelp'Kunst als Produktivkraft' (in Michael Müller 
et al, Autonomie der Kunst, Frankfurt/M., 1972, p. 251) for a 
detailed discussion of this problem. 
113. Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 239. 
114. G. S. 11, pp. 47 - 48. 
115. OL, p. 97; see further Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 238. 
116. See G. S. 11, p. 439 and Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 230. 
117. See G. S. 11, p. 120 and Prismen, p. 203. 
118. G. S. 11, p. 421. 
119. 'Jablinski (op cit, p. 169) misunderstands Adorno's position, in 
that he views ideology critique and immanent criticism as both 
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inform the other. 
120. AT, p. 93. 
121. Susan Buck-Morss, 'T. W. Adorno', (Salmagundi, 36, Winter 1977, p. 91) 
claims the opposite to hold true for Adorno's writings. 
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122. See Adorno's essay on Valery: 'Der Artist als Statthalter', 
1953, G. S. 11. 
123. Marc Jiminez, 'Theorie. Critique et Theorie de t'art', (Revue 
d'esthetigue, 1975, No. 1/2, pages 150 and 156) criticizes 
this point for being paradoxical. 
124. Noten 2, p. 168. 
125. AT, p. 374; see further Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie, p. 240. 
126. See GK, p. 56. 
127. See G. S. 11, p. 51. Adorno states: "Kunstwerke jedoch haben ihre 
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128. ibid, pp. 63 - 64. 
129. See AT, p. 128. 
130. ibid, p. 154. 
131. Hartmut Scheible, 'Geschichte im Stillstand: zur Ästhetischen 
Theorie T. W. Adornos', (in Text und Kritik, Adorno, Munich, 1977, 
p. 96) for a discussion of this point. 
132. AT, p. 131. 
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134. See ibid, pp. 89 - 93 and AT, p. 47. 
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137. G. S. 11, p. 11. 
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141. OL, p. 107. 
142. See AT, p. 428. 
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meister & Kulenkampff (op cit) stress the opposition of natural 
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156. AT, p. 104. 
157. See Figal (op cit, p. 89) for the connection of this image to 
the artwork's appearance. 
158. AT, pp. 86 - 87. 
159. See ibid, p. 86 and page 325. 
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168. Figal (op cit, p. 60) takes this to signify that mimesis depicts 
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-418- 
187. See Eingriffe, p. 73. 
188. See ibid, p. 70. 
189. Prismen, p. 161. 
190. See G. S. 10.2, pages 647 and 651. 
191. Prismen, p. 149. 
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Chapter 10 
1. Jürgen Habermas, 'Psychic Thermidor', (in Berkeley Journal of 
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Issue on Herbert Marcuse, 1979).. 
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Chapter 11 
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Neuwied/3erlin, 1964, p. 43 and p. 221: and 'Terror's Atomization... ', 
pages 4,5 and 7. 
8. See Speech in 'Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature, p. 14. 
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14. op cit, p. 327 ff. 
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17. op cit, p. 14. 
18. Literatur, p. 248. 
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20. Mitmachen, p. 171. 
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46. op cit, p. 216. 
47. op cit, p. 224. 
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49. Mitmachen, p. 175. 
50. Bild, p. 23 and Schriften 2, p. 18. 
51. Schriften 2, p. 7. 
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55. Erzählkunst, p. 167. 
56. Schriften 2, p. 8. 
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63. Literatur, p. 12. 
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65. See Yearbook, p. 16 and Schriften 1, p. 355. 
66. Yearbook, p. 16 and 'Debatte... ', p. 172. 
67. 'Das Problem... ', p. 26. 
68. op cit, p. 29. 
69. Literatur, p. 20 ff. 
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72. op cit, p. 31. 
73. See, op cit, p. 33 and Gross, op cit, p. 126. 
74. op cit, p. 178. 
75. 'A Historical ... ', p. 32. 
76. Mitmachen, p. 278. 
77. 'Das Problem... ', p. 30, see Agitation und Ohnmacht, pp. 70 - 71. 
78. Mitmachen, p. 190 for the difference between 'mass' and 'popular' 
culture, and the 'culture industry', see Adorno in OL, p. 60. 
79. Notizen zur Literatursoziologie, p. 92. 
80. 'Historical Perspectives', p. 332. 
81. 'A Historical', p. 33. 
82. 'Historical Perspectives', p. 331. 
83. Literatur, p. 26. 
84. Dubiel claims the opposite, Mitmachen, p. 174. 
85. Notizen, p. 90 and p. 101 respectively. 
86. Literatur, pp. 168 - 169. 
87. Sayre, op cit, p. 156. 
88. See Schriften 1, pp. 360 - 361. 
89. Literatur, pp. 271 - 272. 
90. 'Historical Perspectives', p. 326. 
91. Dubiel, op cit, p. 181 ff. takes this to be the difference between 
Löwenthal and Adorno (see Literatur, p. 26 ff. ) 
92. See Gross, op cit, p. 138. 
93. for example Literatur, p. 143, Bild, p. 218, and see Literatur, 
p. 190. 
94. e. g. 'A Historical', p. 31. 
95. See Yearbook, p. 16 ff. 
96. Sayre, op cit, p. 155. 
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Chapter 12 
1. Kaltenbrunner, op cit, p. 155 ff. 
2. Holz, op cit, pages 24 and 26. 
3. Andrew, op cit, p. 250 ff. 
4. Böckelmann 'Die Möglichkeit ist die Unmöglichkeit', (in Schoeller, 
op cit, p. 18 ff. ). 
5. Konrad Boehmer 'Adorno, Musik und Gesellschaft' (in Schoeller, op 
cit, p. 123). 
6. op cit, p. 126. 
7. John Fry Marcuse; Dilemma and Liberation, (Stockholm, 1974, p. 155). 
8. Landmann, op cit, p. xxii and p. xx. 
9. Beier, op cit, p. 99. 
10. Held, op cit, p. 373. 
11. Connerton, op cit, p. 131 ff. 
12. op cit, pp. 127 - 128. 
13. Skuhra, op cit, p. 54. 
14. op cit, p. 68. 
15. See Theunissen, op cit; Fredel, op cit and Peter Reichel, 'Verabso- 
lutierte Negation. Zu Adornos Theorie von den Triebkräften der 
gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen, Berlin 1972; and for tacit 
acceptance of this argument, Buck-Morss, op cit, p. 139 and Lindner, 
op cit, p. 27. 
16. Gerd Kaiser, op cit, p. 289. 
17. Jopke, op cit, p. 55. 
18. See Puder, 'Adornos Philosophie'. 
19. Lindner/Lüdke, op cit, p. 19. 
20. Über Th. W. Adorno, p. 84. 
21. Dubiel, Wissenschaftsorganisation, p. 124. 
22. Postone and Brick, 'Critical Pessimism and the Limits of Traditional 
Marxism' (Theory and Society, 11,1982). 
23. The 1983 Adorno Conference at the J. -W. -Goethe University in 
Frankfurt was the last place at which critical opinion aired 
this condemnation of Adorno's aesthetics, with the exception of 
Albrecht Wellmer's lecture. 
24. In a sense the French Deconstructionists' description of the non- 
subjective, non-telic nature of logocentric thought moves in a 
similar direction, while permitting a less precise notion of 
'unfree' communication. ' Habermas, however, tends to ignore 
aesthetics. 
25. Both Trotsky and Benjamin outline these possible conclusions. 
Benjamin's famous version of it in his 'Kunstwerk' essay is 
therefore not as illogical as it may seem, and thus worthy of 
consideration. 
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26. See Gerhard Pasternak, Theoriebildung in der Literaturwissenschaft, 
(Munich, 1975, p. 19 ff. ). 
27. I use the term in the same way as the label 'adequate'. 
28. In Lindner/Lüdke, op cit, pp. 261 --309. 
29. See Lukhcs' essay 'Reportage oder Gestaltung? ' in the Linkskurve. 
30. Werke, (Vol. 4, p. 616), from the essay 'Kunst und objektive 
Wahrheit', 1954. 
31. ibid, p. 629. 
32. Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 10, p. 774. 
33. Wider den mißverstandenen Realismus, (Reinbek/Hamburg, 1958, p. 34 
and p. 45 ff. ). 
34. Werke, (Vol. 4, p. 618, see also p. 621 ff. ). 
35. Robert Scholes, Semiotics and Interpretation, Yale, 1982, p. 20. 
36. Shaw in his Dictionary of Literary Terms, New York, 1972, gives 
the following definition of 'montage'. "A combination of elements 
that forms a unified whole, a single image (see collage). Montage 
is used in literature as a device to establish a theme or create 
an atmosphere through a series of rapidly presented impressions 
or observations /... / The device of montage frequently used by 
writers of impressionism, appears in the interior monologue of 
novels and plays and in motion-pictures and television productions. " 
This definition is somewhat outdated if the concept of montage is 
to be held to embrace much of modern neo-realist writing. Burkhart 
Lindner and Hans Schlichting (in Alternative, 122/23, Oct. -Dec. 
1978) provide a detailed discussion of the concept of montage, 
(pp. 209 - 224), reaching the conclusion that one must move along 
a line drawn between it and Adorno's view of autonomous artistic 
material (p. 224). 
37. In his Walter Benjamin, (London, 1981, p. 141), footnote, Terry 
Eagleton mentions the similarity between Deconstructionism and 
Adorno but pinpoints it only in Adorno's rejection of 'the 
intentionality' of signification' and his 'insistence on the power 
of heterogenous fragments. ' Clearly, the convergence between the 
two bodies of thought needs to be studied more thoroughly, for 
what it might reveal on the nature of both philosophies. 
38. Erich Auerbach, in his (Mimesis, Bern, 1959, p. 507) saw novels 
as having been shown their limits by the advent of the moving 
picture. He thus failed completely to anticipate the extent to which 
the novel would itself undergo transformations to enable it to 
simulate some of the devices used by cinematography, e. g. montage. 
39. See, for example, Peter Chotjewitz, Saumlos, (Königstein, 1980); 
Gerd Fuchs, Stunde Null, (Königstein, 1980); Heinar Kipphardt, 
Bruder Eichmann, (Reinbek/Hamburg, 1983). 
40. This points to a certain connectedness of Brecht and Adorno's 
thought, despite their mutual animosity, and is a topic that 
certainly warrants further investigation for what it might 
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